

The Political Culture of Democracy in Bolivia: 2000

by:

Mitchell A. Seligson

Department of Political Science

University of Pittsburgh

Pittsburgh, PA 15260

(412) 648-7268

seligson@pitt.edu

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Introduction and Executive Summary

In 1998 over 3,000 Bolivians were interviewed in order to learn of their views on democracy. Again in the year 2000 a similar number of Bolivians were interviewed and asked many of the same questions, as well as some new questions not asked in 1998. This report presents the results of the 2000 survey, making comparisons (where appropriate) with the early survey results. This introduction and executive summary reports some of the main findings, the details of which are contained in the chapters that follow.

- Both the 2000 sample and the one that preceded it in 1998 were designed to represent the entire country, and therefore interviews were conducted in each of Bolivia's nine departments and in the nation's three main languages, Spanish, Quechua, and Aymara. Both samples had an identical design. The samples were chosen to be representative of the urban/rural distribution of the population within each department, as well as the distribution of population by department at the level of the nation. An additional special sample was collected in 2000 in nine municipalities in which a USAID development program (the DDPC program) has been operating. The special sample in 1998 was limited to six special municipalities. In 2000 a total of 3,006 respondents were interviewed in the national sample and 900 in the special municipal sample. In 1998, 2,977 respondents were interviewed for the national sample, and 599 were interviewed in the special municipal sample areas, with 100 of the latter overlapping with the national sample.
- The sample included all of Bolivia's nine departments, as well as 67 of its 108 provinces and 99 of its 311 municipalities. This is unusually broad coverage for national surveys, which in Bolivia and many other Latin American countries tend to be limited to the major urban centers.
- To avoid drawing the sample largely from urban areas to the exclusion of rural ones, the sample was stratified within each department by population size. The population was divided into four clusters: (1) cities larger than 20,000 persons; (2) cities and towns of 2,000-20,000; (3) "compact rural" zones, with populations of 500-1,999; and finally (4) "dispersed rural" zones of fewer than 500 people.
- The sampling error for both years is $\pm 1.7\%$. This means that if one drew repeated samples of this size in Bolivia, 95% of them would reflect the views of the population with no greater inaccuracy than $\pm 1.7\%$. Of course, factors other than sampling error can reduce the accuracy of the results, such as non-response, errors in selecting the respondent, misunderstanding the question, etc. But a confidence interval this small is very good, by the standards of the survey research profession. Within each department, however, the smaller sampling size gave a confidence interval of $\pm 5.8\%$. In La Paz, Santa Cruz, and Cochabamba, however, where the samples were larger, the confidence interval was a smaller $\pm 5.0\%$.

- The survey itself was efficiently and professionally carried out by Encuestas & Estudios, the premier survey research firm in Bolivia. Founded in 1984, this firm is affiliated with Gallup International. The entire project was supervised by the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project, and comparisons with data from that project are made with the Bolivia data analyzed here.
- The sample drawn from this study closely resembles the overall population of Bolivia not only in terms of geographic dispersion, but also in its basic demographic characteristics. Half of the sample was male and half female; the average age of respondents was 36.3 years in 1998 and 36.6 years in 2000.
- In 1998 nearly half of respondents lived in homes in which the household income was 500 Bolivianos or less per month, while in the 2000 sample, 38% had incomes this low. At the conversion rate of 5.5 Bolivianos per dollar in 1998, over 90% of the sample in 1998 earned U.S. \$364 or less per month, and over 80% earned U.S. \$181 or less. In 2000, at an exchange rate of 6.1 Bolivianos to the dollar, 85% of the sample earned \$327 or less, and 70% of the sample earned no more than \$164 per month. Incomes varied by gender, with males earning more than females; and by place of residence, with urban dwellers earning more than those in rural areas.
- Three-fifths of the respondents in both samples considered themselves to be ethnically *mestizo*, while 10% identified as Indian. The minority of “whites” earned the greatest income, while Indians and blacks earned the least.
- Only about half the population was monolingual (Spanish-speaking), whereas the others spoke some combination of Spanish and Quechua and/or Aymara, and fewer than 10% were monolingual speakers of indigenous languages.
- The 2000 survey found that 84% of the population classified themselves as Catholic (active or inactive) and an additional 14% as evangelical Christians.
- An overall question measuring support for democracy found that 72% of Bolivians preferred democracy over authoritarianism, or expressed no preference regarding whether Bolivia under democratic or authoritarian rule. This result places Bolivia among the countries in Latin America that register a high support for democracy. Only the department of Pando scores significantly lower than the national average, while Chuquisaca scores above.
- The more rural the locality in Bolivia, the *higher* the preference for democracy. The multivariate analysis found that for each decrement in population size in the four-category scale of rural-urban residence used in this study, the odds of a Bolivian preferring democracy are 20% higher than for those who don't care if the system is democratic or dictatorial.

- Young people are less supportive of democracy than the old in Bolivia. With each year's increase in age, Bolivians prefer democracy (rather than having no preference) by nearly 2%. Among those who prefer democracy, the only group for whom age is a significant predictor, the greatest difference occurs between the youngest Bolivians (ages 18-25) and all others. Only among the young is a preference for democracy substantially lower than the national average. However, a preference for authoritarianism is not age-related. It is also important not to exaggerate the differences found; even among the youngest respondents, over two-thirds support democracy.
- A preference for democracy increases among those with higher incomes, while the number of those who don't care which system governs declines as incomes decrease.
- Among those who are nonreligious, the preference for democracy stands at 65%, whereas among those who are more actively religious, the preference for democracy is 75%. This finding runs counter to some thinking in the social sciences whereby those who are strongly religious are found to be anti-democratic. Not in Bolivia.
- No other demographic or socioeconomic variables have a significant impact on the preference for democracy question.
- Political participation variables, however, did matter in predicting support for democracy. Those who attend municipal meetings are more likely to prefer democracy and are more than twice as likely *not* to prefer authoritarianism than those who do not attend such meetings. We cannot say, of course, that those who attend such meetings are more positive about democracy because of their participation, or that they attend because they prefer democracy. Indeed, there is probably a reciprocal relationship, with participation and attitudes interacting with each other. But it is certainly a positive sign that this relationship exists, given Bolivia's strong emphasis on decentralization and participation.
- Those who are especially critical of the government's efforts on anti-corruption are most likely to prefer democracy. Those less critical are more likely not to care which kind of political system rules, suggesting that concerned, critical citizens are pro-democratic citizens who represent a threat only to those who would corrupt democracy.
- The odds of preferring democracy increase by 1% for each one-point increase in system support, measured by the political support/alienation scale used throughout the study.
- The impact of trust in the office of the public defender has a significant negative impact on preference for authoritarianism. The odds of preferring authoritarianism

decline by 17% for each one-point increase in the original scale of trust in the public defender, which ranged from 1 to 7.

- Those who opposed a military coup because of the protests in April 2000 were much more likely to favor democracy. Indeed, the odds of favoring democracy over not caring which system was in power were 83% higher among those who opposed a coup.
- Among those who said that a military coup could be justified because of the protests, a higher percentage preferred authoritarianism than among those who said it was not justified. An even sharper distinction is found among those who do not care which system is in power. Among those who said that the coup might not be justified, 10% did not care which system is in power, whereas among those who said that the coup might be justified, 21% said that they did not care which system was in power.
- Among those who support the right to organize of citizens who favor the return of military government, the odds of preferring authoritarianism are 41% higher than among those who don't care which government is in power.
- In the Bolivia 2000 survey, 72% respondents preferred a participatory form of rule over *mano dura* governments.
- The odds of preferring democracy are 46% higher among those who prefer participation over *mano dura* governments, while the odds of preferring authoritarianism are 58% lower for those who want participation.
- In another question related to regime preferences, we asked to what extent respondents would approve or disapprove of people participating in a group that would want to overthrow an elected government by violent means. This item was asked on a ten-point scale, and 49.1% of respondents selected a score of 1, which is the strongest disapproval. The mean for the entire sample was 2.5, and only fewer than 2% were strongly in favor.
- For each one-point increment (on a ten-point scale) in disapproval of people participating in a group to overthrow the government, the odds of preferring a democratic regime went up by 87%.
- The survey asked about approval or disapproval of citizen participation in legal demonstrations. On the 1-10 scale, approval averaged 6.8, with only 18.8% disapproving (i.e., scored 4 or lower) of such activities. A strong association emerged between approval of legal citizen protests and support for democracy. The odds of preferring democracy increased by 10% for each one-point increase in the scale of approval of legal demonstrations.

- Three-fifths of respondents support the rights of those suspected of criminal activities, while a little over one-third do not. Among those who prefer an authoritarian regime, there is a greater willingness to violate the rights of the accused.
- The odds of preferring authoritarian rule over not caring which system is in power increased by 64% for those who would prefer limiting liberty to guarantee order.
- One factor that is very much within the realm of public opinion is belief in the legitimacy of one's government. As discussed in some detail in the 1998 version of this study (material that will not be repeated here), without popular belief in the legitimacy of a country's political system, democratic stability will be ephemeral. So it is vital to penetrate beneath that national preference for democracy to understand what Bolivians think about their existing political system, not some idealized democracy that does not exist. Moreover, it is vital to know whether Bolivians support key democratic principles, especially tolerance for minority rights.
- Of the five items that make up the core of the system support scale, three showed no significant change over the two-year period (1998-2000). Two did have a significant change, with support for institutions increasing, while pride in the political system declined. Overall, this represents a pattern of stability rather than change, which is rather surprising, given the serious political shocks the Bolivian system has experienced of late. It suggests that these events, especially the violent demonstrations and subsequent brief state of siege declared in the spring of 2000, not many months before the survey was conducted, did not have a strong impact on system support.
- Using an overall scale of the five core items, in 1998 Bolivia's score was 44, which declined to 43 in 2000, a decline that is statistically insignificant. In Bolivia, support for the system remains far higher than in Peru, but substantially below the levels of support reported in the countries of Central America.
- Looking within Bolivia for variation at the department level, there is also no significant difference between the level of system support in 1998 compared to 2000.
- In short, there are no significant changes in system support nationally or regionally over the period 1998-2000.
- In the 1998 study one of the most troubling aspects of the findings was the very low level of political tolerance expressed by the population. Tolerance was low not merely in absolute terms, but also in terms relevant to other Latin American countries in which the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion project has taken measurements. In light of these findings, it is very encouraging to find that

in three of the four variables measuring tolerance, there were significant increases, with only the *run for office* question not showing any increase.

- It is also notable that the greatest increase occurred in the *right to demonstrate* question, perhaps reflecting in part the perception of the impact of the demonstrations in the first half of the year 2000. This may also have affected the *right to vote* question, where tolerance also increased significantly.
- These results can be placed in comparative perspective by examining the Bolivian case in the context of some other Latin American countries for which we have recent data. Bolivia's increase since 1998 is notable, but tolerance remains low by the standards of the countries in the Latin American region. It is also of note that some countries (e.g., El Salvador) have experienced major increases in tolerance over the period of a decade. Therefore significant increases in Bolivia are certainly encouraging, but there is still a considerable distance to travel before tolerance in Bolivia lies within the positive end of the continuum.
- Comparisons of Bolivians' political tolerance across departments reveal some important shifts. What is striking about this national breakdown by department are the strong increases in Pando, El Beni, and Cochabamba, and the sharp decline in Tarija, each of which is statistically significant. Further examination of the tolerance results at the department level reveals that the largest increases occurred among the departments that ranked lowest in 1998, so the phenomenon we are observing may be part of the well-known tendency of any data series to regress to its mean. That is, these departments that were outliers in 1998 have reversed course and shifted to levels much closer to the national average by 2000. Nonetheless, the size of the shift is so large that one wonders whether other factors are at play. We investigate those below.
- An examination of the simple correlation (Pearson's r) between education and tolerance for 1998 and for 2000 for the sample as a whole, as well as within each department, shows no significant association in either year. Therefore, variation in education between the samples could not be responsible for the increases in tolerance found in some departments in Bolivia. Similarly, examinations of age, gender, and income data did not reveal any obvious reason for the increase in tolerance in Pando, El Beni, and Cochabamba. We must assume, therefore, that the increases had something to do with political events in those areas over the period 1998-2000.
- Prior studies emerging from the University of Pittsburgh project have explored the relationship between system support and tolerance in an effort to develop a predictive model of democratic stability. Only about one in ten Bolivians both supports the political system and expresses political tolerance, but it is very encouraging to find that between 1998 and 2000 the percentage increased. On the other hand, the largest cell by far is the *democratic breakdown* cell, in which nearly

half of all Bolivians fall. These are individuals with low system support and low tolerance. Yet these percentages declined in 2000.

- Since it has already been shown that system support remained basically unchanged between 1998 and 2000 but tolerance increased, the shifts between the two years are a function of the increased levels of tolerance. Higher tolerance propelled more Bolivians into the *stable democracy* cell and also increased those in the *unstable democracy* cell, i.e., those who express tolerant attitudes but are unsupportive of the political system.
- How do the new Bolivian results compare with those from other countries in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project data base? Bolivia ranks lowest among the six countries in the data series, approximately matching the results for Peru, but exhibiting only a little more than one-fourth the level of support for stable democracy found in Costa Rica.
- Corruption was hardly touched on in the 1998 report, but it is examined here in considerable detail. The focus of the research presented here is to see whether there is a link between being a victim of corruption and support for the system.
- The chapter on corruption draws on survey data collected by the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project in Bolivia and three other Latin American countries. These countries ranked on the 1999 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index as follows: El Salvador, 49; Nicaragua, 70; Bolivia, 80; and Paraguay, 90. Thus they all score in the bottom half of the rankings, and the group includes countries that are perceived as being anywhere from moderately corrupt to extremely corrupt. National probability samples were drawn in each country, with interviews in Paraguay and Bolivia conducted in 1998 and those in El Salvador and Nicaragua in 1999. In Bolivia, we can also draw on the 2000 survey, but for comparative analysis we will use the Bolivia 1998 survey because it most closely matches the other data sets. Then a separate analysis is undertaken by comparing Bolivia 1998 to Bolivia 2000.
- Respondents were asked eight questions measuring their experience with corruption over the two years prior to the survey. These included: (1) being stopped by a police officer for a trumped-up infraction of the law; (2) being asked to pay a bribe to a police officer; (3) observing a bribe being paid to a police officer; (4) observing a bribe being paid to a public official; (5) being asked to pay a bribe to a public official; (6) being asked to pay an illegal fee to expedite a transaction of the municipal government; (7) being asked to pay a bribe at work; (8) being asked to pay a bribe in the court system.
- Overall, 25% of Bolivians reported having experience with corruption within the two years prior to the survey, a percentage that is lower than for Paraguay, 28%, but much higher than for El Salvador (6%).

- The statistical analysis found that in each of the four countries, including Bolivia, *higher* experience with corruption is significantly ($< .001$) associated with *lower* support for the legitimacy of the political system, even when controls for other variables are introduced.
- Presumably the direction of causality here is clear, since those from whom bribes were solicited could not be selected by public officials because of the latter's foreknowledge of the former's perceptions of legitimacy. Or could they? What if bribe targets are selected precisely because the incumbent political party favors its friends and "taxes" its enemies? Or what if those who do not support the incumbent party are more likely to report bribery attempts in the survey than those who support the party? Either or both could be true, which might mean that low support for the legitimacy of the political system is a *cause* of bribery (or a cause of reporting bribery) rather than the other way around. The results show, however, that once political party preferences are controlled for, corruption still has a significant and negative impact on belief in legitimacy.
- Victims of corruption are found to exhibit lower levels of interpersonal trust.
- Comparing the 1998 survey with the 2000 results showed that there was little change, except that instances of being unfairly stopped by the police and bribes requested by public employees declined.
- The report examines in detail levels of corruption for each department and for each of the major forms of corruption.
- Urbanization is a significant predictor of corruption victimization; the more urban the residence of the respondent, the more likely he/she is to be a victim of corruption.
- Corruption occurs at a much higher rate in Bolivia's urban areas; 29% of those who live in cities with populations over 20,000 have been victims of one or more of the seven forms of corruption measured in the 2000 national survey, whereas only 18-19% of those who live in more rural areas report having been victims over the last two years.
- Males are far more likely than females to be victims of corruption in Bolivia.
- As age increases, corruption victimization declines. The relationship is not linear, however, and it is clear that corruption victimization declines only among those who are 56 years of age or older--individuals who have fewer dealings with the state as they move into retirement.
- Education is also related to corruption victimization; higher levels of education are associated with more victimization of corruption.

- Income is also related to corruption victimization. Among those with little or no income, only about 5% of the population have been victims of corruption, but among those with the highest levels of income, about half have been victimized.
- Returning to the theme of a preference for democracy over authoritarian rule, it was found that the lowest levels of victimization correspond to those who prefer democracy, while the highest levels of victimization correspond to those who prefer authoritarianism. Since those who ask for bribes could not have any idea as to the type of regime preferred by their victims, it is clear that being a victim of corruption is responsible for a significantly decreased preference for democratic rule. When this information is coupled with the earlier cross-national analysis of the impact of corruption on reduced system support, one can fully appreciate the pernicious impact of corruption on the stability of democracy in Bolivia.
- In a similar finding, those who have a higher corruption victimization score are those more likely to prefer a *mano dura* government.
- Those who have a higher corruption victimization score are significantly more likely to have a low satisfaction with democracy score.
- How central are ethnic distinctions in Bolivia, and how do those distinctions relate to support for or opposition to democracy? The political explosions of 2000 make this question relevant, since newspaper reports within Bolivia and internationally linked them to ethnic tensions.
- Over half of Bolivians consider themselves to be *mestizo*, or of mixed race. The next largest group, one-quarter of the population, considers itself to be *blanco* or white. The indigenous population is only 8.5% of the total, with the *cholo* population adding another 3%. Blacks make up only about 1% of the population, with an additional 3.9% not able or willing to define themselves. By the definition of dress, fewer than one in ten respondents would be defined as Indian. Only the *cholo* self-classification is largely associated with indigenous dress patterns, whereas only one-fifth of those who call themselves Indian dress in that fashion. Surprisingly, among the black population, over one-third are seen as dressing in an indigenous manner. The conclusion from this analysis is that judging by form of dress is not a good way of estimating ethnicity, as it does not correspond to how our respondents classify themselves. Moreover, although there are strong associations between language and ethnicity, language does not fully define what Bolivians see as their ethnic status. Far too many Bolivians who identify themselves as Indians or *cholos* did not grow up speaking an Indian language, whereas far too many Bolivians who identify themselves as white did grow up speaking one of those languages. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the most appropriate way to reflect ethnic differences is to use ethnic self-identification.

- Whites have the highest incomes, followed by *mestizos*, Indians, *cholos*, and blacks. Incomes of whites and *mestizos* do not vary much from each other, but there is a sharp falling-off for the other groups.
- Educational differences are also sharp among the various self-defined ethnic groups. The white and *mestizo* populations are virtually identical in terms of education, but both are far above the other groups, showing a pattern even sharper than what we saw for income.
- There are wide differences in place of residence associated with each ethnic group. As the population shifts from urban to rural Bolivia, there is a clear pattern. White Bolivians are most likely to live in urban areas, as are *mestizos* to a nearly similar degree. But *cholos*, Indians, and especially blacks are more likely to have a rural residence.
- There is a high level of system support among the black population, a finding that is unexpected but may be a function of the very small sample size.
- The Indian and *cholo* populations have significantly lower levels of system support than any other group, even when controls for socioeconomic status are applied.
- White Bolivians do not have a significantly different level of support for the system, even when demographic and socioeconomic factors are controlled for.
- While there is a greater level of alienation from the political system (as shown by lower system support) among Indians and *cholos*, their desire for democracy is as strong as that of any other ethnic group.
- The survey examined support for military coups, a problem that once plagued Bolivia but now seems to have receded. Nearly one-third of Bolivians would justify a coup under various circumstances.
- The level of coup support has not changed since 1998 in any significant way, except for a just barely significant increase of support for a coup under conditions of a reduction in workers' salaries.
- High crime is more likely to justify a coup than other forms of social and economic stress.
- Looking at the impact on ethnicity and coup support, the one major change is an increase in support for coups among those who identify themselves as Indian.
- This finding not only holds true for the overall index of coup support, but on each question support for a coup increased among the indigenous population between 1998 and 2000.

- We asked a speculative question as to whether respondents thought conditions could arise that would justify a coup. Support for a coup increased significantly from the 1998 levels, encompassing nearly two-fifths of the population by 2000.
- All ethnic groups exhibited an increase between 1998 and 2000 in those who could see conditions arising that might justify a coup. The changes are relatively small among whites and *mestizos*, but very sharp among *cholos* and Indians. The increase among blacks is very large, but the sample size is very small.
- Responding to a question focused on the riots of April 2000, Indians and blacks exhibited a greater proclivity to support a coup.
- Bolivians were shown in the 1998 study to have high levels of support for civil disobedience. By the year 2000, such support for protests in the form of blocking streets rose even higher. The increase among the *mestizo* population was large enough to place them in the same league as the Indian population, and the *cholo* population also increased its support, now matching that of the *mestizos*.
- Other forms of civil disobedience did not increase, however, between 1998 and 2000. Between 1998 and 2000 approval increased only for blocking streets. This, of course, is the classic form of protest, one widely used in Bolivian demonstrations. More direct action, such as invading property, taking over buildings such as factories or offices, and participating in a group trying to overthrow an elected government by violent means, received far less support, and support for these measures declined from 1998 to 2000.
- Three departments, Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, and Potosí, experienced the only significant increases. This means that while most departments saw an increase in support for this form of civil disobedience (Tarija and El Beni saw an insignificant decline), only these three saw significant increases. The protest events in Cochabamba and Santa Cruz prior to the survey may help to explain these increases.
- The rule of law has increasingly become the focus of democratization efforts throughout the world. The study looks at support for various legal norms. Nearly as many Bolivians believe that the police can break the rules to halt crime as do citizens of other countries. Nearly half of Bolivians feel this way.
- Substantially fewer Bolivians than other Latin Americans believe that police officers should have a court-issued warrant to enter the home of someone seriously suspected of wrongdoing. Even so, over three-fifths of Bolivians believe that such an order is needed.

- When it comes to the choice between order and liberty, however, Bolivians are far more likely than those in other countries to choose liberty. Nearly two-fifths of Bolivians would prefer to live in a society in which all rights and freedoms are respected, even if this means some disorder, than to live in an ordered society in which liberties are limited.
- Feeling secure in one's neighborhood is an important dimension in the rule of law. By far the strongest predictor of a feeling of security is urbanization; the more urban one's residence, the greater the fear.
- Those who live in urban areas are more than twice as likely to have been crime victims as those living in rural areas.
- Those with higher levels of education (once urbanization is controlled for) have a greater sense of security than those with less education.
- Those with higher incomes feel more secure than those with lower incomes, even though wealthier citizens presumably are more attractive targets for robbery. Females feel less secure than males, another obvious and common finding in studies such as these. Interestingly, age and ethnicity play no role at all in the security/fear equation. But even when all of these demographic and socioeconomic factors are controlled for, system support turns out to have a significant and very strong relationship to feelings of security. Those who have more reason to trust the political system are those who feel more secure in their neighborhoods.
- The objective condition of crime victimization is a significant and powerful predictor of a sense of fear; moreover, even when this factor is held constant, support for the system remains a significant and powerful predictor. Indeed, system support is a slightly stronger predictor of security/fear than crime victimization and is only less powerful than urbanization. This means that whatever factors promote fear, they help to weaken support for the system.
- A multiple regression analysis pointed to one variable—education—that significantly predicted all three measures of respect for the rule of law. Astonishingly, however, those with *higher* levels of education express *lower* respect for the rule of law. This is a finding consistent with the pattern uncovered in the analysis of the 1998 survey: whereas in other countries those with higher education are more tolerant, in Bolivia this is not the case.
- The New Code of Criminal Procedures was enacted by Law 1970, approved on March 25, 1999, and it will enter into full force on June 1, 2001. In the 2000 survey we asked respondents about their knowledge of the new code. We also asked this question in the special municipal sample interviewed in 1999. Since we want to detect change on a question that was not asked in 1998 but was asked in 1999 and

again in 2000, we will use this sample here. With this data it is possible to compare the level of knowledge of the code between 1999 and 2000.

- Knowledge of the code increased dramatically between 1999 and 2000 in both urban and rural areas. Even so, only about one-third of Bolivians have heard of it by 2000. Yet a look at the national-level data shows results that are more favorable.
- Nearly half of Bolivians had heard of the code, a substantial increase over the DDPC results, but since the DDPC samples do not cover the major urban capitals, where the mass media have greater coverage, this finding is not surprising.
- Those who live in urban areas are far more likely to have heard of the code than those who do not.
- A major factor in knowledge of the code is related to respondents' level of education. Only about 20% of those with primary education have heard of the code, compared to 75% of those with a university education.
- Females are less likely to have heard of the code than males.
- A multivariate analysis shows the importance of these variables. As residence shifts from urban to progressively more rural areas (on the five-point scale used in this survey), the odds of respondents having heard of the new code decline by 12% for each point on the scale. The results also show that for each increase in years of education, the odds of having heard of the new code increase by 19%. Females are 22% less likely to have heard of the code than males. In this regression analysis, the relative wealth and poverty of the municipality are included as predictors as well. We find that even when urban/rural residence is controlled for, along with education, those who live in municipalities with higher GNPs and lower levels of poverty are more likely to have heard of the new penal code. What these findings show is that the economic ecology of the region matters, affecting one's chances of having heard of the new code, irrespective of one's personal characteristics. Indeed, even when personal income is included in the equation, these economic environmental factors are significant.
- One of the most innovative (and controversial) features of the new criminal code are the *jueces ciudadanos*, or citizen judges. The survey attempted to determine to what extent Bolivians favor this portion of the code. Opinions are strongly favorable; Over three-quarters of the respondents expressed a favorable opinion.
- Urban residents and those who are more highly educated and have higher incomes are more favorably inclined toward the citizen-judge component of the law. Females and older persons are less favorable. But what is especially interesting is that system support is strongly associated with having a favorable view of the citizen

- judges; those who support the system look more favorably on this reform of the penal code, independent of their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics.
- The survey included a series of items measuring people's satisfaction with their contact with the police. An extensive analysis of those questions was carried out in the 1998 survey report, so in this study the focus is on change or stability in those views.
 - The first question in the series asked how easy or difficult it is to report a crime to the police. There is no significant difference between 1998 and 2000. The modal respondent says that it is difficult to report a crime.
 - There were no significant differences in the expected treatment by the police between 1998 and 2000.
 - Victimization of crime did not change between 1998 and 2000. A bit less than one-quarter of the population reported being victims of crime within the last year.
 - A majority of Bolivians do not report crimes. There is no significant change between 1998 and 2000.
 - Bolivia is at the forefront in the movement to decentralize central government services in Latin America. An extensive analysis of the local government data was presented in the 1998 report. Here the focus is on change from 1998 to 2000.
 - For the nation as a whole, participation in local government has declined from 18% of respondents to 15%, a difference that is small in absolute terms but nonetheless statistically significant.
 - Participation in local government is far higher in rural areas than urban. Specifically, for each increment on the five-point scale of urban/rural residence, the odds of participating increase by 42%.
 - Females are far less likely than males to participate; the odds of a female participating are 50% less than that of a male.
 - Age matters; for each year's increase in age, the odds of participating in local government increases by 2%.
 - Income also has an impact on participation; for each point increase in the nine-point scale of income used in this study, the odds of participation increase by 15%.
 - Ethnicity makes no difference in municipal participation.

- Those who support the system more strongly participate significantly more in municipal meetings. Recall that measures of system support focus on national-level government rather than local government, yet those with higher levels of support in the Bolivian system of government are more likely to participate in local government.
- We find that participation increases in *municipios* that received a higher per capita amount of social investment funds in 1996. We also find that those who lived in municipalities that had an MNR mayor in the period 1996-1998 were more likely to participate. Finally, in *municipios* that have higher rates of literacy, participation goes down. This means that in more developed *municipios*, participation is lower, but, based on the other variables shown in the regressions, within any given *municipio*, better educated Bolivians participate more.
- There is no significant change in demand-making on local government since 1998.
- Urbanization, system support, gender, age, income, and development of the *municipio* (measured by literacy) all prove to be significant predictors of demand-making by citizens. Demand-making is not, however, influenced by per capita social investment funds or by the presence of a mayor of the same party as the president.
- Bolivian municipal governments are supposed to develop their budgets and their Annual Operating Plan (POA) with the consultation of citizens. We asked in both 1998 and again in 2000 whether our respondents were involved in this planning process. Participation declined significantly between 1998 and 2000. The rate of participation in such meetings was lower than in municipal meetings generally in 1998, but by 2000 had declined to fewer than 9 of every 100 citizens.
- What is the reason for this decline? It may well be that the novelty of participation in the serious work of municipal budget making and planning may be wearing off, and only those with a deep interest in the process stick with it.
- Greater urbanization decreases participation in budget-making.
- We also find that those who tend to support the system participate more in budget-making, as do males and older Bolivians. But neither education nor income of the respondent makes any significant impact on this form of participation. This means that individuals of both lower and upper socioeconomic status are equally likely to participate in budget making and planning, once the other factors are controlled for.
- Two final contextual factors make a difference. First, the less developed the area (measured by literacy), the higher an individual's participation in budget-making. Second, the lower the municipality's total investment (in 1997), the higher the participation. This is an indication that "scarcity is the mother of invention."

- One of the most direct ways that citizens can influence local government is to lodge complaints with the local vigilance committees. Such complaints declined between 1998 and 2000.
- Two questions were asked both in 1998 and 2000 regarding satisfaction with local government. The first asked about services provided by the municipal government; there was a significant decline in services received, but in absolute terms the decline was quite small.
- The second satisfaction item (SGL2) asked about treatment by the municipal government when transactions were carried out. We find the same pattern, with satisfaction declining significantly, but to only a small degree in absolute terms.
- The municipality and the community are seen as the most responsive government entities in both 1998 and 2000. There is a shift, however, in 2000, with more Bolivians seeing the community as most responsive and fewer seeing the local government as most responsive. There is also an increase in those who found that none of the institutions was responsive.
- We also asked in both 1998 and 2000 which level of government should be assigned more responsibility and income. Despite the increase in critical views of municipal government between 1998 and 2000, more Bolivians would like to see local government strengthened in 2000 as compared to 1998.
- The final question in the series asked respondents to what extent the municipality provides what the people want. There is no significant difference between responses in 1998 and 2000.
- As a group, respondents in the DDPC samples participate more in municipal government than the nation as a whole.
- At each level of urbanization except the most dispersed rural settlements, levels of participation in municipal meetings of the DDPC sample exceed those of the national sample in 2000. Thus the DDPC respondents clearly participate more.
- Demand-making is significantly higher among respondents in the DDPC areas. Third, demand-making has increased substantially among those in the DDPC areas, reaching a high of 24.5% in the 2000 sample. The difference between the 1998 DDPC sample and the 2000 sample, when considered in isolation from the national samples, is statistically significant (Sig.= .018).
- Once again, we control for the impact of urbanization (the DDPC sample is more rural than the national sample). For each level of urbanization, the DDPC respondents score higher than the national sample on demand-making.

