

**A Study of the Latin American Public
Opinion Project (LAPOP)**

The Political Culture of Democracy in Mexico, Central America and Colombia, 2004



REGIONAL REPORT

- Mitchell A. Seligson
Vanderbilt University





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Mitchell A. Seligson
*Centennial Professor of Political Science
Vanderbilt University*

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Abbreviations

LAPOP Latin American Public Opinion Project

USAID United States Agency for International Development

Executive Summary

This “regional report” is one in a growing series of studies produced by Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), known as OPAL in Spanish. That project, initiated over two decades ago and for many years housed at the University of Pittsburgh, is now hosted by Vanderbilt University, and has received generous support in recent years from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The report compliments eight country-specific studies that were carried out by LAPOP in 2004 in Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia. An additional LAPOP study was carried out in 2004 in Ecuador, and a collaborative project was conducted in the Dominican Republic. A LAPOP study of Bolivia was also carried out in Bolivia in 2004, but the result were not available at the time of the writing of this regional report, so the 2002 Bolivia LAPOP results were used instead. In total, then, this regional report, focuses on eight countries, but makes use of the data from Ecuador, the Dominican Republic for 2004 and Bolivia for 2002.


The study was based on a common questionnaire and sample design, although each country was able to include specialized questions focusing on particular interests of that country. In each of the countries from Mexico to Colombia, the sample size was of 1,500 respondents. In Ecuador and Bolivia, the sample was of 3,000, but for this reported weighted down to match the 1,500 of the other countries. Finally, the Dominican Republic sample was of 4,500, but again weighted down to be the equivalent of only 1,500 respondents. All samples were of multi-stage, stratified probability design, with quotas by age and gender at the level of the household. This regional report examines only a subset of the core items used in each country. The design of both the questionnaire and sample design involved a collective effort, under the overall technical guidance of LAPOP and administrative guidance of ARD, Inc. The individual collaborators and their institutional bases are as follows: for Mexico, Jorge Buendía and Alejandro Moreno, Departamento de Ciencia Política, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM); for Guatemala, Dinorah Azpuru and Juan Pablo Pira, Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales (ASIES); for El Salvador and Honduras, Ricardo Córdova, Fundación Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo (FUNDAUNGO), José Miguel Cruz, Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (IUDOP) de la Universidad Centroamericana, UCA, and Siddhartha Baviskar, University of Pittsburgh; for Nicaragua, Luis Serra and Pedro López Ruiz, Universidad Centroamericana (UCA); for Costa Rica, Luis Rosero-Bixby, Universidad de Costa Rica and Jorge Vargas, Programa Estado de la Nación; for Panamá, Marco A. Gandásegui hijo, Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos (CELA) and Orlando J. Pérez, Central Michigan University; for Colombia, Carlos Lemoine, Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC), and Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, University of Pittsburgh. Polibio Córdova, CEDATOS/Gallup, Ecuador, provided excellent guidance throughout on sample design.

The study was made possible by the generous support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Margaret Sarles, Bruce Kay and Eric Kite in the “Office of Democracy and Governance” of USAID, supported by Maria Barrón in the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, secured the funding and made possible the entire project thanks to their unceasing support. All of the participants in the study are grateful to them, as well as to Todd Amani, USAID/Guatemala, who assumed the role of coordinating the project at the USAID end.


The major conclusions of this regional report are as follows:

- The study included a very broad range of countries in terms of both economic and democratic development. Indicators from the World Bank and the surveys themselves set the context of the study. On the one hand there were, in the regional context, countries like Mexico and Costa Rica with high levels of economic and social development and countries like Nicaragua and Bolivia with very low such levels. Costa Rica represents the extreme end of democratic consolidation among these countries by most world-wide measures, while the other countries have a much more varied experience with democracy. Mexico has just emerged as a democratic country, Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua are post civil war democracies that now enjoy regular free and fair elections, Honduras. Panama is well beyond its years of dictatorship and the U.S. invasion, and now enjoys a country free of a military establishment. Honduras has avoided civil wars and invasions, but cannot free itself from the grip of social underdevelopment. Ecuador and Bolivia have experienced serious challenges to democratic rule in the new millennium, both having seen presidents removed from office while experiencing serious economic downturns and both unable to overcome high levels of poverty. The Dominican Republic, finally, after many years of stable democratic rule, has been rocked by economic crisis and political scandals, and yet has held democratic elections once again.
- The analysis in this regional report focuses on the role of political culture after the national levels of economic and social development have been controlled for. The intra-country variation on democratic values and behaviors was examined in detail in each country report. This regional report compares inter-country variation, but does so after first placing the countries on a level playing field in terms of their economic and social development. Technically, what has been done is to calculate the residual values of the political culture variables after economic and social development, defined by GNP per capita and infant mortality, have been taken into account. That way, when the report notes significant variation among the countries, it can attribute that variation to political culture rather than variations in economic or social development.
- A basic variable included in all studies was that of political legitimacy, defined here in terms of a five-item index of “system support.” Costa Rica scored far above the other countries in the study, even when controlled for economic and social development, being more than one-half a standard deviation higher than the mean. At the other extreme lie Ecuador and Bolivia, with results substantially below the mean for these countries. The Dominican Republic results, which arrived as this report was being finalized, show very low levels of system support. Political tolerance of minority rights is also another key variable in the study. Panama, Nicaragua and Honduras are found to comprise one group with relatively high tolerance. The remaining countries all group closely except for Ecuador, which is substantially lower than the others. The major difference from the individual country studies is that Bolivia’s level of tolerance increases substantially as a result of controls for GNP and infant mortality. This means that part of the explanation of the low levels of tolerance in Bolivia is a function of its economic underdevelopment.


- The study combines the measures of system support and tolerance to produce an overall scale of support for stable democracy. The results, *without controls for economic and social development* are shown in the following figure, where it can be seen that Costa Rica, Mexico and Panama have the highest proportion of their populations with values supportive of stable democracy, while the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Bolivia have the lowest proportions.




- Once controls for economic and social development are introduced, the pattern changes somewhat, as is shown in the figure below. Costa Rica, Mexico and Panama remain the leaders, and Bolivia remains at the bottom, but now Nicaragua is second lowest. These results do not include the Dominican Republic.



- Widespread corruption is increasingly seen as one of the most significant threats to deepening democratization in Latin America (and indeed much of the democratizing Third World). The LAPOP has developed a “corruption victimization” index that measures direct personal experience with corruption at the level of the daily life of citizens. This measure provides results that are sometimes at variance with the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International. As shown in the figure below, the level of corruption victimization is extreme in Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico and the Dominican Republic, but far lower in the other countries in the sample.




- Control variables have an impact on these results, as is shown below. Bolivia and Mexico still have high levels of corruption, but Ecuador’s levels decline, while those of Guatemala increase. Costa Rica and Colombia are lowest, once economic and social development differences are removed from the analysis.




- ❑ Corruption victimization takes its toll on political legitimacy. In each of the countries in the study, the higher the level of corruption victimization, the lower the level of system support expressed by the respondents.
- ❑ In a similar fashion, the survey found that crime victimization lowers system support in each of the countries. Crime victimization has an especially strong impact on lowering trust in the judicial system.
- ❑ The combination of high corruption and high crime make a potent brew that is helping to erode the legitimacy of the political systems in the countries studied.
- ❑ Latin America governments have been attempting to decentralize in order to achieve two objectives. First, there is the widespread belief that local government is efficient government. Large, distant and impersonal central governments are increasingly seen as highly inefficient, being unable to respond to variations in local needs and demands and also more likely to be immune to citizen control and accountability. Second, local governments, by placing control in the hands of the people, may help build democracy from the ground up. The survey data he results are striking since they differ sharply from the picture of democracy at the national level that we have seen thus far in this report. Countries like Costa Rica and Panama, that have been shown to have relatively high levels of democratic values, show low levels of citizen participation in municipal meetings.
- ❑ When controls for national level of development are introduced, the findings become clearer. Robust regression techniques demonstrate that infant mortality, as a measure of national development, has a significant impact on municipal participation. The higher the infant mortality rate the higher the municipal participation, indicating that less developed countries are the ones where local government is more salient to citizens.
- ❑ A different, probably better, perspective can be obtained from examining demand-making. The results are very illuminating. First, they show that Bolivia, the country with the most advanced decentralization program in the region, has the highest level of citizen demand-making. Second, they show that Costa Rica, the region's most democratic country, also has very high levels of demand-making, indicating high levels of personal efficacy among its citizens, even though they are not likely to attend municipal meetings during the year. Finally, Panama, Ecuador, Honduras and El Salvador are at the low end of demand-making on local government.
- ❑ Another question asked respondents to rate municipal services on a scale from very good to very bad. The results fall into three clear groups. First, there is the group of Colombia, Ecuador and El Salvador, where satisfaction is highest, then Panama and Bolivia where it is lowest, and all the others in between. It is of note that even though Bolivia has had the most extensive decentralization reforms and that the demand-making is the highest, its level of satisfaction is the lowest. These results demonstrate rather clearly that structural reforms can bring about unintended consequences. This finding is very important for USAID local government programs, since it shows that focusing exclusively on increasing participation

and demand making, without an equal emphasis on building capacity can be a recipe for declining support. In addition, as many of the country reports showed, dissatisfaction with local governments has a significant effect on system support and stable democracy values.



- The final area covered in this study is that of social capital. Sharp differences emerge among the countries based on interpersonal trust, seen by many analysts as an important requisite democracy. Not surprisingly, Costa Rica come out at the top, Bolivia at the bottom.



This executive summary, and indeed this regional report, only scratches the surface of the data base collected in this project. There are nearly limitless comparisons that can be between within and across the countries studied. The common methodology assures comparability across all of

the surveys. All of the researchers involved in the study are hopeful that policy makers will be using this data to inform their decisions on democracy programming in the years to come. The studies have shown that these countries vary considerably in their level of support for democracy, and they have also shown that within each country different dimensions of democracy receive greater or lesser support. In addition, the country-based studies have shown important differences among respondents based on gender, socio-economic status, region, etc. These findings need to be examined with care and factored into programming decisions made by USAID, multi-lateral donors and the governments of the countries themselves.

Preface

Democratic governance is increasingly recognized as central to the development process. Applied democratic development is now an emerging field of academic study and development assistance. From an academic perspective, the great movement of political regimes towards democracy led to a new focus on the processes of democratization. Recent research has demonstrated the centrality of good governance to sustained economic and social progress. The result is a ballooning literature on regime change, democratic consolidation, and the institutionalization of good governance.

Development agencies have also begun to invest in programs that promote democratic governance both to spur growth and poverty reduction as well as an end in itself. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has been at the forefront of donors in recognizing democracy and good governance as fundamental characteristics of development. Even a decade before the agency created the Center for Democracy and Governance in 1994, country missions—particularly in Latin America—began to invest heavily in justice reform, electoral assistance, local government, legislative development, civil society strengthening and other programs that have become the bedrock of our current extensive programming in “DG”. Every Administration over the past two decades has supported and expanded these efforts. At present we have democracy programs in over 80 countries, as well as large regional and global programs. Our programs in this region (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Colombia) are all tailored to the specific country context and managed by a local Mission, but share a focus on transparent and accountable governance and strengthened rule of law.

Unfortunately, rigorous measurement has lagged behind insight and action, but it is now underway with a vengeance. Analysts are developing and refining measures of institutional strengthening, political and civil rights, democratic culture, transparency, and other attributes of democracy and governance. At a much slower pace, donors are just beginning to examine closely the impact and effectiveness of their own work in this sector. In this context, USAID missions have supported high quality democracy surveys that analyze the beliefs, perceptions, and behavior of citizens and used the results to develop strategies of support.

Of course, surveys are only one tool in the arsenal of analytic instruments needed for good programming. We also rely on assessments of institutional development in both government and non-governmental organizations, on analyses of relationships among power contenders, and on a large range of other factors that affect prospects of democratic development and good governance. Nonetheless, surveys offer information not available from other sources on the state of democratic culture and, increasingly, on the effectiveness of our programs.

USAID missions have sponsored numerous surveys, many in collaboration with Dr. Mitchell Seligson and the local research teams that have carried out the present study. These are now being put on the web and made publicly available for further analysis.

This current study, nonetheless, is pioneering. It is the first time that missions have worked in concert to develop a common transnational survey in democracy and governance, allowing reliable comparisons of the democratic attributes across all of Central America, Colombia, and

Mexico, as well as with recent studies in Andean countries. For several missions, these surveys are the second or third in a series, offering reliable measures of change for the first time. Moreover, the survey instrument itself was the product of collaboration between survey research specialists led by Dr. Seligson and the USAID Democracy Offices in the region. As a result, the data allow reliable comparisons with the growing body of democracy surveys elsewhere, but also respond to specific needs of donors. For example, there are many questions that “drill down” into aspects of corruption and local government to provide insights into these potentially fruitful areas of donor support. Potentially even more important, some of the surveys over-sample geographic areas where USAID DG programming is concentrated, so that we can measure more reliably what changes might be due to specific program interventions—an important step in rigorously measuring the impact and effectiveness of our programs.

USAID missions intent on improving democracy programs and better measuring the impact of their work led this initiative. The Office of Democracy and Governance and the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean in Washington also strongly supported the work, as an innovative effort within the Agency to standardize our measurements and better report on our progress to Congress. However, we also believe these surveys will be an important resource for policy makers and academics, offering the best data available for decision-making and further research. To this end, we are supporting not only publication of the results, but a web-based data base allowing further analysis of the data. This report, and the country reports that preceded it, are only the tip of the iceberg in terms of research possibilities.

Undertaking these surveys has had other positive outcomes. For example, previous surveys have at times been important mobilizing tools for policy reformers in Latin America, with results presented to the Bolivian congress, for example, and to cabinet officials in a number of countries. In addition, the national research teams who conducted the surveys increased their own institutional capacities that will outlast this particular piece of work. Third, the surveys offer a public “voice” for citizen concerns about democracy, and the opportunity to see how particular subgroups—ethnic groups, women, people in specific regions—are faring.

We hope these surveys will be widely used by practitioners and policy-makers and contribute to our understanding of the processes of political change now underway in the hemisphere.

Margaret Sarles
Division Chief, Strategic Planning and Research
Democracy and Governance Office, DCHA
US Agency for International Development

Prologue

Studying Democratic Values in Eight Latin American Countries: The Challenge and the Response

The publication you have before you is one in a growing series of studies produced by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), known as OPAL in Spanish. That project, initiated over two decades ago, and for many years housed at the University of Pittsburgh, is now hosted by Vanderbilt University, and has received generous support in recent years from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in almost all countries in the region.

The present study reflects LAPOP's most extensive effort to date, incorporating eight countries (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia). The sample and questionnaire designs for all eight studies were uniform, allowing direct comparisons among them, as well as allowing for detailed analysis within each country. The 2004 series involves a total of nine publications, one for each of the eight countries, authored by the country teams, and a summary study, written by the author of this Prologue, who serves as the Director of the LAPOP, and the overall scientific coordinator of the eight-country project. Fortunately, many of the questions asked in the surveys administered in these eight countries were also included in LAPOP national sample studies carried out in 2004 in Ecuador and Bolivia, meaning that for some items it will be possible to compare across ten countries in Latin America. As of this writing, the Bolivia data for 2004 are not available, so in this volume, results for Bolivia 2002 are used. Finally, a collaborative investigation in the Dominican Republic, in which a small number of key questions from the LAPOP were included, broadens the country sample of 2004 to eleven, and gives us at least a limited picture of the Caribbean, adding to our samples of Central America and the Andes, although those data were not available for analysis at this writing. The only missing region in Latin America is the Southern Cone, a deficit we hope to remedy in the future. For several of the countries in the current round, LAPOP had previously carried surveys using identical batteries of questions. For that reason, in the country-based reports on Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, comparisons with prior results are made.

Surveys of public opinion in Latin America have become very popular in recent years. Unfortunately, too few of those studies follow the rigorous scientific procedures that have become accepted as the norm in academic public opinion research in the United States and Europe. Those studies often suffer from poorly designed questionnaires, unrepresentative and non-random samples, poor fieldwork supervision, sloppy data entry, and data analysis that rarely

goes beyond univariate presentation of percentages.¹ As a result, such studies are often dismissed by academics and policy-makers alike.

The LAPOP project has attempted, with considerable success I would argue, to deviate from the prevailing Latin American norm to produce quality survey data that matches the highest standards of academic research in the U.S. and Europe. The surveys on which the present study relies, because they were envisioned from the outset to allow for cross-national comparisons, were carried out with special rigor and attention to methodological detail, as is described in this prologue and in the methodology section of this synthesis report and the individual volumes. We recognized from the outset that all survey research, by its very nature, contains error (derived from many sources, including errors resulting from probability sampling, respondent inattention, coding mistakes, and data entry failures). Our goal was to reduce to the absolute minimum each of those errors, and to do so in a cost-effective manner.

We also sought, from the outset, to make our methodology transparent and replicable. The essence of scientific research is that it can be replicated. Excitement about the prospects for “cold fusion” quickly faded when physicists were unable to replicate the initial “discovery.” All too many surveys published in Latin America contain no information whatsoever about the sample designs, or when such information is provided it is so sketchy that it is impossible to determine with any degree of detail how the sample was carried out. Equally serious, it is rare for the data base itself to be made available to the public; almost without exception the raw data are closely guarded, making it impossible for social scientists and policy makers alike to reanalyze the data looking for new insights, or to attempt to replicate the original findings. Publicly funded databases should be available to the public. Failure to do so results in privatization of public goods. Of course, in the dissemination of data, all human subjects protection policies, as governed by Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) must be followed scrupulously so that the rights of subjects are respected.

We embarked on the 2004 series in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our belief is that the results can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, they can also serve the academic community that has been engaged in a quest to determine which citizen values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy, and which ones are most likely to undermine it. For that reason, the researchers engaged in this project agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. We agreed on that core in a meeting held in Panama City, in January 2004, hosted by our Panamanian colleague Marco Gandásegui, Jr.. All of the country teams were represented, as was the donor organization, USAID. It was not easy for us to agree on a common core, since almost everyone present had their favorite questions, and we knew from the outset that we did not want the interviews to take longer than an average of 45 minutes each, since to go on much longer than that risked respondent fatigue and reduced reliability of the data. As it turns out, the mean interview time for all 12,401 interviews was 42 minutes, a near-perfect “bulls-eye.” The common core of questions allows us to examine, for each nation and across nations, such fundamental democratization themes as political legitimacy,

¹ A detailed recounting of the problems encountered in those surveys can be found in Mitchell A. Seligson, “Improving the Quality of Survey Research in Democratizing Countries,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* (2004, forthcoming).

political tolerance, support for stable democracy, civil society participation and social capital, the rule of law, participation in and evaluations of local government, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and voting behavior. Each study contains an analysis of these important areas of democratic values and behaviors. In some cases we find striking and sometimes surprising similarities from country-to-country, whereas in other cases we find sharp contrasts.

When readers examine the findings presented in this synthesis volume, as well as the country studies, and find that the results are those that coincide with their expectations, they might well say, “That is just what I had expected, so the survey tells me nothing new.” On the other hand, when the results are at variance from expectations, readers might say, “This does not make any sense; the data must be wrong.” These reactions to survey data are common, and for some surveys emerging from the developing world, the data may in fact be “wrong.” We cannot guarantee that our results are “right,” but we have made every effort, as described below, to try to minimize error. Given that we are working with a sample of the population of each country rather than interviews with all voting-aged adults, there is always a one-in-twenty chance that our results are not within the approximately $\pm 2.5\%$ sampling error found in each of the national samples. Indeed, as we point out in the methodology section of each country report, these confidence intervals can be wider for some variables in some countries as a result of “design effects,” i.e., we used a stratified and clustered sample, which is standard practice in modern survey samples, the impact of which is to affect the precision of our estimates while keeping fieldwork costs within reasonable limits (as a result of clustering). Rarely does anyone doing surveys today use simple random sampling, and we have not done so either. In short, if readers find some results inconsistent with expectation, that may be because we are working with *probability* samples, and the odds are, from time-to-time, our results will be wide of the mark. But, 95 times out of 100, our results should be reasonably close to what we would have obtained had we interviewed the millions of voting-aged adults in the countries included in the study (an obvious impossibility). Moreover, since we have taken special pains to deal with the problem of “non-coverage,” something that we have rarely seen done anywhere in Latin America, we believe that our results are about as good as they can be.

To help insure comparability, a common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. Prior to flying to Panama for the start-up meeting, the author of this chapter prepared for each team the guidelines for the construction of a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample with a target N of 1,500. In the Panama meeting each team met with Dr. Polibio Córdova, President of CEDATOS/Gallup, Ecuador, and region-wide expert in sample design, trained under Leslie Kish, the founder of modern survey sampling, at the University of Michigan. Refinements in the sample designs were made at that meeting and later reviewed by Dr. Córdova. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes in each country report.

The Panama meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7 or higher, as the minimum

level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For a five-item scale, for example, if the respondent answered three or more of the items, we assigned the mean of those three to that person for that scale. If fewer than three of the five were responded to, the entire case was treated as missing.

Another agreement we struck in Panama was that each major section of the studies would be made accessible to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate and tri-variate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied. We also agreed on a common graphical format (using chart templates prepared for SPSS 11.5). Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board (IRB). The approval document is contained in each country report.

A common concern from the outset was minimization of data entry error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, we prepared a common set of data entry formats, including careful range checks, using the U.S. Census Bureau’s CSPro2.4 software. Third, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to a central location for an audit review. At that point, a random list of 100 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 100 surveys via express courier to that central location for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps. The first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the database itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire database had to be reentered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new database. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform eight-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

The next step in our effort to maximize quality was for the teams, once they had written their draft reports, to meet again in plenary session, this time in Santo Domingo de Heredia, Costa Rica, graciously hosted by our Costa Rica colleagues Luis Rosero-Bixby and Jorge Vargas-Cullell. In preparation for that meeting, held in mid-June 2004, pairs of researchers were assigned to present themes emerging from the studies. For example, one team made a presentation on corruption and democracy, whereas another discussed the rule of law results. These presentations, delivered in PowerPoint, were then critiqued by a small team of our most

highly qualified methodologists, and then the entire group of researchers and the USAID democracy staffers discussed the results. That process was repeated over an intense two-day period. It was an exciting time, seeing our findings up there “in black and white,” but it was also a time for us to learn more about the close ties between data, theory and method. For example, we spent a lot of time discussing the appropriate modalities of comparing across countries when we wanted to control for macro-economic factors such as GDP or GDP growth.

After the Costa Rica meeting ended, the author of this chapter, in his role of scientific coordinator of the project, read and critiqued each draft study, which was then returned to the country teams for correction and editing. In addition, the description of the sample designs was refined by including for each study a chart prepared by Luis Rosero of our Costa Rica team showing the impact of stratification and clustering on confidence intervals (i.e., the “design effect”). Those revised reports were then reviewed a second time, appropriate adjustments made, and then passed along to USAID for its comments. Those comments were taken into consideration by the teams and the final published version was produced. A version was translated into English for the broader international audience. That version is available on the web site, as is the data base itself (www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/dsd/).

What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, and field supervisors, hundreds of interviewers and data entry clerks, and, of course, the all-important over 12,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

Acknowledgements

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guidance throughout on sample design. The team of graduate assistants at the University of Pittsburgh has worked very hard in numerous aspects of the Latin American Public Opinion Project: Miguel García (Colombia), Daniel Moreno (Bolivia), Sawa Omori (Japan), and Rosario Queirolo (Uruguay). John Booth of the University of North Texas, and Miguel Gómez, formerly of the Universidad de Costa Rica, provided excellent pro bono advice on the questionnaire design. Chris Sani performed admirably as undergraduate assistant. Profound gratitude is owed to all of these fine people for their excellent work on this study. Finally, we wish to thank the 12,401 individuals in these eight countries who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would not have been possible.