- We next compare participation in budget or planning meetings for the POA. We have already noted that the national sample produced a decline in this sort of participation. Here we see that the DDPC samples are far higher than the national sample, but that the increase between 1998 and 1999 is reversed in 2000, with 2000 levels being virtually identical to 1998 levels (but the changes are not significant). Thus, while persons in the DDPC samples exhibit significantly higher participation in municipal planning and budgeting than do respondents in the nation as a whole, the number participating seems to have leveled off at around 15%.
- Satisfaction in the DDPC samples was initially lower than for the nation as a whole, then declined in 1999, but by 2000 satisfaction was higher than in any prior year for the DDPC samples and higher than for the nation as a whole. The increase in the DDPC sample is significant at $< .001$.
- In the 2000 survey we asked a somewhat altered question as to which institution would better solve community problems. In the prior surveys we asked this question, but included "community" as a valid response. In 2000, we dropped this category. Members of the DDPC sample are more likely to see the municipality as better for solving community problems than the nation as a whole, while at the same time they are less likely to select the alienated response of "none."
- One of the main differences between the dramatic economic growth in Asia versus the slower growth in Latin America has been the role of women in the economy. The survey asked whether the respondents felt that there is discrimination against women in Bolivia. Overwhelmingly Bolivians perceive discrimination. There is no significant difference between 1998 and 2000 on this issue. Among those who said that there is discrimination against women, 60% said that it was a serious or very serious problem.
- Between 1998 and 2000, there was a significant increase (sig. = .02) in the perception that the problem of discrimination against women was serious. Not surprisingly, women perceive discrimination as being more serious than do men.
- Even though, as shown above, there is widespread belief that discrimination against women exists in Bolivia, the population is almost evenly divided as to whether this discrimination extends to the crucial area of employment. Indeed, in 2000, there is a small but significant increase in respondents who believe that such discrimination does not exist.
- Men and women are divided on this issue of discrimination against women, with women seeing far less opportunity for employment than men, even though in 2000 their optimism increased along with that of men.
- The more urban the residence of the respondent, the *more* likely it is that the individual will believe that there is employment discrimination, the odds being 23%

greater for each increase in urbanization on the four-point scale used in this study. Similarly, there is a 27% increase in the odds of seeing equality if one is white, but a 43% decline in the odds if one is *cholo*. Among the black population, there is a much greater sense that women have equal employment opportunities.

- Men have significantly higher levels of education than women in both 1998 and 2000.
- Not only are females less well educated, they have significantly less information about politics than males. While the differences are narrowed a bit when education is controlled (females increase their level of knowledge while males decrease), the differences are still two to one.
- What do these results show? They suggest that unequal access to education in Bolivia is only part of the problem faced by females. Their knowledge of politics is far more limited than that of men, a factor that has serious consequences for their ability to change the rules of the game and obtain greater parity with males. Our analysis has shown that even when the impact of education is accounted for, females remain at a disadvantage, thus suggesting a cultural difference.
- Females who read newspaper news are more knowledgeable (if only slightly) about political information than males who do not read newspaper news. Thus women can close part of the gap by accessing the news media.
- One important way in which the gender gap affects political behavior is in voting. Males are significantly more likely than females to have been registered to vote at the time of the 1997 presidential election. Yet, even though the difference is significant, in absolute terms the variation is only 5%.
- Males are nearly twice as likely to have participated in municipal meetings as females.
- While 20% of males have made demands on their local governments in the year prior to the survey, this number is only 14% for females.
- Males participate at almost twice the rate as females in budget-making at the municipal level.
- Although it is clear that women are far less active than men in local government, the picture is rather different at the community level. There we find women more active than men in church groups as well as in civic associations. Men are far more active in professional associations and unions, activities that are job-related, an area where we have already seen that women are at a disadvantage.

- The final area of comparisons is in work related to resolving community problems. Males are significantly more active than females.

These results are presented in far greater detail in the pages that follow. In many ways, however, they merely scratch the surface of the rich data base that has been collected for this study. Not only do these data serve as a solid base line for comparisons with future surveys, they also allow investigation of themes not explored here. The data base stands ready to answer many other questions relevant to democracy in Bolivia.

Chapter I. Methodology and Sample Characteristics

Introduction

This report presents the results of the second nation-wide review of the political culture of democracy in Bolivia. In this study, a total of 7,382 interviews were conducted and analyzed, probably the largest study of political culture ever undertaken in Bolivia. The first report was undertaken with data from a 1998 national probability sample. The results were reported on in both English and Spanish, and the results made widely available to the Bolivian public via the publication in 1999 of *La cultura política de la democracia boliviana*, published by Encuestas & Estudios, in their series, "Así piensan los bolivianos," No. 60. The present report is a follow-up to that study, presenting some new themes for analysis, while making comparisons between the 1998 data and a restudy conducted in 2000.

In the first chapter of the report on the 1998 survey, a detailed presentation of the methodology was made. That presentation consisted of a description of the sample design, along with some basic descriptive data of the sample itself. In the present report it is necessary to repeat that sample design information for those readers who do not have access to the 1998 study. The first part of this chapter, therefore, consists of a restatement of the sample design. The second portion is new here, presenting comparisons between the two samples.

Sample Design

A study of democratic values needs to be designed so that it will gather data on the values of *all* citizens, not just the active ones, the politically "important" ones, or those who live in major towns and cities. Indeed, the major advantage of surveys over elections is that in elections many people do not vote, and often it is the poor or the rural voter who is

underrepresented in the election.¹ Surprisingly, many studies that claim to represent the views of citizens, are often based on samples that systematically underrepresent certain sectors of the population. Often the biases that crop up in samples emerge because of cost considerations, which in turn are a function of the dispersion of populations over wide areas, or because the multi-lingual nature of the national population makes it difficult and expensive to conduct the interviews in all of the languages widely spoken in a given country.

Any serious study of democratic values in Bolivia confronts two problems in sample design: 1) the wide dispersal of the population; and 2) a multi-lingual population. Comparisons with other countries help put these problems in perspective. Consider Germany, the country with the largest population in Western Europe, is home to 82 million people, who occupy 357,000 square kilometers of territory. Bolivia, in contrast, with a population of only 8 million, occupies a massive 1.1 million square kilometers.² Bolivia is the 29th largest country on the planet, but with a population about the same size of that of the Dominica Republic, a country that is only 4% of Bolivia's size. Indeed, all of Japan, with its 125 million people, would nearly fit into Santa Cruz Department alone. In short, Bolivia has a relatively small population living on a large land mass. From the point of view of sample design, this creates complexities, which are only compounded by the fact that Bolivia's population is very unevenly distributed. For example, La Paz has a population density of about nearly 17 persons per square kilometer, whereas the Department of Pando, with a surface area substantially larger than Costa Rica but an estimated population in December, 1997 of 53,000, has a density of fewer than .5 residents per square kilometer.

In a multi-lingual country it is important to avoid excluding linguistic minorities. In Bolivia, many languages are spoken, but Spanish is the overwhelmingly predominant language. According to the Bolivian 1992 census bureau, 8.1% of the population over the age of 6 were monolingual Quechua speakers, and 3.2% of the population were monolingual Aymara speakers.³ These numbers of monolingual speakers of indigenous

¹This point is argued forcefully by Sidney Verba, recent past President of the American Political Science Association, in Verba, Sidney, "The Citizen as Respondent: Sample Surveys and American Democracy." *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 1 (March 1996): 1-7.

²Data are from the World Bank (2000) *World Development Report, 2000/2001*. Oxford University Press, Washington, D. C., pp. 274.

³There were also small numbers of speakers of other indigenous Languages such as Guarani, as well as speakers of Portuguese, English and other languages. The costs involved in preparing questionnaires in each of these languages, and having a multi-lingual

languages however, have been declining rapidly as a result of the widespread dissemination of the mass media. For example, the Bolivian census bureau estimates for 1997 show that only 4.4% of the population are monolingual Quechua and 2.0% are monolingual Aymara. Nonetheless, in order not to exclude the opinions of these individuals, it was necessary to prepare versions of the questionnaire in both Quechua and Aymara, and to include bi-lingual interviewers in the survey team.

In the design of the sample, the factors of population size and its distribution needed to be considered. In addition, Bolivia's Departments, which range so greatly in population and geographic area, each have their own social and political profiles, and a study that attempts to represent the country ought to be certain to include each of its departments. In order to achieve this objective, it was decided that the sample would be designed to represent each of Bolivia's nine departments, while still being able to speak with confidence about the country as a whole.

It is perhaps easiest to understand the sample design methodology employed in this study by making an analogy to drawing winning raffle tickets. Let us assume that there are nine high schools in a school district and the district has decided to have a raffle to raise money. Those who are running the raffle want to be sure that there is at least one winner in each of the nine schools. If the tickets are each drawn at random, it may well turn out that one or more schools would be left without a winner. In order to achieve this objective, rather than placing all of the raffle tickets in one bowl, and have nine tickets drawn out at random, the tickets from each school are placed in a separate bowl, and one ticket is drawn from each.

In Bolivia, if we want to be sure that citizens from each of the nine departments are interviewed, we must divide the sample into nine "bowls." We call these bowls "strata." Thus, in the Bolivia census, we have nine separate strata, one for each department. If we do not divide the country into separate strata, then it is quite likely that most of those to be interviewed would come from Bolivia's most populous departments (La Paz, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba), and that few, if any interviews would take place in the department of Pando, the least populous department. By stratifying the sample, we guarantee a distribution of interviews across all nine departments.

Returning to the analogy of the raffle, what if we also want to guarantee that there would be one prize per grade within each high school? We would follow the same procedure, and utilize one bowl for each grade within each school, and draw one ticket from each bowl. Of course, we would have to increase the number of total tickets drawn in order to achieve that objective. For example, if each high school had 3 grades (10th, 11th, and 12th), then a total of 27 tickets would need to be drawn, (3 grades x 9 schools).

staff of interviewers available on the spot as such speakers were encountered, made the exclusion of such monolingual speakers necessary.

In Bolivia it is important to further subdivide the departments into cities, towns and villages of various population sizes. Here again, if we placed the names of all of the residents from each department into separate bowls, it would be likely that in a number of departments we would draw most of the names from the largest cities, since those cities contain the bulk of the population. To avoid drawing the sample largely from urban areas to the exclusion of rural, we need to stratify each department by population size. It is common practice in Bolivia to divide the population into four clusters: 1) cities larger than 20,000; 2) cities and towns of between 2,000 and 20,000; 3) "compact rural" zones, of populations from 500 to 1,999; and, finally, 4) "dispersed rural" zones of fewer than 500 people. Our sample for each department has been stratified in this fashion.

Since the sample has been stratified at two levels, that of the department and within each department, we have what is called a "multi-stage stratified sample design." But now the question comes as to how large a sample and how the sample should be distributed among the strata. It is common practice to distribute the sample in direct proportion to the size of the population in each stratum. But such a procedure does not work well when the strata are of very different population sizes, as is the case in Bolivia. That is because the smallest departments would have such a small sample that it would be impossible to talk about them with any degree of confidence unless the overall national sample were very, very large. For example, Pando comprises only .6 of one percent of Bolivia's population, and if we had a national sample of 3,000 respondents, only about 18 would likely be drawn from Pando.

In order to overcome this problem, it was decided to draw a sample of 300 respondents per department, which would mean that 95% of the time, our sample would be no more than $\pm 5.8\%$ away from the true departmental view for a given question in the survey. This level of $\pm 5.8\%$ is calculated using the standard formulas for sampling error. Thus, in the worst case scenario⁴ at the level of the department the survey would be a reasonably accurate representation of citizen views, erring by no more than 5.8% more or less (95% of the time) than the results if we could interview all adults residing there. Under more favorable conditions⁵ the results could be as accurate as $\pm 3.5\%$ at the level of the department. Since the three departments of Bolivia that form the so-called "central axis" are so important politically (i.e., La Paz, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba), it was decided to increase the accuracy of the sample in those departments by interviewing an additional 100 respondents in each of them, for a total of 400 in each. In those three departments, our "confidence interval" for the sample is no more than $\pm 5.0\%$, or nearly 1% more accurate than for the other departments.

⁴The worst case emerges when opinion is divided right down the middle, and on a given question, 50% express one view and 50% express another.

⁵For example, if the results produced a 90/10 split on an item.

The samples of 300 and 400 per department were designed to provide approximately equal confidence intervals for each one. But once we attempt to generalize beyond the level of the department to the nation as a whole, it is vital to adjust the sample size so that it accurately reflects the relative population size of each department. For example, referring again to Pando, and comparing it to La Paz, it is necessary to decrease the relative weight of Pando in the national sample and increase the relative weight of La Paz in order that we can obtain an overall picture of opinion in Bolivia. To do this the sample, once drawn, was assigned post-hoc weights so that each department correctly reflected its contribution to the national population total.

The sample design for the nine departments as a whole, with 300 interviews in six departments, and 400 interviews in three departments, called for a total sample of 3,000. A sample of this size is accurate at no worse than $\pm 1.7\%$. Technically, our sampling error is $\pm 1.7\%$. This means that if we drew repeated samples of this size in Bolivia, 95% of them would reflect the views of the population with no greater inaccuracy than $\pm 1.7\%$. Of course, other factors other than sampling error can reduce the accuracy of the results, including non-response, errors in selecting the respondent, misunderstanding of the question, etc. But in terms of the science of survey sampling, a confidence interval of $\pm 1.7\%$ is very good.

The above estimates of the accuracy of the sample could stand as stated if it were possible to carry out what is known as a "simple random sample" of each stratum in the study. To do this, it would mean that the sample would be scattered randomly all over each of the nine departments. But, to do so would mean interview costs that would be astronomically high because of very high travel expenses. In virtually all survey research travel costs are reduced by drawing what are known as "clustered samples," that is, we cluster groups of interviews together in a relatively compact area such as a block, or row of houses, and interview several people together. Clustering dramatically cuts cost, especially in a country like Bolivia where the density of population nation-wide is so low. Yet, clustering normally increased the confidence interval of the sample and thus lowers its precision. It is not possible to know with precision how much clustering increases the confidence interval because it all depends on the degree of commonality on a given characteristic that the residents in a single block or street have in common. For example, if all of the residents within a given city block earn a very similar salary, then the impact of clustering on salary would be larger than for age, which presumably would vary more and come close to approximating the variation in age within the country as a whole. Experience suggests that the confidence for a clustered stratified sample design of 3,000 Bolivians would increase to around $\pm 2.0\%$ from the level of $\pm 1.7\%$ stated above. For the purposes of this study, a level of $\pm 2.0\%$ will be assumed. It should also be noted that probability criteria were used at each stage of selection until the household itself was reached. The individual respondent within the household was selected using quota criteria for both gender and age in order to overcome the commonly confronted problem of having the sample incorporate too many females and too many very young or very old people. That household bias results from a higher probability of females, the very young and the very

old to be at home more often than other respondents. Quotas at the level of the household is an economically efficient way to overcome this problem.

The survey itself was efficiently and professionally carried out by Encuestas & Estudios, the premier survey research firm in Bolivia. Founded in 1984, this firm is affiliated with Gallup International. Over the past 16 years, Encuestas & Estudios has conducted over 900 surveys for more than 250 clients. It currently employs 116 people full time, and utilizes 83 part-time interviewers, of whom 40 are bilingual (Quechua or Aymara). This firm implemented the above described sample design, and was also responsible for carrying out multiple pre-tests of the survey instrument as well as the translation of the instrument into Quechua and Aymara. In addition, the firm was responsible for all data entry.

The actual number of interviews gathered in 2000 by the Encuestas & Estudios firm in the national sample was 3,006 or 6 more than the goal of 3,000. In 1998, a total of 2,997 respondents were interviewed. This is a remarkably high level of completion of the survey, and speaks well of the dedication of the interviewers and their supervisors.

Those interviews at the national level were not, however, the only ones collected for this study. USAID has been assisting the Bolivian government to improve municipal governance and citizen participation at the local level, in a project called “Desarrollo Democrático y Participación Ciudadana” (hereafter DDPC), and a secondary goal of the present study was to create a baseline of data in selected municipalities in which that project has been operating. A total of 6 municipalities were selected for this baseline in 1998, and additional three were selected in 2000, for a total of 9 (see Table I.1). A total of 100 interviews were to be collected in each DDPC municipality, divided evenly between urban and rural areas. Thus, the initial sample was expanded with these 600 interviews in 1998 and 900 interviews in 2000. Interview costs in remote Pando Department were so high, however, that it proved necessary to incorporate 100 of the municipal sample interviews into the national sample in 1998. Thus, the municipal study in 1998 added only 500 rather than 600 interviews to the study. Of those 500 additional interviews, 499 were completed, yielding a total number of completed questionnaires of 3,476. In 2000, the full 900 interviews were conducted.

Table I.1 DDPC Selected Municipalities

		Year		Total
Department	Municipality	1998	2000	
La Paz	Patacamaya	100	100	200
	Pucarani	100	100	200
Cochabamba	Mizque	0	100	100
	Punata	99	100	199
Oruro	Challapata	0	100	100
	Curahuara de Carangas	100	100	200
Potosí	Llallagua	100	100	200
	Yocalla		100	100
Pando	Cobija	100	100	200
Totals		599	900	1499

The interviews normally took place in the respondent's home, and were "face-to-face." In cases where a selected respondent was not at home when the interviewer arrived, call-backs were made to the dwelling at least once.⁶ The interviews lasted for an average of 42 minutes each in 1998 and 36 minutes in 2000 (the number of questions asked in 2000 was somewhat fewer than in 1998), although six interviews lasted for two hours and one lasted for three in the combined pool of interviews for 1998 and 2000. Rural and urban interviews took about the same amount of time, but travel to the rural areas to locate the respondents took much more time. In order to carry out the survey it was necessary to utilize a fleet of buses and jeeps, as well as a small airplane in the most remote areas.

Sample Weights

As noted above, in order that the sample accurately reflect the distribution of population in Bolivia is necessary to weight the sample. To do this involves the calculation of sample weights. The calculations are shown in Table I.2 below. In the second column

⁶When call-backs did not produce the selected respondent, then a substitute was used from the same PSU.

of the table the best estimates of departmental populations as of December, 1997 are provided by the Bolivian census bureau. The percent of the population that each department comprises is given in the third column. For example, La Paz comprises 29.21% of the national population. In the fourth column, the actual sample for each department is given, excluding the DDPC additional interviews. Those interviews are excluded here because the goal is to use the weights to modify the sample totals so as to mirror the national population distribution among the nine departments. The additional DDPC interviews would skew those results since the selection was based on DDPC criteria rather than the national population distribution. In the fifth column, the percent of the total national sample that each department comprises is given. In the penultimate column the weight factor is derived, which is the result of dividing the population percentage by the sample percentage. Finally, by multiplying the sample size by the weight factor, the final column provides the weighted sample size.

The weighted sample shows the striking impact of the variation in population size among Bolivia's nine departments. In Pando, with less than 7% of the population, but with a sample of 300 respondents, or 10% of the sample, it is necessary to weight down the sample so that these interviews now comprise only 21 out of the 3,006. If this correction were not introduced, Pando would end up being as influential in the national totals as Potosí. On the other hand, when we wish to examine Pando alone, we have 300 interviews to examine, thus allowing us to speak of those results with a reasonable level of confidence. If we had interviewed only 21 respondents from Pando, virtually nothing could have been said about the area. It should also be kept in mind that within each department, the sample was drawn proportional to the population distribution, so that large and small population concentrations are each correctly represented.⁷

Table I.2 Calculation for Sample Weight Factors for 2000 sample

Department	Population Estimate, December 1997 ^a	% of national total	Sample N	% of sample total	Weight factor: (population % ÷ sample %)	Weighted sample
La Paz	2,268,824	29.21%	402	13.37%	2.184274	878

⁷Readers who compare this table of weights with the 1998 table will notice very slight variation (in the second decimal place) for the population percentage for some of the departments. That variation occurred because in 1998 a minor error was made in calculation that has been corrected for the 2000 data. No substantive differences emerged because of this error in the 1998 weights as the impact involved only fractions of a case in a sample of over 3,000 respondents.

Department	Population Estimate, December 1997 ^a	% of national total	Sample N	% of sample total	Weight factor: (population % ÷ sample %)	Weighted sample
Santa Cruz	1,651,951	21.27%	400	13.31%	1.598341	639
Cochabamba	1,408,071	18.13%	403	13.41%	1.352234	545
Potosí	746,618	9.61%	300	9.98%	0.963185	289
Chuquisaca	549,835	7.08%	300	9.98%	0.709322	213
Oruro	383,498	4.94%	300	9.98%	0.494737	148
Tarija	368,506	4.74%	300	9.98%	0.475396	143
El Beni	336,633	4.33%	300	9.98%	0.434278	130
Pando	53,124	0.68%	301	10.01%	0.068306	21
Total	7,767,060	100.00%	3,006	100.00%		3,006

^a Data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (Bolivia, 1998).

Sample Distribution

It is perhaps easiest to comprehend the manner in which the sample was distributed in Bolivia by first pointing to some overall features and then looking at the distribution on a map of the country. Overall, the 7,382 interviews were conducted in 9 departments, in which a total of 67 provinces were targeted. In all of Bolivia there are 108 provinces, which means that the sample included interviews in 62% of the nation's provinces. Within those 67 provinces, interviews were conducted in a total of 99 municipalities. In Bolivia there are a total of 311 municipalities, and thus the sample included 32% of the total. In sum, the sample includes all of Bolivia's departments, 62% of its provinces and 32% of its municipalities. This is an unusually broad coverage for a sample survey and helps reassure us that the results accurately reflect the national picture. The interviews themselves were distributed into 145 distinct areas, what we call "primary sampling units." In each primary sampling unit, approximately 20 interviews were carried out. This means that survey teams visited 145 neighborhoods spread out among the 67 provinces. They did so during the month of August in 1998 and again in August 2000.

The graphical display of the interviews is shown in Figure I.1. It would be impossible to display all 7,382 interview points, so one dot is used to display twenty interviews. The greater density of points in departments such as Oruro and Cochabamba reflects the smaller geographic area of these departments compared to Santa Cruz and the Beni. In

order to maximize the confidentiality of respondents, the location of points shown here within each department are merely illustrative, and do not reflect the actual locations of the interviews.




Figure I.1 Map of Bolivia: Distribution of Sample by Department

One dot = 20 interviews (location within departments for illustrative purposes)

The actual number of interviews per department is shown in Table I.3. This table, like the map above, includes all of the interviews, weighted.

Table I.3. Distribution of Weighted Sample (Including DDPC) by Department

	Year		Total
	1998	2000	
La Paz	1,069	1,078	2,147
Santa Cruz	633	639	1,272
Cochabamba	639	745	1,384
Oruro	247	348	595
Chuquisaca	211	213	424

	Year		Total
Potosí	386	489	875
Pando	21	121	142
Tarija	141	143	284
El Beni	129	130	259
Totals	3,476	3,906	7,382

Sample Characteristics⁸

Comparisons with Census Data

The sample drawn from this study closely resembles the overall population of Bolivia, not only in terms of its geographic dispersion, but in terms of basic demographic characteristics. Since the most recent census compiled in Bolivia was from 1992, we have to make some assumptions to project those parameters to July of 1998.

In the area of education, the 1992 census reports that 20.0% of the population of the country 15 years of age and older were illiterate. The World Bank in the year 2000, however, provides updated figures for 1998, showing male illiteracy (15 years of age and older) at 9% and female at 22%.⁹ Our survey data are among the population 18 years of age and older, so we cannot make an exact match to the World Bank data. Moreover, the survey did not specifically ask about literacy, which is often a subjective determination, since some individuals can read numbers but not words, or some have limited literacy. Rather, the survey asked about years of education completed. It is widely assumed that literacy comes with an education of greater than 3 years of primary school. In the 1998 sample, 14.6% of the respondents had fewer than 4 years of primary education. In the 2000 sample, this percentage shrank to 10.0%. Breaking this down by gender to more evenly match the World Bank data, we find that in the 1998 survey 9.0% of the male respondents had fewer than 4 years of education, a figure that matches precisely the World Bank data. Similarly, females with fewer than 4 years of education totaled 20.2% of the 1998 survey, very close to the World Bank figure. The 2000 sample, however, shows a

⁸From this point on in the discussion of the data, the weighted sample, excluding the DDPC additional interviews, are used as the point of reference.

⁹World Bank, *World Development Report, 2000/2001* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 276.

smaller percentage of low-education respondents, 7.0% male and 13.0% female. Thus, by the census criterion, the 1998 sample appears to correctly estimate the level of education found in Bolivia. The 2000 survey, however, shows a lower illiteracy rate, which may be a function in part of the extensive efforts being made in Bolivia to increase primary education, but may also be a function of variation in the sample. Estimates of illiteracy vary, of course, and it is difficult to determine which one is correct. For example, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) reported that for 1994, adult illiteracy in Bolivia was 17%, or only .6% higher than the 1998 survey results.¹⁰ The World Bank reports the same figure of 17% for 1995.¹¹ Since illiteracy has been dropping steadily in Bolivia, the lower level of illiteracy in the 2000 sample may well be a function of the rising national level of literacy. For example, the UNDP reports that in 1970, Bolivia's illiteracy rate was 43%,¹² and it thus likely that by July of 1998 the rate would have fallen from the 1994/5 figure of 17% to the survey figure of 16.4%, and fallen still further by 2000. Moreover, one must again recall the confidence interval issue. The results in the survey are taken to be within $\pm 2\%$ of the national values, and thus the 1998 sample estimate comes well within the UNDP and World Bank estimates.

Age is another parameter on which comparisons can be made with census data. In Bolivia the census data are presented in 5-year age cohorts, which means that the cohort of those who are 18 years of age is imbedded within the census group of 15-19. In order to match the census with the sample, we can exclude those younger than 20 and compare the cohorts. The census reports 19.2% as falling between 20 and 24 years of age in its 1995 estimates.¹³ The 1998 survey finds 17.2%, and 16.4% for the 2000 sample. The 1998 result that falls within the $\pm 2\%$ confidence interval of the sample, but the 2000 result falls just outside of that range, possibly a result of the fact that by 2000, the census data were eight years out of date.

In sum, the samples seem to well represent Bolivia geographically and demographically. There is every reason to believe that the findings that are drawn from the analysis of these surveys would closely match those that would be obtained if we were to interview the entire adult population of Bolivia. Doing so, of course, would be impossible

¹⁰United Nations Development Program. *Human Development Report*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 166.

¹¹World Bank. *World Development Report, 1997*. Washington, D. C.: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 214.

¹²UNDP, *ibid.*, p. 167.

¹³Anuario Estadístico, 1995, p. 45.

given the costs involved. For a tiny fraction of those costs, we have been able to obtain extensive information on the democratic values and behaviors of Bolivians.

Key Demographic Characteristics

In the chapters that follow a number of key demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the respondents will be employed in the analysis. We will often wish to know how certain attitudes or behaviors vary by gender, age, and socio-economic status.

In order to enable the reader to obtain a global view of the characteristics of the sample as a whole, the relevant summaries are presented here.

The sample was designed to produce a 50-50 split between men and women. This was accomplished, as already noted, by utilizing quotas for gender at the level of the household. Not surprisingly, therefore, the samples that emerged was comprised of 50% male and 50% female, in 1998 and virtually a 50-50 split in 2000, as is shown in Table I.4.

Table I.4. Gender Distribution of the National Samples

Year		Frequency	Percent
1998	Male	1,488	50.0
	Female	1,488	50.0
	Total	2,976	100.0
2000	Male	1,498	49.8
	Female	1,508	50.2
	Total	3,006	100.0

The age distribution of the sample, as noted above, matched closely the national census parameters. Throughout this study, 10-year cohorts of age will be used, except for the youngest cohort, which ranges from 18 years of age through 25 years of age. The average age of the respondents for the *ungrouped* data is 36.3 years in 1998 and 36.2 in 2000, as is shown in Table I.5. There was no significant difference in the average age of males versus females.

Table I.5. Age and Gender

Sex	Mean
1998	
Male	36.5
Female	36.1
All 1998	36.3
2000	
Male	37.1
Female	36.2
All 2000	36.2

The grouped data of age appear in Table I.6. As can be seen, and as to be expected, a larger proportion of the sample is clustered at the younger age cohorts. This is a typical pattern found in countries with relatively high fertility rates. Nearly three quarters of the respondents were 45 years or younger, while only fewer than 5% were older than 65 years of age. For each cohort, however, there are sufficient numbers to be able to make reasonable generalizations about the respondents of that age group. This is especially true among those 55 or younger where there are over 400 persons in each cohort.

Table I.6 Age Grouped by Cohorts

Year	Age	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
1998	18-25	856	28.8	28.8
	26-35	809	27.2	55.9
	36-45	539	18.1	74.0
	46-55	436	14.7	88.7
	56-65	205	6.9	95.6
	66+	132	4.4	100.0
	Total	2,977	100.0	
2000	18-25	866	28.8	28.8
	26-35	717	23.8	52.7
	36-45	628	20.9	73.6
	46-55	428	14.2	87.8
	56-65	245	8.2	96.0
	66+	121	4.0	100.0
	Total	3,006	100.0	

The civil status (i.e., marital status) of the respondents was also included in the questionnaire. Table I.7 shows the breakdown. Married respondents comprise more than half of the total, and if common law marriages are added to the married category, this rises to over 60%, with single respondents comprising another third. Only a very small percentage of the sample were divorced, separated or widowed.

Table I.7. Civil Status of Respondents

Year	Status	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1998	Bachelor	934	31.4	31.5	31.5
	Married	1,583	53.2	53.4	84.9
	Common law	258	8.7	8.7	93.6

Year	Status	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Divorced	41	1.4	1.4	95
	Separated	28	.9	.9	96
	Widow	119	4.0	4.0	100
	Total	2,964	99.6	100.0	
	Missing	12	.4		
		2,977	100.0		
2000	Bachelor	928	30.9	30.9	30.9
	Married	1,634	54.4	54.5	85.4
	Common law	222	7.4	7.4	92.8
	Divorced	49	1.6	1.6	94.4
	Separated	43	1.4	1.4	95.9
	Widow	124	4.1	4.1	100
	Total	3,000	99.8	100.0	
	Missing	6	.2		
		3,006	100.0		

Key Socio-Economic Characteristics

We have already reviewed education levels in the discussion of literacy. Income is, of course, a very important socio-economic characteristic. Surveys such as this, however, that are not focused on income itself, often have a difficult time obtaining accurate measures of income. That is because non-wage earners, especially farmers, often find it difficult to estimate their incomes. There are further problems of before-tax and after-tax income, and active versus passive income. In addition, many individuals (in Bolivia and elsewhere) prefer not to disclose their incomes to interviewers. It is for these reasons, that in addition to asking the respondents about their incomes, the survey also asked about ownership of a number of household appliances so that an index of household wealth could be established. With these caveats in mind, we can now turn to the income levels of the respondents in the survey. Table I.8 shows the breakdown of monthly household income in the sample. This data was obtained by using the standard unobtrusive method of requesting income information; a card was held up with a list of 9 income ranges. The respondent then read the number (or pointed to the number) that most closely reflected his/her income. In the case of illiterate respondents, the income ranges were read to the respondent. Not surprisingly, in a country in which over half of the population has been classified as "poor," most of the respondents report incomes at the lower levels of the scale.¹⁴ In the 1998 survey, over 90% of the respondents reported monthly incomes of less than 2,000 Bolivianos, and in 2000 survey 85% reported this level of income or lower. Over 80% in 1998 and 70% in 2000 reported incomes below 1,000 Bolivianos. At the conversion

¹⁴ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean). *Social Panorama of Latin America, 1996*. Santiago, Chile: ECLAC, 1996, p. 196-199. The 1994 urban poverty figure for Bolivia is given as 47%, while the rural level was not given in this publication but was presumably much higher.

rate of 5.5 Bolivianos per dollar, this means that over ninety percent of the sample in 1998 earned U.S. \$364 or less per month, and over 80% earned U.S. \$181 or less. In 2000, at an exchange rate of 6.1 Bolivianos to the dollar, 85% of the sample earned \$327 or less, and 70% of the sample earned no more than \$164 per month.

Table I.8. Monthly Household Income in Bolivianos

YEAR	Income	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1998	None (housewife, unemployed)	52	1.8	1.9	1.9
	<250 Bolivianos	410	13.8	15.3	17.2
	251- 500	833	28.0	31	48.2
	501 - 1,000	868	29.2	32.3	80.5
	1,001 - 2,000	348	11.7	13.0	93.5
	2,001 - 5,000	130	4.4	4.8	98.3
	5,001 - 10,000	37	1.2	1.4	99.7
	10,001 - 20,000	8	.3	0.3	100
	>20,000	1	.0	0	100
	Total	2687	90.3	100.0	
Missing	290	9.7			
	2977	100.0			
2000	None (housewife, unemployed)	22	.7	.8	0.8
	<250 Bolivianos	376	12.5	13.3	14.1
	251- 500	686	22.8	24.2	38.3
	501 - 1,000	896	29.8	31.7	70
	1,001 - 2,000	442	14.7	15.6	85.6
	2,001 - 5,000	288	9.6	10.2	95.8
	5,001 - 10,000	83	2.7	2.9	98.7
	10,001 - 20,000	31	1.0	1.1	99.8
	>20,000	5	.2	.2	100
	Total	2830	94.1	100.0	
Missing	176	5.9			
	3006	100.0			

Income levels are strongly impacted by location of residence. Those who live in larger towns and cities earn far more than those who live in rural areas, as is shown in Figure I.2 The income ranges listed in the figure correspond to the incomes in the table above. As shown in the figure, the correlation (r) between residence and income is .33 for 1998 and .34 for 2000, significant at $< .001$. This means that as residence moves from large urban to dispersed rural, income declines sharply.




Figure I.2 Income and Residence

We now move from salary income to household indicators of wealth (and poverty). Respondents were read a list of 13 appliances and capital goods that they might have in their homes, and were asked if the home had or did not have each item. While this measure of wealth does not directly tap the respondent's own level of income, it gives a very good idea of the relative wealth/poverty of the household of which the respondent is a part. Moreover, it avoids much of the missing data problem since on no item did non-response exceed only 1.5% of the sample and on most items it was far lower than one percent. The list of items covered those that would be found in urban areas and in electrified rural areas, as well as a limited number of items that could be found in any rural area (tractor, truck, car, motorcycle). The list of items does not, however, distinguish well among rural folk without access to electricity, since most of those would not have access to most of the items on the list. The survey did, however, contain information on land tenancy, which can be used to discriminate further among the farming population. Information on that variable will be presented below.

The wealth/poverty index basic information are presented in Figure I.3 The items chosen allow us to distinguish quite well between the homes that demonstrate numerous indicators of wealth versus those that seem far more impoverished. As can be seen in the bar chart, access to potable water in the home and electricity in the home was nearly

universal. The less than 10% of the sample that had neither potable water nor electricity are either very poor or live in very remote locales. Another cluster of indicators, including television, refrigerators, sewage disposal, and a bicycle were in the homes of about half the respondents, and another group of indicators, including a telephone, a car or truck, washing machine, microwave oven and a tractor, were in the homes of about one-quarter or less of the sample. The variation between 1998 and 2000 on these indicators is small, except that microwaves and washing machines have become more common.




Figure I.3 Indicators of Wealth: 1998 vs. 2000

Land rental or ownership is another way to distinguish among Bolivians socio-economically. In the weighted sample, only 5% of the respondents reported owning or renting land in both 1998 and 2000.

Ethnicity

The indigenous population of Bolivia is considered to be proportionally the second largest in all of Latin America, after Guatemala. For this reason alone, it is important to have some notion of the ethnicity of the respondents in the sample. Since ethnicity is a subjective criterion and the terminology used to define various groups varies

from place-to-place and from time-to-time (e.g., recall the transition from the use of the term “Negro” to the term “Black” to the term “Afro-American” in the United States), we had to examine the wording of this question with special care. Based upon both pre-tests as well as the relevant social science literature on the subject, we determined that the best (but not perfect!) way to determine ethnicity in Bolivia was to ask the respondent to locate themselves in one of four categories: “Mestiza,” “Blanca,” “Indígena” or “Negra.” The questionnaire allowed for a fifth category, “Chola” as well as “other.” These are the terms that Bolivians themselves use to distinguish among ethnic groups, although we hasten to note that they are subjective terms with no precise, universal agreement as to which individual fits into which category. The category “White” presumably reflects those who believe that they are of “pure blood,” i.e., no mixture with Indian or Black blood. In reality, the reference is to cultural factors rather than blood, since it is well known that there is extensive blood type mixture throughout Bolivia. The “Mestiza” category represents such mixtures, largely between Indian and White cultures. The category “Indian” presumably represents a pure Indian culture, while “Negra” represents a pure Afro culture. Figure I.4 shows the relative distribution of the responses. As can be seen, about 60% of Bolivians consider themselves to be “Mestizos,” while nearly one-quarter consider themselves to be “White.” A surprisingly small 10% self-identify as Indian, but this, no doubt, is because of the availability of the “Mestizo” category. When a similar question was asked in Guatemala, in which the local discourse normally divides ethnicity into “Ladino” and “Indígena,” over 40% regularly select the latter. There was very little difference between the two samples.




Figure I.4 Ethnic Self-Identification: 1998 vs. 2000

There are strong linkages between these self-identifications and socio-economic status. These are reviewed in this report in some detail in chapter 5, so will not be covered here.

Closely related to ethnicity, but by no means synonymous with it, is language. As already noted in this chapter, Bolivia is a multi-lingual country. We asked each respondent which language(s) they spoke in their home as they were growing up. Figure I.5 shows that Spanish was the predominant language, comprising over half of the respondents, but multi-lingual households with Spanish/Quechua and Spanish/Aymara combinations were also very common. Monolingual indigenous language upbringing was not very common in the sample. The two samples are very similar with regard to language.




Figure I.5 Language(s) Spoken While Growing Up

In order to avoid excluding mono-lingual speakers of indigenous languages, as already noted, version of the questionnaire were prepared in both Quechua and Aymara. It was anticipated that the number of interviews to be conducted in those languages would be relatively small, lower than the number of persons who grew up in mono-lingual Quechua- or Aymara-speaking households. The reason for this is that as these individuals

grew to adulthood, their contact with Spanish in many cases increased. In 1998 A total of 23 interviews were conducted in Quechua and an additional 50 interviews conducted in Aymara for the entire sample of 3,476 respondents, or 2.1% of the entire sample (unweighted, including the DDPC sample). In the weighted national sample alone for 1998, 0.7% of the interviews were conducted in Quechua and 1.4% in Aymara. In the 2000 full sample, 47 interviews were conducted in Quechua, and 10 in Aymara.

Another way of looking at ethnicity is to take note of the type of dress worn by the respondent. This, of course, is necessarily a subjective judgement made by the interviewer, but we broadly classified dress into Indigenous and Western, and found that 11.1% of the respondents were wearing Indigenous dress at the time of the interview in 1998 and 9.8% in 2000. In Bolivia, as elsewhere in Latin America, Indigenous dress is far more common among females than males, presumably because of the greater regular contact Indian males have with the large Hispanic world. Figure I.6 shows that female Bolivians are almost three times more likely to have been wearing Indigenous dress at the time of the interview (1998 sample).



Figure I.6 Dress and Gender

Dress is closely associated with socio-economic status. Figure I.7 shows that those wearing Western clothing at the time of the interview (1998 survey) were far higher on our index of wealth than those wearing Indigenous dress.




Figure I.7 Dress and Wealth

In terms of education levels the differences are also sharp and statistically significant. Figure I.8 shows that those wearing Indian dress (1998 sample) have less than the average level of education enjoyed by those who wear Western dress.




Figure I.8 Dress and Education

Employment

There are many detailed studies carried out on employment and unemployment, and an investigation such as the present one, focused on democratic values, can only make a very general determination of the employment in the sample. We asked three questions regarding employment, a general one regarding the kind of work the respondent normally does, and one on whether or not the respondent had been unemployed in the year prior to the interview. If the respondent had been unemployed, we asked how for many weeks that unemployment had lasted.

The overall picture on the occupational categories of the respondents is contained in Table I.9.

Table I.9. Employment, 1998 vs. 2000

	Year		Total Both Years
	1998	2000	
Propietarios de negocios o empresas grandes o medianas	.8%	1.7%	1.2%
Propietarios de negocios o empresas chicas	7.1%	13.2%	10.1%
Agricultores dueños o inquilinos de su tierra	4.9%	5.2%	5.1%
Ganaderos dueños de su ganado	.7%	1.1%	.9%
Profesionales independientes	4.4%	3.1%	3.7%
Directivos superiores de empresas/ negocios/militares	.6%	.7%	.7%
Directivos intermedios de empresas/negocios/militares	.4%	1.1%	.8%
Personal o empleos de planta	12.9%	15.1%	14.0%
Obreros	5.0%	7.3%	6.1%
Campesinos empleados en faenas agrícolas	2.1%	.7%	1.4%
Comerciantes y artesanos empleados	11.6%	4.5%	8.0%
Amas de casa	24.4%	21.6%	23.0%
Estudiantes	14.9%	16.0%	15.5%
Jubilados, rentistas	3.6%	4.1%	3.8%
Trabajadores ocasionales	6.3%	4.3%	5.3%
16 Desocupados	.2%	.2%	.2%
No sabe	.1%		.1%
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Analysis Plan

The survey conducted for this study includes a great many variables of interest to those who are working for a more democratic Bolivia. In the chapters that follow, each of these variables will be studied, including system support, political tolerance, civil society participation, local government participation, support/opposition to military rule, and the administration of justice. In addition, an examination of the baseline data from the DDPC project will be undertaken, and comparisons will be made with the rest of the country.

Most contemporary quantitative social science projects aim at presenting an overall model predicting (or explaining) the dependent variable. In some ways, this study will follow that approach. Each of the above-mentioned variables (i.e., system support, tolerance, etc.) are dependent variables in this study, and the effort here will attempt to show which independent variables best explain differences in support for democratic values and behaviors. The effort will be to show which independent variables (e.g., gender, education, etc.) significantly explain the dependent variables (e.g., system support).

This study will, however, differ from the conventional social scientific analysis of data. Typically, researchers disregard any variable that plays no role in the overall explanation of the dependent variable. For example, a number of studies in Latin America have found that females are more intolerant than males. But further analysis has shown that this intolerance is largely a function of the lower overall level of education and the higher degree of church attendance of females. The overall model from typical social science investigations would ignore gender as a factor, arguing (correctly) that intolerance is a function of education and religiosity. Yet, for the policy maker, it may be very important to know that women are less tolerant than men, even if that intolerance stems from factors other than gender itself. A policy maker concerned with the problem of political intolerance could embark upon a long-term program of increasing national education levels, and expect that eventually female levels would increase to those of males. On the other hand, policy makers often do not have the luxury of waiting for such long-term policies to come to fruition, and might seek to shortcut the process in order to get more immediate results. Thus, knowledge that females in a given country are more intolerant than males, democracy-promoting programs could be aimed directly at adult females, while assisting in the long-term strategy of increasing education for young women so that they emerge as more tolerant adults.

There are other findings that have emerged in studies of democracy that policy makers need to know about even if they cannot or do not wish to attempt influence. For example, ethnicity might play a role in support for democracy and policy makers need to know this, but they might not wish to be involved in any policies designed to affect ethnic identity.

The presentation of the data here will take note of each of the factors that are found to be important in explaining democratic values and behaviors so as to provide maximum assistance to policy makers. At the same time, it will conclude each discussion with a multivariate analysis that will simultaneously examine all of the predictors of the democratic behavior or attitude and see which ones explain it best when the others are being held constant. Such a presentation of bi-variate and multivariate results in combination will be of greatest use to policy makers.

Chapter II. Support for Democracy

Political scientists have been making extensive efforts to measure support for democracy among the citizens of countries throughout the developing world. Democracy, as is well known, is a complex phenomenon, involving not just a single attribute but a complex series of characteristics including, among others, a robust civil society; active citizen participation; competitive, free, and fair elections; the rule of law; and respect for human and civil rights. The list could go on, and serious researchers attempt to include most of them in their efforts at measurement.

In light of the complexity of the phenomenon of democracy, is it possible to use a single survey question to capture citizen support or opposition? Probably not, yet one survey question, used repeatedly in many studies, has at least attempted to do so. That item (AOJ14 in the Bolivia surveys) reads as follows:

With which of the following sentences are you most in agreement?

1. Democracy is preferable to any other form of government.
2. Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government is preferable to a democratic one.
3. A democratic regime or a non-democratic regime makes no difference to me.

This item has many virtues, but it also presents difficulties. Its key virtue is that it asks respondents to make a clear choice between democracy on the one hand and authoritarian rule on the other. It is also a good item because it gives respondents who don't care one way or the other an option through which to reflect their opinion (option 3). Thus, non-response is limited because of this option. But the item has weaknesses, the most important of which is that it leaves it to each respondent to define *democracy*. To take an extreme case, during the time of the Soviet Union, many Soviets claimed that they had a democracy, just not a *bourgeois democracy*. A further problem with the item is that it is laced with a heavy dose of social desirability; democracy is the "right" answer for many people.

These limitations notwithstanding, we can use the item to see how Bolivia compares with other nations in Latin America, and, what is perhaps more important, we can dissect the item to find out just what supporters of democracy in Bolivia mean when they say that they prefer democracy. We can do this by first asking who supports democracy in Bolivia and then by seeing what that support means by examining its relationship to other items in the survey.

The first task is to compare the responses in Bolivia to responses from the rest of Latin America. We can do this using the Latinbarometer from 1997. Although there are more recent versions of the Latinbarometer, the last to be released to the University of Pittsburgh by the Inter-American Development Bank is from 1997. As has been noted in many quarters, the Latinbarometer suffers from a number of problems in sample design.

Most notably, the samples tend to over-represent urban, well-educated populations. One can partially correct for those biases by reweighting the samples, but such adjustments are no substitute for a truly national sample, such as we have with the University of Pittsburgh democracy surveys in Bolivia. Furthermore, the sample size for Bolivia is quite small (N=796). Figure II.1 shows the percentage of respondents who selected the first (i.e., democratic) option versus the other two. Missing data have been deleted from this calculation, but they represent only 5.3% for the Latinbarometer as a whole, and only .5% in the Bolivia 2000 survey.¹⁵ In the analysis that follows, detailed attention will be given to the other two options, but for broad comparative purposes, it is instructive to simply compare those who preferred democracy to those who did not.




Figure II.1 Preference for Democracy:
Bolivia in Comparative Perspective

¹⁵The question was asked for the first time in the University of Pittsburgh surveys on Bolivia in the 1999 municipal sample, so the year 2000 is the first time we have it for the entire national sample.

Several comments are in order about these initial findings. On the basis of the Bolivia 2000 data, Bolivia ranks among the top five countries of the seventeen for which we have data. Using, however, the Latinbarometer's data point for Bolivia for 1997, Bolivia ranks about in the middle. But take careful note that the difference between the 1997 Latinbarometer results and the Bolivia 2000 results are only 3 percentage points, which is smaller than the confidence interval of the Latinbarometer sample.¹⁶ This means that the 1997 survey results could easily have been as high as the 2000 results. Indeed, from a broader perspective, the large group of countries that scored in the high 60% range through the middle 70% range are hard to distinguish from each other. That is, a fair reading of these data would suggest that support for democracy is about the same in Panama, Bolivia, Colombia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Peru, Venezuela, and Honduras. Indeed, there may be only three major groupings in this data: Uruguay, Costa Rica, and perhaps Argentina on the high end; Brazil, Mexico, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Ecuador on the low end; with all of the others in a broad middle category, where Bolivia comfortably fits.

Let us now examine the full range of responses, first for the Latinbarometer 1997 and then for the Bolivia 2000 survey. Table II.1 contains the breakdown of Latin American countries in alphabetical order. The data presented here are unweighted. The pattern shown by the first category sets the overall trend within each country. Generally speaking, the preference for authoritarian rule, or a lack of preference between democracy and authoritarianism, are more or less equally divided in most countries, with the exception of Argentina, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Paraguay, where the preference for an authoritarian regime is higher.

¹⁶The confidence interval for that sample is about 3.5%.

Table II.1. Preference for Democracy, Authoritarianism, or Neither, 1997

	Democracy is preferable	Authoritarian government could be preferable	It makes no difference	Total
Argentina	76.6%	15.2%	8.2%	100.0%
Bolivia	68.9%	16.8%	14.2%	100.0%
Brazil	55.9%	21.5%	22.6%	100.0%
Colombia	70.8%	15.8%	13.4%	100.0%
Costa Rica	84.6%	9.2%	6.2%	100.0%
Chile	62.5%	16.4%	21.0%	100.0%
Ecuador	44.7%	24.6%	30.6%	100.0%
El Salvador	69.9%	14.0%	16.1%	100.0%
Guatemala	52.8%	29.2%	18.0%	100.0%
Honduras	66.3%	17.4%	16.4%	100.0%
Mexico	52.9%	31.4%	15.7%	100.0%
Nicaragua	70.0%	19.7%	10.3%	100.0%
Panama	74.4%	11.0%	14.6%	100.0%
Paraguay	48.9%	40.3%	10.8%	100.0%
Peru	67.2%	18.3%	14.5%	100.0%
Uruguay	88.3%	7.4%	4.3%	100.0%
Venezuela	66.4%	18.0%	15.5%	100.0%
Overall average	66.6%	18.5%	14.9%	100.0%

Source: Latinbarometer, 1997

The Bolivian case alone, using the survey from 2000, exhibits the following distribution of responses shown in Figure II.2. As can be seen, Bolivia fits the overall pattern, with a nearly equal division among the two non-democratic responses.




Figure II.2 Preference for Democracy: Bolivia, 2000

The question now is to see which Bolivians support democracy. It is probably most appropriate first to examine this question geographically. Figure II.3 shows the results. Several comments are appropriate about this figure. First, it is very obvious that Pando has a far lower preference for democracy than any other department in Bolivia. Using the weighted data, whereas the national average is 71.9%, in Pando it is 52.3%. Since, however, the samples for each department are only of modest size, it is important to know whether this difference between Pando and the rest of Bolivia is a function of mere sampling error or is a significant difference. To show this, we must revert to the unweighted data set, which properly reflects the actual number of respondents interviewed in Pando (and in every other department in Bolivia). Doing so in no way alters the percentage scores shown in the figure, but it inserts the proper sample size on which “confidence intervals” can be constructed. The vertical “I”-shaped lines drawn through each average point in the figure show the possible range of values in departments implied by the sample size. As can be seen, the range for Pando, even at its highest point, overlaps with no other department in the country. It is clear, therefore, that Pando is a true exception.

Second, La Paz and Oruro are also lower than the national average, with scores of 66% and 68%, respectively (recall that the national average is 72%). The scores of both La Paz and Oruro, however, as shown by the confidence interval bars, do overlap with those of all other departments except Chuquisaca, which scored 78%. Hence these two

departments can be said to score low only with respect to Chuquisaca. The remaining departments, while differing somewhat in their preference for democracy, are all within the same confidence interval range, and therefore one should not attribute any substantive significance to this variation.




Figure II.3 Preference for Democracy by Department

In sum, two departments stand out from the rest. On the one hand, there is Pando, with by far the lowest level of support for democracy, and on the other, there is Chuquisaca, which is somewhat above the national average. Attempting to explain these differences, we introduced controls for education and income. However, education had no significant impact, and while income did, it had no substantive impact on the results. That can be shown in Table II.2, where the impact of monthly income (question Q10) is removed from the results. As can be seen, the adjusted mean for Pando, for example, is 52, hardly changed from its unadjusted score (listed above). We conclude that it is not poverty (or education) that is responsible for the scores shown here.

Table II.2. Preference for Democracy by Department: Controlled for Monthly Income

Department	Mean %	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
La Paz	66.21	2.36	61.58	70.84
Santa Cruz	75.23	2.32	70.69	79.77
Cochabamba	74.04	2.23	69.67	78.40
Oruro	67.70	2.65	62.50	72.90
Chuquisaca	80.55	2.62	75.41	85.69
Potosí	74.23	2.63	69.06	79.39
Pando	52.03	2.88	46.39	57.68
Tarija	74.13	2.68	68.87	79.38
El Beni	75.88	2.72	70.54	81.22

Exploring further the low democracy score of Pando, one might suspect that since Pando is a remote, relatively rural department, that rural folk must be less likely to prefer democracy. In fact, however, this is not the case at all, as is shown in Figure II.4. The more rural the locality in Bolivia, the *higher* the preference for democracy.




Figure II.4 Preference for Democracy: by Urbanization

These findings suggest that we need to take a multivariate look at the preference for democracy in Bolivia. Doing so is complicated by the fact that the original question, not as recoded above into two categories (*prefer democracy* or *other*), had three options, as already noted. We cannot assume that those who prefer dictatorship are less democratic than those who don't care which kind of regime rules. Thus, we cannot establish a clear order of the three choices; while the first option, *democracy*, is clearly in a category by itself, we do not know how the other two categories differ from each other and from the democratic response. In order to solve this question, we must use a recently developed statistical technique called multinomial logistic regression. In this technique, we compare those who chose the main category, *preference for democracy*, and the second category, *preference for authoritarian rule*, with those who say it makes no difference. The very small number of respondents who expressed no opinion (the *don't know* category) are excluded from the analysis.

To carry out this analysis, the first task is to select the variables that might distinguish among the three categories of response. To do this, it seems appropriate to begin with the urban-rural distinction just noted. In the survey, respondents are grouped into four categories based on population size: (1) urban, larger than 20,000 residents; (2) urban, between 2,000 and 20,000; (3) compact rural, between 500 and 1,999; (4) rural, fewer than 500 residents. The distribution of the national 2000 (weighted) sample on this dimension is shown in Figure II.5. (Note that most surveys in Bolivia do not include the

“dispersed rural” population because of the high cost of obtaining interviews in some localities. In this survey, those citizens are included and well represented.)




Figure II.5 Distribution of Sample by Population Size

The other key demographic variables to examine are gender and age. In addition, socioeconomic variables of education and income should also be considered in determining who supports democracy in Bolivia. Beyond those basic factors are ethnicity, which we measured in two ways. First, we used ethnic self-identification (question ETID), which allowed respondents to classify themselves as white, *cholo/a*, *mestizo/a*, *Indian*, or black. In order to create a continuous variable, we recoded by combining the categories of *mestizo*, *cholo*, and black. The initial (unrecoded) breakdown of the population by self-identified ethnicity is shown in Figure II.6. A second way to categorize the population is by interviewer identification, a judgment based on dress. We include this variable as well.




Figure II.6 Distribution of Sample by Ethnic Self-Identification

Many political science surveys have shown that respondents are sensitive to the economy. In the 2000 survey, we included three items (*soct1*, *soct2*, and *soct3*) to measure these perceptions. We include those variables here as well.

Informed citizens are often found to be more supportive of democracy. In the Bolivia survey we included five questions (GI1-GI5) to measure the degree of political information possessed by the respondents. We summed these into an overall scale that ranged from 0 (i.e., no correct responses) to 5 (correct responses on all five items). The mean on this scale was 1.2.

Other variables in the study were also examined for their impact on the preference for democracy question. This was done by including items from the questionnaire in the multinomial logistic regression equation and testing to see if they had a significant impact on the dependent variable. The final equation, in which insignificant predictors of a preference for democracy item were “trimmed” from the equation, is presented in Table II.3.

The output is complex, but a much simpler bivariate analysis will appear immediately after this table. The multivariate results are presented here, however, to show the interested reader that each of the bivariate analyses is significant when each of the other factors in the equation is held constant. Only in that way can we be confident that the bivariate results are not misleading. The results presented in Table II.3 are presented in two

panels. The upper panel shows the predictors of those who prefer democracy in contrast to those for whom dictatorship or democracy makes no difference, while the lower panel presents results for those who say that under certain circumstances a dictatorship is preferable to democracy, in contrast to those who express no preference for either dictatorship or democracy.

The interpretation of this apparently complex table is straightforward. First, we examine the column labeled “Sig.” to assure ourselves that the variable is a significant predictor in either the upper panel or the lower panel. As we see, this is the case for every variable in the table. The column labeled $\text{Exp}(B)$ is the “odds ratio” of each predictor variable. When that number is higher than one, then this indicates positive odds of the occurrence of the dependent variable, but when it is negative, it indicates negative odds. The Nagelkerke pseudo R^2 printed at the bottom of the table shows that this model explains over 25% of the “variance” in the dependent variable, a very good prediction for survey data.¹⁷ Since the signs of the results are important, telling us in which direction (positive or negative) each variable affects the preference for democracy or dictatorship, it is easiest to move ahead to the bivariate analysis to describe each predictor and its impact.

¹⁷The Wald statistic is the square of the ratio of the parameter estimate to its standard deviation. If the significance of the statistic is small (i.e., less than 0.05) then the parameter is useful to the model.

Table II.3 Parameter Estimates of Predictors of Preference for Democracy or Dictatorship (AOJ14)

AOJ14 Type of government preferred		B	Std. Error	Wald	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)		
							Lower Bound	Upper Bound	
Democracy	Intercept	-2.819	.883	10.186	.001				
	UR (Degree of residential ruralality)	.178	.072	6.174	.013	1.195	1.038	1.375	
	Q2 (Age)	.016	.006	6.549	.010	1.016	1.004	1.028	
	Q10 (Income)	.226	.066	11.660	.001	1.253	1.101	1.426	
	SOCT3 (View on future of economy)	.382	.114	11.305	.001	1.466	1.173	1.831	
	N9 (Government fights corruption)	-.156	.058	7.257	.007	.855	.763	.958	
	M1 (Evaluation of Banzer government)	-.056	.103	.291	.590	.946	.773	1.158	
	NP1R (Attends municipal meetings)	-.002	.002	.660	.416	.998	.994	1.003	
	BC17 (Coups justified during April 2000 protests)	.606	.174	12.159	.000	1.834	1.304	2.579	
	JC11 (Coups justified when crime is high)	.895	.172	27.187	.000	2.447	1.748	3.426	
	B22 (Trust in municipal government)	.105	.058	3.315	.069	1.110	.992	1.243	
	B23B (Trust in public defenders)	-.039	.055	.492	.483	.962	.864	1.072	
	E5 (Approve participation in protest marches)	.096	.030	10.044	.002	1.101	1.037	1.169	
	E3 (Approve overthrowing elected government)	-.138	.034	16.721	.000	.871	.815	.931	
	NEWTOL6 (Approve right to organize to return military government)	-.177	.157	1.270	.260	.837	.615	1.140	
	AOJ11 (Warrant needed for search)	.341	.171	4.004	.045	1.407	1.007	1.966	
	AOJ12 (Prefer order or liberty)	.143	.161	.786	.375	1.153	.841	1.581	
	AOJ15 (Prefer strong fist government)	.380	.173	4.845	.028	1.462	1.043	2.051	
	AOJ16 (Satisfaction with democracy)	-.366	.105	12.285	.000	.693	.565	.851	
	Q3R (Religious/non-religious)	-.599	.163	13.483	.000	.549	.399	.756	
	PSA5 (System support)	.013	.005	6.543	.011	1.013	1.003	1.023	
	Authoritarianism, under some circumstances	Intercept	-2.407	1.087	4.901	.027			
		UR (Degree of residential ruralality)	.138	.090	2.349	.125	1.148	.962	1.369
Q2 (Age)		.013	.008	3.012	.083	1.013	.998	1.028	
Q10 (Income)		.256	.079	10.569	.001	1.292	1.107	1.508	
SOCT3 (View on future of economy)		.525	.141	13.764	.000	1.690	1.281	2.229	
N9 (Government fights corruption)		-.003	.070	.002	.963	.997	.869	1.144	
M1 (Evaluation of Banzer government)		-.309	.127	5.878	.015	.734	.572	.943	
NP1R (Attends municipal meetings)		-.010	.003	10.614	.001	.990	.984	.996	
BC17 (Coups justified during April 2000 protests)		.463	.222	4.364	.037	1.589	1.029	2.454	
JC11 (Coups justified when crime is high)		.786	.218	13.022	.000	2.194	1.432	3.363	
B22 (Trust in municipal government)		.339	.072	22.361	.000	1.404	1.220	1.616	
B23B (Trust in public defenders)		-.189	.069	7.458	.006	.827	.722	.948	
E5 (Approve participation in protest marches)		.061	.037	2.717	.099	1.063	.988	1.144	
E3 (Approve overthrowing elected government)		-.111	.045	6.172	.013	.895	.820	.977	
NEWTOL6 (Approve right to organize to return military government)		-.528	.195	7.328	.007	.590	.402	.864	
AOJ11 (Warrant needed for search)		.760	.204	13.885	.000	2.138	1.434	3.188	
AOJ12 (Prefer order or liberty)		-.439	.197	4.962	.026	.644	.438	.949	
AOJ15 (Prefer strong fist government)		-.540	.205	6.914	.009	.583	.390	.872	
AOJ16 (Satisfaction with democracy)		-.031	.129	.058	.810	.969	.753	1.249	
Q3R (Religious/non-religious)		-.267	.201	1.777	.183	.765	.517	1.134	
PSA5 (System support)		.007	.006	1.095	.295	1.007	.994	1.019	

Nagelkerke pseudo R² = .257.
Model Fitting Information for the Overall Equation

Model	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Intercept Only	2783.031			
Final	2401.025	382.007	40	<.000

We have already examined the impact of the size of the community in which the respondent lives. The results of the multivariate analysis demonstrate that this population factor has a significant influence on the preference for democracy, even when all other variables in the model are controlled for. For each decrement in population size in the four-category scale of rural-urban residence used in this study, the odds of a Bolivian preferring democracy are 20% higher than for those who don't care if the system is democratic or authoritarian. The option *prefer authoritarianism* is not, however, significantly related to community size. This means that while those who live in large cities are less likely to prefer democracy than those who have no preference between dictatorship and democracy, those who prefer dictatorship are no more likely to live in areas with large populations than to live in less populated areas.