Nashville, Tennessee
October, 2004

1.0 The Regional Context

In each of the country-focused studies that form part of this series, there is an extended discussion of the socio-economic and political context in which the survey was conducted. Readers interested in that specific contextual material should consult the individual country reports. In this region-wide report, the focus is on comparison of the relative levels of development and institutional democracy found among the eight countries in the study. Since the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) also has relevant data from Ecuador for 2004 and from Bolivia for 2002 (with 2004 Bolivian data to become available some months from now), data for those countries will also be included here.

The range of indicators that could be included to measure socio-economic development and institutional democracy is staggering. One only need examine the recent literature in the field to see that if one wants to be comprehensive, the list would contain hundreds of measures. Yet, it is also the case that researchers have shown that so many of these variables are highly correlated with each other, often above .9, and therefore much of the information is redundant. Therefore, this region-wide report opts for a parsimonious approach, looking at a small number of indicators that are not only used repeatedly in studies around the world, but ones that seem to capture best the differences and similarities among the countries being studied here.

In the Table I.1 below, the key indicators and their sources are shown:

Table I.1. Economic-Social and Governance Indicators for the CAM/Colombia Study

Variable Name	Indicator	Source	Year
Economic-Social Development Indicators			
GNI2002	Gross National Income	World Bank, <i>World Development Report, 2004</i>	2002
PPP2002	Purchasing Power Parity Gross National Income	World Bank, <i>World Development Report, 2004</i>	2002
INFMORT	Under-five Infant Mortality per 1,000	World Bank, <i>World Development Report, 2004</i>	2001
WEALTH	Summated index of material possessions	CAM/Colombia 2004 survey	2004
Governance Control Indicators			
VOICE	Voice and Accountability	World Bank Institute Governance Indicators (web)	2002
STABLE	Political Stability	World Bank Institute Governance Indicators (web)	2002
LAW	Rule of Law	World Bank Institute Governance Indicators (web)	2002
EFFECT	Government Effectiveness	World Bank Institute Governance Indicators (web)	2002
POPULAR	Presidential Popularity	CAM/Colombia 2004 survey	2004

Ideally, it would have been better if we could show data for 2004, since the surveys were drawn in that year. Alas, there is always a considerable lag in generating world tables of macro-level phenomenon, and the figures used here are the most recent ones available that were gathered using a common methodology. Individual country data are available for 2003, but in the case of GNP data, this means construction of conversion rates based on current currency exchange, whereas the World Bank “Atlas method” smoothes those conversion rates over a three-year period. Infant mortality figures also lag far behind. So, the table above contains the most recent regionally-available data that we consider to be reliable and comparable across all cases.

All but one of the measures shown above comes from the World Bank, and the World Bank Institute. The first two measures, GNI2002 and PPP2002 are attempts to capture the relative wealth of the countries being studied. GNP per capita is widely accepted as the quintessential measure of wealth across countries. In recent years, however, the International Comparisons Project (ICP) of the United Nations has attempted to correct distortions in the GNP per capita measure brought on by variations in exchange rates (exchange rates being the basis for the conversion of international currencies into the standard, the U.S. dollar). The ICP carries out surveys in many countries that examine purchasing power, hence the measure of GNP per capita based on those surveys is called Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), or “real” income. Since a major dispute in the development literature rages as to the proper measure to utilize,² this study uses both.

Many measures of well-being are available beyond infant mortality, the one selected here. All of them have limitations. Beyond questions in the quality of data, there is the issue of physical limitations that tend to flatten the extremes of these measures. For example, life expectancy is finite, no matter how advanced a country, and while a number of countries have life expectancies that now exceed 80 years, no country has, or can anticipate having, a life expectancy of 200 years. The same is true with infant mortality figures. The theoretical lower limit is zero deaths per 1,000, and perhaps some day the world will achieve that level (Sweden is already at about 3 per 1,000), but as countries approach the zero level, declines become harder and harder to achieve compared with drops from their previously high levels of over 100.

In order to provide a finer-grained measure of welfare than the macro-level measures given above, this study relies on the 2004 CAM/Colombia survey itself. In that study each respondent was asked to select among 10 possible monthly family income ranges, the numbers for which were drawn from the census bureau publications in each country. While it would be possible to use this as a measure of wealth for each country, the difficulty was that since many respondents did not report family income (in the case of farm families, such incomes would have to have been imputed, based on crop and livestock sales and production costs, a very time consuming task that would have been impossible to carry out within the confines of a survey that was focused on democratic values) there was too much missing data. As a result the survey-based measure of wealth is an index built on summing up the total number of household appliances and other material signs of wealth. Specifically, the survey counted the number of TVs in the house (allowing up to three), and the number of vehicles (again, allowing up to three), and then scoring one point each for ownership of a refrigerator, telephone, clothes washer, microwave, and having


² Mitchell A. Seligson and John T. Passé-Smith, *Development and Underdevelopment: The Political Economy of Global Inequality* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003).

potable water piped into the dwelling unit. This produced an index that ranged from 0-11, but since there were very few cases in the upper range, those scoring 11 were collapsed with those who scored 10, leaving an index in the 0-10 range.³

Finally, it is important to take note of the governance measures listed above. All are from the World Development Institute governance project led by Daniel Kaufmann.⁴ Of the six measures in the Kaufmann series, four are used here. Two of them, “control of corruption” and “regulatory quality,” are excluded because the first too closely approximates the corruption measures included in the surveys being analyzed here and the second seems to be too obliquely related to democratization for it to be relevant for this study.

We now proceed to compare the ten nations in the study on the various socio-economic and governance measures listed above. In Figure I.1 below, the two World Bank measures of national income, GNP per capita and PPP GNP per capita are shown. The range is wide, from a high in the Mexico case, the second highest GNP in Latin America according to the World Bank (exceeded only by Chile), to the low of Nicaragua, the poorest of the countries in the region (excluding Haiti in the Caribbean).

Figure I.1. Per Capita Income in U.S. Dollars, 2002: GNI and PPP




³ Since two of the items, such as TV and vehicle ownership, allowed for reporting more than one (e.g., two or three TVs), some of the teams decided to include those numbers to add further refinement to the index.

⁴ Daniel Kaufmann, Arat Kraay, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, *Governance Matters*, vol. 2196, *Policy Research Working Paper* (Washington, D. C.: World Bank, 1999).


The wealth measure emerging from the 2004 CAM/Colombia survey is examined next, with the results shown in Figure I.2. This rendering of national wealth produces some small variation from the GNP and GNI figures shown above. In this measure, Nicaragua and Honduras are again the two poorest countries, but Costa Rica and Mexico switch places at the high end of the scale. Some of this variation can be attributed to the degree to which the sample (and the nation represented) has made rural electrification a priority and the extent to which the country has urbanized. Several of the wealth indicators depend on a regular supply of electric power, and without it, even those who could afford the appliance (e.g., TV, clothes washer) would not purchase one. Controlling for urbanization in the study is an option, but, unfortunately, there is no agreed upon standard for urban/rural, and in sparsely populated Bolivia, an “urban” area might be classified as “rural” in other, more densely populated countries such as El Salvador.

Figure I.2 Mean Capital Goods per Country, Based on 2004 Survey



The last of the social and economic development measures is infant mortality, as shown in Figure I.3. Once again, there is great variation among the countries under study, ranging from a low of 9 in Costa Rica to a high of 56 in Bolivia. In the larger world-wide perspective, it is of note that the figure for the low income countries (nations located largely in Africa) was 121, the lower middle income countries was 41 and the upper middle income countries 23. The high income countries average 7, just a bit better than Costa Rica.


Figure I.3 Under-Five Infant Mortality, 2001



Turning now to the governance measures from the World Bank Institute, once again there is great variation. The World Bank Institute publishes these figures in percentile rank, so with the same metric it becomes easy to compare the indicators one to the other.


The first index is “Voice and Accountability,” with the results shown in Figure I.4. Not surprisingly, Costa Rica ranks at the top of this group, with a score of 85. What is surprising is that Colombia ranks so low, no doubt because of the protracted violence that has wracked that country for decades. Guatemala also fares poorly in the Voice and Accountability dimension of governance.

Figure I.4 Voice and Accountability, 2002




The serious impact of the violence in Colombia can be seen clearly in the “Political Stability” index, which is shown in Figure I.5. Colombia’s extreme position at the bottom of the scale is troubling, however, given the length of time that country has enjoyed regular elections and normal transitions from one government to another.

Figure I.5 Political Stability, 2002




Government effectiveness is shown in Figure I.6. Costa Rica continues to lead the group, but for this measure, Colombia ranks far higher than it did for stability. These findings are a good indication that the governance measures are not all basically measuring the same thing (correlations will be shown below). In the case of Colombia, we have a country which the governance measures classify as highly unstable yet it has a government that, when compared to others in the region, is relatively effective.

Figure I.6 Government Effectiveness, 2002




The next measure in this series is the Rule of Law, as shown in Figure I.7. Costa Rica, again, scores highest, but Guatemala, probably because of the well-publicized cases of military figures acting with impunity, scores at the low end.

Figure I.7 Rule of Law, 2002



The last of the macro-level variables is Popularity of the Incumbent Administration, with the results shown in Figure I.8. If a president and his/her government is extremely popular, citizens might feel optimistic about the future and give more favorable scores to survey questions than when citizens are pessimistic or even worried about the future. While there are many ways to measure incumbent popularity, the one that emerges from the surveys themselves are the best for the purpose of this study since popularity is ephemeral, and by capturing it at the moment of the interview in which the democratic values questions were asked, allows us to best control for this impact. Question M1 in the surveys asked, “Speaking about the current administration, how good a job is the administration of [fill in President’s name] doing? Very good, good, fair, not so good, poor.” The results, shown in the following table, are consistent with a number of other studies. The President of Colombia, at the time of the survey, was extremely popular, while the Panamanian President was receiving very low rankings in the polls. It needs to be kept in mind, however, that these results are for only the moment of the interview and can shift rather quickly.

Figure I.8 Presidential Popularity, 2004



1.1 Relationship Among the Socio-Economic and Governance Measures

The variables described above are related to each other, but not perfectly so. On average, countries that have higher GNPs, have higher PPP GNPs. Similarly, countries that have higher GNPs and/or higher PPP GNPs have *lower* levels of infant mortality. Yet, the correlation is far from perfect. Governance measures are also related among themselves, although, as has been shown, countries can perform well on one measure and not well on another. The relationships among the four measures of socio-economic development are shown in Table I.2 below. The only measure that is significantly less strongly related to the others is infant mortality.⁵ This finding no doubt reflects national policy in terms of long-term public expenditures on health. In Costa Rica, for the past half century the government has prioritized the health of the populace and has made preventive health care expenditures in all areas of the country widely available. Thus, as early as the 1960s rural health workers spread throughout the countryside and inoculated children, while sanitation engineers established potable drinking water systems, and physicians staffed rural clinics and hospitals.⁶ Social Security protection was universalized for all citizens.⁷ In Honduras, however, public health lags far behind, with the resulting higher levels of

⁵ Note that the negative sign in the correlation coefficient simply means that *higher* wealth is correlated with *lower* infant mortality.

⁶ Mitchell A. Seligson, Juliana Martínez, and Juan Diego Trejos, *Reducción de la pobreza en Costa Rica: El impacto de las políticas públicas*. (San José, Costa Rica and Quito, Ecuador: Serie Divulgación Económica No. 51, Instituto de Investigaciones en Ciencias Económicas Universidad de Costa Rica, 1996).

⁷ Mark Rosenberg, *Las luchas por el seguro social en Costa Rica* (San José de Costa Rica: Editorial Costa Rica, 1983).

infant mortality. These correlations suggest, therefore, that the addition of infant mortality to the measures based on health alone provides a broader look at development.

Table I.2. Correlations Among the Economic-Social Development Indicators

Indicator	GNI2002 Gross National Income (GNI), 2002 (World Bank)	INFMORT Under-five Infant mortality, 2001 (World Bank)	PPN2002 PPP Gross National Income, 2002 (World Bank)	WEALTH Mean National Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership (r1,3,4,5,6,7,12)
GNI2002 Gross National Income (GNI), 2002 (World Bank)	1	-.580(**)	.921(**)	.838(**)
INFMORT Under-five Infant mortality, 2001 (World Bank)	-.580(**)	1	-.719(**)	-.704(**)
PPN2002 PPP Gross National Income, 2002 (World Bank)	.921(**)	-.719(**)	1	.898(**)
WEALTH Mean National Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership (r1,3,4,5,6,7,12)	.838(**)	-.704(**)	.898(**)	1

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The five governance items are also related to each other, as is shown in Table I.3. While some of these variables are closely associated, others are not. Voice and Accountability, for example, is very closely associated with the Rule of Law indicators and also reasonably associated with Government Effectiveness. But, there is a significant and *negative* association with presidential popularity. Again, popularity of an administration can shift sharply and quickly, as any incumbent administration knows, based upon short-term changes in the economy or significant national events (including corruption scandals), so this negative association does not have theoretical significance for this analysis. Political Stability is strongly associated with the Rule of Law and more modestly associated with Government Effectiveness and *negatively associated* with Presidential Popularity. Finally, the Rule of Law is strongly associated with Voice, Stability and Effectiveness, but *negatively* associated with presidential popularity.

Table I.3. Correlations Among the Governance Indicators

	VOICE Voice and Accountability, 2002 (World Bank)	STABLE Political Stability, 2002 (World Bank)	EFFECT Government Effectiveness, 2002 (World Bank)	LAW Rule of Law, 2002 (World Bank)	POPULAR Presidential popularity, based on M1 means - 5 (so that high number = most popular)
VOICE Voice and Accountability, 2002 (World Bank)	1	.918(**)	.596(**)	.939(**)	-.376(**)
STABLE Political Stability, 2002 (World Bank)	.918(**)	1	.526(**)	.823(**)	-.286(**)
EFFECT Government Effectiveness, 2002 (World Bank)	.596(**)	.526(**)	1	.774(**)	.193(**)
LAW Rule of Law, 2002 (World Bank)	.939(**)	.823(**)	.774(**)	1	-.214(**)
POPULAR Presidential popularity, based on M1 means - 5 (so that high number = most popular)	-.376(**)	-.286(**)	.193(**)	-.214(**)	1

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

In order to get an overall look at these indicators and their relationship one to another, a factor analysis is shown below. Factor analysis looks for commonalities among the variables and produces a table that shows “loadings;” the higher the number the more that the indicator is related to the dimension. What emerged are two clear factors, or dimensions. The first is comprised of the Economic-Social Development indicators, while the second is comprised of the Governance indicators. However, two Governance indicators, Rule of Law, and especially, Effectiveness, are actually far more closely associated with the Economic-Social Development indicators than they are with the Governance indicators for this group of ten Latin American countries. In effect, this leaves “Voice and Accountability,” “Political Stability” and “Political Stability” as the only variables that effectively measure a dimension distinctly different from the Economic-Social series of indicators.

Table I.4. Rotated Component Matrix of Nine Indicators

	Component	
GNI2002 Gross National Income (GNI), 2002 (World Bank)	.881	.221
INFMORT Under-five Infant mortality, 2001 (World Bank)	-.703	-.164
PPN2002 PPP Gross National Income, 2002 (World Bank)	.990	.011
WEALTH Mean National Wealth Measured by Capital Goods Ownership (r1,3,4,5,6,7,12)	.915	.224
EFFECT Government Effectiveness, 2002 (World Bank)	.936	.053
LAW Rule of Law, 2002 (World Bank)	.794	.570
VOICE Voice and Accountability, 2002 (World Bank)	.578	.772
STABLE Political Stability, 2002 (World Bank)	.471	.747
POPULAR Presidential popularity, based on M1 means - 5 (so that high number = most popular)	.226	-.816

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

1.2 Conclusions

This chapter has attempted to characterize the ten nations that are included in this summary report. The focus has been on macro-level indicators of economic and social development, as well as governance. The World Bank is the primary source for these indicators, but data from the surveys themselves, aggregated at the national level, are also used to measure wealth and presidential popularity.

The descriptive information contained herein allows the reader to place the ten nations in context. The next chapter briefly reviews the methodology that is employed in the analysis that follows.

2.0 Analysis and Sample Design

2.1 Sample Design

A study of democratic values and behaviors needs to be designed so that it will gather data on the values of *all* citizens, not just the active ones, the politically “important” ones, or those who live in major towns and cities. Indeed, the major advantage of surveys over elections is that in elections many people do not vote, and often it is the poor or the rural voter who is under represented in the election.⁸ Surprisingly, however, many studies carried out in Latin America that claim to represent the views of the nation, are often based on samples that systematically under represent certain sectors of the population. Often the biases that crop up in samples emerge because of cost considerations, which in turn are a function of the dispersion of populations over wide areas, or because the multi-lingual nature of the national population makes it difficult and expensive to conduct the interviews in all of the languages widely spoken in a given country. But, more often than not, the samples are designed, as one sample design “expert” told me, to represent the “politically relevant population.”

In the current project, the effort has been to draw samples fully representative of the voting-age population of each of the countries included in the study. The target group of countries was the seven nations in the USAID CAM region, plus Colombia, which joined our project. The map below (Figure II.1) shows these countries. We believe that we have accomplished this goal, within the limitations of the science of sampling and an appropriate consideration for cost effectiveness. That is, in the field of survey research, larger samples are always better, but cost is always a factor to be considered. Consider the impact of sample size on the precision of the results. In this study we determined that a sample of 1,500 respondents per country would satisfy our objectives, and still remain feasible from a cost point of view. With a sample of this size, using what is known as “simple random sampling,”⁹ 95 times out of 100, results are accurate to within $\pm 2.5\%$ of the result that would have been obtained, had 100% of the voting-aged adults been interviewed. Is that good enough? That depends on the trade-off of greater cost for greater precision. If we had doubled the sample to 3,000, the accuracy would have improved to about $\pm 2.2\%$, or an increase of only .3% for a doubling of the sample size and fieldwork costs. How does the 2.5% figure compare to research in other fields? Quite well. In national elections in the U.S., it is common to see samples of only about 1,000, and in most medical research testing new drugs and procedures, samples that are far smaller are common. So, we believe that the sample size selected for this study is appropriate.

⁸ This point was made forcefully by Sidney Verba in his Presidential address to the American Political Science Association: Sidney Verba, "The Citizen as Respondent: Sample Surveys and American Democracy," *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 1 (1996):1-7.

⁹ As will be noted below, the surveys carried out here were actually “stratified, clustered samples,” so the 2.5% figure is not precisely accurate.

Figure II.1. Sample Countries, CAM Region Plus Colombia



The sample design itself made use of the principle of “stratification” in order to increase the precision of the results. It is perhaps easiest to understand the impact of stratification on our samples by making an analogy to drawing winning raffle tickets. Let us assume that there are eight high schools in a school district and the district has decided to have a raffle to raise money. Those who are running the raffle want to be sure that there is at least one winner in each of the eight schools. If the tickets are all pooled into one bowl, and winners drawn at random, it may well turn out that one or more schools would be left without a winner. Indeed, all winners might come from a single school. In order to make sure that all schools had at least one winner, rather than placing all of the raffle tickets in one bowl, and have all winning tickets drawn out at random, the tickets from each school are placed in a separate bowl, and one ticket is drawn from each. That is the procedure we followed in this study, dividing the sample by country, and subdividing the countries into regions, and further subdividing them into urban and rural areas.

Stratified samples are more precise than simple random samples because they guarantee that no one important component of the population will be left outside of the sample. In the CAM project, our first decision was to stratify the sample by country, so as to guarantee that by simple random chance alone the population of any one country would not end up being excluded. In studies of voting behavior of the U.S., for example, the samples are stratified so as to forcibly include New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and other major population centers to guarantee that none of these major cities would end up being excluded from the sample. Thus, we have a sample with the seven core countries from the CAM region (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador,

Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama), plus Colombia, and Ecuador, which was already involved via a grant to the University of Pittsburgh (now transferred to Vanderbilt University). We also had a sample of Bolivia from 2002 and one planned for that country for August of 2004. Since the 2004 data would not be available in time for this publication, we used the 2002 Bolivia data. For a few questions, there is also data from a study carried out with USAID support in the Dominican Republic in which LAPOP provided some assistance on questionnaire design. This gave us a total sample of ten countries, each one comprising its own stratum, although not all of the questions are available for all of the samples.

We further stratified the samples within each country to increase their precision even further. We divided each country into a minimum of five strata, representing the major geographic divisions of the countries. In that way, each region of the country would be represented. For the most part, we did not exclude any region unless the cost of access was extreme. For example, in Ecuador we excluded the Galapagos Islands. On the other hand, in Honduras, we developed an English version of the questionnaire for use on the Bay Islands so as not to exclude that population from the survey. Similarly, we developed translations of the questionnaire in four Mayan languages for the case of Guatemala, and used both Aymara and Quecha versions in Bolivia. The sample design details of each country explain any such omissions, but they are very minor when they occur, and justified by cost considerations.

As a further effort to increase the precision of the samples, we subdivided each of the country-level strata into urban and rural. We know that many other similar samples in Latin America largely exclude rural areas because of their inaccessibility, but we did not want to do that. So, we relied upon census definitions of urban and rural, and divided our strata so that each one would faithfully represent the urban/rural breakdowns within them.

The next stage in the sample design involved determining the neighborhoods in which the interviews would take place. We referred to these as “primary sampling units,” or PSUs. The teams obtained census maps from their respective census bureaus and, using population data segments, randomly selected the maps from within each stratum, and then randomly selected the segments in which the interviews would be carried out. Each stage of selection involved using “Probability Proportional to Size” (PPS) criteria so that the probability of any one unit being selected was in direct proportion to the most recent population estimates. In that way, voting-aged adults in each country had an equal and known probability of being selected, a fundamental criterion for a scientifically valid probability sample. Thus, respondents living in sparsely populated rural villages had the same probability of being selected as respondents in large cities.

The final stages of selection involved picking the household and selecting the respondent. Selecting the household involved a systematic selection of housing units within a PSU (using the census maps and locally updated information). We determined that 6-8 interviews would be carried out in each urban PSU and 10-12 in each rural PSU. We allowed larger clusters in rural areas than in urban areas because of the far lower housing density in the former, and the increased travel time smaller clusters would imply. Clusters are commonly used as they provide an appropriate trade-off between cost and precision. Since the residents of each PSU are likely to have more in common with each other than residents living in the country at large (similar incomes, similar levels of education, etc.), the selection of a “cluster” of households in a given

area produces a somewhat reduced level of precision, but at great cost savings. By clustering respondents in a neighborhood, and interviewing several of them, the efficiency of an interviewer is greatly increased. The result is the introduction of what is known as “intra-class correlation,” that can widen the confidence intervals. Each of the studies contains a section in which these design effects are estimated and reported for key variables in the study.

Once the household was selected, we determined that random selection of the respondent within the household was far too costly since it would have required multiple call-backs, since the selected respondent is often not at home when the interviewer arrives at the door. We decided to use a quota sampling methodology at the level of the household. The quotas were established for age and gender, again based on census data for each country.

The sample designs also took into consideration the issue of non-coverage. That is, some respondents refuse to cooperate, and if we had targeted only 1,500 interviews per country, we could have ended up with a smaller sample size than we had planned. As a result, in each country an estimate of non-coverage was included. The final samples are shown in Table II.1 below. As can be seen in the table, the total pooled sample N was 15,410.

Table II.1. Sample Size per Country

Country	Sample size	Percent of entire sample
1 México	1,556	10.1
2 Guatemala	1,708	11.1
3 El Salvador	1,589	10.3
4 Honduras	1,500	9.7
5 Nicaragua	1,430	9.3
6 Costa Rica	1,500	9.7
7 Panamá	1,639	10.6
8 Colombia	1,479	9.6
9 Ecuador	1,500	9.7
10 Bolivia 2002	1,509	9.8
Total	15,410	100.0

Note: The samples for Ecuador and Bolivia were ca. 3,000 each. In order that these samples not skew means computed for the pooled data base, they were weighted down by half.