These findings regarding a preference for democracy among the less urban populations in Bolivia suggest an old theme in the literature about democracy. It has long been argued that a key source of democracy in the United States, as well as in Costa Rica, has been its rural origins, that life in the countryside is more conducive to democracy than life in the city. Of course, there are other theories arguing just the opposite, pointing to more hierarchical and therefore less democratic patterns in the countryside. In Bolivia, at least, the rural model seems to prevail.

We next turn to age (the next row in the table) as a factor helping to explain support for democracy. As the table shows, age is a significant predictor among those who prefer democracy, but not among those who prefer dictatorship. Specifically, with each year's increase in age, Bolivians prefer democracy (rather than having no preference) by nearly 2%. Among those who prefer democracy, the only group for whom age is a significant predictor, Figure II.7 shows that the greatest difference occurs between the youngest Bolivians (ages 18-25) and all others. Only among the young is preference for democracy substantially lower than the national average. It declines again among those in the 46-55 age range, but falls only slightly below the national average.

A preference for authoritarian rule is not age-related. It is also important not to exaggerate the differences found. Examination of figure II.7 shows that even among the youngest respondents, over two-thirds support democracy. What is not known, however, is whether the lower level of support among the young is a temporary one (i.e., an age cohort effect) that will disappear as these respondents grow older, or whether this finding represents the beginning of a decline in support for democracy and suggests that young respondents, as they age, will not "recover" the support found among their older

compatriots. Only cross-time data can answer this question. Since this item was added for the first time at the national level in the 2000 questionnaire, we cannot answer it until some years down the road.




Figure II.7 Preference for Democracy and Age

The next row of Table II.3 shows that income significantly predicts both a preference for democracy and a preference for authoritarianism over the neutral option. It appears that people with higher incomes are more apt to state (and probably to formulate) their political preferences, compared to those with lower incomes. The odds of preferring democracy (see the Exp(B) column) increase by 25% with each increase in income on the 9-point income scale used in the survey (see question Q10). The impact on support for dictatorship is even stronger, with the odds of preferring it increasing by 29% over those who see no difference between the two systems.

Figure II.8 clearly shows the impact of income on democratic preferences. Since there were only five respondents with the highest level of income in the survey, their responses were combined with those in the next lower income category to enable us to have stable mean scores. The clearest pattern is that a preference for democracy increases among those with higher incomes, while the number of those who don't care which system governs declines as incomes decrease. The trend whereby there is a steady

increase in support for authoritarianism as incomes rise is reversed among those with the very highest incomes.




Figure II.8 Preference for Democracy by Income

The last socioeconomic variable to be considered is religious affiliation (Q3). Respondents were asked to name their religion. The main responses were: (1) active Catholic; (2) inactive Catholic; (3) evangelical or other Protestant sect; and (4) atheist. We found that 84% of the population classified themselves as Catholic (active or inactive) and an additional 14% as evangelical. In examining the distribution of responses, we found that atheists had views on democracy more in common with those of nonparticipating Catholics and that the evangelicals held views more in line with those of active Catholics. So it appeared that the relevant factor here was not denomination but intensity of religious conviction. We recoded this variable to tap this measure and found, as shown in the multinomial logistic regression presented above, that it had a significant impact only on those who prefer democracy, but no significant impact on those who do not. Specifically, the odds of preferring democracy *decreased* by 45% among those who have no strong religious affiliation. More specifically, among those who are nonreligious, the preference for democracy stood at 65%, whereas among those who are more actively religious, the preference for democracy was 75%. This finding runs counter to some thinking in the social sciences whereby those who are strongly religious are antidemocratic. In fact, in Bolivia it does not work that way. For example, those who prefer democracy were found to attend church more frequently (Q4) than those who prefer an authoritarian regime, but the

difference was quite small. Those lowest on church attendance care least about the kind of regime they have.

No other demographic or socioeconomic variables have a significant impact on the preference for democracy question. The remaining factors are ones that emerge from respondents' behavioral and attitudinal dispositions.

Consider the behavioral variable measuring attendance at municipal meetings in the twelve months prior to the survey (NP1). Figure II.9 shows that those who attended municipal meetings are more likely to prefer democracy and are more than twice as likely *not* to prefer authoritarianism than those who did not attend such meetings. We cannot say, of course, that those who attend such meetings are more positive about democracy because of their participation, or that they attend because they prefer democracy. Indeed, there is probably a reciprocal relationship, with participation and attitudes interacting with each other. But it is certainly a positive sign that this relationship exists, given Bolivia's emphasis on decentralization and participation. We also examined trust in municipal government (B22) and found no significant relationship between this variable and a preference for democracy. The relationship with a preference for dictatorship was significant but entirely nonlinear, and therefore it has no substantive interpretation.




Figure II.9 Impact of Attendance at Municipal Meetings and Preference for Democracy

A series of variables related to respondents' opinion of the government are related to a preference for democracy. One item (N9) asks respondents to evaluate how the incumbent government has combated corruption (to be dealt with in detail in a later chapter). The multinomial regression shows that a respondent is more likely to prefer democracy in proportion to the respondent's disapproval of the government's attempts to combat corruption. Specifically, the odds of preferring democracy increase by 15% for each step down the seven-point scale that measures respondents' evaluations of government anti-corruption efforts. Figure II.10 shows the results. We see that those who are especially critical of the government's efforts on anti-corruption are most likely to prefer democracy. Those less critical are more likely not to care which kind of political system rules, suggesting that concerned, critical citizens are pro-democratic citizens who represent a threat only to those who would corrupt democracy.




Figure II.10 Preference for Democracy and Perception of Government Anti-Corruption Efforts

Directly connected to this evaluation of the efficacy of the Banzer government's anti-corruption efforts is the overall evaluation of the government (variable M1). The analysis found that while the evaluation had no significant impact on those who prefer democracy, it did have an impact on those who prefer dictatorship. For each increase in positive evaluation of the Banzer government (on a 1-5 scale), the odds of preferring an authoritarian regime increased by 27%. Figure II.11 shows the pattern for the choice that is significantly affected by regime evaluation: a preference for authoritarian rule.




Figure II.11 Preference for Authoritarianism and Evaluation of the Banzer Government

System support is another aspect of politics that has been focused on in prior studies in this series. A later chapter will examine the dynamics of system support to measure what changes, if any, had occurred between 1998 and 2000. Here the question is different. Are citizens who are more supportive of the legitimacy of the Bolivian government also more likely to prefer democracy? Since authoritarian governments can also be viewed as legitimate in the eyes of citizens, it is not self-evident that strong support for the system alone would be linked to a preference for democracy. However, empirical evidence from the 2000 survey shows that it is. System support here is measured by the five-variable index (ranging from 0 to 100) that has been used in several studies in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion series (B1, B2, B3, B4, B6). We find that the odds of preferring democracy increase by 1% for each one-point increase in

system support. On the other hand, there is no statistically significant impact of system support on preference for authoritarianism.

Related to the core system-support measures are additional items examining various specific aspects of the Bolivian system of government. One of those is trust in the public defenders (B23B). We find that the impact of trust in the public defender has a significant negative impact on preference for authoritarianism. The odds of preferring authoritarianism decline by 17% for each one-point increase in the original scale of trust in the public defender, which ranged from 1 to 7. Figure II.12 shows the results. As can be seen, among those with low trust in the public defenders, preference for authoritarianism ranges from 16% to nearly 22%, whereas among those with the highest trust, only about 8% of respondents prefer authoritarianism.




Figure II.12 Trust in the Public Defenders and Preference for Authoritarianism

We also asked a series of questions on preferences for using military solutions to solve political problems. For example, we asked whether a coup was justified in the April 2000 protests (BC17). For the sample as a whole, 32% of respondents who gave an

opinion said that a coup was justified.¹⁸ Those who opposed the coup were much more likely to favor democracy. Indeed, the odds of favoring democracy over not caring which system was in power were 83% higher among those who opposed a coup. Figure II.13 shows that the preference for democracy was substantially higher among those who opposed the coup than those who supported it. Yet among those who said that the coup was justified, a higher percentage preferred authoritarianism than among those who said it was not justified. An even sharper distinction is found among those who do not care which system is in power. Among those who said that the coup might not be justified, 10% did not care which system is in power, whereas among those who said that the coup might be justified, 21% said that they did not care which system was in power.




Figure II.13 Preference for Democracy and Support for Coup in April 2000

A similar finding emerges with respect to a more general question regarding support for coups. When asked if a coup was justified when there is a lot of crime (JC11), 3% of those with an opinion replied that it was (4.6% had no opinion). Once again, we find the

¹⁸A total of 9.4% had no opinion.

same pattern: those preferring democracy were significantly (sig. < .001) less likely to say that high crime justified a coup than to say that a coup was justified. Among those who prefer an authoritarian regime or who have no preference, the pattern is reversed, with a higher percentage justifying a coup. The pattern is nearly identical to that just presented, so a figure is not presented here.

A related item is the one called NEWTOL6, which asks: "The citizens who support the return of the military to the government in Bolivia ought to: (1) have the same right to organize themselves as anyone else, or (2) the groups who support a military government ought to be prohibited." As we see from the multinomial logistic regression table, this item has no significant relationship to those who prefer democracy, but it is significantly associated with those who prefer dictatorship. That is, among those who support the right to organize of citizens who favor the return of military government, the odds of preferring authoritarianism, are 41% higher than among those who don't care which government is in power. Figure II.14 shows the results. As can be seen, among those who prefer democracy, respondents are somewhat more likely to oppose groups who want to bring back the military. Of course, opposing the right to organize runs up against the democratic principle of freedom of association. So some pro-democracy respondents may have been thinking about their opposition to military rule, while others may have worried about the civil liberties implications of prohibiting groups from organizing. Among those who prefer authoritarianism, however, the gap is much wider and in the reverse direction. Among those respondents, a significantly higher percentage (41%) would allow such groups to organize.




Figure II.14 Preference for Democracy and Support for Organizations to Bring Back the Military

In yet another related predictor of regime type preference, question AOJ15 asks: “Do you think that what our country needs is a strong fisted (*mano dura*) government, or that the problems can be resolved with everyone’s participation?” In the Bolivia 2000 survey, respondents strongly preferred the participatory form of rule, as shown in Figure II.15.




Figure II.15 Preference for Strong-Fisted Government

Looking back at the multinomial logistic regression results for this variable (AOJ15), we see that it is a significant predictor of both a preference for democracy and a preference for authoritarian rule, but the signs of the coefficients are different. The odds of preferring democracy are 46% higher among those who prefer participation, while the odds of preferring authoritarianism are 58% lower for those who want participation. In both cases, we are comparing these preference, as always, with the base group who do not care which kind of regime is in power. Figure II.16 shows the results graphically for the bivariate situation (i.e., without controls). We can see that a preference for democracy is much higher among those who prefer participation as a mechanism of rule than those who want strong-fisted government (77% vs. 59%), whereas among those who prefer authoritarian

rule, a preference for strong-fisted rule is more than twice as strong as among those who prefer participatory government.




Figure II.16 Preference for Democracy and Preference for Participation

In another question related to regime preferences, we asked (E3) to what extent respondents would approve or disapprove of people participating in a group that would want to overthrow an elected government by violent means. This item was asked on a 10-point scale, and 49.1% of respondents selected a score of 1, which is the strongest disapproval. The mean for the entire sample was 2.5, and only fewer than 2% were strongly in favor. We see from the multinomial logistic regression that disapproval of such groups was strongly associated with the democratic preference. For each one-point increment in disapproval, the odds of preferring a democratic regime went up by 87%. On the other hand, and apparently paradoxically, a similarly strong disapproval was expressed by those who would prefer a dictatorship. The explanation, however, rests in the nature of the question. We were not asking about a military coup, but citizen organization to overthrow a regime--which might imply, in the Bolivian context, a leftist, clandestine overthrow of the type envisioned by Che Guevara in his aborted guerrilla movement. This evidence clearly suggests that a preference for dictatorship does not extend to citizen organizations trying to overthrow an elected government. Even though we found that

support for military rule was higher among those who prefer an authoritarian regime, this did not extend to citizen revolutionary movements.

We also asked about legal forms of citizen organization. In question E3, we asked about approval/disapproval of citizen participation in legal demonstrations. On the 1-10 scale, approval averaged 6.8, with only 18.8% disapproving (i.e., scored 4 or lower) of such activities. In the regression analysis shown above, we found a strong association between approval of legal citizen protests and support for democracy. The odds of preferring democracy increased by 10% for each one-point increase in the scale of approval of legal demonstrations. On the other hand, there was no significant association between approval of legal demonstrations and those who support authoritarianism. Figure II.17 shows the results. As can be seen, as approval for legal demonstrations increases, a preference for democracy increases, while there is a concomitant increase (albeit not significant in the multivariate context) in preference for authoritarianism among those who disapprove of legal demonstrations.




Figure II.17 Preference for Democracy and Approval of Legal Demonstration

Similar findings are obtained from examining the impact of a preference for judicial rights. Question AOJ11 asks, “When there are serious suspicions of criminal activity, do you think that (1) one should wait until a judge issues a warrant, or (2) the police may enter a house without the need for a warrant?” Figure II.18 shows the results for this survey

question. In Bolivia, three-fifths of respondents support the rights of those suspected of criminal activities, while a little over one-third do not.




Figure II.18 Do Police Need a Warrant
When Serious Criminal Activity Is Suspected?

The impact of this variable on preference for democracy or authoritarian rule is shown in Figure II.19. In both cases, the impact is significant, but it is much stronger among those who prefer an authoritarian regime. Among those who prefer an authoritarian regime, there is a greater willingness to violate the rights of the accused. Among the respondents who say that the police can enter without a warrant, 17% prefer authoritarian rule, whereas among those who say that the police should wait for a warrant, only 13% would prefer an authoritarian regime.




Figure II.19 Preference for Democracy and Need for Warrant for Suspected Criminal Activity

The survey also asked a more general question tapping into the classic conflict between liberty and order. The question (AOJ12) asks: “What do you think is better: (1) to live in an orderly society, even though some liberties are limited, or (2) to respect all rights and liberties, even if this causes some disorder?” The results of this item are shown in Figure II.20. We can see that on this question there is a strong division of opinion. Moreover, among those who prefer democracy (as shown by the regression results), this variable makes no statistically significant impact. Among those who prefer authoritarian rule, however, it has a strong impact. The odds of preferring authoritarian rule over not caring which system is in power increased by 64% for those who would prefer limiting liberty to guarantee order.




Figure II.20 Is it Preferable to Limit Liberties to Have Order or to Have Full Liberty at the Cost of Some Disorder?

Conclusions

This chapter has provided strong evidence of the preference for democracy over authoritarian rule in Bolivia. Comparative evidence showed Bolivians at the upper end of the scale when placed with the framework of 17 Latin American countries. Moreover, a preference for democracy is strongly linked to a variety of other variables associated with democratic rule, especially those related to the rule of law. We now turn to other key measures of support for democracy, namely system support and tolerance.

Chapter III. System Support and Tolerance

The previous chapter demonstrated that more than one out of seven Bolivians in 2000 believed that democracy was preferable to authoritarianism. This is certainly encouraging news, even if we can still be very concerned that one out of three Bolivians preferred authoritarianism or did not care whether the political system was democratic or authoritarian. Yet a desire or preference for democracy does not a democratic system make. Many other factors are at play, including those institutional and international factors beyond the reach of public opinion.

One factor that is very much within the realm of public opinion is belief in the legitimacy of one's government.¹⁹ As discussed in some detail in the 1998 version of this study (material that will not be repeated here), without popular belief in the legitimacy of a country's political system, democratic stability will be ephemeral. So it is vital to penetrate beneath that national preference for democracy to understand what Bolivians think about their existing political system, not some idealized democracy that does not exist. Moreover, it is vital to know whether Bolivians support key democratic principles, especially tolerance for minority rights. Since we have data on these attitudes for 1998 as well as 2000, in this chapter we will compare the two surveys to look closely for trends.

System Support: 1998-2000

As a result of a long-term research project at the University of Pittsburgh, a scale of legitimacy called "Political Support/Alienation" (PSA) has been developed, based initially on studies in Germany, the United States, but later expanded to all of Central America, Peru, Paraguay, Venezuela, and now Bolivia. The most recent of these studies were published on Nicaragua²⁰ and El Salvador.²¹ Earlier studies developed the theoretical approach.²² The scale attempts to tap the level of citizens' support for their system of government, without focusing on the incumbent regime itself. The core of this scale rests


¹⁹See Mitchell A. Seligson, "Toward a Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America," *Estudios interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2 (2000).

²⁰Mitchell A. Seligson, *Auditoria de la Democracia Nicaragua, 1999* (Managua: Centro Nicaragüense de Desarrollo. N.D.C., 2000).

²¹Mitchell A. Seligson, José Miguel Cruz, and Ricardo Córdova Macías, *Auditoría de la Democracia: El Salvador, 1999* (San Salvador: IUDOP, FundaUngo and the University of Pittsburgh, 2000).

²²Mitchell A. Seligson, "On the Measurement of Diffuse Support: Some Evidence from Mexico," *Social Indicators Research* 12 (January 1983): 1-24; Mitchell A. Seligson and Edward N. Muller, "Democratic Stability and Economic Crisis: Costa Rica 1978-1983," *International Studies Quarterly* (September 1987): 301-26; trans. as Mitchell A. Seligson, and Edward N. Muller, "Estabilidad Democrática y Crisis Económica: Costa Rica, 1978-1983," *Anuario de Estudios Centroamericanos* 16-17, no. 2 (1990): 71-92; Edward N. Muller, Thomas O. Jukam, and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Diffuse Political Support and Antisystem Political Behavior: A Comparative Analysis," *American Journal of Political Science* 26 (May 1982): 240-64; Mitchell A. Seligson, *Political Culture in Paraguay: 1996 Baseline Study of Democratic Values* (Asunción, Paraguay: CIRD, 1997); Mitchell A. Seligson, *Democratic Values in Nicaragua: 1991-1997*, Report to USAID/Nicaragua (Pittsburgh, Pa., 1997).

on five items, and each item has utilized a seven-point response format ranging from *not at all* (1 point) to *a great deal* (7 points).



The full Spanish text of items B1, B2, B3, B4, and B6 is given in the questionnaire provided in an appendix to this study.²³ The numbering system used in the questionnaire as well as in the data base is reproduced here to enable the interested reader to further explore the data. The questions were as follows:

- B1. To what extent do you believe that the courts in Bolivia guarantee a fair trial?*
- B2. To what extent do you have respect for the political institutions of Bolivia?*
- B3. To what extent do you think that the basic rights of citizens are well protected by the Bolivian political system?*
- B4. To what extent do you feel proud to live under the political system of Bolivia?*
- B6. To what extent do you feel that one ought to support the political system of Bolivia?*

²³There is no question B5 in this study. Earlier versions of the PSA series included additional items, including B5, but that item (and others) were dropped as they were shown to be less essential to measuring the basic concept. To retain consistency of comparisons with prior work, the original numbering system was retained in this study for this series and all others presented in these pages.

To facilitate the interpretation of the results, we have rescaled all items to have a 0-100 format so that readers can more easily compare questions from one scale to the next.²⁴ The first task is to examine the individual items and note any changes from 1998 to 2000. The comparisons are shown in Figure III.1. Of the five items, three had no significant change over the two-year period. Two did have a significant change, with support for institutions increasing, while pride in the political system declined. Overall, this represents a pattern of stability rather than change, which is rather surprising, given the serious political shocks the Bolivian system has experienced of late. It suggests that these events, especially the violent demonstrations and subsequent brief state of siege declared in the spring of 2000, not many months before the survey was conducted did not have a major impact on support.




Figure III.1 System Support, Core Items: 1998 vs. 2000

We can place these findings in perspective by creating an overall scale of the five items and comparing them to findings for several other countries in the University of

²⁴A score of 1 point was subtracted from each variable to give them all a 0-6 range, and then the resulting number was divided by 6, to give the scale a 0-1 range, and then multiplied by 100, to give it a 0-100 range.

Pittsburgh data base. The five items are combined into a single scale (also ranging from 0 to 100), and comparisons are shown in Figure III.2. As can be seen, in 1998 Bolivia's score was 44, which declined to 43 in 2000, a decline that is statistically insignificant. In Bolivia, support for the system remains far higher than in Peru, but substantially below the levels of support reported in the countries of Central America.




Figure III.2 System Support in Comparative Perspective

We can also examine the Bolivian data more closely for regional changes. In Figure III.3, each of the departments is shown for the overall measure of system support, with comparisons made for each department in the country. Overall, there is no significant difference between the level of system support in 1998 compared to 2000. There is some minor variation across departments, however, as the data show. Yet, these are within confidence intervals (which for the departmental samples of 300 respondents are $\pm 5.8\%$).

Thus the largest change is the decline in Pando, but that change of 5% is not statistically significant. Readers should be cautioned, therefore, not to view changes within departments (e.g., the Pando decline) as having any substantive significance, since the changes are all smaller than the confidence intervals. When pollsters say “the election is too close to call,” they are not just being cautious; they are reflecting the reality of the limitations of sampling methodology. It is all too tempting to view a small increase or decrease as meaningful; in this case, the shifts are not. In future years, however, larger shifts might occur, and those could well be meaningful.

In short, there are no significant changes in system support nationally or regionally over the period 1998-2000. This should not lead readers to believe that such changes could not occur. For example, in Figure III.2, examine the sharp increase in Nicaraguan system support (using the identical questions asked in Bolivia) between 1995 and 1999. Recent data from Peru suggest further declines in that country, which is not surprising in light of the political situation there.




Figure III.3 System Support, by Department: 1998 vs. 2000

Tolerance: 1998-2000

We now turn our attention to another key dimension of the political orientations of the Bolivian population. In the 1998 study one of the most troubling aspects of the findings

was the very low level of political tolerance expressed by the population. Tolerance was low not merely in absolute terms, but also in terms relevant to other Latin American countries in which the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project has taken measurements.

Our argument is that political systems may be politically stable for long periods of time, undergirded by high levels of system support, as discussed above in the section on system support.²⁵ But such systems are not necessarily democratic. For a political system to be both stable and democratic, its citizens ought not only to believe in the legitimacy of the regime, but also to be tolerant of the political rights of others, especially those with whom they disagree. When a majority of citizens are intolerant of the rights of others, the prospects for minority rights are dim indeed. Concretely, it is difficult if not impossible for those who hold minority points of view to aspire to persuade others to accept those views if the majority will not allow them to express themselves publicly. As Przeworski argues, in democracies citizens must agree to “subject their values and interest to the interplay of democratic institutions and comply with [as yet unknown] outcomes of the democratic process.”²⁶

The measurement of tolerance has a long history, much of which was reviewed in the report on the 1998 data set and will not be repeated here. The other main method of measuring tolerance is to ask a set of questions that refer to the same group or groups. This method was pioneered many years ago in the United States, where the focus was on tolerance toward communism.²⁷ This approach worked well as long as communists were perceived as a threat in the United States, but once the threat of communism receded, it was impossible to assume that lower levels of intolerance toward communists indicated a general decline in intolerance. It became evident that a more general approach was needed so that comparisons could be made across time and across countries. That is the approach


²⁵The section of the theory of political tolerance and its link to stable democracy is drawn from earlier discussion of this topic in prior reports on other countries in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project.

²⁶Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 51.

²⁷Samuel C. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (New York: Doubleday, 1955).

taken by the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project.²⁸ The four-item series on tolerance that we developed reads as follows:

This card has a scale from 1 to 10 steps, with 1 indicating that you disapprove a lot and 10 indicating that you approve a lot. The questions that follow are to find out your opinion about different ideas that people have who live in Bolivia.



D1. There are people who only say bad things about the governments of Bolivia, not only the current government, but the system of Bolivian government. How strongly (on the scale of 1-10), would you approve or disapprove the right to vote of these people? Please read me the number.

D2. Thinking still of those people who only say bad things about the Bolivian system of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove that those people can carry out peaceful demonstrations for the purpose of expressing their points of view?

D3. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that the people who only say bad things about the Bolivian system of government be allowed to run for public office?

²⁸Even though different measures have been utilized in the study of tolerance, it turns out that they all seem to capture the same underlying dimension. For evidence of this, see James L. Gibson, "Alternative Measures of Political Tolerance: Must Tolerance Be 'Least-Liked?'," *American Journal of Political Science* 36 May (1992): 560-77.

D4. Thinking still about those people who only say bad things about the Bolivian system of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of them appearing on television to make a speech?

The first question to be examined is the national patterns on these four items in the period 1998-2000. Figure III.4 shows the results. In three of the four variables measuring tolerance, there were significant increases, with only the *run for office* question not showing any increase. This item, of course, is the most challenging, since the other rights do not so clearly threaten to shift political control from one group or the other. On the 0-100 scale, this right is still far toward the negative end of the continuum. It is also notable that the greatest increase occurred in the *right to demonstrate* question, perhaps reflecting in part the perception of the impact of the demonstrations in the first half of the year 2000. This may also have affected the *right to vote* question, where tolerance also increased significantly.




Figure III.4 Political Tolerance in Bolivia: 1998-2000

We can place these results in perspective by examining the Bolivian case in the context of some other Latin American countries for which we have recent data. Figure III.5 shows the results. Bolivia's increase since 1998 is notable, but, as we can see, tolerance remains low by the standards of the countries in the Latin American region. It is also of note

that some countries (e.g., El Salvador) have experienced major increases in tolerance over the period of a decade. Therefore, the small, significant increases in Bolivia are certainly encouraging, but there is still a considerable distance to travel before tolerance in Bolivia lies within the positive end of the continuum.




Figure III.5 Political Tolerance: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective

Comparisons of Bolivia's tolerance across departments reveal some important shifts. Figure III.6 shows the results, with the departments ordered by their combined 1998-2000 average scores. What is striking about this national breakdown by department are the strong increases in Pando, El Beni, and Cochabamba and the sharp decline in Tarija, each of which is statistically significant. There were also increases of a much lesser nature in La Paz, Chuquisaca, and Santa Cruz, but declines in Oruro and Potosí. Since changes need to be nearly 6% or greater to produce significant differences, the only significant shifts are the ones already noted.

Further examination of the tolerance results at the department level reveals that the largest increases occurred among the departments that ranked lowest in 1998, so the phenomenon we are observing may be part of the well-known tendency of any data series to regress to its mean. That is, these departments that were outliers in 1998 have reversed course and shifted to levels much closer to the national average by 2000. Nonetheless, the

size of the shift is so large that one wonders whether other factors are at play. We investigate those below.




Figure III.6 Tolerance by Department: 1998 vs. 2000

First to be considered is the most obvious candidate, education. Worldwide, higher levels of education are associated with increased tolerance. In Bolivia, however, the study on the 1998 data set showed this was not the case there. An examination of the simple correlation (Pearson's r) between education and tolerance for 1998 and for 2000 for the sample as a whole, as well as within each department, shows no significant association in either year. Therefore, variation in education between the samples could not be responsible for the increases in tolerance found in some departments in Bolivia. Similarly, examinations of age, gender, and income data did not reveal any obvious reason for the increase in tolerance in Pando, El Beni, and Cochabamba. We must assume, therefore, that the increases had something to do with political events in those areas over the period 1998-2000.

System Support and Tolerance

The report on the 1998 study undertook to analyze the relationship between system support and tolerance. In the present study, we compare the results from 1998 with those for 2000. Since the analysis requires a fairly detailed explanation, without which the results would make little sense to readers who do not have the report on the 1998 study at hand, we decided to include here the essential sections of that earlier analysis before presenting the comparison of the 1998 data with the 2000 data.

The theory behind this study of system support and political tolerance is that both are needed for long-term democratic stability. Citizens must both believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions and also be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In such a system, majority rule can accompany minority rights, a combination of attributes often viewed as the quintessential definition of democracy.

Prior studies emerging from the University of Pittsburgh Project have explored the relationship between system support and tolerance in an effort to develop a predictive model of democratic stability.²⁹ Table III.1 represents all of the theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance when the two variables are divided between high and low.³⁰

²⁹This framework was first presented in Mitchell A. Seligson and Ricardo Córdova Macías, *Perspectivas para una democracia estable en El Salvador* (San Salvador: IDELA, 1993). See also Mitchell A. Seligson and Ricardo Córdova M., *El Salvador: De la Guerra a la Paz, una Cultura Política en Transición* (San Salvador: IDELA y FUNDAUNGO, 1995). The Nicaragua study, based on the 1991 and 1995 data sets, is found in Mitchell A. Seligson, *Political Culture in Nicaragua: Transitions, 1991-1995* (Managua: United States Agency for International Development, 1996). The discussion in this report draws directly on the explanatory material contained in the 1996 study.