2.2 Analysis Design

The individual country-based monographs focus on the key dependent variables in this study. Those are: system support, tolerance, corruption, administration of justice and crime, local government participation and satisfaction, voting, and social capital. In this synthesis volume, the same variables will be examined, but now at the regional level, whereas in the country-based study, the emphasis was on variation within the countries based on region, gender, age, income, education, etc. This regional report will not include a chapter on voting, since those results were entirely country-specific.

The first chapter of this volume showed quite clearly that the countries in the study vary sharply in terms of levels of economic and social development. A great deal of democratic theory tells us that economic and social development is closely related to the emergence and longevity of

democratic regimes. Ever since Lipset published his landmark study, it has been argued that countries with higher GNPs are more likely to be democratic than countries with low GNPs.¹⁰ Lipset also demonstrated that social development, defined by various indicators such as literacy, was also common to democracies.¹¹ More recent research, now based on nearly all countries in the world for the post-World War II period, shows that democracies do not necessarily emerge in more developed countries, but it confirms that countries that are more developed are more likely to survive as democracies.¹² Other research strongly supports the original view that democracy is “caused” by economic development.¹³

Our analysis is focused on the democratic (and anti-democratic) values and behaviors of citizens, and it is reasonable to assume that those attitudes are shaped, in part, by the economic and social conditions of the countries in which they live. For example, Costa Ricans, who have enjoyed stable democracy for over half a century have also enjoyed a higher standard of living than the their neighbors to the south, the Nicaraguans.¹⁴ One could assume that the higher standard of living has both made it more likely for democracy to emerge and to survive in Costa Rica than in Nicaragua.

On the other hand, higher levels of economic and social development could well be a product of democracy itself. There is much theorizing about the impact of democracy on economic growth. Many scholars state that in the context of the freedom that democracy provides, the economy will grow more quickly.¹⁵ Other scholars maintain, however, that the only positive impact of democracy on growth is that the former slows birth rates and results in higher levels of human capital formation.¹⁶

In this study, we cannot resolve those important questions about the connections between development and democracy, but we can present results that control for the variation in our samples so as to determine what is “left over” once we have done so. That is to say, we want to know, for example, how much variation among the countries is there on system support once the nation’s level of development has been taken into account. If development has produced citizens who are supportive of their political system, then once we control for development, there should

¹⁰ Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53 (1959):65-105.

¹¹ Ibid; Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics*, 1981 (expanded edition) ed. (Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1961); Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited," *American Sociological Review* 59 (1994):1-22.

¹² Adam Przeworski, José Antonio Cheibub Michael Alvarez, and Fernando Limongi, "What Makes Democracies Endure?," *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 1 (1996):39-55; Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and development : political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

¹³ Robert Barro, "Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Countries," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 106 (1991):407-45; Robert J. Barro, *Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).

¹⁴ Deborah J. Yashar, *Demanding Democracy: Reform and Reaction in Costa Rica and Guatemala, 1870s-1950s* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); John A. Booth, *Costa Rica: Quest for Democracy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998).

¹⁵ Stephen Knack, ed., *Democracy, Governance and Growth* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).

¹⁶ Adam Przeworski, José Antonio Cheibub Michael E. Alvarez, and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

be no significant remaining variation among the countries under study here. On the other hand, if there remains variation, we can then more confidently argue that there are indeed differences in political culture independent of development. If variation remains, do the countries highest on system support prior to the controls being introduced still remain at the top? Or, does controlling for development elevate some countries above the leaders?

There is, however, one important precaution we need to take before drawing any conclusions about the impact of country-level development on our measures of democracy drawn from public opinion. We need to know if that impact is statistically significant. Normally, that question would be a simple one to answer; we would just enter into a standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) equation both the country-level information (e.g., GNP per capita) and the individual information (e.g., individual attitudes toward democracy) and if both variables prove to determine significant variation across the ten countries under study, we would conclude that both have an impact. However, following that approach would violate a fundamental requirement of OLS regression, and that is the “independence” requirement. Since we know that the individuals living within each country have values and behaviors that are not independent of one another, and therefore the standard errors of the equations are not identical from one country to the next, we need to correct for this. We do so in this study by calculating what are known as “robust standard errors,” (using STATA’s “cluster” procedure) and examine if both the country-level and individual-level variables are both significant. If they are, we can proceed to present the controlled results.¹⁷

In this study, many of the results will be presented in both their original form, and after controlling for key factors that could explain variation in the dependent variables, will be presented in their controlled form. These results will both be presented using standardized results, so the original scores will be transformed into *z-scores*, and the residuals of the regression equations will be presented in standardized format. That way, comparisons can easily be made between the two results. In no case, however, will results be presented in the controlled form if the control variables, as determined through the use of robust regression techniques, prove not to be statistically significant. Each chapter in this study explains which variables are used as controls.¹⁸

2.3 Conclusions

This chapter has presented the key methodological issues in the comparative, regional study. It has shown that some variables can be used to help distinguish among the countries in the study. Those variables can help determine if cultural/attitudinal variables play a role independent of these macro-level variables. In the pages that follow, the study examines key variables that were included in the country-based studies.

¹⁷ The point estimates do not change using robust standard errors, just the standard errors (and T values) themselves. As a result, the residual plots produced by SPSS, and used here, do not distort the results. SPSS does not (yet) calculate robust standard errors in regression equations.

¹⁸ The method used for controls is to compute the “residuals” after the control variables are introduced, and to standardize those results, so that they have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Then the original results, also standardized to make them comparable to the controlled results are presented alongside of the new results, so that comparisons can be easily made, and shifts can be observed.

3.0 Support for Democracy: Political Community, Political Legitimacy and Political Tolerance

This chapter examines citizen support for democracy in Central America, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia. It does so at three different levels. It first examines support for the political community, a basic value measuring pride in one's nationality, without which it is hard to see how a nation could hold together. It then shifts the focus from nationalism to support for the institutions of government, and measures what is called "system support," or the belief in the legitimacy of the political system. Without that support, government's right to rule is in question. The chapter then moves on to examine a fundamental democratic principle, the belief in the civil liberties of others, including those with whom one disagrees. Without tolerance, there can be no opposition, and without opposition, no democracy. Finally, the paper tests a model in which the combination of political support and political tolerance are seen as crucial to stable democracy. The results for all ten nations in the model are presented.

3.1 The Existence of Political Community

A crucial factor in the stability of any nation is that its citizens support it. Support, as has recently been pointed out by Pippa Norris of the Harvard Department of Government, is multidimensional.¹⁹ At the most general level, citizens must believe in the existence of, and have support for, the "political community." According to Norris (p. 10), this involves "a basic attachment to the nation." It is precisely this attachment that appears to be missing in a number of countries in Africa, where the loyalty is to the clan or tribe and not to the artificially constructed post-colonial national boundaries.²⁰


Our first question, then, is, "is there a political community in the countries under study?" The answer is a resounding "yes." The survey asked a long series of questions in the area of system support, but one of them (B43) focused directly on the pride in the political community, and asked "To what degree are you proud of being a [fill in citizenship name]?" The respondents replied with respect to a seven-point scale, which ran from 1 on the low end, indicating no pride, to 7 on the high end, indicating high pride. In this graph, and all others in this report, the 1-7 (and other scales) are converted to a 0-100 range so as to provide a common metric for the reader.²¹ Unfortunately, this item was not asked in Bolivia, so we limit the comparisons to nine countries. As can be seen in Figure III.1, an overwhelming majority of the respondents in each of the countries in which the survey was conducted were extremely proud of their nationality. On the seven-point scale, three out of four respondents in the countries selected a score of "7," which is the highest possible score, while most of the other respondents selected a score in the positive end of the continuum (5 or 6). This finding clearly suggests that there is a real sense of political community in these countries.

¹⁹Pippa Norris, *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

²⁰ Robert Mattes, "Understanding Identity in Africa: A First Cut," in *Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 38* (Cape Town, South Africa: AfroBarometer, 2004).

²¹ The conversion is accomplished by subtracting 1 from each score, so that they all have a 0-6 range rather than a 1-7. Then each score is divided by 6, so that they now range from 0-1, and then the scores are multiplied by 100.

Figure III.1 Pride in Nationality



The analysis was run with two key controls: GNP per capita for 2002 (the most recent data available, as noted in Section 2) and infant mortality for 2001 (again, the most recent data available). The theory we are trying to test is the impact of these key development indicators on the pride in nationality variable. It turns out, however, that when a robust regression is run on this data, clustered by country, neither GNP nor infant mortality has any impact on pride in nationality.²² This demonstrates that the widely varying levels of development found among the countries being studied do not affect national pride.

3.2 Support for Specific Institutions

While the results presented above show that the respondents in the countries studied overwhelmingly believe that they form part of a political community, this does not necessarily

²² regress b43r gni2002 infmort [pweight=wt2], robust cluster(pais)
(sum of wgt is 1.3748e+04)

```

Regression with robust standard errors
Number of clusters (pais) = 9
Number of obs = 15242
F( 2, 8) = 1.98
Prob > F = 0.2008
R-squared = 0.0056
Root MSE = 16.92
    
```

b43r	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
gni2002	-.000705	.0006424	-1.10	0.304	-.0021863	.0007764
infmort	-.1802081	.0924584	-1.95	0.087	-.3934175	.0330014
_cons	100.2894	3.641684	27.54	0.000	91.8917	108.6872

mean that they are confident in the institutions that govern them. In fact, as we shall shortly see, there is a yawning gap between pride in being a citizen of these countries and pride in their systems of government. Support for the political system we consider to be a measure of political legitimacy, and without legitimacy, no political system can expect to remain stable over long periods of time. Citizens must have confidence in their government's right to rule (which is the essence of the definition of legitimacy). In this section we will analyze the degree of political legitimacy of the various institutions of government.

The LAPOP has developed a battery of items that measure what we call "system support" that measure a generalized sense of legitimacy of the political system. In addition, another, longer battery of questions has been developed to measure confidence in the specific institutions of the state. In this chapter we first compare the high levels of national pride that we have already uncovered, with support for various dimensions of the political system. The questions were all based on the same format and the same 1-7 response metric that was used to measure national pride, so the comparisons can be made directly. To make it easier, however, for the reader to compare these responses the items are converted into a familiar 0-100 metric (commonly used in test grades or in Centigrade thermometers). In Table III.1 these items are listed by their average score, going from highest (i.e., greatest level of citizen confidence) to lowest (i.e., lowest level of citizen confidence) for the pooled sample of ten countries. Costa Rica and Panama do not have armed forces, and the question on the army was not asked there, nor was it included in Bolivia.


Table III.1 Support for Institutions by Country: Mean Scores, 0-100 Basis.

Country	B43R Pride in nationality	B20R Catholic Church	B12R Armed Forces	B11R Election Tribunal	B32R Munici- pality	B18R Police	B31R Supreme Court	B13R Congress	B21R Parties
México	89.1	72.1	67.7	54.7	53.1	42.4	51.9	51.9	41.5
Guatemala	93.2	63.8	49.1	49.7	54.9	39.6	43.9	38.3	29.4
El Salvador	95.2	68.5	68.6	59.9	62.9	64.6	53.2	52.5	39.9
Honduras	92.5	69.6	60.0	47.0	55.5	56.7	47.7	47.3	31.6
Nicaragua	94.9	63.1	54.2	47.3	48.7	54.2	43.3	37.1	29.0
Costa Rica	97.0	66.6	--	70.8	56.9	58.4	61.9	53.5	35.3
Panamá	97.0	78.7	--	66.1	47.5	58.4	45.7	36.6	32.9
Colombia	93.7	71.1	66.0	47.0	55.2	58.9	53.9	47.3	35.8
Ecuador	92.3	69.0	54.9	38.1	51.4	45.9	31.7	25.3	22.3
Bolivia 2002	--	68.6	--	46.5	28.9	26.0	--	38.0	28.7
Regional mean	93.9	69.2	60.1	53.0	51.7	50.5	48.4	42.7	35.5

Looking first at the pooled mean for the ten countries leads to some important conclusions; the highest scoring institution in the series is the Catholic Church. At the other extreme, are the legislature and the political parties. These results are shown graphically in Figure III.2.²³

²³ Controls for national income and infant mortality do little to change these results. There is no significant impact on the Church, the Supreme Court, the Election Tribunal, or Congress. Only on parties do both variables make a small difference, and infant mortality makes a small but significant difference on the trust in the Municipality and the Police. Given the weakness of these controls, the uncontrolled results are presented here.

Figure III.2 Trust in Institutions: Averages for Pooled Data



A striking finding from this comparison is the high level of trust in the military in most of these countries. With the exception of Guatemala, where the score falls slightly below 50, all of the countries in the region that have armies report trust levels in the positive end of the continuum. No doubt, these results are related in part to the peace processes in the region and to the transformations of the militaries in several countries. Perhaps more important, with the exception of Guatemala where the electoral court and the municipality have a slight and statistically insignificant edge over the armed forces, *trust in the armed forces is higher than in any other state institution.*²⁴ This finding speaks volumes about the role of the military in governance in Latin America. While militaries no longer rule in these countries, they have the respect of their populations and are viewed as legitimate institutions despite (or perhaps because of) their tainted record on human rights.

The electoral tribunals are the next most trusted institutions among these ten countries, as a whole. Looking at the individual countries, one finds the electoral court right below the Church and the military in all countries except in Costa Rica, where the support for the electoral court *exceeds* that of the Catholic Church. This is less a statement about the role of the Church in Costa Rica than it is a statement about the image of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. Support for the Church falls in the middle of the group of ten countries, not especially high or low. The support for the Electoral Tribunal, however, is higher in Costa Rica than in any other nation in

²⁴ See Ricardo Cordova Macias, “Las relaciones civico-militares en Centroamerica a fin de siglo”. In Ricardo Cordova Macias, Gunther Maihold y Sabine Kurtenbach, eds., *Pasos hacia una nueva convicencia: democracia y participación en Centroamerica*. San Salvador, FUNDAUNGO, Instituto de Estudios Iberoamericanos de Hanburgo e Instituto Ibero-Americano de Berlin, 2001.

the study. Much research has shown that a fundamental element of the stability of Costa Rican democracy has been the electoral tribunal. The civil war of 1948 was fought over the integrity of the disputed elections of that year. This finding alone is suggestive of the importance of clean elections as a pillar for stable democracy. Indeed, the overall average for all of the countries in the study places the electoral tribunal at the top of the political institutions being studied.

In light of this discussion, it is of interest to observe that there is one country, Ecuador, in which the electoral court does very badly in the public's view; Costa Rican levels of support for this institution are nearly *double* those in Ecuador. This finding has important programmatic implications for Ecuador, where trust in the key electoral institution is especially low.

A third major finding is that local government scores far higher than national institutions. Local government is seen as far more legitimate than the courts, the legislature or the political parties. In El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Ecuador, the police score higher than local government.

3.3 System Support

The Latin American Public Opinion Project is designed to advance our understanding of the factors that are important for democratic survival and strengthening. In this section we examine what we consider to be an embryonic "leading indicator" of democratic strengthening or weakening. In effect, we have been attempting to develop the social science equivalent of the "canary in the coal mine," something that would on the one hand alert us to shifts in public opinion that might prove ominous for democratic development, and, indeed, even democratic survival. On the other hand, the same indicator, if it were moving in a positive direction, might point the way toward a more stable future.

The social sciences have been struggling to develop indicators of social phenomena for decades. Indeed, entire journals, such as *Social Indicators Research* have long been dedicated to this effort, and the World Bank has been publishing its *Social Indicators of Development* in both paper and electronic formats. In political science, the compilation of handbooks of indicators has seen some progress.²⁵ In the field of democratization, however, we must admit that little progress has been made. One reason for this is that the problem is very complex. We know that many factors influence the direction of democracy, and several of those are very difficult to measure. For example, international factors, involving foreign support for--or opposition to-- democracy no doubt play an important role in democratic development. In Third Wave coup attempts in Latin America, for example in Guatemala, Ecuador and Venezuela, external factors played a major role. Elites, of course, play a major role in determining the direction in which democracy develops or decays.²⁶ But in democracies, the mass public counts for a great deal. At one level,

²⁵ Charles Lewis Taylor and David A. Jodice, *World Handbook of Political Social Indicators*. 3d ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press., 1983).

²⁶ John Higley and Richard Gunther, *Elites and Democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Richard Gunther, Nikiforos P. Diamandouros, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, *The politics of democratic consolidation : southern Europe in comparative perspective, The new Southern Europe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Richard Gunther, Josê R. Montero, and Juan J. Linz, *Political parties :Old concepts and new challenges* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

the public votes, and can vote in favor of leaders who promise a democratic future or can vote in favor of those who do not.²⁷ The public can also unsettle and even unseat democracies through relentless protest demonstrations as they recently did in Venezuela. Bolivia in the past few years has experienced a number of such protest demonstrations, which eventually resulted in the democratically elected president having to resign and flee the country. So, it is important to include in any leading index of democracy the views of the mass public.

Unfortunately, in our view, the efforts to develop good measures that would help us predict the future direction of democracy based on survey research have been hampered by the widespread tendency to include the word “democracy” in the survey questions themselves. The term is loaded, one that carries with it a great deal of what social scientists refer to as “social desirability response bias.” In a recent article the author of this monograph co-authored with two collaborators, it was demonstrated that the use of the word “democracy” in survey questions can lead to serious problems of interpretation.²⁸

The approach perused in this series of studies is to avoid the term “democracy” and attempt instead to probe the underlying values that presumably are needed to support stable democracy. This has been done by probing the values of system support and political tolerance as is described below. Is there any evidence that the LAPOP approach does provide a glimpse into the future? In fact, there is. Costa Rica is Latin America’s oldest and most stable democracy, and nobody is predicting its demise. Yet, in recent years it is clear that the system has been undergoing a major change. Evidence of that emerged first in 1998 when abstention from the presidential vote went up by 50% over its historically low levels, and voting for minor parties in the legislature increased by over 25%. Then, in March and April of 2000 the greatest civil unrest in over 50 years broke out, with protests against the preliminary legislative approval of the “Energy Combo” legislation, a package of three bills designed to modernize the Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE) in the areas of energy and telecommunications. ICE has been a highly regarded state monopoly that has extended electric and telephone service to nearly all areas of the country, but has been criticized for inefficiency at a time when such enterprises are being privatized around the world. The bill was strongly supported by the country’s two main parties, but opposed by a coalition of ten legislators from minor parties. Initial protests came from environmental groups, but later involved an extremely broad group of civil society organizations spreading throughout the country, leading to the biggest protests in thirty years. Eventually, the government agreed to table the legislation, setting up a bi-partisan study committee to review its provisions. Then, in the 2002 elections, new parties emerged including a right-wing anarchist/libertarian party. The result was not only a further increase in abstention, but for the first time in Costa Rica’s history the vote count required a second round to decide among the two leading candidates.


Was any of this predictable by the leading indicators developed by LAPOP? Consider the information presented in Figure III.4, which is based on the longest series of surveys in the LAPOP data base. There is shown the index of system support that will be used in this chapter of

²⁷ Amber L. Seligson, "When Democracies Elect Dictators: Motivations for and Impact of the Election of Former Authoritarians in Argentina and Bolivia" (Doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, 2002b).

²⁸ Damarys Canache, Jeffrey Mondak, and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Measurement and Meaning in Cross-National Research on Satisfaction with Democracy," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (2001).

the regional report to compare the countries in the study. There we see that support in the 1970s was high, and remained high even though in the period 1980-82 the country suffered its worst economic crisis of the century. Yet, by the late 1980s it became apparent that system support was declining and the elections of 1998, the protests of 2000 and the elections of 2002 could all be anticipated by the trend in sharply declining system support. This is not the place to discuss these results further, but the interested reader can peruse the articles on the subject.²⁹ The important point is that the system support measure showed important and systematic declines *before* the shifts in the electoral system. The level of support in Costa Rica, even after these declines, is still higher than in any other Latin American country for which we have data at LAPOP, so it is not the case that the indicator is predicting a breakdown of democracy. But it did appear to predict a major electoral realignment and unprecedented civil disobedience. For countries that are far lower in system support, as will be shown in this chapter, political stability will be much harder to ensure.

Figure III.4 System Support on Costa Rica: 1978-1999




The Bolivian case provides additional evidence that the leading indicators are meaningful. In 1998 when the first measure was taken, most political scientists were arguing that Bolivia was advancing very rapidly in democratic development. While true in many ways, it was also the case that the Bolivian public had serious reservations about their system, evidence of which emerged in the large-scale protests that followed beginning in 2000. Even stronger evidence emerged more recently as mass protests forced a sitting president to resign.

²⁹ Mitchell A. Seligson, "Trouble in Paradise: The Impact of the Erosion of System Support in Costa Rica, 1978-1999," *Latin America Research Review* 37, no. 1 (2002a):160-85., pp. 165-180.

3.4 Measurement of System Support

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a battery of items that measure what we call “system support,” or a generalized sense of legitimacy of the political system. In addition, another, longer battery of questions has been developed measuring confidence in the specific institutions of the state. The questions were all based on a 1-7 response metric that has been used in many other countries. To make it easier, however, for the reader to compare these responses, the items are converted into a familiar 0-100 metric (commonly used in test grades or in Centigrade thermometers).

The series measuring system support contained a core of five items that attempt to get a generalized feeling of legitimacy in the system. These read as follows:



- B1. To what extent do you believe that the courts in [country] guarantee a fair trial?*
- B2. To what extent do you have respect for the political institutions of [country]?*
- B3. To what extent do you think that the basic rights of citizens are well protected by the [country] political system?*
- B4. To what extent do you feel proud to live under the political system of [country]?*
- B6. To what extent do you feel that one ought to support the political system of [country]?³⁰*

The comparative results are presented in two ways. First, the results are presented uncontrolled by any other variables. Second, the results are presented controlled for respondent evaluation of the performance of the incumbent government.³¹ Controls were also introduced for level of development (GNP per capita and infant mortality), but these variables played no significant role in determining overall levels of system support.³² This is an important finding. It suggests that

³⁰There is no question ‘B5’ in this study. Earlier versions of the PSA series included additional items, including B5, but that item (and others) were dropped as they were shown to be less essential to measuring the basic concept. In order to retain consistency of comparisons with prior work, the original numbering system was retained in this study for this series and all others presented in these pages.

³¹ The specific question asked M1. “Speaking in general about the current government, would you say that the job that President X is doing is (1) very good (2)good (3) neither good nor bad (4) bad (5) very bad? The control variable reversed the coding (M1R) so as to parallel the PSA5, which was coded from low system support to high.

³² The robust regression results are as follows:

Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 17270

overall levels of national wealth and development are *not* significant determinants of national levels of political legitimacy. The evaluation of incumbent performance, on the other hand, can be considered to be a measure of “specific support,” as compared to the five-item series that attempts to measure “diffuse support.” Prior research has shown that over time, low levels of specific support, brought on by popular satisfaction or dissatisfaction with government performance, will influence diffuse support.³³


The results are shown in Figure III.5. The y-axis measures system support, but now with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1. As can be seen, Costa Rica is far above the other countries in the study, being more than one-half a standard deviation higher than the mean. At the other extreme lie Ecuador and Bolivia, with results substantially below the mean for these ten countries. The control for incumbent evaluation, as we see, while it has a statistically significant impact on system support, it does not change the basic patterns that we find, with very sharp differences among the countries.

	F(3, 9) = 21.19
	Prob > F = 0.0002
	R-squared = 0.0990
	Root MSE = 20.856
Number of clusters (pairs) = 10	

psa5	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
gni2002	.0022069	.0010338	2.13	0.062	-.0001317 .0045455
infmort	-.1052443	.1245549	-0.84	0.420	-.387007 .1765184
m1	-6.012008	.7643067	-7.87	0.000	-7.74099 -4.283026
_cons	68.23269	7.210619	9.46	0.000	51.92114 84.54425


³³ Mitchell A. Seligson and Edward N. Muller, "Democratic Stability and Economic Crisis: Costa Rica 1978-1983," *International Studies Quarterly* 31 (1987):301-26; Steven Finkel, Edward Muller, and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Economic Crisis, Incumbent Performance and Regime Support: A Comparison of Longitudinal Data from West Germany and Costa Rica," *British Journal of Political Science* 19 (1989):329-51.

Figure III.5 System Support, Ten-Country Comparison: Standardized Results: Controlled vs. Uncontrolled



Another way of looking at these same data is to return to the 0-100 scale used throughout this report, while examining closely the confidence intervals of the results. That is, by looking at confidence intervals we can determine if there are groups of countries that have similar levels of system support. As shown in Figure III.6, four groups do indeed emerge. First there is Costa Rica, which is in a group of its own at the extreme high end of system support. Second, there is the group comprised of El Salvador, Mexico and Colombia, with a mid-range level of support. The third group, comprised of Panama, Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala, show relatively low levels of support, with Bolivia and Ecuador being at the extreme low end. Ecuador, actually forms a group of its own at the extreme low end.

Figure III.6 System Support, Ten-Country Comparison: Unstandardized Results (0-100 Basis)



3.5 Political Tolerance

Political tolerance, defined in these studies as the willingness to respect civil liberties of all citizens, even those with whom you disagree, has been problematical in much of Latin America. In most of the countries in the LAPOP series, majorities of respondents are found to be intolerant. These findings have been reported upon in prior studies in this series.

3.6 Measurement of Political Tolerance


Political systems may be politically stable for long periods of time, undergirded by high levels of system support, as discussed above in the section on system support.³⁴ But such systems are not necessarily democratic. In order for a political system to be both stable and democratic, its citizens ought not only believe in the legitimacy of the regime, but also be tolerant of the political rights of others, especially those with whom they disagree. When majorities of citizens are intolerant of the rights of others, the prospects for minority rights are dim, indeed. Concretely, it is difficult if not impossible for those who hold minority points of view to aspire to persuade others to accept those views, if the majority will not allow them to express themselves publicly. Majorities, as Przeworski has argued, must agree to “subject their values and interest to the interplay of democratic institutions and comply with (as yet unknown) outcomes of the democratic process.”³⁵

³⁴ The section of the theory of political tolerance and its link to stable democracy is drawn from earlier discussion of this topic in prior reports on other countries in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project.

³⁵ Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 51.

The measurement of tolerance has a long history. One method of measuring tolerance is to ask a set of questions that refer to the same group or groups. This method was pioneered many years ago in the United States, where the focus was on tolerance towards communism.³⁶ This approach worked well, so long as communists were perceived as a threat in the United States, but once the threat of communism receded, it was impossible to assume that lowered levels of intolerance toward communists were an indication of a general decline of intolerance. It became evident that a more general approach was needed so that comparisons could be made across time and across countries. Another approach has been to use the “least-liked group” question, where the respondent selects the group that he/she dislikes the most and then is asked a series of questions about tolerating that group.³⁷ Unfortunately, many Latin Americans refuse to name a group, leaving the level of tolerance for those people unknowable. The approach taken by the Latin American Public Opinion Project avoids both of these pitfalls.³⁸ The four-item series on tolerance that we developed reads as follows:

This card has a scale from 1 to 10 steps, with 1 indicating that you disapprove a lot and 10 indicating that you approve a lot. The questions that follow are to find out your opinion about different ideas that people who live in [country] have.



D1. There are people who only say bad things about the governments of [country], not only the current government, but the system of [country i.e. Bolivian] government. How strongly (on the scale of 1-10), would you approve or disapprove the right to vote of these people? Please read me the number.

³⁶ Samuel C. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (New York: Doubleday, 1955).

³⁷ John L. Sullivan, James E. Pierson, and George E. Marcus, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

³⁸ Even though different measures have been utilized in the study of tolerance, it turns out that they all seem to capture the same underlying dimension. For evidence of this, see James L. Gibson, “Alternative Measures of Political Tolerance: Must Tolerance Be ‘Least-Liked?’,” *American Journal of Political Science* 36 May (1992): 560-77.

D2. Thinking still of those people who only say bad things about the [country] system of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove that those people can carry out peaceful demonstrations with the purpose of expressing their points of view?

D3. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that the people who only say bad things about the [country] system of government be allowed to run for public office?

D4. Thinking still about those people who only say bad things about the [country] system of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of them appearing on television to make a speech?

3.7 Tolerance Results

In the course of writing this summary report, data from the Dominican Republic became available as part of the LAPOP collaboration with the Pontificia Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra (PUCMM). In this section, therefore, it is possible to include some of that data.

Before looking at the results for tolerance, it is important to consider the role of control factors. Since tolerance is positively associated with education, countries with higher levels of social development should be more tolerant, or at least so goes the theory. For this reason, we introduce the standard two control variables used in this study: GNP and infant mortality. But, there is another factor, which is that since the battery of questions refers to those who “only say bad things about our system of government,” those respondents who are highly critical of their governments might favor the civil liberties of those who might express their criticism more than those who support the system of government. To deal with this potential source of bias, the data also need to be controlled for by individual evaluations of the incumbent regime (M1 in the questionnaire).³⁹ It turns out that both infant mortality, as a measure of national development (one closely associated with national levels of education) and evaluations of the incumbent government are both significant predictors of tolerance.⁴⁰ This suggests that there is some truth to the argument that countries with higher levels of social development would have more tolerant citizens, and there is also some truth to the argument that the tolerance scale picks up on individual evaluations of the regime in power. The results, both controlled and uncontrolled are shown in Figure III.7.

³⁹ A control for national-level popularity was also attempted, but the variable was not significant.

⁴⁰ Regression with robust standard errors


Number of obs = 17267
 F(3, 9) = 12.87
 Prob > F = 0.0013
 R-squared = 0.0472
 Root MSE = 25.796

Number of clusters (pais) = 10

tol	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
gni2002	.0017035	.0010775	1.58	0.148	-.000734 .0041409
infmort	-.2399709	.0952627	-2.52	0.033	-.45547 -.0244717
m1	2.078553	.6908083	3.01	0.015	.5158358 3.64127
_cons	48.87361	5.505707	8.88	0.000	36.41883 61.32838


Several findings need to be commented upon. First, the countries seem to divide into two main groups, those with tolerance above the average for the ten countries and those below. Specifically, Panama (with the highest *uncontrolled* level of political tolerance), Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica and Mexico score as more tolerant than the mean, while El Salvador, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala and Bolivia are below the mean. Second, when the controlled scores are examined, important differences emerge for some countries. The unpopularity of the incumbent administration in Panama sharply decreases political tolerance in that country (i.e., tolerance for the right of people to say bad things about the political system). When we correct for presidential popularity, Panama has about the same level of tolerance as does Nicaragua and Honduras. Surprisingly, correcting for the popularity effect, along with development, also sharply reduces the high level of political tolerance in Costa Rica and Mexico. At the other extreme, Bolivia's low level of tolerance is mitigated by the controls, leaving Ecuador as the most intolerant of the countries.

Figure III.7 Political Tolerance: Eleven-Country Comparison: Controlled vs. Uncontrolled Standardized Results



These findings need to be examined more carefully to look for significant differences in the controlled results. These results are presented in Figure III.8. This is a clearer picture (excluding the Dominican Republic). It shows that Panama, Nicaragua and Honduras comprise one group with relatively high tolerance, although note that the increase over the mean for all ten countries is only about .2 of a standard deviation, which is rather small. The remaining countries all group closely except for Ecuador, which is substantially lower than the others.


Figure III.8 Political Tolerance: Ten-Nation Comparison: Confidence Intervals of Standardized Results With Controls



The most dramatic change occurs in Bolivia, which shifts from a very intolerant nation to one in about the middle of the group, when the controls are included. Recall, that the results of the tolerance measure were controlled by GNP per capita, infant mortality and approval/disapproval of the incumbent administration. The robust regression analysis determined that only the last two make a significant impact on tolerance scores, so the question that now arises is which of the two remaining variables has the largest effect on explaining the dramatic shift in Bolivia's tolerance level? This can be determined by removing GNP as a control, and including the two remaining variables in separate equations. The results are shown in Figure III.9. When controlled for incumbent approval alone, Bolivia's tolerance levels remain far below the others in the series. When controlled for infant mortality, however, tolerance increases dramatically, nearly reaching the overall mean of zero for the eleven countries. (Note that the chart needs to be read carefully since the incumbent approval measure is not used in the regressions for the Dominican Republic.) The conclusion is clear: one major reason why tolerance scores in Bolivia are so low is because of the low national level of social development in that country. Specifically, the very high levels of infant mortality, which has been used in this report as a summary index of social development, are also associated with low levels of education. The difficulty is that measures of education are unreliable because it is not possible to equate a year of education in one country with a year in any other because of very large differences in quality of education. This means that in a country like Costa Rica, it is possible that someone with 12 years of education might be far better educated than someone with the same number of years of education in Bolivia. Since we just don't know, the more objective infant mortality data are used in this study. The country

reports that have been written on Bolivia have found that this is the only country in the LAPOP in which higher levels of education do not correlate with higher levels of tolerance.⁴¹ This finding suggests that the quality of education does matter for the democracy variables being studied in this series.

Figure III.9 Political Tolerance: Ten-Nation Comparison: Differential Impact of Control Variables



3.8 Support for Stable Democracy

The two variables being examined in this chapter, system support and tolerance, have now been examined in some detail. The interested reader can probe the relationships at the country level by reviewing the results contained in the eight country-level studies that accompany this synthesis volume. The theory with which we are working at LAPOP is that both attitudes are needed for long-term democratic stability. Citizens must *both* believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions *and* also be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In such a system, there can be majority rule accompanying minority rights, a combination of attributes often viewed as the quintessential definition of democracy.

⁴¹ Mitchell A. Seligson, *La cultura política de la democracia boliviana, Así piensan los bolivianos*, # 60. (La Paz, Bolivia: Encuestas y Estudios, 1999); Mitchell A. Seligson, "El reto de la tolerancia política en Bolivia," *Retos, Revista especializada de análisis político* 8, no. Mayo (2001):5-15; Mitchell A. Seligson, *Auditoria de la democracia: Bolivia, 2002* (La Paz, Bolivia: Universidad Católica Boliviana, 2003).

In prior studies emerging from the LAPOP, the relationship between system support and tolerance has been explored in an effort to develop a predictive model of democratic stability.¹¹ The framework shown in Table III.2 below represents all of the theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance when the two variables are divided between high and low.¹²

Table III.2. Theoretical Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support in Institutionally Democratic Polities

System support	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democratic Breakdown

Let us review each cell, one-by-one. Political systems populated largely by citizens who have high system support and high political tolerance are those political systems that would be predicted to be the most stable. This prediction is based on the logic that high support is needed in non-coercive environments for the system to be stable. If citizens do not support their political system, and they have the freedom to act, system change would appear to be the eventual inevitable outcome. Systems that are stable, however, will not necessarily be democratic unless minority rights are assured. Such assurance could, of course, come from constitutional guarantees, but unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be little opportunity for those minorities to run for and win elected office. Under those conditions, of course, majorities can always suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are both politically legitimate, as demonstrated by positive system support and that have citizens who are reasonably tolerant of minority rights, are likely to enjoy stable democracy.¹³

When system support remains high, but tolerance is low, then the system should remain stable (because of the high support), but democratic rule ultimately might be placed in jeopardy. Such systems would tend to move toward authoritarian (oligarchic) rule in which democratic rights would be restricted.

Low system support is the situation characterized by the lower two cells in the table, and should be directly linked to unstable situations. Instability, however, does not necessarily translate into the ultimate reduction of civil liberties, since the instability could serve to force the system to deepen its democracy, especially when the values tend toward political tolerance. Hence, in the situation of low support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict if the instability will result in greater democratization or a protracted period of instability characterized perhaps by

¹¹This framework was presented in Mitchell A. Seligson, "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America," *Estudios interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2 July-December (2000): 5-29. See also Mitchell A. Seligson and Ricardo Córdoba Macías, *El Salvador: De la guerra a la paz, una cultura política en transición* (San Salvador: IDELA y FUNDANGO, 1995).

¹²The scale ranges from 0-100, so the most natural cut-point is 50. In actuality, since the zero also counts as a valid value in the scale, there are 101 points to the scale, and the arithmetic division would be 50.5. In this and other studies we have used 50 because it is more intuitive.

¹³Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.

considerable violence. On the other hand, in situations of low support and low tolerance, democratic breakdown seems to be the direction of the eventual outcome. One cannot, of course, on the basis of public opinion data alone, predict a breakdown, since so many other factors, including the role of elites, the position of the military and the support/opposition of international players, are crucial to this process. But, systems in which the mass public neither support the basic institutions of the nation, nor support the rights of minorities, are vulnerable to democratic breakdown.

It is important to keep in mind two caveats that apply to this scheme. First, note that the relationships discussed here only apply to systems that are already institutionally democratic. That is, they are systems in which competitive, regular elections are held and widespread participation is allowed. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have entirely different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Second, the assumption being made is that over the long run, attitudes of both elites and the mass public make a difference in regime type. Attitudes and system type may remain incongruent for many years. Indeed, Seligson and Booth have shown for the case of Nicaragua that incongruence might have eventually helped to bring about the overthrow of the Somoza government. But the Nicaraguan case was one in which the extant system was authoritarian and repression had long been used to maintain an authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of its citizens.¹⁴

3.9 Empirical Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support

It is now time to put together the two variables that have been the focus of this chapter by examining the joint distribution of the two variables. To do this, both variables are dichotomized into “high” and “low.”¹⁵ The overall index of tolerance was utilized, but the scale was divided into high and low at the 50-point. System support is scaled in a similar way, and split at the 50-point to distinguish between high and low. The results are shown in Table III.3.

¹⁴Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, “Political Culture and Regime Type: Evidence from Nicaragua and Costa Rica,” *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 55, No. 3, August, 1993, pp. 777-792. A different version appears as “Cultura política y democratización: vías alternas en Nicaragua y Costa Rica.” In Carlos Barba Solano, José Luis Barros Horcasitas y Javier Hurtado, *Transiciones a la democracia en Europa y América Latina*. México: FLACSO y Universidad de Guadalajara, 1991, pp. 628-681. Also appears as “Paths to Democracy and the Political Culture of Costa Rica, Mexico and Nicaragua,” Larry Diamond, ed., *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, pp. 99-130.

¹⁵If the variables were left in their original 0-100 format, the table would potentially have 100 cells in each direction, making it impossible to read and interpret.


Table III.3. Relationship of Tolerance and System Support: Eleven-Nation Comparison

Country			TOLR Political Tolerance Recorded	
			1.00 High	2.00 Low
1 México	PSA5R System Support Recorded	1.00 High	41.3%	23.2%
		2.00 Low	21.1%	14.4%
2 Guatemala	PSA5R System Support Recorded	1.00 High	21.2%	23.8%
		2.00 Low	19.3%	35.7%
3 El Salvador	PSA5R System Support Recorded	1.00 High	32.3%	34.8%
		2.00 Low	17.1%	15.8%
4 Honduras	PSA5R System Support Recorded	1.00 High	29.9%	21.8%
		2.00 Low	22.6%	25.7%
5 Nicaragua	PSA5R System Support Recorded	1.00 High	28.3%	20.0%
		2.00 Low	26.8%	24.8%
6 Costa Rica	PSA5R System Support Recorded	1.00 High	48.5%	33.0%
		2.00 Low	10.7%	7.7%
7 Panamá	PSA5R System Support Recorded	1.00 High	37.9%	16.1%
		2.00 Low	30.3%	15.7%
8 Colombia	PSA5R System Support Recorded	1.00 High	31.6%	30.1%
		2.00 Low	16.6%	21.8%
9 Ecuador	PSA5R System Support Recorded	1.00 High	14.9%	18.1%
		2.00 Low	26.9%	40.2%
10 Bolivia 2002	PSA5R System Support Recorded	1.00 High	13.5%	28.1%
		2.00 Low	14.6%	43.7%
15 Dominican Republic	PSA5R System Support Recorded	1.00 High	18.1%	20.8%
		2.00 Low	21.9%	39.3%

In order to simplify the presentation, and focus on the crucial stable democracy cell, the results are presented in graphical form for that cell alone in Figure III.10. These results show the dramatic differences in the percentage of the populations in the stable democracy “cell” in the above tables, ranging from the high end in Costa Rica to the low end in Bolivia (2002). It comes as no surprise that Costa Rica is so high compared to the other countries. Indeed, the only reason Costa Rica is not higher is that political tolerance in that country is not nearly as high as one would hope, given its many years of democratic rule. Some researchers have suggested that tolerance has declined in recent years as a result of the waves of immigration from Nicaragua, which has raised prejudices against those who are seen as weakening the Costa Rican model. This is a subject dealt with in the country report from Costa Rica, and the interested reader should consult that report. The low levels of support for stable democracy in Ecuador and Bolivia also do not surprise, given the extreme difficulties those two countries have faced in recent years. The ephemeral coup in Ecuador, and the later election of its leader to the presidency, and the mass protests in Bolivia, which drove out of office a sitting president, are manifestations of the combination of low levels of national legitimacy and low levels of political tolerance. More surprising, perhaps, is the higher level of support for stable democracy in Colombia, a country wracked by civil war and guerrilla violence. As will be shown in the next graph, the very high level of presidential popularity in Colombia at the moment of the survey is not responsible for this mid-range ranking. Therefore, we would need to conclude, as does the

country-level report on Colombia, that there are much stronger routes to democratic stability in Colombia than the violence suggests.

Figure III.10 Percent of the Population With Attitudes Conducive to Stable Democracy: Eleven Countries



The results from the above figure are presented again, but this time controlled for GNP per capita, infant mortality and incumbent performance.⁴² Of the three control variables, only infant mortality is not significant in the robust regressions reported below. The results are shown in Figure III.11. Employing these controls, one finds that Costa Rica, Mexico and Panama are still at the high end of the series, and Bolivia at the low end. But, Ecuador, once these controllers are introduced, moves substantially higher. Nicaragua and Honduras fall substantially. The Dominican Republic is excluded from the analysis as the data set does not have the same incumbent performance variable as found in the others.


⁴² Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 16904
 F(3, 9) = 25.63
 Prob > F = 0.0001
 R-squared = 0.0490
 Root MSE = 43.708

Number of clusters (pais) = 10

bar2x2	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
gni2002	.0040205	.001593	2.52	0.033	.0004168 .0076241
infmort	-.299252	.1611331	-1.86	0.096	-.6637603 .0652563
mlr	4.325574	.8442906	5.12	0.001	2.415656 6.235492
_cons	14.429	11.3319	1.27	0.235	-11.20554 40.06354

Figure III.11 Support for Stable Democracy: Eleven-Country Comparison: Normalized Results, Controlled



3.10 Conclusions

This chapter has examined system support, political tolerance, and the relationship among the two variables. The study has found sharp differences among the countries in the series. A portion of these differences is a function of the macro-economic and social conditions that vary from country-to-country, while an important part of the difference can be attributed to genuine differences in political culture.

4.0 Corruption and Democracy

4.1 Corruption as a Threat to Democracy: Is there a Link?

Widespread corruption is increasingly seen as one of the most significant threats to deepening democratization in Latin America (and indeed much of the democratizing Third World). In a recent study, Kurt Weyland argues forcefully that corruption has increased a great deal under democracy in Latin America, and points to several factors that are responsible for the increase.⁴³ First, he argues that the dispersion of power in the hands of many (as has occurred as dictatorships have been replaced by democracies) has widened the opportunity for bribery. In effect, there are many more “veto players” today than those under the military, and therefore there has been an increase in the number of palms that require greasing. Second, neoliberal reforms have involved opening many areas of the economy to bribery, especially those involving sales of public corporations. Third, the increasing numbers of neopopulist leaders, who win elections based on personal appeals through television, are driving aspiring politicians to corrupt practices in order to collect the funds needed to pay for TV time.

In recent years foreign donors has expended considerable resources worldwide in the effort to mitigate corruption.⁴⁴ New initiatives in the international assistance area, including the Millennium Challenge Account, require the recipients to be making important progress in stemming corruption as a condition for aid. Although there is much concern over the negative impact that corruption is having on democracy, the proponents of this view have not often made explicit precisely how it is that democracy is weakened by corruption.

How might corruption threaten democratization? The argument is that corruption weakens democracy by undermining citizen trust in the regime, in effect, deligitimizing it. If Weyland is right, and corruption is on the rise, one can expect that the nascent democracies in Latin America, and by extension the democratizing world, will have an even greater difficulty in establishing and retaining their right to govern. One of the major limitations that authoritarian regimes have in establishing their own legitimacy is that more often than not they operate as cleptocracies, in which the state is corrupt to its core, and citizens know it. In a similar fashion, democracies, based as they are on expectations of accountability, may weaken their own legitimacy when corruption is rampant.

Is there evidence for this linkage between corruption and the erosion of legitimacy? In fact, the classic research in the field, widely respected for many years, argued persuasively for precisely the reverse relationship. From that point of view, corruption serves a very constructive purpose in developing countries by establishing functional clientelistic ties that bind constituents to public officials, allowing relatively low-cost circumvention of dysfunctional bureaucracies. In that way, corruption was seen as having a positive impact on political systems. As Samuel Huntington put it most succinctly in this classic statement: “the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, over-centralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over-centralized honest bureaucracy.”⁴⁵ The view that corruption helps “grease the wheels” of dysfunctional

⁴³ Kurt Weyland, “The Politics of Corruption in Latin America,” *Journal of Democracy*, no. 2 (1998):108-21.

⁴⁴ USAID Agency Objectives, “Good Governance” from <http://www.usaid.gov/democracy/gov.html> and also <http://www.usaid.gov/democracy/anticorruption/usaidprogs.html>.

⁴⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

bureaucracies is prominent not only in the work of Huntington and classic works such as V.O. Key's *Southern Politics* published in 1949, but also in more contemporary studies.⁴⁶ In short, according to this view, corruption is just what the doctor ordered for the Third World.

Is this argument accurate and does corruption help “grease the wheels” of the public bureaucracy, thus making it more agile, functional, and most importantly more responsive to public demands? If it does, then one would expect that more corruption would lead to greater accountability and a public that is more satisfied with the political system.

More recent research, empirically based, takes the opposite approach, one that is consistent with international donor concerns that corruption is not only unhelpful, but it can do serious damage to both economic growth and democratic development.⁴⁷ Unfortunately, there are few empirically-based studies of the subject, and the ones that do exist do not test corruption itself, but only perceptions of corruption. One study on ten Central and Eastern European countries and Russia supports the linkage, finding that greater perceived corruption relates to lower trust in democratic institutions.⁴⁸ A more recent study, based on 16 countries, including the U.S., Japan, New Zealand, and countries in Western and Eastern Europe, concludes that “corruption undermines citizens’ faith in their governments.”⁴⁹ In the present paper these findings will be supported, but with a direct measure of corruption experienced by individuals who live in the countries being studied rather than with an index of perception of the degree of corruption constructed by external observers.

In order to establish the linkage between corruption and the erosion of support for democracy, the paper dwells on the issue of the measurement of corruption. Early on in the effort to increase transparency to fight corruption, it became evident to USAID that in order to know precisely where to expend its resources and how to measure the degree of success of its program, it was going to be very important to be able to measure the magnitude of corruption in each of the countries in which it might invest anti-corruption resources. However, unlike programs in other areas—for example health, where there are universally accepted objective indicators like infant mortality rates and life expectancy—there is not yet any universally accepted standard for measuring corruption.

Unless it is known how much corruption there is, and whether it is increasing or declining, little can be done to target efforts to reduce it. In the absence of reliable data on corruption, USAID faces difficulties in targeting its anti-corruption spending. More important, perhaps, is that without reliable and specific information on corruption, USAID cannot determine what impact, if any, anti-corruption efforts are having, which is, after all, “the bottom line.”

⁴⁶ Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston, and Victor T. LeVine, *Political Corruption: A User's Manual* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1989).