³⁰The scale ranges from 0 to 100, so the most natural cut point is 50. In actuality, since the zero also counts as a valid value in the scale, there are 101 points to the scale, and the arithmetic division would be 50.5. In this and other studies, we have used 50 because it is more intuitive.

Table III.1
Theoretical Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support
in Institutionally Democratic Polities

		Tolerance	
		High	Low
System support	High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
	Low	Unstable Democracy	Democratic Breakdown

Let us review each cell one by one. Political systems populated largely by citizens who have high system support and high political tolerance may be predicted to be the most stable. This prediction is based on the logic that strong support is needed in non-coercive environments to assure the stability of the system. If citizens do not support their political system and they have the freedom to act, system change would appear to be the eventual inevitable outcome. Systems that are stable, however, will not necessarily be democratic unless minority rights are assured. Such assurance could, of course, come from constitutional guarantees, but unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, those minorities will have little opportunity to run for and win elected office. Under those conditions, of course, majorities can always suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are both politically legitimate, as demonstrated by positive system support, and have citizens who are reasonably tolerant of minority rights are likely to enjoy stable democracy.³¹

When system support remains high but tolerance is low, then the system should remain stable (because of high support), but democratic rule might ultimately be placed in jeopardy. Such systems would tend to move toward authoritarian (oligarchical) rule in which democratic rights would be restricted.

Low system support, the situation characterized by the lower two cells in the table, should be directly linked to unstable situations. Instability, however, does not necessarily

³¹Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

translate into the ultimate reduction of civil liberties, since instability could force the system to deepen its democracy, especially when popular values tend toward political tolerance. Hence, in a situation of low support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict whether instability will result in greater democratization or a protracted period of instability perhaps characterized by considerable violence. On the other hand, where there is low support for the system and low tolerance, democratic breakdown seems to be the eventual outcome. One cannot of course predict a breakdown on the basis of public opinion data alone, since so many other factors, including the role of elites, the position of the military, and the support or opposition of international players, are crucial to this process. But systems in which the public supports neither the basic institutions of the nation nor the rights of minorities are vulnerable to democratic breakdown.

Two caveats apply to this scheme. First, note that the relationships discussed here apply only to systems that are already institutionally democratic. That is, they are systems in which competitive, regular elections are held and widespread participation is allowed. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have entirely different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Second, the assumption is that over the long run, attitudes of both elites and the mass public make a difference in regime type. Attitudes and system type may remain incongruent for many years. Indeed, as Seligson and Booth have shown for Nicaragua, such an incongruence might have eventually helped to bring about the overthrow of the Somoza government. But the Nicaraguan case was one in which the existing system was authoritarian and repression had long been used to maintain an authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of its citizens.³²

Empirical Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support in Bolivia

It is now time to put together the two variables that have been the focus of this chapter by examining the joint distribution of the two variables. First, it should be noted that system support and tolerance are positively associated with each other (for both 1998 and

³²Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, "Political Culture and Regime Type: Evidence from Nicaragua and Costa Rica," *Journal of Politics* 55 (August 1993): 777-92. A different version appears as "Cultura política y democratización: vías alternas en Nicaragua y Costa Rica," in Carlos Barba Solano, José Luis Barros Horcasitas, y Javier Hurtado, *Transiciones a la democracia en Europa y América Latina* (México: FLACSO y Universidad de Guadalajara, 1991), pp. 628-81. It also appears as "Paths to Democracy and the Political Culture of Costa Rica, Mexico and Nicaragua," in *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), pp. 99-130.

2000, $r = .13$, $\text{sig.} < .001$). This means that those who are more tolerant are more supportive of the system. This is certainly an encouraging sign, since it suggests that, at least in this case, all good things can go together. But the more profound question is to examine in detail how the two variables interrelate. To do this, we have dichotomized both variables into *high* and *low*.³³ The overall index of tolerance was utilized, but the scale was divided into high and low at the 50-point. System support is scaled in a similar way and split at the 50-point to distinguish between high and low.³⁴

The results for the Bolivia 1998 and 2000 surveys are shown in Table III.2.³⁵ As can be seen, while only about one in ten Bolivians both supports the political system and expresses political tolerance, between 1998 and 2000 the percentage increased. On the other hand, the largest cell by far is the *democratic breakdown* cell, in which nearly half of all Bolivians fall. These are individuals with low system support and low tolerance. Yet these percentages declined in 2000. Finally, between about a fifth and a quarter of Bolivians fall into the *unstable democracy* or *authoritarian stability* cells.

Since we have already seen that system support remained basically unchanged between 1998 and 2000 but tolerance increased, the small shifts between the two years are a function of the increased levels of tolerance. Higher tolerance propelled more Bolivians into the *stable democracy* cell and also increased those in the *unstable democracy* cell, i.e., those who express tolerant attitudes but are unsupportive of the political system.

³³If the variables were left in their original 0-100 format, the table would potentially have 100 cells in each direction, making it impossible to read and interpret.

³⁴It is important to note that the results presented here differ from those in some earlier presentations of the University of Pittsburgh Public Opinion Project. In many of those presentations the expanded scale of items was utilized, whereas here the focus is on the core list. In addition, in this study an algorithm is used for missing data (i.e., non-response) so as to minimize the number of missing cases in the overall scale. In the tolerance scale, when two or more of the four items are answered, the overall scale score is based on the valid responses. If fewer than two are answered, the case is scored as missing. For the system support measure, a valid score is accepted when at least three of the five questions are answered. As a result of these changes, the percentages reported in the following tables vary somewhat from some earlier reports and publications.

³⁵The total sample size represented in this chart = 2,791. This means that a total of 187 of the 2,977 cases had missing data on either the tolerance or the system support measure and were therefore deleted from this analysis.

Table III.2
Empirical Relationship Between
Tolerance and System Support in Bolivia

		Tolerance			
		High		Low	
System support	High	Stable Democracy		Authoritarian Stability	
		1998: 11%	2000: 13%	1998: 24%	2000: 21%
System support	Low	Unstable Democracy		Democratic Breakdown	
		1998: 17%	2000: 21%	1998: 47%	2000: 45%

How do the new Bolivian results compare with those from other countries in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project data base?³⁶ Not well, as is shown in Figure III.7. As can be seen, Bolivia ranks lowest among the six countries in the data series, approximately matching the results for Peru, but with only a little more than one-fourth the level of support for stable democracy found in Costa Rica.

³⁶In order to create this chart, a new variable called "democ" was created in the data base. It eliminates cases in which missing data are found on either the tolerance or the system support measure. The coding was:

if (psa5r = 1 and tol = 1)democ = 100.
if (psa5r = 1 and tol = 2)democ = 0.
if (psa5r = 2 and tol = 2)democ = 0.
if (psa5r = 2 and tol = 1)democ = 0.




Figure III.7 Attitudes Favoring Stable Democracy:
Bolivia in Comparative Perspective

Conclusions

This chapter has examined the evolution of system support and political tolerance in Bolivia over the period 1998-2000. System support was basically unchanged, a finding that is somewhat surprising in light of the serious protests that occurred prior to the survey. Tolerance, however, increased significantly nation-wide, and in select departments. The result was an overall increase in respondents classified in the *stable democracy* cell of the study. Nonetheless, Bolivia still remains low in comparison to other Latin American countries.

Chapter IV. Corruption and System Support

The report on the 1998 democratic values study pays scant attention to the problem of corruption and its impact on democracy. Only a few pages in the report covered the subject. Subsequent to the publication of that report, however, this researcher had the opportunity to examine the results of recent studies ranking countries by their level of corruption, and Bolivia emerged as among the worst in those studies. For this reason, an entire chapter is devoted to the problem of corruption in this report on the 2000 survey. Since this subject was not covered in any depth in the prior report, it is necessary to review the scholarship on the subject so as to place the Bolivian data in their proper context.

Why the Interest in Corruption?

Corruption, for many years a topic of limited interest in the academic and policy worlds, has recently received greater attention.³⁷ Most analysts believe that the ending of the cold war has been responsible for this shift.³⁸ With the cold war over, trade, neoliberal reforms and anti-narcotics efforts dominate the interests of the advanced industrial countries. Along with the expansion of trade and economic reforms, however, have come unprecedented opportunities for corruption. Trade and neoliberal privatization schemes can favor those who pay the biggest bribes, hampering companies that are formally prohibited from doing so. And the spread of narcotics traffic threatens to deepen the corruption of the police and judicial institutions of many nations.

Economists have long warned of the pernicious impacts of corruption, arguing that it increases transaction costs, reduces investment incentives, and ultimately results in reduced economic growth. Political scientists, even the realists, have taken a much more ambivalent view of the problem. The early tradition in political science was dominated by the functionalist school. As Huntington argues in his famous writings on the subject: "Corruption provides immediate, specific, and concrete benefits to groups which might otherwise be thoroughly alienated from society. Corruption may thus be functional to the maintenance of a political system in the same way that reform is."³⁹ This view represents a considerable body of writing by political scientists and sociologists that views corruption

³⁷Definitions of corruption are many and varied, but the most commonly accepted one, and the one used in this chapter is *abuse of public office for private gain*. For an excellent review of the concept of corruption, see Robert Williams, "New Concepts for Old," *Third World Quarterly* 20 (1999): 503-13.

³⁸This argument is made forcefully by Robert Williams in his introduction to a special issue on corruption in the *Third World Quarterly*, "The New Politics of Corruption," *Third World Quarterly* 20 (1999): 487-89.

³⁹Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, p. 69).

in functionalist terms, especially in the developing world. More recently, however, now that democracies have emerged widely in the Third World, corruption has begun to be viewed quite differently and is seen as a threat to the consolidation of those regimes.

Economists have gathered strong evidence proving the negative impact of corruption on investment and growth in developing nations. Political scientists, however, have been far more anecdotal in their claims regarding the costs or benefits of corruption in those nations. This chapter shows that the apparently Janus-faced nature of corruption, at least in Bolivia, is an illusion. Corruption is not only bad for the economy, it is also bad for the polity as well. This chapter first briefly reviews the literature, then tests the competing claims of the political effects of corruption, using survey data from Bolivia along with data from three other Latin American countries that rank high on international indices of corruption.

Corruption as Economic Evil

Most economists who have studied corruption argue that it reduces investment and slows growth for a variety of reasons.⁴⁰ First, bribes are normally not reported by either party to the transaction, thus denying the treasury needed tax revenues. This tax loss is compounded because the bribe often serves to circumvent the reporting of normal business transactions that otherwise would have produced tax consequences (e.g., construction permits, ad valorem taxes, sales taxes, import and export taxes, etc.). Second, public services are focused toward assisting those who pay bribes, denying those services to those who do not, thereby resulting in uneven and often inferior services to many. Third, bribes enable service providers (such as contractors for public infrastructure projects) to ignore established standards, and thus the economy suffers from substandard goods or services (e.g., roads that deteriorate rapidly, hospitals that provide inferior treatment). Fourth, corruption weakens the rule of law and as a result makes transactions irrational from an economic point of view. (For example, contracts are not awarded to the highest-quality, lowest-cost bidder but to the firm that pays the highest bribe.)

In a large-scale cross-national study of over 100 countries carried out by the International Monetary Fund for 1982-1995, Mauro found that when corruption increases by two points on a ten-point scale, GDP decreases by .5% and investment decreases by 4%.⁴¹ Furthermore, public investment suffers; expenditures on education decline by .5%

⁴⁰One exception is Nathaniel Leff, "Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption," *American Behavioral Scientist* 8 (November 1964): 8-14.

⁴¹Paolo Mauro, *Why Worry About Corruption?* Economic Issues, vol. 6 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1997).

for each two-point increase in corruption.⁴² The World Bank also found that among countries in which bribery is both high and unpredictable, the rate of investment is nearly half that in low-corruption countries.⁴³ Corruption is also found to increase income inequality. According to Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme, for example, corruption severely decreases income growth for the poor.⁴⁴ Other studies come to virtually identical conclusions.⁴⁵ Yet another cross-national study based on sixty-nine countries found that high levels of corruption encourage businesses to go underground, which denies the government of tax revenue, producing smaller, less effective government.⁴⁶ In short, while not all agree on this point, there is a consensus that corruption is bad for the economy.⁴⁷

Convinced of the pernicious effects of corruption, international lending agencies have embarked upon major efforts to reduce corruption, conditioning many of their loans on formal, widespread efforts to clean it up. In the 1996 annual meeting of the World Bank/International Monetary Fund, the president of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, pledged the resources of the bank to fight the "cancer of corruption." In June 1997, the Organization of American States approved the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, ratified by Bolivia in 1998 and by the U.S. Senate in August 2000. In December 1997, the OECD, along with representatives from emerging democracies, signed the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business

⁴²The IMF argument is further elaborated by Vito Tanzi and Hamid Davoodi, *Roads to Nowhere: How Corruption in Public Investment Hurts Growth*. Economic Issues, vol. 12 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1968).

⁴³World Bank, *World Development Report, 1997* (Washington, D.C.: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 102-04.

⁴⁴Sanjeev Gupta, Hamid Davoodi, and Rosa Alonso-Terme, "Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?," IMF Working Papers 98/76 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1998).

⁴⁵Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella. "The Causes and Consequences of Corruption." *IDS Bulletin* 2 (1997): 6-10; Paolo Mauro, "Corruption and Growth," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 110 (1995); Paolo Mauro, "The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment and Government Expenditure: A Cross-Country Analysis," in *Corruption and the Global Economy*, ed. Kimberly Ann Elliot (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1996).

⁴⁶Eric Friedman et al., "Dodging the Grabbing Hand: The determinants of Unofficial Activity in 69 Countries," *Journal of Public Economics* 77 (2000): 459-93.

⁴⁷For a different view, see J. P. Beck and M. W. Mahr, "A Comparison of Bribery and Bidding in Thin Markets." *Economic Letters* 20 (1986): 1-20; and D. D. Lien, "A Note on Competitive Bribery Games." *Economic Letters* 22 (1986): 337-431.

Transactions. In November 1998, the Council of Europe, including Central and Eastern European countries, adopted the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. Then in February 1999, the Global Coalition for Africa adopted "Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries." Increasingly, manuals are being written to guide the implementation of anti-corruption measures.¹²

Corruption as Political Good

If economists largely view corruption as "sand" in the gears of the economy, political scientists, drawing on the classic work of Robert Merton,¹³ for many years largely viewed it as the "grease" that gets the bureaucracy moving in many developing countries. V. O. Key, one of the leaders in the early systematic study of politics, viewed corruption as necessary for politics itself. As he argued in his classic work on southern politics,

Quite apart from the levity with which corrupt-practices acts are regarded, literal adherence to some of the state laws would make a statewide campaign almost impossible. . . . The chances are about 99 to 1 that not a single serious race for statewide office in any southern state (or any other state) during the past 20 years has been unaccompanied by perjury, morally if not legally, by the candidate or his managers in reports of campaign receipts or expenditures.¹⁴

This 1949 work was followed by early studies in the developing world that saw positive political benefits to corruption.¹⁵ But the classic statement is that of Huntington, who stood the economists' perspective on its head: if the goal is to stimulate growth,

¹²For an overview, see the June 2000 issue of *Finance and Development* and the January 1998 issue of *Governance*. For detailed guides, see, for example, Robert Klitgaard, Ronald MacLean-Abaroa, and H. Lindsey Parris Jr., *Corrupt Cities: A Practical Guide to Cure and Prevention* (Oakland: ICS Press, 2000); Jeremy Pope, *National Integrity Systems: The TI Source Book* (Berlin: Transparency International, 1996); World Bank Institute, *New Empirical Tools for Anti-Corruption and Institutional Reform: A Step-by-Step Guide to Their Implementation* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1999).

¹³Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structures* (New York: Free Press, 1957).

¹⁴V.O. Key Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Vintage Books, 1949), p. 481.

¹⁵José Abueva, "The Contribution of Nepotism, Spoils, and Graft to Political Development," *East-West Center Review* (1966): 45-54; David Bayley, "The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation," *Western Political Quarterly* 19 (1967): 719-32; Joseph Nye, "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 61 (1967): 417-27.

corruption is a necessary evil. As he argued, "In terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, over centralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over centralized honest bureaucracy."¹⁶ Huntington was not alone in his view of the positive benefits of corruption. Other major studies followed.¹⁷ In a classic collection of essays, Heidenheimer and his colleagues included many pieces that sang the praises of corruption.¹⁸ For example, in a study that looks at Africa, Leys asks, "What is the problem about corruption?" and answers by saying, "It is natural but wrong to assume that the results of corruption are always both bad and important."¹⁹ From this point of view, corruption serves the function of binding society together, something that is sorely needed in most developing nations. As Leys puts it: "the greater the corruption, the greater the harmony between corruptor and corruptee."²⁰

This argument is made even more forcefully in a study on corruption in France. Becquart-Leclerq states it clearly:

Corruption functions like grease in the gears; it has an important redistributive effect, it is a functional substitute for direct participation in power, it constitutes the cement between elites and parties, and it affects the effectiveness with which power is exercised.²¹

Moreover, corruption is especially beneficial in nations with authoritarian traditions, since "corruption guarantees certain zones of freedom and of free movement in the face of the totalitarian tendencies inherent in states and political parties. . . . Political corruption has

¹⁶Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 69.

¹⁷John Waterbury, "Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime," *World Politics* 25 (1973): 533-55; John Waterbury, "Corruption, Political Stability, and Development: Comparative Evidence from Egypt and Morocco," *Government and Opposition* (1976): 426-45.

¹⁸Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston, and Victor T. LeVine, eds., *Political Corruption: A Handbook* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1989).

¹⁹Colin Leys, "What Is the Problem About Corruption?," in *Political Corruption: A Handbook*, ed. Heidenheimer, Johnson, and LeVine (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1989), p. 57.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 54.

²¹Becquart-Leclerq, "Paradoxes of Political Corruption: A French View," in *Political Corruption: A Handbook*, ed. Heidenheimer, Johnson, and LeVine, p. 192.

another important function, to redistribute public resources by parallel means accessible to groups that would otherwise be excluded.”²²

In a similar vein, Werner argues that corruption in Israel has positive economic as well as political effects. It encourages foreign investment by “bypassing cumbersome, genuinely hampering, governmental economic regulations.” It has helped to integrate immigrant groups into the larger culture and improves the quality of the bureaucracy by providing “supplemental income” that helps counteract the attractiveness of higher-paid private-sector employment.²³

Corruption is also central to clientelism, which is also seen as a mechanism to bind citizens to elites. The classic work is that of Banfield in southern Italy.²⁴ From this perspective, clientelism involves a clear-cut exchange relationship in which personal favors are exchanged for political support in the form of votes or contributions. Not all clientelism involves corrupt practices, but much of it does.²⁵ Clientelism, it has been noted, however, can be a two-edged sword, increasing trust between patron and client while decreasing trust for all others.

Corruption as Political Evil

Recently, several prominent works have appeared that take strong issue with the benign view of corruption articulated by many political scientists in the past.²⁶ The rapid spread of democracy throughout the developing world is perhaps most directly responsible for this shift in perspective. While corruption may have had its positive functions under dictatorships, it is seen as dysfunctional under democracy, especially as regards confidence in the political system.

²²Ibid., p.193.

²³Simcha B. Werner, "The Development of Political Corruption in Israel," in *Political Corruption: A Handbook*, ed. Heidenheimer, Johnson, and LeVine, p. 251.

²⁴Edward Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (Chicago: Free Press, 1958).

²⁵Eva Etzioni-Halevy, *Bureaucracy and Democracy* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985); Michael Johnston, "Patrons and Clients, jobs and Machines," *American Political Science Review* 73 (1979): 385-98.

²⁶Susan Rose-Ackerman, *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

Summarizing the findings of papers gathered in a recent edited volume, Doig and Theobald argue, "Countries in which petty corruption is pervasive must . . . endure disablingly low levels of trust in public institutions, with all the extremely negative consequences for commitment to collective projects, civic behavior, levels of crime and public order."²⁷ Readers who seek empirical confirmation of these findings will be disappointed, however. The studies, which cover Uganda, Hong Kong, Botswana, and Australia, are almost entirely descriptive, with little data and no statistical tests offered. The editors are not to be faulted, however, since an extensive review of the literature worldwide uncovers virtually no empirical support for these claims.²⁸

One partial exception is a new study by Lipset and Lenz.²⁹ However, this study, utilizing a large cross-national data set that incorporates a measure of democracy and a measure of corruption, is not focused directly on Huntington's emphasis on legitimacy, but on a related one: the impact of corruption on democracy. (The data on corruption come from the Corruption Perception Index for 1998 compiled by Transparency International, and the measure of democracy used is the Freedom House Index, averaged over the period 1972-1998.) Lipset and Lenz find that although a strong bivariate relationship emerges, when controls for GNP per capita and other (unspecified) variables are introduced, the relationship becomes insignificant. These findings, while not speaking to the corruption/legitimacy nexus, do weaken support for the impact of corruption on the political system, because at least since the time of Huntington's observations on the functionality of corruption, scholars have repeatedly found that developing countries have higher levels of corruption than advanced industrial countries. Therefore, if the relationship between trust and democracy fails to survive the introduction of a control for GNP, our confidence in their conclusion that democracy is inversely associated with corruption is greatly weakened. This study, therefore, not only does not test the relationship between corruption and legitimacy; its own assertion that the study "broadly confirms" the linkage is refuted by the multivariate analysis.³⁰

²⁷Alan Doig and Robin Theobald, eds., *Corruption and Democratisation* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 6.

²⁸Alan Doig and Stephanie Mclvor, "Corruption and Its Control in the Developmental Context: An Analysis and Selective Review of the Literature," *Third World Quarterly* 20 (June 1999).

²⁹Seymour Martin Lipset and Gabriel Salman Lenz, "Corruption, Culture and Markets," In *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*, ed. Lawrence J Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

³⁰Seymour Martin Lipset and Gabriel Salman Lenz, "Corruption, Culture and Markets," in *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*, ed. Lawrence J Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Basic Books, 2000), p.122.

The most recent evidence supporting the view that corruption leads to lowered legitimacy emerges in the collection edited by Pharr and Putnam.³¹ Using data from Europe, Donatella della Porta hypothesizes that corruption is both a cause and an effect of poor government performance, "thus reducing trust in the government's capacity to address citizens' demands. . . . Lack of confidence in government actually favors corruption insofar as it transforms citizens into clients and bribers who look for private protection to gain access to decision-makers."³² That study once again uses the Transparency International Perception Corruption Index and the Eurobarometer to obtain evidence on confidence in government. The results, focused on France, Germany, and Italy for the period 1976-1995, support the hypothesis. Indeed, looking at all of the Eurobarometer cases as a group, della Porta finds an association between high levels of corruption and low satisfaction with democracy.

In a related paper in the same volume focused on Japan, Pharr states: "This chapter demonstrates that in Japan, at least, officials' misconduct has been by far the single best predictor at any given point in time of citizen confidence in government over the past two decades."³³ Pharr notes that this finding corresponds to that of Page and Shapiro,³⁴ who found that in the United States public corruption (especially the Watergate scandal) brought about an abrupt and lasting change in public opinion. Several sources of data are used, but the main conclusions are based on a time-series regression that demonstrates that the number of articles on corruption in the main newspaper in Tokyo is the best predictor, over time, of dissatisfaction with politics.

In the Latin American region, Morris carried out an extensive study of the causes and consequences of corruption in Mexico, a country that ranked fifty-eighth on the TI survey for 1999.³⁵ Morris concludes that the positive role of corruption is limited to elites, who both pay and receive bribes as a regular way of conducting their affairs. For the mass public, however, Morris uses survey data to test the corruption/legitimacy linkage. The

³¹Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam, eds., *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

³²Donatella della Porta, "Social Capital, Beliefs in Government, and Political Corruption," in *Disaffected Democracies*, ed. Pharr and Putnam, p. 205.

³³Susan J. Pharr, "Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies," in *Disaffected Democracies*, ed. Pharr and Putnam, p. 173.

³⁴Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans; Policy Preferences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 337-38.

³⁵Stephen D. Morris, *Corruption and Politics in Contemporary Mexico* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1991).

survey (a nonrandom sample of about 700 respondents in three Mexican cities), did not ask about experience with corruption, but only about perceptions of the extent to which corruption is necessary to deal with the bureaucracy. The findings show a strong relationship between this perception and low trust in government, which is another (limited) way of defining legitimacy; however, since the perception that bribes are needed may in fact be a function of the low evaluation of government in the first place, we really cannot be sure whether corruption itself is responsible for the decline in trust in government. A more recent study on corruption and system support, conducted in Chile, Costa Rica, and Mexico, also examines perception of corruption rather than experience with it.³⁶ In Asia, Shin has studied corruption in South Korea, but he focuses on citizens' perceptions of the corruption or honesty of public officials rather than on personal experience with corrupt practices.³⁷

Correcting for Limitations of Prior Work

Does corruption matter in politics? As the review of the literature shows, views on this subject differ widely. Those who have made the strongest case that corruption performs a beneficial function are based on studies that are almost entirely anecdotal and/or theoretical. On the other hand, those who have made the case that corruption has a pernicious effect on belief in the legitimacy of political institutions have either provided no evidence supporting the claim or have given evidence that is flawed and indirect. Let us review these problems in the prior research.

Prior Efforts at Measuring Corruption

It is not surprising that until recently corruption research has been largely descriptive rather than empirical. The problem confronted by researchers is that given its *sub rosa* nature, corruption is an inherently extremely difficult phenomenon to measure. Over the years, various approaches have been taken to solve this problem, each with its own limitations.

Early efforts were based on the criminology approach of using official police and court records. One could simply count the number of arrests and convictions for corruption in a given country. The main difficulty with such an approach, of course, is the spuriousness of the measure: the more vigilant the authorities, the more arrests and convictions, completely independent of the corruption rate itself. Thus, in highly corrupt countries there

³⁶Roderic Ai Camp, Kenneth M. Coleman, and Charles L. Davis, "Public Opinion About Corruption: An Exploratory Study in Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico," report of the annual meeting of the World Association of Public Opinion Research, Portland, Oregon, May 2000, pp. 17-18.

³⁷Doh C. Shin, *Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 208-14.

may be virtually no enforcement, while in “squeaky clean” countries there may be frequent arrests and convictions even for minor infractions. For the most part, this approach has been abandoned.

To overcome the measurement problem inherent in using official records, two newer approaches have been taken, although each has serious limitations. The first (already cited) is that carried out by Transparency International (TI) with its annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI). TI is an international coalition that promotes integrity in government worldwide. The TI effort has expanded over the years, embracing more countries and a wider range of data sources, including perceptions of nationals and expatriates. But the primary difficulty with this index is that it is grounded, as its title states, in *perceptions* of corruption rather than the fact of it. This problem, of which TI is well aware, has resulted in extensive efforts to improve the quality of the measure. In recent years, multiple measures and multi year averages have been used in hopes of increasing the reliability of the measure.³⁸ In spite of its limitations, the CPI remains the most widely used measure of corruption in use today, akin to the Freedom House measure of democracy. Most economists rely upon it when examining the impact of corruption on growth and investment.

The second recent approach, designed to go beyond perception and to get more directly at experience with corrupt practices, is the World Bank’s Private Sector Survey.³⁹ This survey was carried out in 1996 and 1997 in sixty-nine countries by sending questionnaires to 3,685 firms in selected countries. The study, while helpful in many ways, still confronts a number of serious problems. First, the response rate was about 30%, leaving open the possibility that selection bias may have resulted in a tendency in the more corrupt countries for more honest firms to respond, whereas in less corrupt countries a wider cross-section may have responded. A further problem with the World Bank approach is that among the firms that did respond, the more corrupt ones certainly had more to hide than the less corrupt ones, resulting in a potentially serious under-reporting of corruption among the more corrupt firms. But perhaps the biggest problem with the World Bank approach is that the data base is made up entirely of private-sector firms, and therefore there is no direct evidence on public-sector corruption. It is the integrity of the public sector that most directly concerns policy makers and anti-corruption reformers alike. Indeed, the World Bank’s own analysis of the pernicious effects of corruption focuses on the public sector, even though its data come from the private sector.⁴⁰

³⁸These efforts are explained in detail in the TI website. The document that presents the methodological issues is: www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/cpi_framework.html.

³⁹See World Bank, *World Development Report, 1997* (Washington, D.C.: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 174-75.

⁴⁰See the analysis of the impact of corruption on growth and investment in *World Development Report 1997*, pp. 102-03.

Another (even more recent) approach to the measurement of corruption moves in an entirely different direction and runs into a new set of problems. The study of Japan by Susan Pharr (noted above) uses newspaper reports of corruption as the independent variable. Pharr recognizes that changes in corruption levels revealed by this measure may reflect changes in the actual level of corruption, or they may be entirely a reflection of variation in the reporting of corruption. Although she argues that this important distinction is not relevant for her analysis, indeed it is--so much so that the conclusions of the research are largely undermined. The argument is flawed for two reasons. First, Pharr states, "A given report of misconduct is a fact, a data point, in that it records a specific occurrence in which a public official is accused of wrongdoing."⁴¹ In reality, however, the accusation may be entirely the invention of the newspaper itself, whose motivations for making the accusation may vary from a desire to increase circulation to an effort to weaken one party or candidate and strengthen another. By no means can we take the report of misconduct as a "fact" in Japan, and we should have even less confidence in newspaper reports in much of the developing world, where newspapers often range from irresponsible to largely government-controlled. Journalists are often poorly trained, standards of ethics are largely nonexistent, and fact verification is uncommon. Second, whatever the quality of the reporting of corruption in the press, if we find that trust in government declines when reports of corruption increase, all we can say is that the media influence public opinion. We cannot say that corruption itself causes any changes whatsoever in public attitudes toward the state. Thus, in countries in which the press makes a habit of inventing stories of government scandals and in which there is low confidence in the political system, our concern as social scientists should be with the quality of journalism and the corruption of journalistic standards rather than with public corruption.

An entirely different approach has been taken in the survey research field. This effort has been inspired by crime victimization surveys, which have become the mainstay of sociological investigations into crime. Criminologists have long recognized that official reports of crime are highly unreliable because of the heavy degree of political manipulation of the data. A police chief who wants new police cruisers from the local government has a major incentive to justify the request by claiming that a new crime wave has hit the town. It may be that the police chief has told his/her officers to become especially aggressive when enforcing the law, or it may be that the figures themselves have been "cooked." Alternatively, politicians seeking credit for success in crime fighting have an incentive to see reports of fewer crimes, and salary raises for the police force might be contingent upon less aggressive policing. To overcome these intractable problems, criminologists have

⁴¹Susan J. Pharr, "Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies," in *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* ed. Pharr and Putnam, p.194.

increasingly come to rely upon victimization surveys, which are widely regarded as providing a more accurate tally of crime rates.⁴²

Internationally, this approach has been spearheaded by the United Nations Center for International Crime Prevention.⁴³ Implemented in 1987, the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) now includes fifty-five countries, with samples of between 1,000 and 2,000 respondents per country. In 1996, for the first time, a single question was included in the surveys on bribe victimization. While a broader series of questions would most certainly be preferred, at least this source of data does not suffer from the biases and limitations inherent in the TI and World Bank approach. The United Nations effort does not ask about perceptions of corruption, but actual citizens' experience with public corruption. While it cannot tap into high-level corruption (bribes of ministers and legislators), it does very effectively measure citizens' exposure to (rather than perception of) day-to-day corruption. Recently, the World Bank has begun following this approach and has begun conducting studies of corruption at the level of the citizen. A review of the approach used by the World Bank has been presented as a conference paper.⁴⁴ One such study, for example, has been carried out in Nicaragua.⁴⁵

The Missing Evidence for the Corruption/Legitimacy Linkage

Typical of those who decry the negative effects of corruption is the World Bank, which in 1997 stated, "Corruption violates the public trust and corrodes social capital.... Unchecked, the creeping accumulation of seemingly minor infractions can slowly erode political legitimacy."⁴⁶ Unfortunately, although the bank presented substantial evidence that corruption negatively affects the economy, it provided no support whatsoever for the claim that minor corruption (or even major corruption) erodes political legitimacy, for while the bank presented evidence on the level of the independent variable (i.e., corruption), it

⁴²Homicide rates, however, are used as reliable indicators of one form of extreme crime.

⁴³Graeme Newman, ed., United Nations, *Global Report on Crime and Justice* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 27-28.

⁴⁴Daniel Kaufmann, 1998. "Corruption Diagnostics: A New Technocratic Framework for the Analysis of Corruption and Its Implications for the Design of Action Programs," report of the Miami Anti-Corruption Summit, April 1998, pp. 2-4.

⁴⁵See Comité Nacional de Integridad and World Bank-CIET International. 1998. *Encuesta nacional sobre integridad y corrupción en la administración pública: Encuesta de hogares* (Managua, 1998).

⁴⁶World Bank, *World Development Report, 1997* (Washington, D.C.: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 102-04.

presented no corresponding evidence on the dependent variable (i.e., political legitimacy). A 1999 World Bank study uses a multi-index measure of governance, including perceptions of corruption worldwide, and finds that per capita incomes, and adult illiteracy are lower and infant mortality higher when governance is poor.⁴⁷ Yet, once again, there is no linkage between corruption on the one hand and political legitimacy on the other.

Much of the empirical research decrying the negative impact of corruption on political legitimacy has used measures of corruption that are seriously flawed (such as the ones enumerated above). Virtually none of the prior work, moreover, has been able to make a direct link between corruption and its impact on legitimacy. The studies that use nationwide aggregates for corruption and political attitudes run into the immediate problem of the ecological fallacy. In the absence of individual-level information, researchers have no way of knowing whether high levels of national corruption (even assuming for the moment that the measurement is not seriously flawed) are responsible for national levels of citizen attitudes toward their political systems. For this reason, the studies reviewed above that use the TI measure of corruption as a predictor and national aggregates of satisfaction with the performance of democracy as the dependent variable are subject to charges of spuriousness. Indeed, the Lipset study (reviewed above) found, as already noted, that once controls were introduced for GNP, the purported relationship disappeared.

To test the hypothesis that corruption undermines political legitimacy, we need data at the level of the individual. Corruption surveys, though embryonic, appear to be the most promising of the efforts undertaken to date. Such surveys give us individual-level evidence of experience with day-to-day corruption. Unfortunately, most of those surveys thus far, while providing information on experience with corruption at the individual level, give us no information on the dependent variable (i.e., belief in legitimacy of the political system).

A way to overcome these limitations is to obtain corruption experience data at the individual level via survey research, as was done in the Bolivia surveys of 1998 and 2000, while simultaneously obtaining information from those same individuals on their belief in the legitimacy of their government. The analytical task, then, becomes searching for connections between experience of corruption on the one hand and belief in legitimacy on the other. Appropriate control variables and direction of causality questions need to be addressed, but they can be with this approach. This is the approach taken in this report.

Testing the Impact of Corruption on Legitimacy

Latin America in general, and Bolivia in particular, where extensive attention is currently focused on corruption, is a good place to test the hypothesized linkage between

⁴⁷Daniel Kaufmann, Arat Kraay, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, *Governance Matters*, Policy Research Working Paper, no. 2196 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1999).

corruption and legitimacy.⁴⁸ This is true for two reasons. First, Latin America is widely believed to suffer from high levels of corruption. It is suggestive that only one Latin American country, Chile, scores in the top 20 of the least corrupt countries, ranking 19 out of 99 in the 1999 data set.⁴⁹ Costa Rica ties with Malaysia at 32. The remaining countries in the region score 40 or worse.⁵⁰ Second, Latin America has long had problems of political stability, suffering an endless succession of coups through much of its history. Bolivia has been an extreme example of a country with unstable regimes. If, as Easton and Lipset have argued, legitimacy is a fundamental requisite for democratic stability, then it is plausible that legitimacy is questionable in many Latin American countries.⁵¹ From an empirical point of view, considerable evidence shows that levels of legitimacy remain low in many countries in the region, despite ten or more years of democratic rule.⁵²

This chapter draws upon survey data collected by the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project in Bolivia and three other Latin American countries. These countries ranked on the 1999 TI Corruption Perception Index as follows: El Salvador, 49; Nicaragua, 70; Bolivia, 80; and Paraguay, 90. Thus, they all score in the bottom half of the rankings, and the group includes countries that are perceived as being anywhere from moderately corrupt to extremely corrupt. National probability samples were drawn in each country, with interviews in Paraguay and Bolivia conducted in 1998 and those in El Salvador and Nicaragua in 1999. In Bolivia, we can also draw on the 2000 survey, but for comparative analysis we will use the Bolivia 1998 survey because it most closely matches the other data sets. Then a separate analysis will be undertaken by comparing Bolivia 1998 to Bolivia 2000.

⁴⁸Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach, eds., *Combating Corruption in Latin America* (Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000).

⁴⁹The TI index for 1999 included 139 countries, but since there are several ties in the ranking, the ranks range only from 1 to 99.

⁵⁰This information is taken from the TI website at www.transparency.org/documents/cpi/index.html.

⁵¹David Easton, "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support," *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (1975): 435-57; Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited," *American Sociological Review* 59 (1994): 1-22.

⁵²Mitchell A. Seligson, "Toward a Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America." *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11 (2000).

The combined data set (excluding Bolivia 2000) consisted of a sample of 9,747 interviews. Sample sizes for the individual countries were: El Salvador, 2,914; Nicaragua, 2,400; Bolivia, 2,970; and Paraguay, 1,463.⁵³

Variable Measurement

As noted above, corruption in this study is measured by respondents' experience with it. Respondents were asked eight questions measuring their experience with corruption over the two years prior to the survey. These included: (1) being stopped by a police officer for a trumped-up infraction of the law; (2) being asked to pay a bribe to a police officer; (3) observing a bribe being paid to a police officer; (4) observing a bribe being paid to a public official; (5) being asked to pay a bribe to a public official; (6) being asked to pay an illegal fee to expedite a transaction of the municipal government; (7) being asked to pay a bribe at work; (8) being asked to pay a bribe in the court system.⁵⁴ The responses were coded as dummy variables (in a 0-100 format) and summed to provide an overall scale of corruption experience that had a theoretical range per individual of 0-100%.⁵⁵ That is, individuals who had suffered all forms of corruption could have scored a 100 (none did), while those who had experienced no corruption would have scored 0.⁵⁶ The overall

⁵³In each country a multistage stratified and clustered PPS sample was drawn. In all but Paraguay, the country was first stratified into its major political divisions (called departments) and then substratified by municipalities. In Paraguay, the country was divided into regions and then sampled within regions.

⁵⁴The word for *bribe* in Spanish differs among the countries sampled. In Central America, the survey used the word *mordida*, while in South America the word *coima* was used. In both areas, however, the additional term *soborno* was used. In the question on the municipality, the surveys referred to "una suma además de lo exigido por la ley," while in the question on bribery at work, the question referred to "algún pago no correcto."

⁵⁵Six of the eight items involved direct personal experience with corruption, while two of them (items 3 and 4) involved respondent observation of corruption. It is possible that these observation variables could have been contaminated with perception, which in turn may be influenced by feelings about system legitimacy. For this reason, all of the analyses here were run twice, once with the full eight-item scale, and then again with a reduced six-item scale, excluding items 3 and 4. The results of the regression analyses using these alternative scales vary in only minor ways, indicating that the impact of this possible contamination effect does not change the results. Since the eight-item scale includes a broader range of corruption measures, it is the one reported on here.

⁵⁶The survey did not ask about multiple instances of the same type of corruption. It may well be that some individuals in the samples had experienced repeated instances of corruption during the year prior to the survey, and that such individuals may have had an even stronger negative reaction to their experience than those who had only one

measure for the four countries formed a reliable scale (standardized item Chronbach's Alpha = .77; mean inter-item $r = .30$), with an overall mean for the entire sample of 17%.⁵⁷ Reliability, however, does not demonstrate validity; that is, the survey may well understate the volume of corruption, measuring only the proverbial "tip of the iceberg." Yet, as is shown below, in some of the countries included here that "tip" incorporates over one-quarter of the respondents. Since there is ultimately no definitive way to validate these illegal actions, just as there is no way to validate many other sensitive questions in survey research (e.g., sexual behavior, child abuse, crime victimization), we will have to take these data as a plausible approximation of reality.

Legitimacy is measured by the scale of system support used in the prior chapter of this report, and attempts to tap into confidence in the key institutions of government.⁵⁸ The scale is based on five items, each scored on a metric of 1-7. To this basic series, a question on trust in the police was added.⁵⁹ To make the metric consistent with the range of the corruption experience measure, the items were summed into an overall scale and transformed into a 0-100 basis. The overall scale was reliable for each country as well as for the pooled data (Pooled standardized item Chronbach's Alpha = .78; mean inter-item $r = .37$).

For comparative and contextual purposes, it is illuminating to examine the mean scores on corruption. As can be seen in Figure IV.1, the countries ranged widely, with 6% of Salvadorans having experienced corruption in the year prior to the survey, compared to 25% in Bolivia and to 28% in Paraguay. How does this compare to countries that rank as much "cleaner" than these Latin American cases? In Western Europe, according to the United Nations ICVS surveys cited above, only .7% of the population had been solicited for bribes by a government official. Thus, even in El Salvador, the country with the lowest experience with corruption in the present data set, corruption is more than eight times as

experience. The survey, rich though it is in measuring corruption compared to prior work, cannot tap this dimension of frequency.

⁵⁷In Paraguay, only three of these items were asked (items 2, 4, and 7), so the scale there was based on these three, using the same 0-100 metric as in the other countries.

⁵⁸Hans-Dieter Klingmann, "Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis," in *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*, ed. Pippa Norris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Pippa Norris, "Institutional Explanations for Political Support," in *Critical Citizens*, ed. Norris, pp. 221-22.

⁵⁹The item in the original support scale, B3, did not associate well with the corruption items in some of the countries. In Bolivia, however, this item worked as expected. In order to maintain uniformity across all four countries, the police item, which is directly relevant to the corruption issue, was substituted.

common as it is in Europe.⁶⁰ A second observation to be made about the results in Figure IV.1 is that the corruption experience closely mirrors the TI Corruption Perception Index; the rank ordering of the two for this subset of four countries is identical, giving us confidence in the validity of the data set.




Figure IV.1 International Corruption Rank and Corruption Victimization

⁶⁰If the survey data for El Salvador are limited to the single question, “Did a public official as you for a bribe?” the percentage declines somewhat to 4.1, which would mean that bribery there is reported at a level 5.8 times higher than in Western Europe.

Findings

_____ The first task is to determine whether corruption has a negative or positive impact on legitimacy. When a citizen pays a bribe either to receive a public service or to avoid sanctions from an accused violation of law, two reactions could emerge, depending on how the bribery is perceived. On the one hand, the bribe could be viewed as a “user fee,” much as those who wish to use a toll road or a campground might willingly pay a fee for a service. Those who pay such fees could view the assessment and payment as an entirely legitimate transaction, implying no negative evaluation of the political system. Indeed, an individual who pays a “processing fee” in order to facilitate the granting of a driver’s license, for example, might be pleased with a system that allows the granting of such licenses even when the requisite requirements (vision test, driving skills test, etc.) have not been met. Or the individual may feel that the salaries paid to public officials are properly kept low so that overall taxes remain low, but that those who use the service ought to legitimately pay these user fees so as to supplement the salaries of public officials.

However, those asked to pay bribes may have an entirely different reaction to the experience, viewing the bribe not as an appropriate user fee but as what economists call a “DUP,” a directly unproductive profit-seeking activity, otherwise known as rent-seeking. When a municipal clerk asks for payment above and beyond the officially established fee to process a birth certificate, the payment represents a surplus value above that of the established price and hence can be considered rent-seeking behavior. Rent-seeking is possible only because those demanding the rent (in the form of a bribe) have been given license by the state to do so (officially or unofficially). We can predict, therefore, that individuals who view such fees as rent-seeking are likely to form negative views about the state.

The empirical results are presented in Table IV.1, which shows the OLS regression results, using the eight-item corruption scale as a predictor and the five-item legitimacy scale as the dependent variable. In this initial model, controls are also introduced for the standard demographic variables (gender and age) and socioeconomic variables (education and income). These controls are needed, since legitimacy views could well be a function of these factors. For example, younger people might express greater belief in the legitimacy of their political system, having recently completed the socialization experience of public schooling, including courses in civic education, while older people might have lived through many years of disappointment with politics and have a more jaded view of the political system. At the same time, younger people might be less likely to be targets of corrupt practices. Thus we need to be able to disentangle age and experience with corruption to see which, if either, has an impact on views on the legitimacy of the political system.

Gender may also play a role in determining beliefs in legitimacy if women are systematically discriminated against in the system while at the same time they are more likely to experience corruption. Education and income may be tied to views of legitimacy in more complex ways. More highly educated individuals are likely to know more about the political system than those who are less well informed, and consequently are more likely

to be in a position to be critical of it when those systems do not perform well. Education, of course, is linked to income, so we would want to examine the role of income, understanding that those with both higher income and more education might possibly be more likely to be targets of corrupt public officials because of their “deeper pockets” when compared to the poor.

Table IV.1. Predictors of Legitimacy in Latin America:
Corruption, Gender, Age, Education, and Income

Independent variables	El Salvador	Nicaragua	Paraguay	Bolivia
Constant	72.764** (2.122)	58.056** (2.909)	56.083** (2.869)	50.625** (1.905)
Corruption scale	-.367** (.034)	-.164** (.029)	-.056** (.017)	-.133** (.013)
Gender	-.968 (.837)	-3.166* (1.161)	-.619 (1.204)	-1.615* (.672)
Age	-.120** (.029)	-.125* (.043)	-.216 (.761)	-.110** (.025)
Education	-.711** (.103)	-.094 (.150)	-.758** (.179)	-.358** (.084)
Income	-.928** (.268)	-.539 (.350)	-.563 (.543)	1.212** (.305)
N	2645	1663	1262	2595
Adj. R ²	0.103	0.027	0.034	0.051
F Test	<.001	<.001	<.001	<.001

Model is OLS. Coefficients are unstandardized. Standard errors in parentheses. Gender is coded 1= male; 2 = female. ** = < .001 * = < .01

The initial findings shown in Table IV.1 suggest that the functionalist argument is wrong, at least for these four countries. In every country including Bolivia, *higher* corruption is significantly (< .001) associated with *lower* support for the legitimacy of the political system. The patterns for the control variables are very similar across these countries. In each case, males have a higher level of support than females, but the difference is significant only in Nicaragua and Bolivia. Younger respondents express a higher level of support than older ones, a difference that is significant in each country except Nicaragua.

Education is negatively associated with support in each country, significant in each country except Paraguay. Finally, income is negatively related with support in three countries (significant only in El Salvador), but the two factors have a positive and significant relationship in Bolivia. Thus on only one variable and in only one country do the signs of the control variables vary. Interestingly, those with higher incomes are more likely to be victims of corruption in Bolivia but not in the other countries.

The regression results presented thus far appear to demonstrate that those who are exposed to corruption do not view the experience as equivalent to paying a “user fee” for a toll road. Rather, those experiencing bribery have a lower level of support for the legitimacy of the system than those who do not. Presumably the direction of causality here is clear, since those from whom bribes were solicited could not be selected by public officials because of the latter’s foreknowledge of the former’s legitimacy perceptions. Or could they? What if bribe targets are selected precisely because the incumbent political party favors its friends and “taxes” its enemies? Or what if those who do not support the incumbent party are more likely to report bribery attempts in the survey than those who support the party? Either or both could be true, which might mean that low support for the legitimacy of the political system is a *cause* of bribery (or a cause of reporting bribery) rather than the other way around.

To examine whether support for the incumbent party produces a decline in reports of corruption and/or a decline in the prospects of being targeted for corruption, Table IV.2 expands the regression model, adding in a variable measuring how respondents voted in the most recent presidential election prior to the survey. In each case, the variable is coded as a dummy variable, with voters for the incumbent party assigned a score of 1. The results show two things. First, and entirely predictably, supporters of the incumbent party in each of the four countries are more supportive of the system. After all, since the time of Easton’s original work on the empirics of legitimacy, it has been known that there is a connection between attitudes toward the political system and attitudes (pro or con) toward the incumbent government. Second, even after controlling for the vote variable, not only does the corruption term remain significant, but also its coefficients are barely changed from the model shown in Table IV.1. These findings seem to show clearly that it is corruption that causes a decline in perceptions of legitimacy, rather than partisan factors being responsible for a selection bias effect. That is, once political party preferences are controlled for, corruption still has a significant and negative impact on legitimacy.

Table IV.2. Predictors of Legitimacy in Latin America:
Corruption, Gender, Age, Education, Income and Presidential Vote

Independent variables	EI Salvador	Nicaragua	Paraguay	Bolivia
Constant	71.462** (2.105)	57.489** (2.920)	54.941** (2.869)	50.543** (1.901)
Corruption scale	-.361** (.034)	-.163** (.029)	-.056** (.017)	-.137** (.013)
Gender	-.812 (.828)	-3.049* (1.161)	-.545 (1.194)	-1.589* (.671)
Age	-.138** (.028)	-.137* (.043)	-.704 (.763)	-.120** (.025)
Education	-.710** (.102)	-.081 (.150)	-.776** (.177)	-.358** (.084)
Income	-.921** (.264)	-.555 (.349)	-.768 (.541)	1.176** (.304)
Vote for incumbent party	7.719** (.978)	2.550** (1.254)	5.465** (1.203)	2.752** (.798)
N	2645	1663	1262	2594
Adj. R ²	0.123	0.029	0.049	0.055
F Test	<.001	<.001	<.001	<.001

Model is OLS. Coefficients are unstandardized. Standard errors in parentheses. Gender is coded 1= male; 2 = female. ** = < .001 * = < .01

Yet another way of testing the validity of the findings generated thus far is to consider the impact of norms. What might be the expected relationship between experience of corruption and perceptions of legitimacy among those who do not define bribes as corruption? The prediction would be that among those individuals corruption experience should not lower perceptions of legitimacy. In Nicaragua alone, survey respondents were asked their reaction to learning that a congressional deputy received a bribe from a foreign corporation: Should the deputy be considered blameworthy and punished, be considered blameworthy but not punished, or not be considered blameworthy? In the sample, most respondents chose the first alternative, but 9.1% chose one of the others. The regression equations were rerun for the Nicaragua case among those who were tolerant of corruption.

The results are shown in Table IV.3. The overall equation shrinks to insignificance, in part because the N is so much smaller than when the entire sample is used. The key coefficient, however, is that for the corruption scale, which is now only one-quarter of its magnitude for those who believe that bribery is blameworthy and ought to be punished.⁶¹ Thus these results support the view that when respondents do not see bribery as corrupt, they do not blame the political system for such acts.

⁶¹The only other parameter that changes notably is the decline in education. Respondents who believe that bribery of a deputy is not blameworthy and should not be punished have significantly less education than those who believe it is blameworthy and should be punished (5.8 years vs. 7.9 years). In neither case, however, is the parameter significant.

Table IV.3. Predictors of Legitimacy in Nicaragua and Tolerance of Public-Sector Corruption

Independent variables	Coefficients for those who are tolerant of corruption	Coefficients for those who are intolerant of corruption
Constant	62.861** (8.278)	53.047** (3.240)
Corruption scale	.039 (.093)	-.165** (.030)
Gender	-2.174 (3.462)	-3.055* (1.263)
Age	-.294 (.127)	-.102* (.048)
Education	-.679 (.546)	.038 (.161)
Income	-.304 (1.005)	-.315 (.382)
Vote for incumbent party	7.239 (3.858)	2.733* (1.361)
N	147	1403
Adj. R ²	0.02	0.025
F Test	NS	< .001

Model is OLS. Coefficients are unstandardized. Standard errors in parentheses. Gender is coded 1= male; 2 = female. **= < .001 * = < .01

Since the sample size was small for those who did not see bribery as a corrupt act, the above regression was repeated with a question on price gouging by small merchants. Answers were more evenly divided in the Nicaraguan sample. The specific question was as follows: "During the Christmas holidays, a shopkeeper increases his prices on candy. Do you think that the action is corrupt and should be punished, corrupt but justified, or not corrupt?" Whereas 67% of respondents thought that such price gouging was corrupt and deserved punishment, 17% said that it was corrupt but justifiable, and 15% said that it was not corrupt. An additional 2% gave a "don't know" reply. The regression results shown in Table IV.4 reconfirm the findings of the previous table, with larger Ns. In this case, we see that only for those respondents who found price gouging to be corrupt and deserving of

punishment was their experience with corruption a significant predictor. On the other hand, among the others in the sample, corruption experience is no longer a significant predictor.

Table IV.4. Predictors of Legitimacy in Nicaragua and Tolerance of Private-Sector Corruption

Independent variables	Coefficients for those who say price gouging is corrupt and should be punished	Coefficients for those who say that price gouging is corrupt but justifiable	Coefficients for those who say that price gouging is not corrupt
Constant	4.425** (.229)	4.352** (.396)	3.939** (.449)
Corruption scale	0.011** (.002)	-.007 (.004)	-.007 (.005)
Gender	-.213* (.088)	-.093 (.156)	.026 (.193)
Age	-.009* (.003)	-.002 (.005)	-.010 (.007)
Education	.007 (.012)	-.013 (.020)	-.018 (.023)
Income	-.038 (.027)	-.041 (.047)	.044 (.059)
Vote for incumbent party	.198* (.094)	.010 (.175)	.328 (.211)
N	1465	380	336
Adj. R ²	0.04	0.026	.023
F Test	<.001	NS	NS

Model is OLS. Coefficients are unstandardized. Standard errors in parentheses. Gender is coded 1= male; 2 = female. ** = < .001 * = < .01

Moving beyond the impact of corruption on legitimacy, we can also take a brief look at its impact on interpersonal trust, a variable that might be an important precursor to institutional trust. According to the work of Putnam and Inglehart, interpersonal trust allows individuals to form deep and lasting civic associations, which in turn are thought to be vital

to individuals' confidence in their political system.⁶² The theoretical and empirical relationship between interpersonal trust and the political system has recently received extensive attention.⁶³ It is plausible to argue that those who have experienced corruption are less likely to be trusting than those who have not. This hypothesis can be tested with the data set being analyzed here with an index formed by three standard questions measuring interpersonal trust.⁶⁴

The impact of corruption experience on interpersonal trust is shown in Table VI.5. In this analysis, since the dependent variable is trust rather than belief in the system's legitimacy, the presidential vote variable is not included, but when it is, the results do not change. Here the analysis is confined to examining the impact of corruption experience on trust, controlling for the same set of demographic and socioeconomic factors employed in Table IV.1.

The results show a clear pattern for each country except Paraguay. In the other three countries, including Bolivia, the level of trust is significantly predicted by corruption, even when the demographic and socioeconomic controls are accounted for. In Paraguay, the coefficient is in the predicted direction, but, perhaps because the sample is smaller in this country, it is too weak to be significant.

⁶²Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

⁶³Mark E. Warren, *Democracy and Trust* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁶⁴These items read:

1. Talking about the people from around here, would you say that they are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, a little trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy?
2. Do you think that most of the time people watch out for themselves, or do you think that most of the time they try to help each other out?
3. Do you think that most people would take advantage of you, given the opportunity, or do you think that they would not take advantage of you?

The items were all recoded on a 0-100 basis, with 100 equal to high trust.

Table IV.5. Predictors of Trust in Latin America:
Corruption, Gender, Age, Education, and Income

Independent variables	El Salvador	Nicaragua	Paraguay	Bolivia
Constant	42.136** (3.018)	41.224** (3.196)	57.285** (4.383)	46.481** (2.885)
Corruption scale	-.213** (.049)	-.147** (.033)	-.030 (.027)	-.131** (.020)
Gender	-1.093 (1.196)	-2.596* (1.284)	-2.917 (1.834)	-1.980 (1.023)
Age	.098* (.040)	.035 (.046)	.284 (1.161)	-.113** (.038)
Education	-.188 (.147)	-.215 (.165)	-.938** (.274)	-.556** (.127)
Income	-.046 (.387)	-.766* (.389)	-1.139 (.845)	.310 (.463)
N	2756	1836	1316	2655
Adj. R ²	0.013	0.019	0.019	0.026
F Test	<.001	<.001	<.001	<.001

Model is OLS. Coefficients are unstandardized. Standard errors in parentheses. Gender is coded 1= male; 2 = female. **= < .001 * = < .01

Bolivia 2000: Levels and Location of Corruption

We now turn to the Bolivia 2000 data set for a more detailed look at that data. The first step is to compare corruption levels in the 2000 survey with those reported in the 1998 survey. Figure IV.2 shows the comparisons on all of the variables measuring direct or observed experience with corruption. As can be seen, there was little change, except that instances of being unfairly stopped by the police and bribes requested by public employees declined. What did change a great deal was observation of bribes in the courts, which increased dramatically from 13% to 26%. This item does not measure direct personal experience with bribery in the courts, however, but "knowing someone" who had to pay a bribe in the courts. This increase is difficult to explain, since it seems unlikely that the courts could have become so much more corrupt from one survey to the next. In fact, when we look back at the two questionnaires, we see that the wording changed from 1998 to 2000. In 1998, we asked about bribery in "*la corte*," whereas in 2000 we asked the more general question about bribery in the "*estrados judiciales*." This later term refers to the court and

its support staff, while the 1998 survey's term was focused on the courts themselves. This finding highlights the importance of retaining question wording from one year to the next, because respondents are in fact listening to what they are asked and respond accordingly. If the stimulus is changed, the results will change.




Figure IV.2 Corruption in Bolivia: 1998 vs. 2000

We now turn to interdepartmental differences in the levels of corruption experienced by Bolivians in the 2000 survey. Doing so, however, requires an extensive set of analyses because we are dealing with different forms of corruption, as measured by eight different questions in the survey, as well as the overall perception of corruption question (EXC7). In the regression analysis presented earlier in this chapter, we created a single index of corruption so as to compare results across countries. Here, however, we are interested in continuing the detailed analysis shown immediately above by looking at different forms of corruption and seeing how they compare across departments. A further complication is this: we do not want to claim that there is significant variation across departments when, given the relatively small sample size for each, the differences may be insignificant. Thus we need to carefully examine the confidence intervals of each department and compare them with the others.

The first step in the analysis is to determine the percentage of respondents who have been victimized by each form of corruption in each department. An examination of statistical significance reveals that for each form of corruption, the differences are significant across departments. That is, in no case is the difference statistically insignificant. However, this does not mean that each department is significantly different from every other department. Rather, it says that at least one department is different from at least one other department. Therefore, to make this information useful, we present it in two ways. First, in Table IV.6 we give the average percentage of corruption victims for each of the eight forms of corruption, plus the perception of corruption measure. These scores are based on the weighted samples, and--it is important to stress again--for each question the interdepartmental differences are statistically significant (at the .05 level or better).

Table IV.6. Percent of Respondents Victimized by Corruption in Last Two Years: By Department

Department	EXC1R Unfair police	EXC2R Police asked	EXC4R Saw police	EXC5R Saw public employee	EXC6R Public employee	EXC11R Municipality	EXC13R Work	EXC14R Courts	EXC7R Perception of corruption
La Paz	11%	32%	56%	40%	27%	27%	12%	37%	73
Santa Cruz	6%	21%	42%	37%	21%	18%	9%	20%	67
Cochabamba	10%	25%	48%	34%	22%	21%	11%	24%	67
Oruro	14%	31%	57%	40%	32%	30%	16%	28%	68
Chuquisaca	5%	19%	37%	23%	15%	13%	11%	13%	66
Potosí	11%	21%	42%	37%	24%	29%	18%	21%	63
Pando	11%	23%	34%	28%	16%	18%	17%	20%	60
Tarija	9%	22%	42%	29%	16%	20%	14%	20%	64
El Beni	6%	23%	39%	22%	13%	13%	12%	18%	61
Average for all	9%	25%	47%	36%	23%	22%	12%	26%	68

All variables significant at $< .05$. Note that the variable names on the column headings correspond to the questionnaires, except that the variables have been recoded to yield a 0-100% score. For that reason, each variable name includes a suffix of "R" to indicate "recoded."

While the above table presents a great deal of detailed information, it is difficult to use for an overall examination of interdepartmental corruption because it does not contain the confidence interval information that would allow readers to determine whether, for example, the score of 11% for La Paz on unfair police practices is significantly different from the 10% score for Cochabamba or the 14% score for Oruro. To do that, we need to use the unweighted sample data in order to reflect the true sample size in each

department. The weighted data, for example, provide a sample size for Pando of 21 (reflecting its small population relative to the other departments), but with a weighted sample this small, the confidence intervals are extremely wide, so it is difficult to determine whether differences in the results for Pando are real or illusory.

In the following series of figures, we examine each measure of corruption for the *unweighted* sample, along with the confidence intervals for each department. This will allow readers to determine if a given department is especially high or low with respect to corruption experience. The results are presented in the same order as in Table IV.6, which is the same as in the questionnaire itself. Keep in mind that questions measuring personal experience with corruption are expected to be lower in their reported corruption levels than questions that report on observing a corrupt practice. Also note that the *unweighted* sample N for each department is given in the chart for all respondents who gave a non-missing response to the question.