⁴⁷ Susan Rose-Ackerman, *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁴⁸ William Mishler and Richard Rose, "What Are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-Communist Societies," *Comparative Political Studies* 34, no. 1 (2001):30-62.

⁴⁹ Christopher J. Anderson and Yuliya V. Tverdova, "Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary Democracies," *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 1 (2003):91-109. The quotation is from p. 105.

Although constrained by the limited space available in the format dictated by these short research notes, this paper will respond to the challenge of developing better measures of corruption in the following six sections:

- 1) a brief examination of the widespread use of corruption *perception* measure;
- 2) a discussion of an alternative measure of corruption *experience*;
- 3) an exploration into the level of corruption detected by the corruption-victimization series, using data from several countries drawn from the Latin American Public Opinion Project;
- 4) an examination of the data to find out who the victims of corruption are;
- 5) a discussion of the research that hypothesizes about the positive and negative effects of corruption on governance, providing evidence that shows just how dangerous corruption is for democratic consolidation, i.e., that corruption matters;
- 6) and finally, the paper will show how corruption levels vary substantially *within* nations being assisted by USAID.

4.2 The Challenge: Measuring Corruption⁵⁰

It is not surprising that until recently corruption research has been largely descriptive rather than empirical. Given its *sub rosa* nature, corruption is inherently an extremely difficult phenomenon to measure—thus presenting a large obstacle for those researchers attempting to study it. In other areas of development, it is easy to have participants or outsiders list accomplishments. For example, health workers can report on the number of vaccines administered or healthy babies delivered. We cannot ask, however, for police officers to report on the number of bribes they take in a given week or for customs officials to report on how much duty goes uncollected. The need to get some handle on the level of corruption has led, over the years, to pursuing different approaches to solving this problem, but each approach has suffered from its own limitations.

The early efforts were based on official police and court records. One simply counted the number of arrests and convictions for corruption in a given country. The main difficulty with that approach, of course, was the spuriousness of the measure; the more vigilant the authorities, the more arrests and convictions, producing a corruption index that was almost completely independent of the corruption level itself. For example, in highly corrupt governments there may be virtually no enforcement, and therefore very little corruption is reported, while in “squeaky clean” governments there may be frequent arrests and convictions for even minor infractions. For the most part, this approach has been abandoned.

In order to overcome the measurement problem inherent in using official records two newer approaches have been taken—each with its own limitations, however. The first is that carried out by Berlin-based Transparency International (TI) with its annual highly respected and widely used Corruption-Perception Index (CPI). TI is dedicated to generating public support for anti-corruption programs and enhancing transparency and accountability in government, and USAID has provided important financial and technical support for their programs worldwide. In recent years the index has been greatly strengthened due to the use of multiple sources of data and

⁵⁰ This section draws on Mitchell A. Seligson, “The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries,” *Journal of Politics* 64 (2002c):408-33.

multi-year averages, thus increasing the reliability of the measure.⁵¹ The CPI remains the most widely used measure of corruption, akin to the Freedom House measure of democracy. Most economists rely upon the CPI when they examine the impact of corruption on growth and investment.

The results of the TI index for Latin America in 2002 are shown in Figure IV.1. The index ranges from a high of 10, in which the country is considered to be “highly clean” to a 0, for countries that are considered to be “highly corrupt.” The 2002 report ranks 102 countries, and finds seventy countries—including many of the world’s most poverty stricken—that score less than 5 out of a possible 10. For comparison, it is important to note that the countries with a score of higher than 9 are Finland, Denmark, New Zealand, Iceland, Singapore, and Sweden. As seen in Figure IV.1, no Latin American country scores that high, with Chile scoring the highest, 7.5. Only one other country scores above 5, Uruguay (at 5.1), while all other Latin American countries do worse, placing them among the bottom 70 countries. It is obvious from this information that corruption in Latin America, at least as measured by the TI perception index, is a serious problem.

As illuminating as these results may seem to be, we need to consider their limitations. The scores are based upon a series of surveys conducted by different organizations and include a measure from the Economist Intelligence Unit, the Pricewaterhouse Cooper’s Opacity Index, and data from Freedom House. These data sources rely heavily upon the impressions of international business people, which are reasonably good, albeit limited, sources of data. The great strength of these data sources is also a weakness—they tap into the perceptions of individuals engaged in international business and thus are good at evaluating business transactions, but they are weak at tapping into the whole range of activities pursued by the citizens of the countries being evaluated. These activities are not business related and thus require a different kind of data. Moreover, a problem with data from such sources is that it is difficult to separate stereotyping from reality. These indexes do not attempt to report on how frequently bribery actually occurs in the countries being studied but on how corrupt the respondents *perceive* the countries to be. Of course, this may be based on their own experience or on what they happened to have heard about a specific country. Consider Paraguay—long considered by most experts on Latin America to be an endemically corrupt country. It is also a country with very little foreign investment and very few international business arrangements. According to the World Bank, for example, net private capital inflows for Paraguay in 2000 was a *negative* \$16 million and total foreign direct investment was only \$82 million in an economy with a GDP of \$6.9 billion. Foreign direct investment in Paraguay amounts to only about 1% of the GDP, a level only one-sixth of that of its neighbor Brazil. How many of the respondents in the surveys of business people used by the data sources whose perceptions were incorporated into the CPI had actually conducted business in Paraguay? The chances are, not many. Rather it is likely that the ratings of Paraguay are based largely upon a stereotype, which may or may not be closely linked to reality. Furthermore, while TI draws on fifteen different sources for its data, Paraguay’s results emerge from consulting only three sources because so few data sources have a large enough sampling of businessmen and -women to enable Paraguay to be given a score. Finland, on the other hand, with a population nearly identical to that of Paraguay, was rated by eight sources. Indeed, an inspection of the

⁵¹ These efforts are explained in detail in the TI website. The specific document that presents the methodological issues is www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/cpi_framework.html.

number of sources used for Latin American countries as a whole reveals that with the exception of the largest and richest, most were rated by only a handful of sources, raising doubts about the reliability of the information.

A further complication with the CPI is that it may suffer from an “endogeneity problem.” That is, the results of the CPI may be strongly influenced by factors other than direct observation by participants. Consider the case of Argentina. In 1995, when Argentina was the darling of the development community, having progressed rapidly in its privatization programs, it was scored at 5.2 on a 0-to-10 scale by TI. By 2002, however, the Argentine economy was in ruins, and its score had plummeted to 2.8. If Argentina had retained its 1995 corruption score, it would have been ranked second in all of Latin America and near the top of the developing world. But by 2002, it had fallen into the bottom half in Latin America. Was that precipitous fall in the index, reflecting a putative increase in corruption, a function of a sudden real increase in corruption or did those who responded to the CPI surveys begin to note a discrepancy between low economic performance and the TI score of reasonably low levels of corruption? If so, it may well be that corruption levels were, in reality, not much different in 2002 than they had been in 1995 but that respondents to the TI surveys felt the need to adjust their corruption scores to match the level of Argentina’s economic performance. In other words, it is likely that the TI corruption measure on Argentina declined not because corruption increased, but because the poor performance of the economy told observers that corruption must be higher than they thought it had been. On the other hand, if we assume that the TI index for Argentina was actually picking up on a sudden increase in corruption over the period 1995-2002, then this would imply that slowed growth actually increased corruption. However, the logic of the research from the World Bank and others has been just the opposite; namely, that high levels of corruption slow growth. If poor economic performance is the cause of corruption rather than the other way around, then anti-corruption programs would be irrelevant since the “fix” for corruption would be to spur economic growth.

In recent years, a very widely used alternative to the TI measure has emerged from the World Bank Institute, which has been releasing a series of “governance indicators” that include a measure of “control of corruption.”⁵² These indicators are widely cited as the best available measures of national governance. The results for Latin America are shown in Figure IV.2. Do we learn something new from these data that we did not know from the TI measure? It is obvious from comparison with the TI results shown in Figure IV.2 that the two scores correspond very closely. Indeed, the rank-order correlation (Spearman’s rho) between the two measures is an almost perfect 0.96. Rarely do the social sciences produce such consistent results in indexes based on perception, and we are left with the impression of great precision of measurement in these two apparently independent sources. Careful examination of the two data sources reveals, however, that they rely on most of the very same sources from which they derive their indexes, explaining why they arrive at similar conclusions. The problems noted with the CPI, then, are also to be found in the World Bank Institute “control of corruption” measure.

⁵² These data are easily available at <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata200.htm>. The original data are listed as a 0–100 percentile rank and have been converted here to a 0–10 score to correspond to the CPI 0–10 format.

Figure IV.1 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index for Latin America, 2002





Figure IV.2 World Bank Institute Corruption Control Index, 2001/2002



The lesson from this examination of TI's CPI and the World Bank Institute's Corruption-Control Index is that one ought to interpret their results with care, while recognizing that they are probably the best measures currently available for a worldwide ranking. If a general notion of the level of corruption in a country is needed, these measures are, at least for the moment, the best source. They allow international agencies to target the countries with the highest levels of corruption and, of course, can provide an important tool for investors who want to know what they are likely to confront if they invest in a specific country. Unfortunately, however, the measures are of limited utility for much of what USAID is trying to accomplish in its transparency and anti-corruption programs because *they provide only a national aggregate measure, with no breakdowns by type or locus of corruption.* These measures do not reveal, for

any of the countries, those who are most likely to be affected by corruption—making it very difficult to design a cost-effective anti-corruption strategy. Similarly, an aggregate measure for a country does not allow development practitioners to measure the impact of specific anti-corruption programs. Equally frustrating, the TI and WBI measures are limited in that they are presented as *relative* scores (i.e., ranks and percentiles).⁵³ Consider the situation where the worldwide trend is toward improvement, and an individual country has done better from one year to the next; if others have also improved, the impression will be given that the country in question has stagnated. Moreover, the aggregate, nation-wide measures make it impossible to know if corruption does in fact erode confidence in the political system, as the World Bank argues, or if it has the positive impacts that Huntington claimed for it. Moreover, national aggregate measures of corruption do not allow for an examination of regions or groupings within a country. It is risky to assume that corruption is uniform throughout a country, and the data presented in this paper will show that it is in fact not. If USAID wants to target certain geographic hot spots of corruption, for example, then national aggregate measures like the CPI are not helpful. If USAID wants to target certain groups demographically, socio-economically, or occupationally, the CPI cannot help.

How to solve the problem of finding a measure of corruption that is both valid and subnational? A new approach has been taken by Harvard's Susan Pharr, who constructs an index based on newspaper reports of corruption.⁵⁴ One advantage of this method is that the newspaper articles report where the corruption occurred and who was involved. Unfortunately, this measure alone cannot overcome the problem of validity. The accusations reported in the articles may be entirely the invention of the newspaper staff, whose motivations for making the accusation may vary from a desire to increase circulation to an effort to weaken one party or candidate and strengthen another. Indeed, the newspaper may publish stories on alleged acts of corruption because the paper is "on the take" from some political or business group that wants to make its opponents look bad. The classic example of this comes from Mexico, where *Excelsior*, for decades regarded as the "newspaper of record" in that country, was subsequently found to have been on the payroll of the PRI (the ruling party) for decades.

4.3 Measuring Corruption Victimization

Recently, a more promising method has been developed that largely overcomes both of the limitations of the previously mentioned methods. The new approach has been inspired by crime-victimization surveys, which have become the mainstay of sociological investigation into crime. Criminologists have long recognized that official reports of crime are highly unreliable because of the likelihood that the data have been manipulated. Police chiefs who want new patrol cars from their local governments have a strong incentive to help justify the request by providing "evidence" that a crime wave has hit the town. To develop this evidence, the police chief may tell his/her officers to become especially aggressive when enforcing the law, or it may be that the

⁵³ The WB web site (<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2001.html>) states: "As discussed in detail in the accompanying papers, countries' *relative positions* on these indicators are subject to margins of error that are clearly indicated in the data files and graphs downloadable below." These measures should not be confused with the WB studies of corruption experience.

⁵⁴ Susan J. Pharr, "Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies," in *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?*, ed. Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

figures themselves have been cooked. Alternatively, politicians who want to take credit for successes in fighting crime have the incentive to make it appear that crime is on the wane, and salary raises for the police force might subtly be made contingent upon less aggressive policing.

In order to overcome these intractable problems, criminologists have increasingly come to rely upon victimization surveys, which are widely regarded as providing a more accurate tally of crime rates.⁵⁵ That approach is the inspiration for the current movement to use surveys of national populations to estimate corruption levels. Internationally, this approach has been spearheaded by the United Nations Center for International Crime Prevention. Implemented in 1987, the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) now includes 55 countries, with samples of between 1,000 and 2,000 respondents per country. In 1996, for the first time, a question was included in the surveys on bribe victimization.

The UN approach represented a good start, but a broader series of questions is preferable since anti-corruption projects need much more detailed information about the nature and level of corruption than a single question could provide. That is precisely the reason behind the approach that the Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project began applying in 1996 and the World Bank began using in 1998. These efforts, which may also incidentally ask about *perception* of corruption, focus on actual citizen *experience* (i.e., victimization) with public sector corruption. The World Bank studies have been carried out in Nicaragua, Honduras, and, more recently, Ecuador, and, by 2003, had been carried out in many other countries around the world.⁵⁶ The World Bank surveys generally include samples of the national public, but also include specialized samples of “service users” and of government officials. In that way they are able to get at corruption from a variety of angles. Moreover, the World Bank has made efforts to calculate the cost of corruption by asking respondents to indicate the value of the bribe solicited or paid. The World Bank surveys, however, do not include questions on attitudes toward democracy, thus making it impossible to see how corruption might affect democracy.

At Vanderbilt, the effort has been to measure corruption and its impact. Corruption is measured by direct personal experience with it. In the course of a public opinion survey of democratic values and behaviors, which is generally applied to a probability sample (i.e., “random sample”) of the nation being studied, a module of questions on corruption experience has been developed and refined since its first application in 1996.⁵⁷ In this approach, respondents are asked a series of questions recording their experience with corruption over the year immediately prior to the

⁵⁵ Homicide rates, however, are used as reliable indicators of one form of extreme crime. Only in places like South Africa under apartheid, where the murder of blacks was often not reported by the police, or in countries undergoing civil wars where record-keeping functions often break down entirely, are these rates unreliable.

⁵⁶ See Comité Nacional de Integridad and World Bank-CIET International. 1998. *Encuesta nacional sobre integridad y corrupción en la administración pública: Encuesta de hogares*. Managua. See also World Bank Institute, “Ecuador: Governance and Anticorruption Empirical Diagnostic Study; Evidence from Surveys of Households, Enterprises, and Public Officials,” (Washington, D. C.: World Bank, 2000).

⁵⁷ The surveys reported on in this project are all national probability samples carried out at various times from 1998 through 2002 in El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Bolivia. A web site is currently being constructed where this data can be easily accessed. The samples each have between 2,500 and 3,000 respondents, except for Paraguay, which included only 1,463. The first survey, conducted in Nicaragua, was developed with Casals and Associates. I would like to thank Dr. Sergio Dias Briquets of Casals and Dr. Andrew Stein, now of the U.S. Department of State, for assistance in that early work. Dr. Orlando Pérez of Central Michigan University has assisted in more recent studies in Honduras and Ecuador.

survey. A study of longer time frames can be attempted, but not only is the reliability of memory over long periods problematic, if USAID is attempting to reduce corruption via a specific project, it is especially important to limit the time frame so that the impact of the project can be picked up in subsequent measurements. These surveys, then, include both the key “independent variable” (i.e., corruption victimization) and the key “dependent variable” (i.e., trust in the system of government) so that the impact of the former on the latter can be measured, controlling for other factors (e.g., respondent income, education, gender, region, party affiliation, etc.)

The forms of corruption measured were decided upon based on focus groups and were ones that were found to be most commonly experienced in Latin America. The items have varied from questionnaire to questionnaire, but the following questions are common to a number of them:

- being stopped by a police officer for a trumped-up infraction of the law;
- being asked to pay a bribe⁵⁸ to a police officer;
- being asked to pay a bribe to a public official;
- being asked to pay an illegal fee to expedite a transaction at the municipal government;
- being asked to pay a bribe at work;
- being asked to pay a bribe for public health/medical service;
- being asked to pay a bribe in the school system;

An observation about the series of questions relates to corruption in the schools and in public health. Focus-group research demonstrated that users of these services tend to be very well aware of the rules of the game. If, for example, primary education is supposed to be free, many citizens consider it corrupt behavior if fees are demanded by the teachers, even if the purpose of the fee is to purchase books or supplies that ought to come from the state. For that reason, the original questionnaire series referred to “improper payments” in the schools or health clinics. However, some critics of these questions suggested that these payments were not really signs of corruption but merely a reflection of the poor state of public financing of human services. In order to focus directly on corruption itself, these items have been altered in the most recent administrations of the questionnaire, and the term “improper payments” was dropped and “bribes” substituted. This change resulted in a small decline in reported acts of corruption in the health service and a somewhat larger decline of reported acts of corruption in the school system. Yet, even with these adjustments the levels remain distressingly high, as will be shown below.

The analysis of the corruption victimization data has been carried out in two ways. First, when the particular form of corruption is the focus (in order, perhaps, to develop an anti-corruption campaign targeted to each specific form of corruption), individual items are chosen to be analyzed so that the particular form of corruption can be highlighted. The second approach is to form an overall scale of corruption so that the total experiences can be examined and linked to their impact on individual variables, such as political legitimacy. When formed as a scale, the items have been found to be reliable (Cronbach Alphas of around 0.75, depending on the country).

⁵⁸ The word for “bribe” in Spanish differs among the countries sampled. In Central America, the survey generally used “mordida” while in South America the word “coima” was utilized. In both areas, however, the additional term “soborno” was utilized.

In the Vanderbilt University approach to corruption victimization, national samples have been used. The World Bank, however, which has also carried out national samples of corruption victimization, has included specialized samples of individuals in various sectors, such as the business world or various sectors of the state. The advantage of the World Bank approach is that it allows an even finer-grained targeting of anti-corruption efforts; the disadvantage, of course, is cost.

4.3.1 Limitations of the Corruption-Victimization Measure

No system of measuring attitudes or behaviors is without limitations, and the corruption-victimization measure suffers from two of them, which will be pointed out here.

- Are all survey respondents who report having paid a bribe really “victims”? Perhaps some bribe payers are not victims at all but in fact are willing participants in the transaction, deliberately seeking to circumvent rules and regulations in order to advance their own objectives. Such individuals, then, may not be “victims” but willing “clients” in a patron/client relationship with the bribe taker. On the other hand, if the system were both *fair* and *efficient*, there would be little reason for citizens to become clients. If the police did not regularly stop motorists in Latin America who have done nothing wrong, then there would be no reason to offer to pay a bribe. Similarly, in instances when the motorist actually commits a traffic infraction and seeks to avoid a ticket and the corresponding fine, an honest police officer would not demand or accept a bribe. If the public sector were both fair and efficient, individuals could easily obtain the service they are seeking (e.g., a permit from the local government) and there would be no need to pay a bribe. Additionally, if one sought to avoid paying a large, legally established fee for a service and the public officials were honest, no bribe would be accepted. In short, while it is always possible to view corruption “victims” as corruption “partners,” bribery would be largely futile if not for the inefficiency and complicity of a corrupt public sector.
- The survey approach is constrained in its coverage because it measures only low-level corruption, but is incapable of measuring much high-level corruption. This critique is valid, but only to a limited degree. It is true that surveys of the public do not measure—nor do they attempt to measure—high-level corruption (e.g., bribes paid to ministers or legislators). But, it would be a serious error to assume that low-level corruption is not strongly correlated with the degree of corruption at the top. It is simply not reasonable to imagine that a political system that is very corrupt at the level of day-to-day transactions (police, local government, schools, banks, etc.) would be squeaky clean at the top. Similarly, it is difficult to imagine the reverse situation with a highly corrupt senior administration combined with an absence of corruption down on the street. Since there seems to be no reasonable way to directly measure high-level corruption (rather, only the perception of that corruption), the victimization approach used by Vanderbilt University may be the best instrument currently available.


4.4 Results: Corruption Victimization in Eleven Countries

One item that was standard across the CAM series, as well as Ecuador, Bolivia and the Dominican Republic was the following:

EXC6. Has a public employee requested a bribe in the last year?


This item, while generic in its focus, does avoid problems of country-specific variation in sources of bribery. The results for corruption victimization, as measured by EXC6 compared to the CPI index for the eleven countries under study here are presented in Figure IV.3 below. The results give us a great deal of information. First, examine the CPI index, which is shown as a red bar in the graph. Since the index ranges from 1 on the low end and 10 on the high end, the range of variation is not great. Among the countries being studied, the range is quite narrow. Only Bolivia and Ecuador fall below an index score of 3, while only one country, Costa Rica, rises above a 4. Second, in marked contrast to the CPI, there is a vast chasm that separates countries on the corruption victimization measure. At the low end, “only” less than 3% of the respondents had been victimized in the year prior to the survey. This was the case in Honduras and Colombia. We say “only” because even these low numbers are far higher than the European levels of less than 1% as measured by the UN research program discussed above.

Figure IV.3 Transparency CPI vs. Corruption Victimization



Third, the CPI provides a very different view of corruption in Mexico and the Dominican Republic from the one obtained from the LAPOP surveys, as shown in Figure IV.4 below. The CPI scores place Mexico among the best four countries in this eleven-country series, whereas the LAPOP data place Mexico among the three countries with the highest levels of corruption, and dramatically higher than most of the remaining countries in the study. Similarly, the levels of corruption in the Dominican Republic seem understated in the CPI compared to the LAPOP.

Figure IV.4 Transparency CPI Index of Corruption



One final look at these results is shown in Figure IV.5, where controls are introduced for GNP per capita and infant mortality, as has been done before in this study. Once again, Bolivia, Mexico and the Dominican Republic are found to have high levels of corruption, but what changes is that Ecuador declines substantially, joining the least corrupt nations. This demonstrates that in the case of Ecuador, its level of wealth and development strongly affects its levels of corruption. However, the regression results with robust standard errors show that only infant mortality is a significant predictor of bribe requests by public officials.⁵⁹

The CAM/Colombia survey included an entire battery of items, as noted above. Those items were standard for the CAM/Colombia and Ecuador, but not for Bolivia and the Dominican Republic, so the remainder of the analysis concentrates only on the CAM/Colombia series plus Ecuador.


⁵⁹ Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 22723
 F(2, 10) = 4.94
 Prob > F = 0.0322
 R-squared = 0.0114
 Root MSE = 27.139

Number of clusters (pais) = 11


	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
exc6r						
gmi2002	.0013963	.000992	1.41	0.190	-.000814	.0036066
infmort	.2983921	.1169233	2.55	0.029	.0378707	.5589135
_cons	-4.18431	6.554647	-0.64	0.538	-18.78898	10.42035

Figure IV.5 Residual Scores of Public Employee Bribery



The results of the comparison across the nine countries in the series are shown graphically in Figure IV.6.

Figure IV.6 Corruption Victimization: Nine Countries



As these results are difficult to compare in any detail in the above chart, Table IV.1 is shown so that the actual percentages in each country can be read. The items EXC1R through EXC6R are for the entire population, while the remaining questions are only for the users of the services. The high scores for Mexico and Ecuador stand out, but it is also of note to see the wide variation across the countries in variables such as municipal bribery and the courts. For example, Nicaragua stands out as having an especially corrupt municipal government and court system, while at the other extreme, bribery in the Costa Rican courts system is the lowest in the series.

Table IV.1 Percentage of Respondents Who Were Victimized by Bribery: Nine Countries

Country	EXC1R Accused by police	EXC2R Police demand bribe	EXC6R Public employee bribe	EXC11R Municipal bribe	EXC13R Bribe at work	EXC14R Courts	EXC15R Health service bribe	EXC16R School bribe
1 México	9.4	18.0	12.9	20.7	10.3	13.5	9.5	12.7
2 Guatemala	4.2	6.9	3.3	8.2	6.5	5.0	6.7	8.7
3 El Salvador	4.7	5.5	4.3	5.3	5.4	4.0	6.6	7.3
4 Honduras	3.7	5.3	2.7	10.2	9.9	6.6	7.2	11.3
5 Nicaragua	3.5	3.7	3.4	12.9	12.6	15.5	10.7	9.5
6 Costa Rica	3.1	3.5	3.2	5.6	4.2	2.7	3.8	8.6
7 Panamá	4.5	6.9	6.0	9.3	6.2	6.5	5.7	6.7
8 Colombia	4.8	3.8	2.7	5.3	5.6	5.1	7.7	5.5
9 Ecuador	4.6	9.7	14.8	15.0	11.3	20.5	12.8	23.8

4.5 Corruption Erodes Political Legitimacy

One of the most frequently heard comments is that corruption erodes trust and confidence in the political system. Typical of those who decry the negative effects of corruption, the World Bank frequently argues the thesis, "Corruption violates the public trust and corrodes social capital. . . . Unchecked, the creeping accumulation of seemingly minor infractions can slowly erode political legitimacy."⁶⁰ Unfortunately, although the Bank presented substantial evidence that corruption negatively affects the economy, it provided no support for the claims that minor corruption (or even major corruption) erodes political legitimacy. While the Bank has presented a great deal of evidence on the level of the independent variable (corruption), it has presented no corresponding evidence on the dependent variable (political legitimacy). The more recent World Bank Institute studies, as reported above, use a multi-index measure of governance, including perceptions of corruption worldwide, and have found that per capita incomes are lower and infant mortality and adult illiteracy are higher when governance is poor.⁶¹ Yet once again, there is no effort to link corruption on one hand and political legitimacy on the other.

Corruption surveys, though embryonic, appear to be the most promising of the efforts undertaken to date to test the corruption/erosion of legitimacy thesis. As discussed in this study, these surveys obtain corruption experience data at the level of the individual while simultaneously obtaining information from those same individuals about their belief in the legitimacy of their government. The analytical task, then, becomes searching for the connections between corruption experience and legitimacy beliefs after appropriate control variables are introduced.

Latin America, where currently there is extensive attention focused on corruption, is a good place to test the hypothesized relationship between corruption and legitimacy for two reasons.⁶² First, as shown above, this is a region of the world frequently found to have high levels of corruption. Second, Latin America has long had problems of political stability, suffering a seemingly endless succession of coups through much of its history.⁶³ If, as Easton⁶⁴ and also Lipset⁶⁵ have argued, legitimacy is a fundamental requisite for democratic stability, then it is plausible that legitimacy is questionable in many Latin American countries. From an empirical point of view, considerable evidence exists to show that legitimacy levels remain low in many countries in the region despite ten or more years of democratic rule.⁶⁶

⁶⁰ World Bank, *World Development Report, 1997* (Washington, D. C.: Oxford University Press, 1997) pp. 102-04.

⁶¹ Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton, *Governance Matters*.

⁶² Joseph S Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach., in *Combating Corruption in Latin America* (Washington, D. C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000).

⁶³ Mitchell A. Seligson and Julio Carrión, "Political Support, Political Skepticism and Political Stability in New Democracies: An Empirical Examination of Mass Support for Coups D'Etat in Peru," *Comparative Political Studies* 35, no. 1 (2002):58-82.

⁶⁴ David Easton, "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support," *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (1975):435-57.

⁶⁵ Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited.;" Seymour Martin Lipset and Gabriel Salman Lenz, "Corruption, Culture and Markets," in *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*, ed. Lawrence J. Harrison, Huntington, Samuel P. (New York: Basic Books, 2000).


⁶⁶ Mitchell A. Seligson, "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America," *Estudios interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2 (2000).

Legitimacy is measured in the Vanderbilt surveys by a scale of system support reported on the previous chapter. The first task is to determine if corruption has a negative or positive impact on legitimacy. When a citizen pays a bribe to either receive a public service or to avoid sanctions from an accused violation of law, two reactions could emerge depending upon how the bribery is perceived. On one hand, the bribe could be viewed as a “user fee,” much like the fee one would willingly pay to use a toll road or a campground. Those who pay such fees might view the assessment and payment as an entirely legitimate transaction, implying no negative evaluation of the political system. Indeed, an individual who pays a “processing fee” in order to facilitate the granting of a driver’s license, for example, might be pleased with a system that allows the granting of such licenses even when the requisite requirements (vision test, driving skills test, etc.) have not been met. Or the individual may feel that the salaries paid to public officials are properly kept low so that overall taxes remain low, but those who use the service ought to legitimately pay these user fees so as to supplement the salaries of public officials.

Those asked to pay bribes may have an entirely different reaction to the experience, viewing the bribe not as an appropriate user fee, but as what economists call a “DUP,” a directly unproductive profit-seeking activity, otherwise known as rent-seeking. When a municipal clerk asks for a payment above and beyond the officially established fee to process a birth certificate, the payment represents a surplus value above that of the established price, and hence can be considered rent-seeking behavior. Rent-seeking is possible only because those demanding the rent (in the form of a bribe) have been given state license (unofficially) to do so. We can predict, therefore, that individuals who view such fees as rent seeking are likely to form negative views about the state.


The empirical results from the CAM/Colombia survey are shown in Figure IV.7. As can be seen, there is a uniform pattern of erosion of system support as corruption victimization, measured by a combined index, increases.

Figure IV.7 Impact of Corruption Victimization on System Support



There are two countries in the series for which this relationship is not as clear and as strong: Mexico and Honduras. Those patterns are shown below in Figure IV.8. Mexico, it will be recalled was a high corruption country in the series. Perhaps citizens there are so accustomed to corruption that they accept it as the norm. Another possibility is that the unusual situation in Mexico with the long dominance of the PRI and the recent move toward liberalization of the system might be having an effect. The Mexican data are discussed in detail in the country report. The Honduras pattern is the only one in which there is no real impact of corruption victimization on system support. Again, the reader needs to refer to that country report for more details.

Figure IV.8 Impact of Corruption Victimization on System Support: Mexico and Honduras



4.6 Conclusions

Corruption matters. This chapter has shown that corruption levels, at the level of personal experience with everyday forms of it, vary strongly among the countries being studied here. In addition, the study has shown that corruption erodes confidence in the legitimacy of the political system.

5.0 Crime, the Rule of Law, and Democracy

5.1 The Problem of Crime in Latin America: Is it a Threat to Democracy?

The great crime wave of the 1980s in the United States is over, just as it is becoming a tidal wave almost everywhere in Latin America. By 2000, FBI reports show that homicide (the most feared crime, but the one that has the "virtue" of being the most reliably reported internationally) declined to 5.5 per 100,000 population in the United States, and indications are that since then the rates have declined even further. The least violent of the countries in Latin America, Costa Rica and Argentina, have murder rates that are now double this figure, while many countries in the region have rates that are ten and even more than twenty times the U.S. rates. The contrast with European and Japanese murder rates, which hover around 1-2 per 100,000, is even starker.

While it is an aphorism that there are no victimless crimes, we normally think of their impact on the individual victims or their immediate families. Economists widen the impact by talking of lost productivity and lost state revenue, while sociologists focus on the impact of crime on the "social fabric." Political scientists, however, have written far less about crime, and when they do, they often focus on issues narrowly related to the criminal justice system itself.⁶⁷ But those perspectives come from studying crime in wealthy, advanced industrial societies, where, even at the peak of a crime wave, levels of violent crime do not come close to those found in many Latin American countries. At the height of the crack-cocaine epidemic in the United States, murder rates did not exceed 10 per 100,000 population, whereas in Honduras the rate has been four times that for a number of years, and in some regions, like the one around the industrial city of San Pedro Sula, rates of over 100 per 100,000 have become the norm.⁶⁸

In the Latin American context of extremely high crime, political scientists and policy makers alike need to ask whether crime, and the associated fear of crime, is helping to build popular support for repressive measures, and by extension, for repressive regimes. In short, is it possible that growing crime is a threat to the durability of democracy in Latin America? To test this proposition, this paper uses survey evidence from selected countries in the region in which crime rates are especially high. Important policy implications flow from the results.

5.1.1 Crime Rates in Latin America: A Look at the Data

The Latin American region has the dubious distinction of having the highest rates of crime and violence in the world. Homicide rates usually are considered to be the most reliable indicator of crime, since few murders go unreported.⁶⁹ According to an extensive study by the World Bank of homicide rates for 1970-1994, the world average was 6.8 per 100,000.⁷⁰ The homicide rate in Latin America is estimated at 30 murders per 100,000 per year, whereas it stands at about 5.5 in the United States, and about 2.0 in the United Kingdom, Spain, and Switzerland. The Pan

67An exception is Jiri Burianek, "Democratization, Crime, Punishment and Public Attitudes in the Czech Republic," *Crime, law & social change* 28 (1998):213-22.

68 Héctor Leyva, *Delincuencia y Criminalidad en las Estadísticas de Honduras, 1996-2000* (Tegucigalpa: United Nations Development Program and FIDE; Proyecto Fortalecimiento de la Sociedad Civil, 2001) 46.

69In South Africa, however, during apartheid, this was not the case among the nonwhite population, where murders were frequently overlooked.

70P. Fajnzylber, D. Lederman, and N. Loayza, *Determinants of Crime Rates in Latin America and the World: An Empirical Assessment* (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1998) 12.

American Health Organization, which reports a lower average for Latin America as a whole of 20 per 100,000 people,⁷¹ says that “violence is one of the main causes of death in the Hemisphere. . . . In some countries, violence is the main cause of death and in others it is the leading cause of injuries and disability.”⁷² In the region there are 140,000 homicides each year.⁷³ According to this and other indicators, violence in Latin America is five times higher than in most other places in the world.⁷⁴ Moreover, according to Gaviria and Pagés, the homicide rates are not only consistently higher in Latin America, but also the differences with the rest of the world are growing larger.⁷⁵ Consistent with the above data, using 1970-1994 data from the United Nations World Crime Surveys, Fajnzylber et al. found that Latin America and the Caribbean have the highest homicide rates, followed by sub-Saharan African countries.⁷⁶

5.1.2 Research on Crime in Latin America

It was not until the second half of the 1990s that the problem of crime in Latin America began to be addressed seriously as one of the most acute problems for the new democracies in the region. According to the World Bank, this was part of a larger concern throughout the democratizing world with the impact of crime and violence on achievement of development objectives.⁷⁷ Thus, crime began to be addressed as a major problem with pernicious effects on economic activity and on citizens' quality of life. In the United States, the problem of crime had been long addressed as a national problem, but academic research on the subject has been either focused on the individual determinants of criminal behavior (within the framework of psychology or criminal law) or focused on the socioeconomic determinants and impact of criminal behavior (within the framework of economics). Researchers have not suggested that crime in the United States or other consolidated democracies presents a threat to stability. However, in the fragile democracies

⁷¹According to the United Nations Global Report on Crime, health statistics as a basis for measuring homicide significantly under-report the total homicide level. Health statistics data are based on the classification of deaths made by physicians rather than by the police. According to the UN comparison, health-based homicide rates average about half those of Interpol or UN statistics. See Graeme Newman, ed., *Global Report on Crime and Justice* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) 12-13.

⁷²Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, "A Theory of Political Transitions," *American Economic Review* 91, no. 4 (2001):938-63.

⁷³Nevertheless, not all of the countries in this region face the same magnitude and type of violence. In the nineties, Colombia, faced with epidemic problems of drug trafficking and guerrilla violence, had one of the highest homicide rates anywhere – around 90 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. In contrast, Chile, despite a history of political conflict, displayed homicide rates no greater than 5 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. See Organización Panamericana de la Salud, "Actitudes y normas culturales sobre la violencia en ciudades seleccionadas de la región de las Américas. Proyecto ACTIVA," (Washington D.C.: World Bank: Division of Health and Human Development, 1996).

⁷⁴See Centro de Investigaciones Económicas Nacionales CIEN, "Carta Económica," (CIEN, 1998); P. Fajnzylber, D. Lederman, and N. Loayza, *Determinants of Crime Rates in Latin America and the World; Diagnóstico de la Violencia en Guatemala* (Guatemala: CIEN, 1999).

⁷⁵Alejandro Gaviria and Carmen Pagés, "Patterns of Crime Victimization in Latin America," Inter-American Bank Conference on Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, (Washington D.C.: 1999).

⁷⁶The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean that were included in this calculation are Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Bahamas, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Barbados, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, Bermuda, Suriname, Honduras, Antigua, Dominica, Belize, Panama, Guyana, Cuba, and El Salvador.

⁷⁷Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza, *Determinants of Crime Rates in Latin America and the World: An Empirical Assessment*; Mitchell Seligson and Dinorah Azpuru, "Las Dimensiones y el Impacto Político de la Delincuencia en la Población Guatemalteca," in *Población del Istmo 2000: Familia, Migración, Violencia y Medio Ambiente*, ed. Luis Rosero (San José: Universidad de Costa Rica, 2001).

that have been consolidating in the 1980s and 1990s, both in Latin America and in Eastern Europe, concerns are growing that crime might threaten the viability of these regimes.⁷⁸

Some social scientists recently have begun to pay attention to the issue of crime as a political problem. Michael Shifter asserts that partially because of more open political systems, the problems of crime, drugs, and corruption are beginning to find a place on the Latin American region's political agenda.⁷⁹ In spite of the successes of democracy in the region in achieving relative economic stabilization, in sharply reducing political violence, and in expanding the arena for political participation and civil liberties, Shifter argues that democracy has not been capable of dealing effectively with other problems that citizens care a great deal about, especially crime.

The World Bank explored a series of explanatory variables for the variation in crime rates across countries.⁸⁰ The central finding of that study is that homicide is directly connected to income inequality; the greater the inequality of income within nations, the higher the homicide rate, *ceteris paribus*. Since Latin America is the region of the world with the highest levels of income inequality, these results are not surprising.

Given the dramatic increases in homicide rates, it is no wonder that common crime is becoming one of the major issues of concern for Latin Americans. Even in Chile, where violent crime rates are among the lowest in Latin America, the main concern of the population, as measured by different surveys, has become the rise in street crime, as well as the increase in drug trafficking and consumption.⁸¹

This chapter presents results from the CAM/Colombia data set regarding the linkage of crime to democratic stability in the region.

5.2 The Crime/Democratic Breakdown Link

Perhaps the clearest historical evidence that we have of the impact of crime on democratic breakdown comes from the interwar period in Europe. As Nancy Bermeo writes, "In 1920, twenty-six out of twenty-eight European states were parliamentary democracies. By 1938, thirteen of these democracies had become dictatorships."⁸² Many theories explaining these breakdowns, which eventually plunged the world into World War II, taking with it not only democracy, but also over 50 million lives,⁸³ have focused on economic crisis. The familiar argument is that Germany's democracy broke down because of the extreme inflation suffered prior to the election of Hitler. Nancy Bermeo shows, however, that this explanation simply does

⁷⁸See, for instance, Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, *La Violencia en El Salvador en los años noventa. Magnitud, costos y factores posibilitadores* (San Salvador: Universidad Centroamericana Simeón Cañas, 1998).

⁷⁹Michael Schifter, "Tensions and Dilemmas of Democratic Politics in Latin America" (paper presented at the Sol M. Linowitz Forum, Washington D.C., 1996).

⁸⁰Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza, *Determinants of Crime Rates in Latin America and the World: An Empirical Assessment*.

⁸¹Felipe Agüero and Jeffrey Starks, eds., *Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-transition Latin America* (Miami: University of Miami Press, 1999) 243.

⁸²Nancy Bermeo, *Getting Mad or Going Mad: Citizen, Scarcity and the Breakdown of Democracy in Interwar Europe*, Center for the Study of Democracy Working Papers (Irvine: University of California at Irvine, 1999), p.1.

⁸³Martin Gilbert, *The Second World War: A Complete History*, rev. ed. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1991), p. 746. Other estimates go as high as 60 million.

not work because the democracies that survived in Europe in the 1930s suffered economically no less than those that broke down. Bermeo's important insight is that it was crime rates, not economic crisis, that most clearly distinguish the surviving democracies from those that collapsed. Her data show that in the cases of breakdown, homicide rates averaged three times those of the surviving cases. Confirming this view are those who have studied the German case and have argued persuasively that voters were supporting a "law-and-order" candidate.⁸⁴

If Bermeo is correct, and social disorder in the form of crime is a significant factor driving voters to support authoritarian solutions and the ultimate breakdown of democracy, then Latin America is a good place to test the thesis. In Bermeo's interwar data set, the homicide rate for the countries in which democracy broke down averaged 7 per 100,000 population. Compare those rates with data from Latin America.

Let us now examine the data from the CAM/Colombia survey of 2004. The survey was constrained in the area of crime victimization as there was only space in the questionnaire for five items. In standard crime victimization studies, hundreds of questions are asked, but since our survey focused on many aspects of democratic values and behaviors, there was only a limited amount of space for any one component.

The respondents were asked:

VIC1. Have you been a victim of a criminal act in the last 12 months?

1. Yes [continue] 2. No [Skip] 8. Don't know.


VIC2. What kind of criminal act did you experience? (Do not read list).

The remaining items in the series dealt with reporting of the crime. The focus in this chapter is on the crime itself. Two countries in the study did not use the same question wording and are deleted from this analysis.⁸⁵ The results of the first question, VIC1, are shown in Figure V.1 below. The overall pattern is that crime victimization does not vary much among these countries, with Guatemala and Honduras being somewhat lower than the other countries and Ecuador being somewhat higher.

⁸⁴This point is argued by Bob Altemeyer, *The Authoritarian Specter* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 91. For a brilliant review of the various explanations of the Hitler phenomenon, see Ron Rosenbaum, *Explaining Hitler* (New York: Random House, 1998).

⁸⁵In Bolivia, the question used was: Durante los últimos 12 meses ha sido Ud. víctima de robos o agresiones?, while in the Dominican Republic, the question was: ¿Ha sido víctima de una agresión física o de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? While these items are similar to the one used in the CAM/Colombia, they differ in that the Bolivian item asks about robbery and aggressive acts, without referring to "actos de delincuencia" and in the Dominican Republic there is mention of "agresión física."

Figure V.1 Crime Victimization in Last Year



These results come as somewhat of a surprise, given the reports of very high murder rates in countries like El Salvador and Colombia. However, this assumes that murder rates are reliable and that overall crime rates are tightly connected, when in fact they are not. In an extensive study of the subject, an Inter-American Development Bank team found no reliable relationship between the two kinds of crime.⁸⁶ A study of murder rates comparing UN data and those from INTERPOL vary by more than 50%.⁸⁷ Moreover, in the widely cited United Nations world-wide crime study, the only countries in the sample that are included in the UN study are Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador and Bolivia.⁸⁸ Since crime victimization studies cannot obtain direct data from homicide victims, for obvious reasons, such surveys do not report on that form of crime. What the survey evidence suggests is that there is a rather high level of crime in these countries, with an average of 15% of their residents experiencing a crime during the course of a year. Compared to the U.S., where the data are not for voting-aged citizens but for those 12 and over, we find that in 2003, the U.S. Department of Justice reports a rate of 10.1%. In both the survey data in this chapter, as well as the U.S. data, murders are excluded.


There is far greater variation in crime rates within countries than across countries, as Figure V.2 shows. Not surprisingly, in every country, urban crime rates are far higher than rural.

⁸⁶ Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza, *Determinants of Crime Rates in Latin America and the World: An Empirical Assessment* (Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1998).

⁸⁷ United Nations, *Global Report on Crime and Justice*, ed. Graeme Newman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) 12.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

Figure V.2 Crime Victimization: Urban vs. Rural



Is there any impact of our key control variables, GNP per capita and infant mortality on crime rates in these countries? The answer is no, as shown in the robust regression analysis.⁸⁹ This means that the level of development of these countries is not affecting their crime rates.

On the other hand, crime matters in terms of democratic stability. Earlier in this study there was an extensive discussion of system support and its importance for democratic stability. In this analysis, we can make use of all eleven countries since crime victimization was measured in all, even though different wording was employed in the Dominican Republic and Bolivia. As shown in Figure V.3, in each of the countries except Guatemala (where there is no impact), system support is reduced among those who report having been crime victims in the year prior to the survey. These findings clearly suggest that crime erodes the legitimacy of the state in these countries, although the impact varies from country-to-country, and is not found at all in Guatemala. For that reason alone, crime becomes an important issue for democratic stability.


⁸⁹ Regression with robust standard errors

Number of obs = 16834
 F(2, 8) = 1.19
 Prob > F = 0.3531
 R-squared = 0.0021
 Root MSE = .33452

Number of clusters (pais) = 9


vic1	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
gni2002	-2.51e-06	7.73e-06	-0.33	0.753	-.0000203 .0000153
infmort	.0015915	.001566	1.02	0.339	-.0020197 .0052028
_cons	1.834371	.0449164	40.84	0.000	1.730793 1.937948

Figure V.3 Impact of Crime Victimization on System Support




Even clearer evidence of the impact of crime victimization on political legitimacy is shown when the focus is on the judicial system, as it is in Figure V.4. In each of the eleven countries, those who have been victimized by crime are *less* likely to believe that one can get a fair trial in that country. In other words, crime victimization shakes confidence in the judiciary.

Figure V.4 Impact of Crime Victimization on Belief of Getting a Fair Trial




There is another measure of legitimacy of the legal system in the CAM/Colombia data set, and it comes from the long “B” series, where respondents were asked about the degree to which they trust various institutions, in this case, the “system of justice” (item B10A). As shown in Figure V.5, trust varies considerably among the eight countries in the CAM/Colombia data set (identical data do not exist for the other countries). Not surprisingly, Costa Rica is at the high end in this group of countries, while Nicaragua and Guatemala are at the low end.

Figure V.5 Trust in the Justice System




Examining the impact of crime victimization on this measure of trust in the judicial system shows a similar pattern, as shown in Figure V.6. In every country in the series, crime victims have less trust in the justice system than non-victims.

Figure V.6 Impact of Crime Victimization on Trust in the Justice System



One of the explanations as to the linkage between crime and low support for the system in general and the judicial system in particular is that most citizens do not report crimes, largely because they feel that it would not do any good. The results in Figure V.7 show that only in one country, Panama, did a majority of crime victims report the crime to the authorities. In Ecuador, fewer than one-third of victims reported the crime (comparable data not available for Bolivia). When we asked why the crimes were not reported, over half of the pooled sample responded that doing so would do no good.

Figure V.7 Reporting of Crimes Among Victims



5.3 Conclusions

One of the problems of the criminal justice system in the Latin American countries studied here is that many citizens do not trust it. This lack of trust is linked directly to the high levels of crime and the low levels of reporting of crimes. Thus there is a vicious circle in which the lack of trust constrains reporting and the low levels of reporting means that the criminals go free, further weakening confidence in the judicial system.

6.0 Local Government

Throughout Latin America governments have been attempting to decentralize in order to achieve two objectives. First, there is the widespread belief that local government is efficient government. Large, distant and impersonal central governments are increasingly seen as highly inefficient, being unable to respond to variations in local needs and demands and also more likely to be immune to citizen control and accountability. Second, local governments, by placing control in the hands of the people, may help build democracy from the ground up. The implicit model, of course, is democracy in the United States, which DeToqueville argued was strong in part because of the widespread proliferation of many local units. The downside, of course, is that local governments may prevent effective implementation of national policies. One only need think of the extreme difficulties Argentina has had in recent years in exercising national fiscal control over provincial governments to recognize that macro-economic policy-making can become complicated when local governments are strong. Moreover, there is widespread concern that with more funding channeled to the local levels, where auditing becomes more difficult, that corruption will increase.

Many governments in the region have recently implemented political reforms designed to transfer greater power to subnational levels of government and provide a more substantial policymaking and oversight role to citizens at the local level.⁹⁰ Advocates of decentralization argue that it holds “great potential to stimulate the growth of civil society organizations . . . ; prevent widespread disillusionment with new policies from turning into a rejection of the entire democratic process . . . ; [and] boost legitimacy by making government more responsive to citizen needs.”⁹¹ Implicit in this proposition is that local institutions, if made relevant to the daily lives of citizens, will have a positive effect on how those citizens view their larger political system.