Figure IV.3 shows the departmental variation for corruption that involves being accused by a police agent of an infraction of the law that the respondent says he or she did not commit. (Exact percentages for each department are given in Table IV.6, whereas relative differences are given in Figure IV.3.) The small black squares show the mean for each department, while the “I” shaped vertical lines through each square show the range of the confidence interval within which this mean resides. The actual mean could be anywhere from the highest to the lowest point on the line. For example, in the first question on corruption, three departments (Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca, and El Beni) appear to be significantly lower than the others. Yet only Chuquisaca ranks so low as put it below the lowest point in the confidence interval of La Paz, yet it is clearly ranks below Oruro. Similarly, Santa Cruz is significantly lower than Oruro, but not lower than any other department.




Figure IV.3 Police Unfairly Accuse Respondent of Violation: Confidence Intervals by Department

The next question asks whether a police agent ever asked the respondent for a bribe. Figure IV.4 shows the results. Note first of all how high these percentages are. In La Paz, nearly one-third of all respondents report having been asked for a bribe within the last two years! The figures are lower elsewhere, but nearly as high in Oruro, and in no department in Bolivia had substantially fewer than one in five respondents been victims of bribe demands by the police over the last two years. The confidence interval ranges show that La Paz and Oruro once again score at the high end, and Chuquisaca at the low end, but there is no significant difference between Chuquisaca and any of the other departments except the top two (La Paz and Oruro). Furthermore, even though La Paz has the highest level of victimization, its confidence interval overlaps with those of Cochabamba, Pando, Oruro, and El Beni.




Figure IV.4 Police Ask for Bribe: Confidence Intervals by Department

The next question received the highest percentages in the series. In this question (EXC4), we asked respondents if they had observed someone paying a bribe to the police in the last two years. Once again, observed behavior produces higher scores than direct personal experience, but in this case, the high scores correspond well to the personal experience with the police measured by the previous question. The results are shown in Figure IV.5. La Paz and Oruro once again score at the high end, with well over half the respondents reporting observing a bribe being paid to the police.




Figure IV.5 Saw Bribe Being Paid to Police: Confident Intervals by Department

The next question in the series asks whether the respondent saw someone pay a bribe to a public employee (EXC5). Nationwide, an average of more than one-third of respondents reported that they had seen this form of bribery. Figure IV.6 shows the results. For this variable, we observe more uniformity, with only Chuquisaca and El Beni falling below most of the others, while La Paz and Oruro no longer stand out.




Figure IV.6 Saw Bribe Being Paid to Public Employee: Confidence Intervals by Department

The next item (EXC6) is a direct measure of corruption experienced by the respondent. Here we asked if a public employee had solicited a bribe over the last two years. As already noted, this direct measure produces a lower level of corruption than the measures that report on observed behavior. Nonetheless, 23% of all Bolivians report having been asked for a bribe. Figure IV.7 shows the results by department. In this analysis, the departments vary very little, except for the higher level in Oruro, in which confidence intervals overlap with those of all departments except Chuquisaca, Pando, Tarija, Santa Cruz and El Beni.




Figure IV.7 Public Employee Solicited Bribe:
Confidence Intervals by Department

Corruption at the local level is of special interest to any study of democracy, since so much research has shown the importance of building democracy from below. In Bolivia this is especially true, given the importance of decentralization in that country. Yet nationwide, 22% of all respondents say that they have had to pay a bribe in their municipality over the last two years (question EXC11). Figure IV.8 shows the results by department. Here again, the variation is not great, but La Paz, Oruro, and Potosí stand out at the high end.




Figure IV.8 Bribe Solicited in Municipality: Confidence Intervals by Department

Far less common was bribery in the workplace. Nationwide, only 12% of respondents reported this form of corruption. Variation by department is shown in Figure IV.9. It is interesting to see a lower score for La Paz, when that department has scored high on many other measures of corruption. But a careful examination of the confidence intervals shows that no department lies outside the range of La Paz except Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca and El Beni.




Figure IV.9 Bribery at Work: Confidence Intervals by Department

The final question dealing with corruption experience measures knowledge of bribery in the court system (EXC14). Nationwide, 26% of respondents had such knowledge. Figure IV.10 shows the results. Here we find that more bribes are reported in La Paz, the department with the largest judicial structure.




Figure IV.10 Know Someone Who Has Paid Bribe in Courts: Confidence Intervals by Department

Predictors of Corruption in Bolivia

We now turn to the question of the factors, other than the departmental differences just discussed, that explain national variations in corruption. In the first part of this chapter, we saw how corruption affected support for the system, when controlled by socioeconomic and demographic factors. We explore here how those same factors affect experiences of corruption.

The first issue in this analysis is how to construct the dependent variable. An analysis that examines each of the seven corruption experience items separately would be appropriate only if the items themselves were not closely related. In that case, separate analysis would be required, even though the analysis would be very complex, involving separate regression analyses for each of the seven corruption questions. As it turns out, the items are in fact very closely related. A factor analysis of the seven items shows that only a single factor emerges that itself explains 39% of the variance in the set of questions. The “principal components” solution is shown in Table IV 7.

Table IV.7. Corruption Experience: Principal Components Solution

Corruption Experience	Loadings
EXC1R Unfair police	.471
EXC2R Police asked	.657
EXC4R Saw police	.711
EXC5R Saw public employee	.716
EXC6R Public employee	.721
EXC11R Municipality	.615
EXC13R Work	.424

Variance explained = 39%.

Further analysis shows that the Alpha reliability of these seven items is high (standardized item Alpha = .76.), further encouraging their use as a single measure of corruption. Therefore, an overall index was created by taking an average of the seven items (as recoded into a 0-100 format).⁶⁵ The overall scale has a mean of 24%. We now use this scale as a dependent variable in a regression analysis in order to determine which demographic and socioeconomic factors predict it. The results are shown in Table IV.8. Each of the demographic and socioeconomic variables entered into the model is statistically significant and will be shown in detail below.

⁶⁵In order to minimize missing values, and given the high association among these variables, the mean score for the valid items was substituted for the missing value in any case in which at least four of the seven items were answered with a valid response. If more than four were missing, the case was coded as missing.

Table IV.8. Predictors of Corruption Victimization in Bolivia: 2000 Survey Data (OLS regression)

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	25.593	2.924		8.752	.000
UR Urban/Rural	-2.249	.400	-.109	-5.623	.000
ED Completed years of education	.693	.125	.126	5.537	.000
Q1 Gender	-4.953	.950	-.095	-5.211	.000
Q2 Age	-.071	.035	-.038	-2.051	.040
Q10 Monthly income	2.290	.416	.120	5.500	.000

Adj. $R^2 = .09$

Demographic Predictors of Corruption

We have already seen that there is some variation in corruption by department. But since the departments vary considerably in terms of their degree of urbanization, these differences in urbanization may well be masked by the departmental variable. To examine the impact of urbanization directly, we rely upon the UR variable in the data set, which divides the sample into four strata, ranging from highly urban to very rural. As shown in the regression analysis above, urbanization is a significant predictor of corruption victimization. The coefficient shown above is negative, which means that the more urban the residence of the respondent, the more likely he/she is to be a victim of corruption. This makes sense, since government presence is higher in urban areas, and the more contact an individual has with government, the greater the opportunities to be victimized by it. Figure IV.11 shows the pattern, and it is a very clear one. Corruption occurs at a much higher rate in Bolivia's urban areas; 29% of those who live in cities with populations over 20,000 have been victims of one or more of the seven forms of corruption measured in the 2000 national survey, whereas only 18-19% of those who live in more rural areas report having been victims over the last two years.




Figure IV.11 Corruption Victimization and Urbanization

The relationship between corruption and urbanization can be seen in a more detailed fashion by examining corruption levels for each of the municipalities in which this study was conducted. Table IV.9 gives the average scale score on the seven-item corruption index. Note that these are the unweighted data, so that the actual sample sizes per municipality are given. In most cases, these samples are very small, and thus the confidence intervals are very wide. Readers should pay close attention to the confidence intervals; the actual score (had we interviewed everyone in the municipality) for a given municipality ranges somewhere within that interval. Even so, it can be seen that in the major urban centers like La Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz, the corruption levels, as reported in our victimization scale, are far higher than in most other places.

Table IV.9. Corruption by Municipality

		N	Mean of Corruption Victimization scale	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		
Department				Lower Bound	Upper Bound	
La Paz	CALACOTO	20	17.9	8.7	27.0	
	CARANAVI	20	21.0	9.5	32.4	
	EL ALTO	99	24.0	18.7	29.2	
	LA PAZ	183	35.8	32.0	39.5	
	PUERTO CARABUCO	20	21.4	9.8	33.0	
	QUIME	20	40.7	24.6	56.8	
	TIPUANI	20	17.1	7.3	27.0	
	VIACHA	20	23.6	12.2	34.9	
	Total	402	29.2	26.6	31.8	
Santa Cruz	ABAPO	20	11.7	3.3	20.1	
	ASCENSION DE GUARAYOS	20	10.7	2.3	19.1	
	CAMIRI	20	17.1	6.4	27.9	
	MONTERO	41	16.0	9.0	23.0	
	PALOMETAS	20	4.3	-1.9	10.5	
	PUERTO SUAREZ	20	14.3	5.3	23.2	
	ROBORE	20	15.0	2.8	27.2	
	SAN IGNACIO	20	15.0	6.5	23.5	
	SAN JULIAN	20	11.4	3.7	19.1	
	SANTA CRUZ	199	31.1	27.5	34.7	
	Total	400	22.1	19.7	24.5	
Cochabamba	AIQUILE	20	16.5	7.3	25.8	
	ARBIETO	20	16.1	4.7	27.4	
	ARQUE	17	13.4	0.3	26.6	
	BOLIVAR	20	17.9	8.2	27.5	
	CAPINOTA	20	15.0	2.6	27.4	
	CHIMORE	20	16.3	3.2	29.4	
	COCHABAMBA	145	35.3	30.6	40.0	
	MOROCHATA	20	15.4	7.1	23.6	
	QUILLACOLLO	38	37.6	27.5	47.7	
	QUIROGA	20	12.1	0.8	23.5	
	SIPE SIPE	20	15.0	6.2	23.8	
	VACAS	20	9.3	0.8	17.8	
	VILLA TUNARI	20	18.6	8.4	28.8	
	Total	400	24.5	21.8	27.2	
	Oruro	BELEN DE ANDAMARCA	20	21.4	10.5	32.4
		CHIPAYA	20	13.6	3.5	23.6
		HUANUNI	30	31.0	18.8	43.1
ORURO		188	35.2	31.4	39.0	
SALINAS DE GARCIA MENDOZA		20	26.5	14.2	38.8	
TOLEDO		20	27.1	13.8	40.5	
Total		298	31.3	28.2	34.4	
Chuquisaca	ALCALA	20	5.0	-0.9	10.9	
	AZURDUY	20	11.4	3.7	19.1	
	LAS CARRERAS	20	22.9	9.1	36.6	
	MACHARETI	20	9.3	2.3	16.2	
	MENDOZA	20	10.7	3.9	17.5	
	MONTEAGUDO	20	10.0	2.8	17.2	
	POROMA	20	26.4	13.4	39.5	
	PRESTO	20	8.6	1.9	15.2	
	SAN LUCAS	20	28.6	13.7	43.4	
	SUCRE	100	23.6	19.0	28.2	
	ZUDAÑEZ	20	15.0	6.7	23.3	
	Total	300	17.7	15.2	20.3	
Potosí	ATOCHA	20	22.1	10.2	34.1	
	LLICA	20	21.4	11.1	31.7	
	OTAVI	20	22.1	11.2	33.1	
	PORCO	20	31.4	16.3	46.6	
	POTOSI	60	30.5	23.6	37.4	
	SAN AGUSTIN	20	19.3	7.4	31.2	
	SAN PABLO DE LIPEZ	20	25.7	13.1	38.3	

		N	Mean of Corruption Victimization scale	95% Confidence Interval for Mean	
	THOLAPAMPA	20	17.9	6.6	29.1
	TINQUIPAYA	20	30.0	17.9	42.1
	TUPIZA	20	12.9	3.9	21.8
	UYUNI	20	37.9	24.8	50.9
	VILLAZON	20	29.8	13.8	45.7
	YURA	20	25.0	12.0	38.0
	Total	300	25.8	22.8	28.8
Pando	BELLA VISTA	20	23.5	10.3	36.7
	COBIJA	101	18.0	14.0	22.0
	CONQUISTA	20	35.5	18.1	52.8
	FILADELFIA	18	32.8	17.9	47.7
	GONZALO MORENO	20	5.0	-0.4	10.4
	NACEBE	20	12.0	4.3	19.7
	PORVENIR	19	27.3	14.2	40.4
	PUERTO RICO	20	31.4	18.2	44.5
	SAN IGNACIO	20	19.5	9.7	29.2
	SANTA ROSA	20	23.0	12.5	33.5
	SENA	19	20.6	7.7	33.4
	Total	297	21.3	18.4	24.1
Tarija	BERMEJO	20	29.3	14.0	44.5
	PADCAYA	20	18.1	8.6	27.6
	PALMAR GRANDE	20	15.7	7.3	24.1
	PALOS BLANCOS	20	16.4	6.9	26.0
	SACHAPERAS	20	12.1	2.9	21.4
	SELLA	20	17.9	6.6	29.1
	TAIGUATI	20	12.4	4.3	20.4
	TARIJA	98	28.3	23.1	33.5
	VILLA MONTES	20	13.6	5.3	21.8
	YACUIBA	40	22.9	14.3	31.4
	Total	298	21.5	18.7	24.3
El Beni	GUAYARAMERIN	40	18.6	11.0	26.2
	LORETO	20	20.7	10.2	31.2
	MAGDALENA	20	12.9	3.4	22.3
	RIBERALTA	60	16.9	11.6	22.2
	RURRENABAQUE	20	27.9	19.3	36.4
	SAN BORJA	20	19.3	10.3	28.3
	SAN IGNACIO	20	12.1	2.6	21.7
	SANTA ANA DE YACUMA	20	12.1	4.5	19.7
	SANTA ROSA	20	23.6	14.0	33.1
	TRINIDAD	60	18.8	12.6	25.1
	Total	300	18.2	15.8	20.6

As noted in the multiple regression analysis, gender also plays a role in corruption victimization. Figure IV.12 shows that males are far more likely than females to be victims of corruption in Bolivia.




Figure IV.12 Corruption Victimization by Gender

Age is also a factor affecting victims of corruption. The multiple regression analysis shows a negative coefficient, which means that as age increases, corruption victimization declines. The relationship is not linear, however, as is shown in Figure IV.13. It is clear that corruption victimization declines only among those who are 56 years of age or older--individuals who have fewer dealings with the state as they move into retirement.




Figure IV.13 Corruption Victimization and Age

Education is also related to corruption victimization, but the coefficient is positive, meaning that higher levels of education are associated with more victimization. Figure IV.14 shows the pattern. More highly educated Bolivians probably have more frequent contact with the bureaucracy, and therefore are more likely to be exposed to corrupt practices.




Figure IV.14 Corruption Victimization and Education

Finally, income is related to corruption. Figure IV.15 shows the results, which clearly show that those who seek bribes do so from those who have the “deepest pockets.” That is, among those with little or no income, only about 5% of the population have been victims of corruption, but among those with the highest levels of income, about half have been victimized.




Figure IV.15 Corruption Victimization and Income

Corruption and Belief in Democracy

This study has already examined in detail the survey question on the belief in democracy. In that item (AOJ140), it will be recalled, respondents were asked whether they preferred democracy over any other form of government, whether under certain circumstances an authoritarian regime is to be preferred, or whether both regimes are about the same. We now examine whether being a victim of corruption influences these preferences. Figure IV.16 shows the results, which are statistically significant. As can be seen, the lowest levels of victimization correspond to those who prefer democracy, while the highest levels of victimization correspond to those who prefer authoritarianism. Since those who ask for bribes could not have any idea as to the type of regime preferred by their victims, it is clear that being a victim of corruption is responsible for a significantly decreased preference for democratic rule. When this information is coupled with the earlier cross-national analysis of the impact of corruption on reduced system support, one can fully appreciate the pernicious impact of corruption on the stability of democracy in Bolivia.




Figure IV.16 Corruption Victimization and Preference for Regime Type

We can observe the same pattern in two other questions asked about democracy. In one (AOJ15), we asked whether the respondent would prefer a “*mano dura*” government (that is, a mailed fist, or law-and-order government) or a government in which problems are resolved with the participation of all. As can be seen in Figure IV.17, those who have a higher victimization score are those more likely to prefer a *mano dura* government.




Figure IV.17 Corruption Victimization and Preference for Participation

Finally, we can look the impact of corruption on satisfaction with democracy. The satisfaction question is AOJ16. As can be seen in Figure IV.18, those who have a higher victimization score are significantly more likely to have a low satisfaction with democracy score.




Figure IV.18 Corruption Victimization and Satisfaction with Democracy

Conclusions

Democracies are experiencing an unprecedented boom, but one wonders, in light of prior democratic waves that did not last, where the threats to the current trend may lie. Specifically, one wonders about the long-term viability of political institutions in these countries. The research in this chapter suggests that one of those threats is corruption. Nobody can say for sure whether corruption is more prevalent today than it was under the dictators, but we do know that it is far more visible because of the press freedoms that have come along with the democratic tidal wave.

In a recent study, Weyland argues forcefully that corruption has increased a great deal under democracy in Latin America, and he points to several factors that are responsible for the increase.⁶⁶ First, he argues that the dispersion of power in the hands of many that has occurred as dictatorships are replaced by democracies has widened the opportunity for bribery. In effect, there are many more “veto players” today than under the military, and therefore there has been an increase in the number of palms that need to be

⁶⁶Kurt Weyland, "The Politics of Corruption in Latin America," *Journal of Democracy* (1998):108-21.

greased. Second, neoliberal reforms have involved opening many areas of the economy to bribery, especially those involving sales of public corporations. Third, the increasing number of neopopulist leaders, who win elections based on personalist appeals via television, are driving aspiring politicians to corruption to collect the funds needed to pay for TV time.

If Weyland is right and corruption is on the increase, the findings of this chapter suggest that there is reason to fear for the stability of democracy in the region. Corruption has been shown to erode the legitimacy of political systems. It follows that if corruption is increasing, such erosion should also be on the rise. This chapter also shows that corruption lowers interpersonal trust, presumably negatively affecting relations within civil society. On the positive side, there is some recent evidence that democratic countries become less corrupt over the very long run, but this result may require half a century to take effect, more years than many fragile democracies have to spare.⁶⁷ It would be the ultimate irony that rising democracy itself may be the cause of its own demise in the developing world. This is all the more reason to be concerned about the problem of corruption and to find ways of reducing its prevalence in Bolivia.

⁶⁷Daniel Treisman, "The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study," *Journal of Public Economics* (June 2000): 399-458.

Chapter V. Ethnicity and Democracy

Throughout the world, ethnic conflicts have placed major stumbling blocks in the path of democratic consolidation. Throughout Africa, the internecine warfare among different tribal groupings has been so intense that genocide has been the outcome in Rwanda. In the former Yugoslavia, centuries-old conflicts between ethnic groups have resulted in violent clashes in recent years. But in Latin America, ethnic conflicts have been muted in recent decades. The main conflict, of course, is between populations that identify themselves as indigenous versus other groups. But Afro-Latin versus Hispanic-Latin conflicts exist as well.

Three countries stand out as having the largest populations identified as indigenous: Guatemala, Ecuador, and Bolivia, even though there are indigenous populations in virtually all of mainland Latin America. In Guatemala, the distinction between what are locally known as *Ladinos* and *indígenas* is clear-cut for many people. Elsewhere in Latin America, the distinctions are more fine-grained, involving numerous subtle gradations of imposed classification and self-classification.

The key question for the purposes of this study is the impact, if any, of these ethnic distinctions for Bolivian democracy. Some have characterized the widespread protest marches and civil disobedience in Bolivia in 2000 as having an ethnic component. For example, Clifford Krauss (*New York Times*, Oct. 2, 2000, p. A5), characterizes these social actions as having a distinct ethnic element. Krauss quotes Felipe Quispe, alleged to be a central indigenous figure in these events, as saying “the whites should leave the country.”

How central are ethnic distinctions in Bolivia, and how do those distinctions relate to support for or opposition to democracy? For the 1998 survey in Bolivia, we made a considerable effort to find the appropriate terminology for classifying respondents by ethnicity. Four measures were used, none of them perfect, since ethnicity itself is a slippery concept, defined differently by different researchers. Our main definition came from self-identification. The survey asked (ETID) whether respondents considered themselves to be white, *cholo*, *mestizo*, Indian, or black. It also asked about the languages spoken at home during childhood (LENG1) and the language of the interview itself (LCUEST), namely, Spanish, Quechua, or Aymar . Finally, the interviewer made a judgment about the dress of the respondent as being native (*traje*) or modern/Western. It is important to emphasize that these are merely approximations of a very difficult to specify concept, and we do not claim to provide a definitive definition of the ethnicity of each respondent.

An Estimate of Ethnic Classification in Bolivia

We first examine the distribution of the Bolivian population as revealed by the three different ethnicity variables discussed above (ETID, LENG1, and LCUEST). Of those, however, one will not help very much, since Bolivians who speak more than one language are overwhelmingly bilingual. In the 2000 survey only thirty-four respondents were interviewed in Quechua and two in Aymar . Figure V.1 shows the breakdown of the 2000

sample by ethnic self-identification (ETID). The original Spanish terminology is used to avoid any confusion in terms. Over half of Bolivians consider themselves to be *mestizo*, or mixed. The next largest group, one-quarter of the population, considers itself to be *blanco* or white. The indigenous population is only 8.5% of the total, with the *cholo* population adding another 3%. Blacks make up only about 1% of the population, with an additional 3.9% not able or willing to define themselves. This breakdown is starkly different from that of Guatemala, where about two-fifths of the population identify themselves as Indian. But in that country, the term *mestizo* is not used to define ethnicity. There, the population is dichotomized into Ladino and *indígena*. No doubt, if pressed to do so, many so-called Ladinos in Guatemala could be subdivided into other categories. In any event, in Bolivia, the largest group view themselves as a mixed population, with a minority calling itself white and an even smaller minority Indian or *cholo*.




Figure V.1 Ethnic Self-Identification

We next turn to language as a variable that might help us to divide Bolivians by ethnicity. As already noted, most Bolivians who speak a language other than Spanish also speak Spanish. Our question in the survey, therefore, was directed at the language used in the household in which the respondent was raised. Figure V.2 shows that about three-fifths of the sample were monolingual Spanish speakers when growing up, while about two-fifths were bilingual or multilingual. The most frequent combination was Spanish and Quechua, followed by Spanish and Aymará. A very large number of additional combinations emerged, and are grouped in the *other* category. The most frequent grouping in the *other*

category was among those who spoke Spanish, Quechua, and Aymar a. Only 3.6% were monolingual Quechua speakers, and another 1.5% (not shown) were monolingual Aymar a speakers.




Figure V.2 Language Spoken by Respondent When Being Raised

Finally, we examine dress as a means of classifying respondents. The question VEST asks if the respondent was wearing traditional/Indian dress or modern/Western dress. The problem with this item is that it is a code assigned by the interviewer, therefore subject to subjective interpretation. In Bolivia, patterns of dress vary, and some forms of clothing worn by the population take on both modern and traditional characteristics. Nonetheless, since dress has frequently been used in ethnic surveys in Latin America, we include it here. Figure V.3 shows the results. By this definition, fewer than one in ten respondents would be defined as Indian.




Figure V.3 Ethnicity Defined by Dress

How can we summarize these diverse definitions of ethnicity, and how do they overlap? Figure V.4 quickly reveals one of the hidden patterns in the above global picture of ethnicity. There is it shown that only the *cholo* self-classification is largely associated with indigenous dress patterns, whereas only one-fifth of those who call themselves Indian dress in that fashion. Surprisingly, among the black population, over one-third are seen as dressing in an indigenous manner. The conclusion from this analysis is that judging by form of dress is not a good way of estimating ethnicity, as it does not correspond to how our respondents classify themselves.




Figure V.4 Ethnicity: Self Defined and by Dress

A clearer picture emerges by cross-tabulating maternal language and ethnic self-identification, as is done in Figure V.5. This figure is organized by the percentage of monolingual Spanish speakers. There we see that 80% of those who say that they are white are monolingual Spanish speakers. On the other hand, 16% of the whites grew up in a household in which an indigenous language was spoken. This suggests, perhaps, households that are multiethnic, with the respondent choosing to identify with *white* rather than something else. Among those who classify themselves as *mestizo*, three-fifths are monolingual Spanish speakers, and almost one-third speak some Indian language. The situation is reversed among those who identify themselves as Indian and *cholo*. There, only about one-quarter or less spoke only Spanish at home. Yet it is surprising to find a group of people who call themselves Indian yet did not grow up speaking any Indian language. This finding suggests a complexity in self-identification that the survey has not fully probed, and perhaps researchers should do so in future surveys. The black population is a puzzle. This group makes up only about 1% of the sample, but as can be seen, only a minority grew up speaking Spanish, while the majority spoke an Indian language.




Figure V.5 Maternal Languages and Ethnic Self-Identification

Thus there are strong associations between language and ethnicity, but language does not fully define what Bolivians see as their ethnic status. Far too many Bolivians who identify themselves as Indians or *cholos* did not grow up speaking an Indian language, whereas far too many Bolivians who identify themselves as white did grow up speaking one of those languages. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the most appropriate way to reflect ethnic differences is to use ethnic self-identification.

Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Ethnic Groups

In what ways, if any, do the self-defined ethnic groups in Bolivia differ from each other? We first examine gender and ethnic self-identification. Figure V.6 shows the results. There is a minor difference in those who identify in each category. For example, whereas 63% of men define themselves as mestizos, 57% of women do so. In contrast, 30% of women define themselves as “white” compared to 24% of men. Similarly, only 7% of women classify themselves as Indian, versus 11 percent of men. The “chola” category, seems largely reserved for women.




Figure V.6 Ethnic Self-Identification by Gender

There is some variation in age, as is shown in Figure V.7. Each group in the sample exceeds the national average age of 37 except the *mestizos*, but the only large gap is between the older age of the *cholo* population versus the *mestizo* population.




Figure V.7 Average Age of Ethnic Groups

Income differences, however, are much sharper. Figure V.8 shows the patterns. Recall that income is scaled on a 1-7 basis. The national average is a scale score of 3, which means a family income of between 501 and 1000 Bs. per month. As shown in the figure, whites have the highest income, followed by *mestizos*, Indians, *cholos*, and blacks. Incomes of whites and *mestizos* do not vary much from each other, but there is a sharp falling-off for the other groups.




Figure V.8 Monthly Average Family Income of Ethnic Groups

Educational differences are also sharp among the various self-defined ethnic groups. Figure V.9 shows the results. The white and *mestizo* populations are virtually identical in terms of education, but both are far above the other groups, showing a pattern even sharper than what we saw for income.




Figure V.9 Ethnic Self-Identification and Education

One factor influencing all of the above comparisons is urbanization. We know that urban Bolivians are generally earn higher incomes and have higher levels of education than rural Bolivians. Figure V.10 shows that there are wide differences in place of residence associated with each ethnic group. As can be seen, as we move from urban to rural Bolivia (the UR variable increases, indicating greater rurality), there is a clear pattern. White Bolivians are most likely to live in urban areas, as are *mestizos* to a nearly similar degree. But *cholos*, Indians, and especially blacks are more likely to have a rural residence. For example, the mean score of 3.0 indicates living in a community of 500-2,000 people.




Figure V.10 Ethnicity and Urbanization

We conclude from this analysis that whereas the ethnic groups are not demographically distinct from each other except for place of residence (i.e., degree of urbanization), whites and *mestizos* have far higher socioeconomic status than Indians, blacks, and *cholos*. We now turn to the question of the impact of these ethnic differences on democratic values and behavior.

Ethnicity and System Support

A central variable in the analysis of democracy in Bolivia has been support for the system. Are there differences in levels of system support associated with ethnicity? Keep in mind that the ethnic groups vary socioeconomically, and therefore we must eventually control for this variation to see whether ethnicity makes a difference, once socioeconomic variation is controlled for. But first, we examine ethnicity and system support alone. Figure V.11 shows the results. Two key observations are appropriate. First, the high level of system support among the black population is unexpected but may be a function of the very small sample size. Notice the very wide confidence interval, which overlaps with that of the white and *mestizo* populations. Second, the Indian and *cholo* populations have significantly lower levels of system support than any other group.




Figure V.11 System Support and Ethnicity: Confidence Intervals

We can use the findings above to help develop a regression model by which to examine the impact of ethnicity on system support, controlling for income and education. To do this, the ethnicity variable (ETHID) must be converted into a series of “dummy variables.” That is because the ethnic variable is a series of nominal categories, with no inherent order. Thus, if it is used as a predictor in a multiple regression analysis, the results would be meaningless. The dummy variable approach requires the selection of a baseline category against which to compare the other groups. Since the largest group is the *mestizo* group, it makes sense to make this the baseline and to see if other ethnic definitions produce significant coefficients even when socioeconomic and demographic factors are controlled for.

The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table V.1. We learn several important things from this regression analysis. First, white Bolivians do not have a significantly different level of support for the system, even when demographic and socioeconomic factors are controlled for. Thus, the conclusion in the above figure, showing that whites have higher, but not significantly higher support for the system than *mestizos*, remains unchanged. Second, *cholos* and Indians do have significantly lower system support than *mestizos*, even when all the controls are applied. Blacks, on the other hand, also show a significantly different level of support from *mestizos*, but support among blacks is *higher* than that among *mestizos*.

Table V.1. Predictors of System Support: Demographic, and Socioeconomic Factors of Ethnic Groups

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
(Constant)	39.601	1.422		27.850		.000
BLANCO	1.607	.832	.038	1.932		.053
INDIGENA	-5.418	1.329	-.080	-4.076		.000
CHOLO	-6.897	2.178	-.061	-3.166		.002
NEGRO	7.475	3.091	.046	2.419		.016
UR Urban/Rural	1.616	.300	.110	5.380		.000
ED Completed years of education	-.144	.092	-.036	-1.563		.118
Q10 Monthly income	.831	.311	.061	2.668		.008

$$R^2 = .03$$

We can show graphically the impact of ethnicity on system support after controlling for urbanization, education, and income, by conducting an analysis of variance, with covariate controls. Figure V.12 shows this result. As can be seen, blacks have a higher level of support than do *mestizos*, but again keep in mind that the black sample size is very small and the differences are not significant. On the other hand, *cholos* are significantly different from the other ethnic groups.