For most of their histories, the countries included in this study have been highly centralized. Their local governments have been and continue to be highly dependent upon central government transfers, with little capacity to generate their own revenue. Moreover, even though recent laws have raised the allocation of national revenues to local governments in a number of the countries given the precarious state of the national economy, it would be wrong to assume that this will, in the short run, imply a significant expansion of local government revenues.

The LAPOP survey contains a battery of items allowing us to measure attitudes toward and participation in local government. The reader should consult the questionnaire, beginning with questions NP1 and ending with question SGL1 to see the entire series. Not all of the items will be examined in this report, but are, of course, available for analysis in the full data base, and can be compared with future studies, or studies carried out in specific regions or municipalities in the region. The database presented here presents a true picture at the national level.


⁹⁰ This paragraph is drawn from Jon Hiskey and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Pitfalls of Power to the People: Decentralization, Local Government Performance, and System Support in Bolivia," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37, no. 4 (2003):64-88.

⁹¹ Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

6.1 Level of Participation in Municipal Meetings

A basic measure of citizen involvement in local government is participation in municipal meetings. The survey asked respondents (NP1) if they had attended a “cabildo abierto” or any other kind of meeting convened by the municipality during the year prior to the survey.⁹² The results are presented in Figure VI.1 below. The results are striking since they differ sharply from the picture of democracy at the national level that we have seen thus far in this report. Countries like Costa Rica and Panama, that have been shown to have relatively high levels of democratic values show low levels of citizen participation in municipal meetings. Is this an indication of a break between national and local level democracy, or is it a reflection of other factors related to development? We attempt to answer this question below.


Figure VI.1 Participation in a Municipal Meeting in the Last Year



One thing we have found in the LAPOP surveys is that participation in local government is highly related to urbanization; the more urban the sample, the lower the level of participation in municipal meetings. This is not a surprising finding; in rural areas, local government may be one of the few “games in town,” whereas in urban areas, citizens have countless distractions and far more money to spend on them. Thus, in rural areas, citizens are not likely to have DVD players and the funds to rent DVDs, while in urban Latin America, such entertainment is more widespread. The results in Figure VI.2 show that rural participation in all countries except Costa Rica is higher in rural areas than in urban. Yet, even if we compare rural participation alone, it is clear that Costa Rica and Panama fare poorly versus the other countries.

⁹² In Colombia, item NP1 was not used, but item NP1A was used instead, which referred only to the municipal meeting and not to the “cabildo abierto.”

Figure VI.2 Impact of Urbanization on Municipal Meeting Participation



When controls for national level of development are introduced, the findings become clearer. Robust regression techniques demonstrate that infant mortality, as a measure of national development, has a significant impact on municipal participation.⁹³ The higher the infant mortality rate the higher the municipal participation, indicating that less developed countries are the ones where local government is more salient to citizens.

The results of the analysis, now controlled for development, are presented in Figure VI.3. The results show that once controlled for the impact of development, participation in Costa Rica and Panama are even lower than they were without those controls. This suggests that the level of development explanation does not account for the low levels of participation in those countries. It is also the case that Mexico's participation declines sharply when the controls are introduced, but Bolivia's increases markedly. In the case of Panama, the low level of participation and demand-making can be attributed to the fact that municipal governments are extremely weak vis-

⁹³ Regression with robust standard errors


Number of obs = 16477
 F(2, 8) = 36.95
 Prob > F = 0.0001
 R-squared = 0.0163
 Root MSE = .33685

Number of clusters (pais) = 9

nplr	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
gni2002	4.74e-07	5.46e-06	0.09	0.933	.0000131 .0000121
infmort	.0032286	.0005269	6.13	0.000	.0044436 .0020136
_cons	1.97026	.0295605	66.65	0.000	1.902093 2.038426

à-vis the central authorities, and that little efforts, beyond mayoral elections, have been made to increase the capacity or authority of local governments.


Figure VI.3 Municipal Participation, Controlled vs. Uncontrolled



6.2 Local Demand-Making

One of the weaknesses of the participation measure just analyzed is that participants at municipal meetings may be there for many purposes, including entertainment. In Central America, for example, a *cabilido abierto* is often an event that includes performances in dance and song of local groups. Thus, it is not clear what the meaning is of attending one of these events in terms of democratic political culture. A different, probably better, perspective can be obtained from examining demand-making. Item NP2 asks respondents if they have made a demand for help or presented a petition to the municipality or its representatives during the year prior to the interview. The results are shown in Figure VI.4. These results are very illuminating. First, they show that Bolivia, the country with the most advanced decentralization program in the region, has the highest level of citizen demand-making. Second, they show that Costa Rica, the region's most democratic country, also has very high levels of demand-making, indicating high levels of personal efficacy among its citizens, even though they are not likely to attend municipal meetings during the year. Finally, Panama, Ecuador, Honduras and El Salvador are at the low end.

Figure VI.4 Demand-Making on Local Government




6.3 Satisfaction With Local Government

The final area of local government to be examined in this synthesis paper is satisfaction with local government services. The individual country studies showed how satisfaction varied internally based on region and urbanization. Here we merely show the cross-national differences.

The question (SGL1), asked respondents to rate municipal services on a scale from very good to very bad. Converting this to a 0-100 range, the results are shown in Figure VI.5 below. The results fall into three clear groups. First, there is Colombia, Ecuador and El Salvador, where satisfaction is highest, then Panama and Bolivia where it is lowest, and all the others in between. It is of note that even though Bolivia has had the most extensive decentralization reforms and that the demand-making is the highest, its level of satisfaction is the lowest. These results demonstrate rather clearly that structural reforms can bring about unintended consequences. This is very important for USAID local government programs, since it shows that focusing exclusively on increasing participation and demand making, without an equal emphasis on building capacity can be a recipe for declining support. In addition, as many of the country reports showed, dissatisfaction with local governments has a significant effect on system support and stable democracy values.

Figure VI.5 Satisfaction With Local Government Services



6.4 Conclusions

The field of local government in Latin America is undergoing major transformations. The data shown here reveal wide variation in participation among the countries being studied, and also considerable variation in levels of satisfaction. The two do not always coincide. In fact, demand-making and satisfaction, for the pooled sample, are significantly and *negatively* correlated with each other. This suggests that programs that increase actions that lead to greater accountability, do not necessarily produce, at least in the short run, high levels of satisfaction. When development agencies embark on supporting such reforms, they must anticipate that empowerment brought on by institutional reform can lead to more demands, more complaints, while the limited resources that define the economic conditions of Latin America today may not enable governments, even with the best of intentions, to satisfy those demands.

7.0 Social Capital and Democracy

We now turn to the very important issue of social capital. Recent events in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and elsewhere have highlighted the powerful impact that such participation can have on the political system. Citizens can and have organized to press for their demands, and that activism can have a positive effect on making governments accountable. World-wide, the rapid and dramatic transitions to democracy that have occurred throughout the world since the 1980s have led many researchers to focus on civil society as a potentially vital element in the democracy puzzle.⁹⁴ In Eastern Europe, the role that Solidarity played in bringing down the old authoritarian communist order has been studied in detail, and many argue that it was vital to the overthrow of that system. In Latin America, many have pointed to the role of civil society in organizing the “No” vote in Chile, which resulted in the replacement of Pinochet’s dictatorship with a competitive and economically dynamic democracy. In Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala and elsewhere, human rights NGOs have played a key role in the democratization process.

Dictatorships have long been infamous for suppressing and/or co-opting civil society organization. Citizens in such systems are deprived of their ability to provide collective expression of their demands. Democracy, on the other hand, cultivates civil society organizations as a key element in the articulation of citizen demands.

In recent years political scientists, stimulated by Robert Putnam’s classic work, *Making Democracy Work*, have begun to take a more systematic look at the role of civil society in democracy.⁹⁵ Putnam and others have argued that the key to building democracies is through the development of “social capital.” Countries with high levels of social capital are countries in which citizens trust each other and trust their governments. This trust largely emerges from their active participation in civil society organizations.⁹⁶ Putnam believes that the process of building social capital is a long one, but cannot prosper without an active civil society. It is for this reason that building stable democracies in former dictatorships does not occur overnight. On the other hand, recent studies have suggested that the generation of negative social capital can emerge as well.⁹⁷ In a number of cases, citizens have organized not to support democracy, but to support the overthrow of democratically elected presidents, as happened in 2003 in Bolivia or earlier in Venezuela. Similarly, citizens organizing to “lynch” mayors for supposed malfeasance has emerged as a new tactic in the region.

How active is civil society participation in the countries being studied? How much social trust is there? The data in the present study allow us to answer that question with some precision.

⁹⁴See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). This introductory section draws on prior reports in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project.

⁹⁵ Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

⁹⁶ Jeffery J. Mondak, "Psychological Approaches to Social Capital, Special Issue," *Political Psychology* 19 (1998); Bob Edwards and Michael W. Foley, "Social Capital, Civil Society, and Contemporary Democracy," *American Behavioral Scientist* 40 (March/April) (1997); Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin, eds., *Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective* (Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 2000).


⁹⁷ Armony and Ariel, *The Dubious link : Civic Engagement and Democratization* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2004).

Numerous other studies of civil society merely count the number of organizations that exist in a given country or region, and presume that those counts reflect the level of activity of citizens. The democratic values survey conducted for this study allows a far more direct measure; the respondents were asked about their participation in nine distinct forms of civil society organizations. The survey makes it possible not only to examine the levels of participation, but to determine who participates more and who less.

7.1 Interpersonal Trust

The classic question on measuring trust is to ask, as we have, (IT1), “Now talking about the people from around here, would you say that the people of your community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, little trustworthy or not at all trustworthy.” The wording we have used varies from that used in some other surveys as we have introduced the word “community.” Thus, we are not asking about people in general, but people from the community.⁹⁸ The result is that the trust levels we find in this survey are higher than those found in other surveys of Latin America. This becomes clear from the results in Bolivia, where the question wording differed from the CAM/Colombia. As shown in Figure VII.1, Bolivia is far lower than the other countries, but the question asked about “people in general” rather than people from the community. It is of note that Costa Ricans, who enjoy the most well established democracy in Latin America also express the highest interpersonal trust levels.

Figure VII.1 Interpersonal Trust




⁹⁸ Jr. Joseph Nye, "The Decline of Confidence in Government," in *Why People Don't Trust Government*, ed. Jr. Joseph Nye (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997); Marc J. Hetherington, "The Political Relevance of Political Trust," *American Political Science Review* 92, no. 4 (1998):791-808.

7.2 Levels of Participation


The survey contains a block of items to measure participation in civil society. In the survey we measured this participation in eight distinct types of organizations. We asked respondents if they participated weekly, once or twice a month, once or twice a year or never. This format differs from those used in prior series of the LAPOP, where we used terms such as, “frequently,” “once in a while,” “almost never” and “never” so the results are not directly comparable. The results shown in Figure VII.2 are for the entire sample, except Bolivia (which did not include the political party question) and the Dominican Republic, which did not include the series. These results show a familiar pattern, with the Church being by far the organization with the highest level of participation, and political parties and professional associations at the low end.

Figure VII.2 Civil Society Participation: All Countries Except Bolivia and the Dominican Republic




Gender roles help determine levels of participation in these countries, as is shown in Figure VII.3. Females are more active in church and school organizations, while males are more active in professional associations and political parties. These findings reflect the gender roles common in Latin America. These patterns, however, vary from country-to-country, as is shown in the individual reports produced as part of this study.

Figure VII.3 Civil Society Participation by Gender



Another way to examine these same data is to recode them into those who participate at least to some extent, and those who do not and then to aggregate these across all five organizations. This produces the results shown in Figure VII.4. Guatemala and Honduras are far higher than the other countries in their levels of civil society participation. What can account for this?

Figure VII.4 Total Index of Civil Society Participation (Coded as “Yes/No”)



When the individual modes of participation are disaggregated, and broken down by country, the answer to this question becomes clear, as is shown in Table VII.1. Examine the first column, the one recording participation in church groups. As can be seen, Guatemala and Honduras stand out far above the other countries. Since church participation is so frequent compared to other forms of civil society participation, it is not surprising that in the overall scale, Guatemala and Honduras score so high. At the other extreme, church related participation is very low in Panama, again, accounting for its low score on the above chart. Yet, it is also the case that school and community development participation are higher in Guatemala and Honduras than in other countries, although the differences are far smaller than for church activities. The relatively low level of civil society participation in Costa Rica suggests, as was noted at the outset of this chapter, that strong democracy and active civil society are not necessarily tightly connected.

Table VII.1. Percent of Respondents Participating in Civil Society Organizations

Country	CP6RRR Church	CP7RRR School	CP8RRR Community Development	CP9RRR Professional Associations	CP13RRR Political party
1 México	23	4	4	2	2
2 Guatemala	52	8	8	3	3
3 El Salvador	31	1	3	2	1
4 Honduras	53	7	6	2	2
5 Nicaragua	32	4	4	2	3
6 Costa Rica	36	3	3	2	1
7 Panamá	16	2	5	3	6
8 Colombia	32	2	2	2	1
9 Ecuador	26	4	4	3	1

7.3 Conclusions

The study of social capital has grown into a major industry among social scientists. In this chapter, a comparative look has been taken of social capital in the form of trust and civil society participation. Notable differences among the countries emerge.

Appendix: Questionnaire

Version # 7.3Lunes, 09 de Febrero de 2004 ; IRB approval # 040103, University of Pittsburgh



[Grey questions were optional for individual countries; for specialized items in individual countries see country reports]

Democracy Audit: Central American, Mexico and Colombia 2004

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Country: 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panamá 8. Colombia	PAIS	
Interview number [assigned in office, not in field: _____]	IDNUM	
Provincia: _____	PROV	
Cantón: _____	CANT	
Parroquia: _____	PAROQ	
Zona _____	ZONA	
Sector _____	SEC	
Manzana (o Segmento) _____	MANZ	
Estrato: 1. Designed for each country	ESTRAT	
Size of place: 1. National capital (metropolitan area) 2. Large city 3. Medium city 4. Small city 5. Rural area	TAMANO	
UR: Zone 1. Urban 2. Rural	UR	
Language of questionnaire (1) Spanish (2) varies by country	IDIOMAQ	

Time begun: _____ : _____

Q1. Q1 Gender (1) Male (2) Female	Q1	
A4. In your opinion, what is the most serious problem facing the country. (01) Economic problems (02) Inflation, high prices (03) Unemployment (04) Poverty (05) Delinquency, crime, violence (06) Massive protests (strikes, road closing, etc.) (07) Lack of land for cultivation (08) Lack of credit (09) Environmental problems (10) Drug addiction (11) Drug traffic (12) Corruption (13) Gangs (14) Lousy government (15) Migration (16) Anti-terrorism war	A4	

With what frequency do you	Every day	Once or twice a week	Rarely	Never	DK	
A1. Listen to news on the radio?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	A1
A2. Watch news on TV?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	A2
A3. Read news in periodicals	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	A3
A4. Via Internet	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	A4

SOCT1. In general how would you categorize the economic situation of the country? Would you say it is very good, good, average, bad, very bad or don't know? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Average (4) Bad (5) Very bad (6) Don't know	SOCT1
SOCT3. Do you think that in the next 12 months the economic situation of the country will be better, the same or worse than it is now? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (4) Don't know	SOCT3
IDIO1. In general how would you categorize your own economic situation? Would you say it is very good, good, average, bad, very bad or don't know? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Average (4) Bad (5) Very Bad (6) Don't know	IDIO1

Now I am going to read some questions about the community and some problems that it faces. CP5 Have you ever worked or tried to resolve some community or neighborhood problem? (1) Yes [Continue with CP5A] (2) No [Go on to CP6] (3) Don't know [Go on to CP6]	CP5
CP5A. Have you ever donated money or materials to help address a problem or help with an improvement?	(1) Yes (2) No (8) DK CP5A
CP5B. Have you given your own work or manual labor?	(1) Yes (2) No (8) DK CP5B
CP5C. Have you been attending community meetings about any problem or some improvement?	(1) Yes (2) No (8) DK CP5C
CP5D. Have you tried to help organize any new group to solve a local problem or to find a solution?	(1) Yes (2) No (8) DK CP5D
CP5E. Have you ever tried to organize a group to fight crime in your neighborhood?	(1) Yes (2) No (8) DK CP5E

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK	
CP6. Of any committee or association of your church or temple?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP6
CP7 Of a parent's group at school?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP7
CP8. Of a committee or group for community improvement?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP8
CP9. Of an association of business or manufacturing professionals?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP9
CP10. Of a union?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP10
CP11. Of a cooperative?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP11
CP12. Of any civic association?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP12
CP13. Of a political party?	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	CP13

PROT1. Have you ever participated in a public demonstration or protest? Do you do it often, rarely or never?	(1) Some times	(2) Rarely	(3) Never	(8) DK	PROT1
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Now, to change the subject, sometimes people and communities have problems that they can't resolve on their own and so they have to ask for the help of a government official or a government agency.

Have you ever asked for help or cooperation to resolve a problem? (1) Yes [continue with CP1] (2) No [go to LS3] (3) Don't know [go to LS3]	Yes	No	DK/DR		
CP1. To the President of your country	(1)	(2)	(8)		CP1
CP2. To a member of congress	(1)	(2)	(8)		CP2
CP4. To a ministry, public office or government agency	(1)	(2)	(8)		CP4
CP4A. To a local authority (Mayor, Municipality, or corregimiento in Panama's case)	(1)	(2)	(8)		CP4A

LS3. To what extent are you satisfied with your life? Would you say you are (1)Very satisfied (2) somewhat satisfied (3) somewhat dissatisfied or (4)very dissatisfied (8) DK					LS3
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IT1. Now, speaking in general terms of the people from here, would you say that people in this neighborhood are generally (1) very trustworthy (2) somewhat trustworthy (3) not very trustworthy (4) untrustworthy (8) DK					IT1
IT2. Do you believe that in most instances people are only worried about themselves or do you believe that in the most instance people try to help others? (1) They worry about themselves (2) They try to help others (3) Don't know					IT2
IT3. Do you believe that the majority of people would try to take advantage of you if they had the opportunity, or do you believe they wouldn't take advantage? 1) Yes, they would take advantage (2) No, they wouldn't take advantage (3) Don't know					IT3

Now let's talk about your local municipality...

NP1. Within the past 12 months have you had the opportunity to attend a neighborhood meeting, a town council meeting or other meeting convened by the municipality/mayor? (1)Yes (2) No (3) Don't know/ don't remember					NP1
NP1A. Have you attended a municipal session in the last 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (3) Don't know/ don't remember					NP1A
NP1B. . To what point you think municipal officers listen to what is said in these meetings? They listen (1) Very much (2) Average (3) A little (4) Nothing (5) Don't know					NP1B
NP1C. If you had a complaint about a local problem and were to take it to a municipality officer, how much do you think he would listen to you (1) Very much (2) Average (3) A little (4) Nothing (5) Don't know					NP1C
NP2. Have you sought help or presented a request to any office, official or councilman of the municipality within the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (3) Don't know/ don't remember					NP2

SGL1. Would you say that the services the Municipality is providing are (1) excellent (2) good (3) average (4) poor (5) awful (8) DK	SGL1
MUNI6. How much confidence do you have that the Mayor's office manages funds well? (1) A lot of confidence (2) Some confidence (3) Little confidence (4) No confidence (5) Don't know/ don't remember	MUNI6

Some people say that, in certain circumstances, the military is justified in taking power. In your opinion, in which of the following situations is it justified for the military to take power

JC1. When there is high unemployment	(1) Justified	(2) Unjustified	(8) DK	JC1
JC4. When there are large social protests	(1) Justified	(2) Unjustified	(8) DK	JC4
JC10. When there is high crime	(1) Justified	(2) Unjustified	(8) DK	JC10
JC12. When there is high inflation with excessive price increases	(1) Justified	(2) Unjustified	(8) DK	JC12
JC13. When there is great corruption	(1) Justified	(2) Unjustified	(8) DK	JC13
JC13A. Do you believe that there can be reason enough for a coup or that no reason is enough to justify that?	(1) There could be a reason	(2) There's no reason enough	(8)DK	JC13A
GBMIL1. Some people say that we would be better off if the country were governed in a different form. Some say that the military should govern, while others say that only a civil government should rule. What do you think?	(1) Military	(2) Civil government	(8) DK	GBMIL1

VIC1. Have you been a victim of physical violence or of some crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes [<i>continue with VIC2</i>] (2) No [<i>go to ST1</i>] (3) DK	VIC1
VIC2. What type of crime did you experience? [<i>don't read the alternatives</i>] (1) Robbery without physical threat or aggression (2) Robbery with physical threat or aggression (3) Physical aggression without robbery (4) Rape or sexual assault (5) Kidnapping (6) Damage to property (7) House robbery Something else (Specify) _____	VIC2
AOJ1. If you've been a crime victim, did you report it to any authority? (1) Yes [<i>continue to AOJ1</i>] (2) No [<i>go to AOJ1B</i>] (3) Don't know/ don't remember (4) Inappropriate	AOJ1
AOJ1A. To what agency or institution did you report the crime? 1) Public prosecutor (2) Police (3) Courts (6) Press or other: _____ (7) Don't know (9) Inappropriate	AOJ1A
AOJ1B. Why didn't you report the crime? (1) It makes no difference (2) Danger or fear of retaliation (3) Lack of evidence (4) It wasn't serious (5) Didn't know where to report it (6) Don't know (7) Inappropriate	AOJ1B

Alter using their services of the following institutions, are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat unsatisfied or very unsatisfied?

(Repeat the alternatives in every question)

	VERY SATISFIED	SOMEWHAT SATISFIED	SOMEWHAT UNSATISFIED	VERY UNSATISFIED	HAVEN'T USED INSTITUTIONS	DK/NR	
ST1. National Police	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST1
ST2 Courts or Justice Tribunals	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST2
ST3. Public Prosecution Office	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST3
ST4 Municipality	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST4

AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always respect the law, or on occasion can they operate at the margins of the law? (1) They must always respect the law (2) On occasion they can operate at the margins of the law (3) Don't know	AOJ8
AOJ9. When there are serious suspicions that someone has participated in criminal activities do you believe that: a judge should issue a warrant before entry or should the police be able to enter a house without the necessary judicial warrant? (1) There should be a prior warrant (2) The police should come in without a warrant (3) Don't know	AOJ9
AOJ11. Speaking of the place or neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being a victim of assault or robbery...do you feel very safe, more or less safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe? (1) Very safe (2) More or less safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe (5) Don't know	AOJ11
AOJ12. If you were a victim of assault or robbery...how much faith would you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty party? (1) A lot (2) Some (3) A little (4) Nothing (8) Don't know	AOJ12
AOJ16. To what degree are you afraid of violence by members of your own family? Would you say you have a lot of fear, some fear, little fear or no fear? (1) A lot (2) Some (3) A little (4) Nothing (5) Don't know [?]	AOJ16
AOJ16A. Have you seen anybody selling drugs in your neighborhood in this last year? (1) Yes [<i>Continue with AOJ16B</i>] (2) No [<i>Go to AOJ 17</i>] (3) Don't know [<i>Go to AOJ17</i>]	AOJ16A
AOJ16B. Does this happen often, once in a while or almost never? (1) Often (2) Once in a while (3) Almost never (4) Don't know (5) Inappropriate	AOJ16B
AOJ17. To what degree would you say your neighborhood is being affected by gangs? Would you say a lot, some, a little or nothing? (1) A lot (2) Some (3) A little (4) Nothing (5) Don't know	AOJ17

AOJ18. Some people say that the police protect people from criminals, while other people might say that the police is involved in criminal activity. What do you think?
 (1) It protects (2) It is involved in criminal activities (3) Don't know

AOJ18

THIS PART MAY ONLY BE USED IN GUATEMALA, NICARAGUA, EL SALVADOR AND COLOMBIA:

<p>WC1. . Have you ever lost a member of your family due to an armed conflict in the country? (Missing relatives also apply) (1) Yes (2) No (3) Don't know</p>	<p>WC 1</p>
<p>WC2. Has a member of your family ever had to seek refuge or leave his home for reasons directly linked to that armed conflict? (1) Yes (2) No (3) Don't know</p>	<p>WC 2</p>
<p>WC3. Have those reasons ever made a family member leave the contry? (1) Yes (2) No (3) Don't know</p>	<p>WC 3</p>

THIS PART MAY ONLY BE USED IN GUATEMALA AND EL SALVADOR

<p>PAZ1. Do you think that the peace agreements reached have been very good, good, bad or very bad for this country? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Bad (4) Very bad (5) Don't know</p>	<p>PAZ1</p>
<p>PAZ2. What did you expect from those peace agreements <i>[read alternatives]</i> (1) Less political violence (2) More employment (3) More social programs (4) Nothing specific (5) Don't know</p>	<p>PAZ2</p>
<p>PAZ3. . What has been the main change in you community since the peace agreements? <i>[don't read alternatives]</i> (1) No war or political violence (2) No more prosecution (3) No fear (4) Social improvements (5) Infrastructure improvements (6) There hasn't been any change (7) Other: _____ (8) Don't know/ don't remember</p>	<p>PAZ3</p>
<p>PAZ4. How much do you believe the political situation of the country has improved after the peace agreements? <i>(read the alternatives)</i> (1) A lot (2) Some (3) A little (4) Nothing (5) Don't know/ don't remember</p>	<p>PAZ4</p>
<p>PAZ5. . How much do you believe the socioeconomic situation of the country has improved after the peace agreements? <i>(read the alternatives)</i> (1) A lot (2) Some (3) A little (4) Nothing (5) Don't know/ don't remember</p>	<p>PAZ5</p>

[Hand card "A" to interviewed person]

Now we're going to give you a card with a 7-point scale. Indicating values from 1 (NOT AT ALL) to 7 (A LOT). For example, if I were to ask you to what extent you trust the news broadcasted on TV, if you don't trust them at all you would say 1, if you trust them a lot you would say 7. If your opinion is between those two then you should pick an intermediate number. So, to what extent do you trust the news broadcasted on TV? Tell me the number *[Make sure the person understands correctly]*.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	(8) DK
NOT AT ALL			A LOT				

Now, using Card "A", please answer the following questions.

B1. To what extent do you believe the courts of justice in Guatemala guarantee a fair trial? If you believe that courts guarantee no justice, pick number 1; if you believe that courts do guarantee justice pick number 7 or a number in between.		B1	
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions in Guatemala?		B2	
B3. To what extent do you believe that basic citizen rights are well protected by the Guatemalan political system?		B3	
B4. To what extent are you proud to live under the Salvadoran political system?		B4	
B6. To what extent do you think one should support the Guatemalan political system?		B6	
B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?		B10A	
B11. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Electoral Tribunal?		B11	
B12. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces? [Eliminate for Panama and Costa Rica]		B12	
B13. To what extent do you trust the National Congress?		B13	
B14. To what extent do you trust the Central Government?		B14	
B15. To what extent do you trust the Budget Office of the Republic?		B15	
B16. To what extent do you trust the Attorney General of the Republic?		B16	
B17. To what extent do you have trust in the Defenders General?		B17	
B18. To what extent do you trust the Police?		B18	
B19. To what extent do you trust the Audit Office?		B19	
B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?		B20	
B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?		B21	
B31. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court?		B31	
B32. To what extent do you trust the Mayor's office of your municipality?		B32	
B37. To what extent do you trust the media?		B37	
B40. To what extent do you trust indigenous movements?		B40	
B43. To what extent are you proud to be Guatemalan? [change identity with every country]?		B43	
B44. To what extent do you trust the Constitutional Tribunal?		B44	
B45. To what extent do you trust the Anti-corruption Commission?		B45	
B46. To what extent do you trust the Anti-corruption National Council?		B46	
B47. To what extent do you trust elections?		B47	
B48. To what extent do you believe Free Trade Agreements will help to improve national economy?"		B48	

[DO NOT GATHER CARD "A"]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
NOT AT ALL			A LOT			(8) DK		
Now, using in this same scale, to what extent would you say that the current government [CADA PAIS INSERTAR EL NOMBRE DEL PRESIDENTE]							Write	
N1. Combats poverty							1-7, 8 = DK	N1
N3. Promotes and protects democratic principles								N3
N9. Combats government corruption								N9

[Gather Card "A"]

[Hand interviewed card "B"]

Now we're going to use a similar card where one represents "strongly disagree" and seven represents "strongly agree". I will read you several statements and I want you to tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with them.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Strongly disagree			Strongly agree			(8) DK	

	Write		
	1-7, DK=8		
ING2. In democratic countries there is always conflict and it is difficult to make decisions. To what extent do you agree or disagree?		ING2	
ING4. Democracy may have its problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree?		ING4	
PN2. Despite our differences, as Guatemalans we have many values that unite us. To what extent do you agree or disagree?		PN2	
PN2A. Politicians seek power for their own benefit and don't worry about helping people. To what extent do you agree or disagree?		PN2A	

[GATHER CARD B]

[Hand interviewed Card "C"]

Now I'm going to read you a list of some actions individuals can do to achieve their political goals and objectives. I'd like you to tell me how firmly you approve or disapprove of the following scenarios:

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)		
Firmly Disapprove					Firmly Approve					DK		
										Write		
										1-10, 88 DK		
E5. E5 That people participate in legal demonstrations?											E5	
E8. That people participate in an organization or group to try to solve community problems.											E8	

E11. That people work on electoral campaigns for a political party or candidate.	E11	
E15. That people participate in the blocking or closing of roads.	E15	
E14. That people trespass on private property.	E14	
E2. That people take control of factories, offices, and other buildings.	E2	
E3. That people participate in a group wanting to remove an elected government by violent means.	E3	
E16. That people take justice into their own hands when the state doesn't punish criminals.	E16	

[Do not gather card "C"]

Now we are going to discuss actions that the government can take. We will continue using the scale from 1 to ten, where 1 indicates strongly disapproval and 10 indicates strongly approval.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)	
Strongly disapproves										Strongly approves	DK

	Write 1- 10,88= DK	
D32. What would you think of a law prohibiting public protest?		D32
D33. What would you think of a law prohibiting meetings of any group critical of the Guatemalan political system?		D33
D34. What would you think if the government censured television programming		D34
D36. What would you think if the government censured library books from the public schools?		D36
D37. What would you think if the government censured the propaganda of those people critical of our country?		D37

The following questions are meant to find out your opinion about the ideas of the Guatemalan people. We will continue to use the scale from 1 to 10.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)	
Strongly disapproves										Strongly approves	DK

	Write 1-10, DK=88	
D1. There are people who speak negatively of the Guatemalan form of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of these people's right to vote?		D1
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that these people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their points of view? Please read the number to me.		D2
D3. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that people who never agree with the Guatemalan government be permitted to seek public office?		D3

	Write 1-10, DK=88	
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of these people going on television to make speeches?		D4
D5. Now, thinking about homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove that they be allowed to seek public office ?		D5
D6. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of homosexuals going on television to make speeches?		D6

[Gather card "c"]

Do you think this country has: (1) Too little (2) Enough (3) Too much	
LIB1. . Freedom of Press (1) Too little (2) Enough (3) Too much (4) Don't know	LIB1
LIB2. Freedom of opinion (1) Too Little (2) Enough (3) Too much (4) Don't know	LIB2
LIB3. Political participation (1) Too little (2) Enough (3) Too much (4) Don't know	LIB3
LIB4. . Human rights protection (1) Too little (2) Enough (3) Too much (4) Don't know	LIB4

ACR1. Now I'm going to read you three phrases. Please tell me which of the three best describes your opinion: 1) The way in which our society is organized should be completely and radically changed by revolutionary means. 2) Our society should be gradually perfected or improved through reform. 3) Our society should be courageously defended from revolutionary movements. 8) DK	ACR 1
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PN4. In general, would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, unsatisfied or very unsatisfied with the way democracy works in Guatemala? (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Unsatisfied (4) Very unsatisfied (5) Don't know	PN4
PN5. . In your opinion, is Guatemala very democratic, somewhat democratic, a little democratic or undemocratic? (1) Very democratic (2) Somewhat democratic (3) A little democratic (4) Undemocratic (5) Don't know	PN5
PN6. Based on your experience from the last few years. Has Guatemala become more democratic, has it stayed the same or is it less democratic? (1) Very democratic (2) The same (3) Less democratic (4) Don't know	PN6

DEM13. What does democracy mean for you, in a few words? [Don't read alternatives] [Write just one answer] (1) Freedom (2) Equality (3) Well-being and economic progress (4) Capitalism (5) Non-military government (6) Free Trade, Free Market (7) Elections, voting rights (8) Right to choose our leaders (9) Corruption (10) Participation (11) Rule of the people (12) Obeying the law (13) Other: _____ (14) Don't know	DEM13
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<p>DEM2. With which of the following phrases are you in most agreement:</p> <p>1) For people like me, it doesn't matter whether a regime is democratic or non-democratic. 2) Democracy is preferable to any other type of government. 3) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one. 8) Don't know</p>	DEM2
<p>DEM6. With which of the following phrases do you most agree:</p> <p>[1] In general, despite its problems, democracy is the best form of government. [2] There are other forms of government that can be just as good or even better than democracy. [3] don't know</p>	DEM6
<p>DEM11. Do you believe that our country needs a government with a firm hand, or that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation?</p> <p>(1) Firm hand (2) Everyone's participation (8) don't know</p>	DEM11

<p>AUT1 On some occasions, democracy doesn't work. When that happens there are people that say we need a strong leader who doesn't have to be elected through voting. Others say that even if things don't function, democracy is always the best. What do you think?</p> <p>(1) We need a strong leader that doesn't have to be elected (2) Democracy is always the best way (8) Don't know</p>	AUT1
<p>[OPTIONAL, EXCEPTO EN GUATEMALA, EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS]</p> <p>AUT2 Our present system of government isn't the only one our country has had. Some people think that it would be better for us if our country was governed in a different way. In your opinion, what type of government should we have?</p> <p>(1) Return of a military government (2) What we have now (8) Don't know</p>	AUT2

<p>PP1 During elections, some people try to convince others to vote for one party or candidate. How often have you tried to convince others on which party to vote?</p> <p>(1) Frequently (2) Once in a while (3) Rarely (4) Never (5) Don't know</p>	PP1
<p>PP2. There are people who work for a party or candidate during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential elections of March, 1998?</p> <p>(1) Yes (2) No (5) Don't know</p>	PP2
<p>ABS5. Do you think that voting can lead to improvement in the future or do you believe that no matter how one votes, things never change?</p> <p>(1) Vote can change things (2) Things are not going to get better (3) Don't know</p>	ABS5

<p>M1. Speaking generally of the current government would you say that the job the current president is doing is very good, good, average, bad, very bad.</p> <p>(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Average (4) Bad (5) Very bad (6) Don't know</p>	M1
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Do you think the following actions are: (1) Corrupted and must be punished (2) Corrupted but justifiable under the circumstances (3) Not corrupted	
DC1. For example: A congressman takes a 10,000 dollar bribe from a company, that action is: (1) corrupted and must be punished (2) corrupted but justifiable (3) Not corrupted (4) Don't know	DC1
DC10. A mother with several children has to get a birth certificate for one of them. To save some time, she pays 20 extra Quetzales to an employee. What the lady did was: (1)Corrupted and must be punished (2) Corrupted but justifiable (3) Not corrupted (4) Don't know	DC10
DC13. An unemployed person's brother in law is an important politician and he uses his position to get the man a job. Do you think this is: 1) Corrupted and must be punished 2) Corrupted but justifiable 3) Not corrupted 4) Don't know	DC13

Now we want to talk about your personal experiences on things that happen in life.	No	Yes	NS	INAP	
EXC1. Have you been accused within the past two years by a police officer for any infraction which you did not commit?	(0)	(1)	(8)		EXC1
EXC2. Did any agent of the police ask you for a bribe during the last year?	(0)	(1)	(8)		EXC2
EXC4. Have you seen anyone paying a bribe to a policeman during the past year?	(0)	(1)	(8)		EXC4
EXC5. Have you seen anyone paying a bribe to a public employee during the last year?	(0)	(1)	(8)		EXC5
EXC6. Has any public employee asked you for a bribe during the past year?	(0)	(1)	(8)		EXC6
EXC11. Have you conducted any diligences in the municipality this last year? [If no, put 9 if yes ask next question] To conduct business in the municipality (such as to get a license, for instance) during the past year, have you had to pay additional money above what is required by the law?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	EXC11
EXC13. Do you work? [If no put 9, if yes ask the next question] In your work, have you been asked for an inappropriate payment within the past year?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	EXC13
EXC14. In the last year have you had dealings with the court system? [If no put 9, if yes ask the next question] Have you had to pay a bribe in the courts during the past year?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	EXC14
EXC15. Have you used public medical services in the last year? To be attended in a hospital or other health facility have you had to pay fees above what is stipulated by law? [If no put 9, if yes ask the next question]?	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	EXC15
EXC16. Have you had children enrolled in school during the last year? [If no put 9, if yes ask the next question] At school have you been asked for a payment above that required by law.	(0)	(1)	(8)	(9)	EXC16
EXC17. Has anyone asked you for a bribe to avoid paying your electric bill?	(0)	(1)	(8)		EXC17
EXC19. Do you believe that it is justifiable to pay bribes because of the bad quality of administrative services in our countries?	(0)	(1)	(8)		EXC18

EXC7. Taking into account your experience or what you have heard, is corruption among public officials very common, common, not very common, or uncommon? (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Not very common (4) Uncommon (5) Don't know	EXC7	
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[Now we'll use Card "D"] Hand interviewed card "D"

I am going to name various public and private institutions. I am interested to know the degree to which you think that the representatives of these institutions are honest or corrupt. I will ask you to grade each one from 1 to 10. 1 being corrupted and 10 being honest.

INSTITUTIONS	Degree of corruption										DK	
	Very Corrupt					Very Honest						
PC1. Delegates	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC1
PC2. Ministers	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC2
PC3. Mayors	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC3
PC4. Municipal Councilmen	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC4
PC5. Policemen	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC5
PC8. University Professors	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC8
PC9. Priests, clerics or pastors	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC9
PC12. Judges	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC12
PC13. Military	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC14
PC14. Political party leaders	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC14
PC15. NGO's leaders	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC15
PC19. Media	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC19
PC21. Presidents	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(88)	PC21

Gather Card D

Now can you tell me G11 Do you remember the name of the current President of the United States? (George Bush) [Don't read, George W. Bush; accept "Bush" or "George Bush"] (1) Right (2) Wrong (don't know)	G11
G13. Do you remember how many provinces Guatemala has? (22) [Don't read, 22] (1) Right (2) Wrong (Don't know)	G13
G14. How long is the Presidential term in Guatemala? (four years) [do not read 4 years] (1) Right (2) Wrong (Don't know)	G14
G15. Do you remember the name of Brazil's President? (Lula Da Silva) [do not read, Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva; accept "Lula"] (1) Right (2) Wrong (don't know)	G15

L1. Show Card "E": Now, for a subject change. In this card there's a one to ten scale that goes from left to right. Today, when people talk about politics they mention left wingers and right wingers, referring to people that sympathize with the left or the right. According to your sense of "left" and "right" in politics, where would you place yourself in this scale?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	L1	
Left					<i>Right</i>					(DK=8)	

If you decided to participate in one of the activities I'm going to mention, would you do it with no fear, some fear or a lot of fear? [READ THE LIST, AND REPEAT THE QUESTION IF NECESSARY]	NO FEAR	SOME FEAR	A LOT OF FEAR	DK	
DER1. Participate to resolve problems in your community?	1	2	3	8	DER1
DER2. Voting in a national election?	1	2	3	8	DER2
DER3. Participate in a peaceful demonstration?	1	2	3	8	DER3
DER4. Run for a public office?	1	2	3	8	DER4

VB1. Are you registered? (1) Yes (2) No (3) In process (4) Don't know	VB1
VB2. Did you vote in the last Presidential elections of 2002? (1) Yes [continue] (2) No [go to VB4] (3) Don't know	VB2
VB3. For which party did you vote on the first round of the 2003 Presidential Elections? [If not, go on to GVB4, if yes continue] (1)list candidates (2)Other: _____ (3) Null vote/blank vote (5)DK	VB3
VB4. If you didn't vote, why didn't you? [write down only one answer] (01) Lack of transport (02) Sickness (03) Lack of interest (04) Didn't like any of the candidates (05) Don't believe in the system (06) Lack of ID document (07) Didn't find self in Register (10) Not in required ages (11) I was late/ it was closed (12) Had to work (13) Other: _____	VB4
VB5. Did you vote on the last elections for mayor and congress? (1) Yes [continue] (2) No [go to VB6] (3) Don't know	VB5

VB6. For which party did you vote in the 2003 elections for city mayor? (1) Other: _____ (2) Null vote/ blank vote (3) Don't know 99. Inap (No vote)	VB6
VB7. . Which party did you vote for in the 2003 elections for Provincial and National Delegates to Congress? (1) (2) Other: _____ (3) Various candidates _____ (4) Null vote/ blank vote (5) Don't know	VB7

I would like to know your opinion on the next electoral reforms, which is a very common topic these days. We'll use Card "c" again for this one. **[Hand interviewed card "C"]**.

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)
Firmly disapproves					Firmly approves					DK

EREF1. To what extent do you approve or disapprove a raise of the minimum quota of women in congress? [read the number]]	EREF1
EREF2. To what extent do you approve or disapprove the reconfiguration of electoral districts so that you can elect one delegate per district and not a bunch of delegates from a party?	EREF2
EREF3. Giving delegates the right to finance public works and other public services in their districts. To what extent would you approve or disapprove?	EREF3

Before we finish I'm going to ask you some questions for statistical purposes.

ED. What was the last year of school you completed?

[Interviewer Fill in:] _____ (grade school, high school, college) = _____ total years **[Use chart below to write the corresponding code]**

None= 00	First year of....	Second year of...	Third year of...	Fourth year of.. .	Fifth year of...	Sixth year ...	ED	_____
Grade School	(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)		
High School	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(11)	(12)		
College	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18) or more		
DK	(88)							

Q2. What is your age in completed years? _____ years	Q2	_____
Q3. What is your religion? (1) Catholic (2) Christian not catholic (3) Another not Christian (4) None (5) Don't know	Q3	
Q4 How many times have you been to church (temple) in the last month? (1)Every week (2) Once in a while (3) Rarely (4) Never Q10 Into which of the following ranges does your monthly income fall?	Q4	

<p>Q10. Including remittances from abroad and income from everyone that works? [Show ranks list F] ADJUST IN EVERY COUNTRY (0-11) (0) No income (1) Less than de \$25 (2) Between \$26-\$50 (3) \$51-\$100 (4) \$101-\$150 (5) \$151-\$200 (6) \$201-\$300 (7) \$301-\$400 (8) \$401-\$500 (9) \$501-\$750 (10) \$751-\$1,000 (88) NS</p>	Q10	
<p>Q10A. Does your family receive remittances from abroad? (1) Yes [continue] (2) No [go to Q11] (5) Don't know</p>	Q10A	
<p>Q10B. To what extent does your family income depend on these remittances? (1) A lot (2) Some (3) A little (4) Nothing (5) Don't know</p>	Q10B	
<p>Q11. What is your marital status? (1) Single (2) Married (3) Civil union (4) Divorced (5) Separated (6) Widower (7) Don't know</p>	Q11	
<p>Q12. How many children do you have? _____ (0 = none)</p>	Q12	
<p>Q13. How many children should a person like you have in all their lives? _____</p>	Q13	
<p>Q14. Are you planning to leave the country and work abroad in the next 3 years? (1) Yes (2) No (8) Don't know</p>	Q14	
<p>Q15. Have you lived in the United States in the last 3 years? (1) Yes (2) No (8) Don't know</p>	Q15	

<p>ETID. Do you consider yourself white, mixed, indigenous or black? (1) White (2) Mixed (3) Indigenous (4) Black (5) Other: (6) Don't know PLEASE CHANGE TO MATCH YOUR COUNTRY.</p>	ETID	
<p>ONLY GUATEMALA NICARAGUA AND HONDURAS LENG1 What language have you spoken in your home since childhood? (1) Spanish (2) Mam.... etc. (3) English (4) Other (foreign) _____ (5) Don't know</p>	LENG1	

Could you tell me if you have the following items in your home?

R1. Television	(0) No	(1) One	(2) Two	(3) Three or more	R1	
R3. Refrigerator	(0) No			(1) Yes	R3	
R4. Telephone line	(0) No			(1) Yes	R4	
R4A. Cell phone	(0) No			(1) Yes	R4A	
R5. Vehicle	(0) No	(1) One	(2) Two	(3) Three or more	R5	
R6. Laundry machine	(0) No			(1) Yes	R6	

R7. Microwave	(0) No	(1) Yes	R7
R12. Running water inside the house	(0) No	(1) Yes	R12
R14. Bathroom inside the house	(0) No	(1) Yes	R14
R15. Computer	(0) No	(1) Yes	R15

OCUP1 What is your occupation? 1. Professional, executive 2. Office work 3. Salesman 4. Peasant 5. Agriculture rural worker 6. Domestic Service 7. Other services 10. Specialized Laborer 11. Non specialized laborer 12. Student 13. House wife 14. Retired 15. Don't know	OCUP1
OCUP1A In this position you are: 1. Paid by the government? 2. Paid by the private sector? 3. Employer or partner in a company with less than 5 employees? 4. Employer or partner in a company with 5 or more employees? 5. Self employed? 6. Work without payment 8. Don't know	OCUP1A
DESOC1. DESOC1 Have you been unemployed during the last year? (1)Yes (2) No [go to T1] (3) Currently unemployed/ retired	DESOC1

Time of interview's end ____ : ____ TI. Interview's length [<i>minutes, see page # 1</i>] _____	TI
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These are all the questions I have. Thank you very much for your cooperation.

I swear this survey was conducted on an appropriate person.

Interviewers Signature _____ Date_ / ____ /04 Field supervisor's signature


Codifier's signature _____

Comments

Signature of the person who input the data _____

Signature of the person who verified the data _____

Card "A"




Card "B"

**Strongly
Agree**



**Strongly
Disagree**

Card "C"



Card "D"

Very honest

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Very corrupt

Card "E"

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Left **Right**

Card “F” (card changes for each country)

This family’s monthly income:

- | | |
|-------------|---------------------------|
| (00) | No income |
| (01) | Less than \$25 |
| (02) | Between \$26- \$50 |
| (03) | \$51-\$100 |
| (04) | \$101-\$150 |
| (05) | \$151-\$200 |
| (06) | \$201-\$300 |
| (07) | \$301-\$400 |
| (08) | \$401-500 |
| (09) | \$501-\$750 |
| (10) | \$751-\$1,000 |

The Political Culture of Democracy in Mexico, Central America and Colombia, 2004

The publication you have before you forms part of growing number of studies produced by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) of Vanderbilt University in the United States. The current study, by incorporating eight countries (Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia) represents the largest effort undertaken to date by LAPOP. The sample and questionnaire designs were uniform for all eight countries, permitting direct comparisons among them, as well as detailed analyses within each country. The study is the product of the intensive effort of 15 highly motivated social scientists, several experts in sample design, dozens of field supervisors, hundreds of interviewers, data entry clerks and more than 12,000 respondents. The 2004 cycle includes a total of nine publications, one for each of the eight countries, authored by teams from the countries, and a global study, written by Professor Mitchell A. Seligson of Vanderbilt University, who directs the LAPOP. The study was made possible by the generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented under contract with ARD, Inc. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are used by policymakers, citizens and academics to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

**A Study of the Latin American Public
Opinion Project (LAPOP)**