We can conclude this examination of system support and ethnicity by stating that reports in the *New York Times* and elsewhere that emphasize an ethnic basis for conflict may well be on the right track. Indians and *cholos* in Bolivia are not as supportive of the system as are other groups, while *mestizos* and whites hardly differ from each other. These




Figure V.12 Estimated Marginal Means of System Support:
Ethnicity Controlled by Urbanization, Income and Education

differences are real, not a function of the lower levels of education or income among Indians and *cholos*.

Ethnicity and Support for Democracy

Does lower support for the system mean that Indians and *cholos* do not favor democracy? The answer is clearly no, as shown in Figure V.13. There we followed the same procedure used above and controlled the results by removing the effect of urbanization, education, and income. The question analyzed here is the one examined extensively earlier in this study (AOJ14), namely, the preference for democracy over dictatorship or over not caring which system is in place. For this analysis we compared a preference for democracy versus the other preferences as a group. The analysis of variance (with covariate controls) shows that there is no significant difference among the ethnic groups (and for that reason,

we use the full scale of 0-100, since there is no difference among the groups on which to focus).




Figure V.13 Estimated Marginal Means of Preference for Democracy Controlled by Urbanization, Education and Income

An analysis was also run on political tolerance, and, as in the case of a preference for democracy, ethnicity was not a significant predictor. These findings suggest that while there is a greater level of alienation from the political system (as shown by the lower system support) among Indians and *cholos*, their desire for democracy is as strong as that of any other ethnic group.

Possible Explanations

We have seen that ethnicity matters in defining system support. What factors might explain lower support among Indians and *cholos*? This is obviously a very complex issue that goes beyond the survey data itself, since it deals with many issues, including long-term

historical ones. Yet we do have some clues in the data set. When we look at corruption victimization, we find the pattern shown in Figure V.14. Indians are more likely to have been victims of corruption than are whites. Yet, corruption victimization among *cholos* is virtually the same as for whites. This suggests that other factors are at work.




Figure V.14 Estimated Marginal Means of Corruption Controlled for Urbanization, Education and Income

Conclusions

Bolivia is a country of considerable ethnic diversity. This diversity has parallels in socio-economic status, with Indians and *cholos* having lower levels of income and education. We also found that these two groups were lower on system support, and Indians are more likely to have been victims of corruption when compared to the whites. These findings have implications for the interpretation of Bolivia's recent political unrest.

Chapter VI. Opposition to Anti-Democratic Measures

This study has already examined support for democracy and support for the political system. It is now time to turn to the flip side of democracy and examine opposition and support for anti-democratic measures. We have already touched on some of the variables to be analyzed here in examining support for democracy, but they were examined in the context of their connection to a preference for democracy over authoritarian rule. In this chapter, we concentrate on support for anti-democratic measures themselves. We first look at support for coups, and then for various forms of civil disobedience.

Support for Coups

Although on occasion democracies have elected dictators, as happened in Germany in the 1930s, by any measure the most frequent scenario for the breakdown of democracies has been the coup d'état. In Latin America, after the restoration of democracy, repeated military coups have been attempted in Argentina, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Venezuela. Even as the twentieth century was being left behind in January 2000, Ecuadorians awoke to a military coup that deposed its constitutionally elected president. Shortly thereafter, there was another attempt, this one in Paraguay. As the *New York Times* put it: "In presidential palaces and defense ministries all across Latin America this week, the same question was being nervously asked in the wake of the military coup here [Ecuador] that toppled President

Jamil Mahuad: can it happen again somewhere else?"⁶⁸ In Africa, coups remain endemic. Even though democracy has spread throughout much of the world and the days of protracted military rule in Latin America seem to be behind us, coups are still very much with us.

Not surprisingly, most studies of military seizures connect coups with low levels of support for the system. The conventional wisdom is that popular dissatisfaction with the political system increases the likelihood of military coups.⁶⁹ The rationale behind this conventional wisdom is twofold. First, a high level of citizen discontent can create an atmosphere in which violent protests become commonplace, giving the military an immediate justification for intervention. Also, low levels of system support can give the military confidence that its intervention would be welcomed by the public, by business elites, and even by external actors, especially the United States. Fitch has shown that in Latin America civilian discontent with the government usually provides the legitimizing argument for coup plotters.⁷⁰

In Bolivia, the year 2000 has brought about levels of violent protest that are unprecedented since the return of democracy. Despite these protests, which have caused considerable damage to property, numerous personal injuries, and even several deaths, there are no outward signs of military unrest. This does not mean, however, that some citizens might not be thinking along those lines and thus possibly creating a permissive atmosphere for such an event. The study of the 1998 survey examined some of the survey questions on coup support. Here we will compare the 1998 responses with those of 2000 and also take a look at some new coup-related items added to the 2000 questionnaire.

Both this study and the one carried out in 1998 show that support for the system is low in Bolivia, in absolute and relative terms. Survival of democracies over the long term has long been linked to their legitimacy. The prevailing scholarly view is that satisfaction with the performance of the political system and its institutions creates, over time, a reservoir of good will—a high level of diffuse support—that enables democratic regimes to survive when times

⁶⁸*The New York Times*, Jan. 30, 2000, p. 3.

⁶⁹S. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 2d ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988); J. S. Fitch, *The Military Coup d'Etat as a Political Process. Ecuador, 1948-1966* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977); Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); E. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics. Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977).

⁷⁰Fitch, *The Military Coup d'Etat*, p.116.

are bad.⁷¹ Studies have shown that in long-standing democratic systems, system support can be deep enough to allow these systems to weather even severe crises.⁷² But in Bolivia this level of support is not present.

The 1998 survey asked four questions on support for coups (JC1, JC4, JC9, and JC10). These questions asked whether respondents believed that a coup would be justifiable under the following conditions: (1) high unemployment, (2) many university student strikes, (3) many unionized worker strikes, and (4) the reduction of workers' salaries by employers. In 2000, a fifth item was added (JC11): justification for a coup under conditions of high crime. This item was added because it proved to be very important in a USAID-sponsored study of El Salvador in 1999. Our purpose here is to compare the results from 1998 to those from 2000 and also to examine the new item.

Figure VI.1 compares the levels of support for coups in 1998 with data from the 2000 survey. Three findings stand out. First, nearly one-third of Bolivians would justify a coup under various circumstances. Second, the level of support has not changed since 1998 in any significant way, except for a just barely significant increase if workers' salaries were reduced. Third, high crime is more likely to justify a coup than other forms of social and economic stress.

⁷¹David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley, 1965); David Easton, "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support," *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (1975): 435-57; R. Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," *American Political Science Review* 82 (1988): 1203-30; Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53 (1959): 69-105; P. Norris, "Introduction: The Growth of Critical Citizens," in *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*, ed. Norris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 1-27.

⁷²S. Finkel, Edward Muller, and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Economic Crisis, Incumbent Performance and Regime Support: A Comparison of Longitudinal Data from West Germany and Costa Rica," *British Journal of Political Science* 19 (1989): 329-51; Mitchell A. Seligson and Edward N. Muller, "Democratic Stability and Economic Crisis: Costa Rica 1978-1983," *International Studies Quarterly* 31(1987): 301-26.




Figure VI.1 Justifications for a Coup: 1998 vs. 2000

Interpreting these results leads to two conclusions. First, in spite of the protests and demonstrations prior to the 2000 survey, Bolivians are not more likely to support a coup than they were in 1998. Second, it remains a matter of concern that a substantial proportion of the population would support a coup. The question now is to see whether this support is linked to ethnicity, a topic that was touched upon in the analysis of the 1998 data. In that analysis it was shown that the four items form a reliable scale. They do so with the 2000 data as well, with an even higher reliability (standardized item Alpha = .87). The new item for 2000 is not included in this scale, as it would make direct comparisons impossible between the two samples.⁷³ Figure VI.2 shows the results. The one major change is an increase in support for coups among those who self-identify as Indian.

⁷³The scale was created by summing up the four items and taking an average. If more than two of the questions were not answered, the respondent received a missing value code. If two or more were answered, the score was based on those items.




Figure VI.2 Support for a Coup and Ethnicity, 1998 vs. 2000

This finding might be deceiving, since it is possible that the overall index of justification for a coup might be hiding some important variation. Figure VI.3 addresses this question by examining the indigenous population alone and by looking at each of the coup questions individually. As can be seen, on each question support for a coup increased among the indigenous population between 1998 and 2000.




Figure VI.3 Support for a Coup and Ethnicity, 1998 vs. 2000:
Indian Respondents

We also asked another question on coups in both 1998 and 2000 to try to probe respondents' feelings about a coup. This question was not analyzed in the 1998 study and is examined here for the first time. We asked (BC15) whether respondents thought that conditions could arise that would justify a coup. This, of course, is a more speculative question, since unlike the preceding questions it does not point to specific issues. But it does allow us to tap into other, unknown motivations for supporting a coup. The comparison between 1998 and 2000 is shown in Figure VI.4. As can be seen, support for a coup increased significantly, reaching nearly two-fifths of the population by 2000.




Figure VI.4 Could Conditions Arise Justifying a Coup?
1998 vs. 2000

We can now link these findings to the question of ethnicity. Figure VI.5 shows the results. Two comments are in order. First, all ethnic groups exhibited an increase between 1998 and 2000 in those who could see conditions arising that might justify a coup. Second, the changes are relatively small among whites and *mestizos*, but very sharp among *cholos* and Indians. The enormous increase among blacks is also clear, but the sample size is very small.




Figure VI.5 Could Conditions Arise Justifying a Coup?
Ethnicity and Year: 1998 vs. 2000

To determine if these differences by ethnic group are significant, we need to turn once again to a confidence interval plot. Figure VI.6 shows the result. As can be seen, the long “I” bars for the 1998 vs. 2000 samples for whites and *cholos* overlap. The increase for *mestizos*, however, while small in absolute terms, is statistically significant. Furthermore, the increase among Indians is large in absolute terms and clearly significant. The same can be said about blacks.




Figure VI.6 Could Conditions Arise Justifying a Coup? Confidence Intervals by Ethnic Group and Year

In a previous chapter when we looked at support for democracy, we examined the results for question BC17, which asked Bolivians whether the violent demonstrations of April 2000 justified a coup. For the sample as a whole, 32% of the respondents felt a coup was justified. Examining this finding by ethnicity produces the results in Figure VI.7. As can be seen, there is a clear ethnic divide on this question here too, with once again Indians and blacks exhibiting a greater proclivity to support a coup.




Figure VI.7 Did April 2000 Protests Justify a Coup?
By Ethnic Group

Support for Civil Disobedience

The 1998 survey showed that there is considerable support for acts of civil disobedience in Bolivia. In fact, the level of support for such actions exceeded that reported in the other countries in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project data base. The violent demonstrations of spring 2000 and again more recently graphically illustrate the validity of the public opinion data. By the year 2000, support for civil disobedience in the form of blocking streets rose to an even higher level, as shown in Figure VI.8. There we see that support at the national level increased from 3.99 to 4.53 on a 10-point scale, a difference that is significant at <.001. The increase among the *mestizo* population was large enough to place them in the same league as the Indian population, and the *cholo* population also increased its support, now matching that of the *mestizos*.




Figure VI.8 Approval of Blocking Streets
Confidence Intervals by Ethnicity, 1998 vs. 2000

Other forms of civil disobedience did not increase, however, between 1998 and 2000. Figure VI.9 shows the results. As can be seen, between 1998 and 2000 approval increased only for blocking streets. This, of course, is the classic form of protest, one widely used in Bolivian demonstrations. More direct action, such as invading property, taking over buildings such as factories or offices, and participating in a group trying to overthrow an elected government by violent means, received far less support, and support for these measures declined from 1998 to 2000.




Figure VI.9 Approval of Civil Disobedience, 1998 vs. 2000

We can examine in further detail the one civil disobedience variable that increased significantly from 1998 to 2000, namely, approval of blocking streets. Figure VI.10 shows how these increases are distributed by department. To properly represent the departments, it is necessary to use the unweighted sample, as the figure shows. Three departments, Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, and Potosí, experienced the only significant increases. This means that while most departments saw an increase in support for this form of civil disobedience (Tarija and El Beni saw an insignificant decline), only these three saw significant increases. The protest events in Cochabamba and Santa Cruz prior to the survey may help to explain these increases.




Figure VI.10 Approval of Blocking Streets, 1998 vs. 2000
Confidence Intervals by Department

Conclusions

Most Bolivians oppose coups and civil disobedience. The survey found that support for coups was no higher in 2000 than it was in 1998, but there was an increase, especially among Indians, for believing that conditions could arise that would justify a coup. Support for civil disobedience is relatively high in Bolivia compared to other countries, and there has been an increase in those who would support blocking streets as a form of protest. It is difficult not to link this increase with the protests of 2000.

Chapter VII. The Rule of Law and Democracy

The rule of law has increasingly become the focus of democratization efforts throughout the world. Much attention has been given to improving the efficiency of the court system, improving the knowledge and techniques of prosecutors, teaching proper police practices, and helping legislatures to pass laws that modernize antiquated legal codes. Far less attention has been placed on educating citizens about their legal rights. This has often led to a gap between apparent improvements in the functioning of the legal system and citizens' perceptions of that system. In this chapter we examine citizens' support for the rule of law.

Respect for Legal Rights

We begin this analysis with an examination of Bolivia in comparative perspective, drawing on the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project data bank. In the Bolivia 2000 study, a series of questions was added that had recently been included in the Pittsburgh surveys of other Latin American countries. Four of these items will be analyzed here.

The first question (AOJ10) asks: With which of the following statements are you in greater agreement: (1) In order to fight crime, the authorities never should break the rules; or (2) At times the authorities have to break the rules. (This item is called "rules" in the results presented in Figure VII.1.)

The second question (AOJ11) asks: When there are serious suspicions regarding a person's criminal activity, do you think (1) that person should wait until the courts issue the appropriate warrant, or (2) the police can enter the house of that person without need of a warrant? (We call this question "habeas" in the analysis.)

Third, we asked (AOJ12): What statement do you prefer: (1) It is better to live in an ordered society even though some liberties are limited; or (2) All rights and liberties should be respected, even when this causes some disorder. (This item is called "liberty.")

Finally, in a question related to citizens' sense of security (and an implicit evaluation of the efficacy of the police), we asked (AOJ13): How secure do you feel walking alone in your neighborhood at night? Do you feel very secure, more or less secure, somewhat insecure, or very insecure? (This item is called "security.")

We calculated the mean for each of the first three items, coding the pro-democracy response as 100 and the anti-democracy response as 0, and took the sum of the first two "secure" responses for the final item.

On two of the four items in Figure VII.1, Bolivia's average is very similar to that of the other countries in the series. That is, nearly as many Bolivians believe that the police can break the rules to halt crime as do citizens of other countries. Nearly half of Bolivians feel this way. With respect to the last item, feeling secure in one's neighborhood, Bolivians feel

about as secure as those in other countries, with only Guatemalans expressing a somewhat lower level of security. Given the extraordinary level of violent crime in Guatemala, this result is not surprising.

Bolivia does differ in important ways from other Latin American countries with respect to the middle two items in the series. Substantially fewer Bolivians believe that police should have a court-issued warrant to enter the home of someone seriously suspected of wrongdoing. Even so, over three-fifths of Bolivians believe that such an order is needed. When it comes to the choice between order and liberty, however, Bolivians are far more likely than those in other countries to chose liberty. Nearly three-fifths of Bolivians would prefer to live in a society in which all rights and freedoms are respected, even if this means some disorder, than to live in an ordered society in which liberties are limited.




Figure VII.1 Support for the Rule of Law in Comparative Perspective

Feelings of Security

What makes some Bolivians feel more secure, while others are more frightened? To determine this, we first ran a multiple regression analysis for the 2000 sample, the results of which are presented in Table VII.1. The dependent variable, AOJ13, was recoded into a 0-100 format, so that those with the greatest sense of security are coded with a score of 100, and those with the lowest sense of security are coded 0. The results are very clear. First, by far the strongest predictor is urbanization; the more urban one's residence, the greater the fear. This, of course, is a nearly universal finding and coincides with higher violent crime rates in urban areas worldwide.

Second, those with higher levels of education (once urbanization is controlled for) have a greater sense of security than those with lower levels. This may be because violent crime may be higher in poorer neighborhoods where those with less education are more likely to live. Further evidence of this finding is that those with higher incomes feel more secure than those with lower incomes, even though wealthier citizens presumably are more attractive targets for robbery. Females feel less secure than males, another obvious and common finding in studies such as these. Interestingly, age and ethnicity play no role at all in the security/fear equation. But, even when all of these demographic and socioeconomic factors are controlled for, system support turns out to have a significant and very strong relationship to feelings of security. Those who have more reason to trust the political system are those who feel more secure in their neighborhoods. It may well be, however, that citizens who feel more secure in their neighborhoods are more likely to trust their system of government. Either way, there is a positive relationship between these two important variables.

Table VII.1 Predictors of Feeling of Security/Fear in Neighborhood

	Unstandardized Coefficients	Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B		Beta		
(Constant)	32.589	3.890		8.377	.000
UR Urban/Rural	10.598	.496	.404	21.361	.000
ED Education	.410	.157	.057	2.608	.009
Q1 Gender	-6.324	1.172	-.095	-5.398	.000
Q2 Age	-.049	.043	-.020	-1.128	.259
BLANCO	-2.175	1.364	-.029	-1.595	.111
CHOLO	1.267	3.614	.006	.351	.726
INDIGENA	-1.845	2.190	-.015	-.842	.400
NEGRO	-4.612	5.195	-.016	-.888	.375
PSA5 System Support	.198	.031	.111	6.343	.000
Q10 Monthly income	.229	.512	.009	.447	.655

R² = .19, Sig. < .001

The question that now arises is whether the feeling of security or insecurity in one's neighborhood is linked in any way to objective factors regarding crime. To determine this, we first eliminate from the regression analysis presented above the insignificant predictors (ethnicity, age and income) and enter a variable that asked whether the respondent had personally been a victim of crime (defined as robbery or assault) within the last year (AOJ3). The results are presented in Table VII.2. The results of this equation are even clearer and stronger. Urbanization, education, and gender remain significant predictors of feelings of security/insecurity. But what is most important about this table is that the objective condition of crime victimization is a significant and powerful predictor of a sense of fear; moreover, even when this factor is held constant, support for the system remains a significant and powerful predictor.⁷⁴ Indeed, system support is a slightly stronger predictor of security/fear than is crime victimization, and only less powerful than urbanization.

⁷⁴These are powerful in the sense that the t-scores are more than 2 times the level of 2.0.

Table VII.2. Predictors of Feelings of Security/Insecurity in Neighborhood:
Trimmed Equation with Crime Added

	Unstandardized Coefficients	B Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
(Constant)	31.389	3.001		10.461	.000
UR Urban/Rural	10.497	.471	.397	22.309	.000
ED Education	.538	.128	.075	4.213	.000
Q1 Gender	-6.221	1.121	-.094	-5.547	.000
PSA5 System support	.198	.030	.112	6.634	.000
AOJ3R Crime victim	-.085	.014	-.105	-6.198	.000

R²= .20, Sig. < .001

Let us examine graphically the impact of these predictors of security/fear so that these complex regression results may be more easily interpreted. First, we examine urbanization. Figure VII.2 shows the impact of residence on crime victimization. As can be seen, those who live in urban areas are more than twice as likely to have been crime victims as those in rural areas.

The relationship between feelings of security and urbanization is equally clear, as




Figure VII.2 Crime Victimization and Residence

shown in Figure VII.3. On the 0-100 scale, security increases from a bit over 40 to close to 80 as residence is moved from urban to rural.




Figure VII.3 Feeling of Security and Urban/Rural Residence: 2000 Sample

As noted in the discussion of the regression results, females feel less secure than males. This result is shown in Figure VII.4.




Figure VII.4 Feeling of Security and Gender

System support is strongly related to feeling of security, as shown in Figure VII.5. On the system support scale, discussed in detail elsewhere in this study, those who feel very safe are much more supportive of the political system than those who feel very insecure. Since, as we have already shown, those who feel insecure are more often likely to be crime victims than those who feel secure, the impact of fear on system support is independent of victimization. This means that whatever factors promote fear, they help to weaken support for the system.




Figure VII.5 Feeling of Security in Neighborhood and System Support

Predictors of Support for the Rule of Law

We can now turn to the three other items shown in Figure VII.1, those that measure the degree to which respondents support the rule of law or are willing to see that rule violated as a tradeoff for greater stability and tranquility. It is not possible to form a single scale of these three items because an examination of the reliability coefficients for such a scale does not justify it. We therefore need to look at each item separately.

A multiple regression analysis pointed to one variable—education—that significantly predicted all three measures of respect for the rule of law. Astonishingly, however, those with *higher* levels of education express *lower* respect for the rule of law. This is a finding consistent with the pattern uncovered in the analysis of the 1998 survey: whereas in other countries those with higher education are more tolerant, in Bolivia this is not the case. Figure VII.6 shows the results. While the declines in support for the rule of law are not dramatic, the mere fact that those with more education have lower respect for the law than those with less education is troubling. For example, a smaller percentage of those with higher

education believe that the police should not break the laws to fight crime than those with less education.




Figure VII.6 Respect for the Rule of Law and Education

One might jump to the conclusion that richer people are more concerned about crime, and that is what drives this finding (since education is positively associated with income). In fact, for the questions on rules and police requiring a warrant, income has no significant association with support for the rule of law; only education matters. When it comes to the question on liberty versus order, income does make a difference, overpowering education in a multiple regression equation. Thus, those with higher incomes are more apt to prefer order to liberty, not a surprising finding. But in this case, education plays no controlling role, since the education variable is insignificant. One might have hoped that those with higher education would favor liberty over order.

Once again, we need to worry about the role of education in Bolivia, especially at the university level. Universally, education helps stimulate tolerance and support for the rule of law, but not in Bolivia.

Knowledge of the New Criminal Code

The New Code of Criminal Procedures was enacted by Law 1970 approved on March 25, 1999, and it will enter into full force on June 1, 2001. The major provisions of the code are as follows:

- ◆ The code establishes an accusatory, adversarial, oral, public, criminal proceeding, designed to be more rapid and more just than its predecessor. The transparency of the oral trial process and the participation of citizens in it are designed to diminish the possibilities of corruption and increase citizen awareness of the reasons for a decision in a criminal case.
- ◆ This procedure requires that the rights of suspects are honored and assures due process, as the constitution of a democratic society mandates. These include the presumption of innocence, which carries with it a right to release during trial unless the accused is found to be a danger to society or unless there is a risk of flight; the right to counsel; the right to remain silent; the right to a fair and speedy trial; and the right to confront one's accusers.
- ◆ The prosecutor in public cases now directs an investigation and files and carries forward a case. In private cases (in which there is no declared public interest, such as in a case of insufficient checking account funds), the complainant (*querellante*) may still appear before the court and may file criminal actions there without intervention of the prosecutor or the police, although a defendant may not be detained. There is an intermediate proceeding in which some private cases, such as rape of an adult, may be converted into a public case to be prosecuted by the state's prosecutor, at the option of the alleged victim.
- ◆ The code provides for specialized investigative units and courts, such as in narcotics cases, that carry out specialized drug interventions both before and after sentencing.
- ◆ In private cases, the court may order an effort at reconciliation. In recognition of the Bolivian constitution's requirement, traditional native community justice is recognized as long as it does not provide for either a process or a punishment that would violate that constitution.
- ◆ The code provides for speedier trial relief, including enabling the prosecutor and defendant to enter into plea agreements by either an abbreviated proceeding or by a suspension of proceedings and imposition of a sentence providing for conditions of release. The victim's participation in this proceeding is required. A prosecutor may offer such an agreement to a co-conspirator in exchange for testimony against others.

- ◆ The code provides for rudimentary rules of evidence, controlling expert witnesses, laboratory tests, documents, and the like, eliminating the archaic *tachas* (whereby credibility is predetermined by statute) of the present code.
- ◆ It creates sentence supervising judges (*jueces de ejecució*) who oversee the actual imposition of the sentence. They also have the power to reduce the actual prison time after two-thirds of a sentence has been served and impose conditions of release in cases where permitted in the criminal code, as a Bolivian form of parole and parole supervision.
- ◆ The number of appeals available is substantially reduced. Except for extraordinary writs, there is a right of direct appeal only at the end of the trial phase and after sentencing. Review by the Supreme Court is granted only when the superior courts of various departments interpret an applicable law differently. Constitutional Issues will ultimately be reviewed by the Constitutional Tribunal. The appeals process, which can take several years, is substantially abbreviated.

The code resolves severe problems that have been endemic to the Bolivian criminal process. Taken in the context of the justice reforms as a whole, its design should provide substantially reduced possibilities for corruption, delay, violations of rights, and negligent conduct by participants within the system.

In the 2000 survey we asked respondents about their knowledge of this new code (AOJ8). We also asked this question in the special municipal sample interviewed in 1999. Although this study has not utilized the special DDPC municipal sample to any significant degree, since we want to detect change on a question that was not asked in 1998 but was asked in 1999 and again in 2000, we will use this sample here. With this data it is possible to compare the level of knowledge between 1999 and 2000.

The DDPC samples are divided into urban and rural segments. Figure VII.7 shows the comparison of these urban and rural segments for both 1999 and 2000. As can be seen, knowledge of the code increased dramatically between 1999 and 2000 in both urban and rural areas. Even so, only about one-third of Bolivians have heard of it. Yet, as we shall see when we look at the national-level data, the results are more favorable.




Figure VII.7 Heard about the New Criminal Code: DDPC Samples, 1999 vs. 2000

The reader is reminded that these results are for the DDPC samples only; therefore, to examine the national results, we must turn to the 2000 sample alone. Figure VII.8 shows the results. Here we see that nearly half of Bolivians had heard of the code, a substantial increase over the DDPC results, but since the DDPC samples do not cover the major urban capitals, where the mass media have greater coverage, this finding is not surprising.




Figure VII.8 Have You Heard of New Penal Code?

To test whether place of residence does in fact have an influence on people's knowledge of the new legal code, we examine the urban/rural variable used before in this study. Figure VII.9 shows the results. As can be seen, those who live in urban areas are far more likely to have heard of the code than those who do not.




Figure VII.9 Heard of New Panel Code by Urban/Rural Residence

A major factor in knowledge of the code is related to respondents' level of education. As shown in Figure VII.10, education has a very strong impact on knowledge of the new code. Only about 20% of those with primary education have heard of the code, compared to 75% of those with a university education.




Figure VII.10 Heard of New Panel Code by Education

Gender has also been shown to be a variable that distinguishes a number of key variables in the study. We would expect, based on the prior results, that females would be less likely than males to have heard about the new penal code. Figure VII.11 shows that this is the case.




Figure VII.11 Heard of New Panel Code and Gender

We already know that more highly educated Bolivians tend to live in urban areas, so the question becomes: Which is more important, education or residence in defining knowledge of the code? We also know that males are more highly educated than females in Bolivia. So to untangle these factors, we need to turn to a multivariate analysis in the form of logistic regression.⁷⁵ We should first point out that in the initial runs of this regression analysis, ethnicity was included as a predictor but was found to have no impact on the dependent variable.⁷⁶

The regression analysis (Table VII.3) shows that each of the above-analyzed variables has a significant and independent effect on explaining why some Bolivians have heard of the new penal code while others have not. Moving from the top of the table toward the bottom, we see that as residence shifts from urban to progressively more rural areas (on the five-point scale used in this survey), the odds of respondents having heard of the new code decline by 12% for each point on the scale. The results also show that for each

⁷⁵Because the question on knowledge of the code was asked as a yes-no dichotomy, we need to utilize logistic regression rather than OLS.

⁷⁶As in prior analyses, ethnicity was included as a set of dummy variables.

increase in years of education, the odds of having heard of the new code increase by 19%. Females are 22% less likely to have heard of the code than males. In this regression analysis, the relative wealth and poverty of the municipality are included as predictors as well. We find that even when urban/rural residence is controlled for, along with education, those who live in municipalities with higher GNPs and lower levels of poverty are more likely to have heard of the new penal code. What these findings show is that the economic ecology of the region matters, affecting one's chances of having heard of the new code, irrespective of one's personal characteristics. Indeed, even when personal income is included in the equation (regression not shown), these economic environmental factors are significant.

Table VII.3. Predictors of Having Heard of New Penal Code

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Urban/rural	-.123	.053	5.417	1	.020	.884
Education	.170	.010	285.642	1	.000	1.185
Sex	-.248	.083	8.877	1	.003	.781
Municipal Income per capita	.000	.000	7.896	1	.005	1.000
Municipal poverty rate	-.009	.003	6.785	1	.009	.991
Constant	-.916	.337	7.386	1	.007	.400

Pseudo R² = .25

Opinion of the New Legal Code

One of the most innovative (and controversial) features of the new criminal code are the *jueces ciudadanos*, or citizen judges. The survey attempted to determine to what extent Bolivians favor this portion of the code. To do so, we defined the provision for the respondents and then asked their opinion (AOJ9). The national 2000 result is shown in Figure VII.12. Opinions are strongly favorable, as can be seen. Over three-quarters of the respondents expressed a favorable opinion.




Figure VII.12 Opinion of the Citizen Judge Provision of the New Penal Code

What factors explain opinion toward the citizen judge provisions of the code? The regression analysis is shown in Table VII.4. Here we find familiar patterns, but with some additional significant factors as well. Urban residents and those who are more highly educated and have higher incomes are more favorably inclined toward the citizen-judge component of the law. But what is especially interesting is that system support is strongly associated with having a favorable view of the citizen judges; those who support the system look more favorably on this reform of the penal code, independent of their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. One surprising finding is that as the poverty rate in a municipality increases, opinions regarding the citizen judges grow more positive. It is not clear why this is so, given the other factors just described.

Table VII.4. OLS Predictors of Support for Citizen Judges

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	53.474	2.552		20.955	.000
UR Urban/Rural	-1.443	.556	-.081	-2.596	.009
ED Education	.366	.113	.076	3.231	.001
Q10 Monthly income	1.143	.386	.071	2.964	.003
PSA5 System support	.077	.024	.065	3.267	.001
POVRATE WBank poverty index	.129	.033	.122	3.863	.000

R²= .02

Since what is new about the above result is the connection between system support and favorable opinion about the code, compared to knowledge of the code, it is worth showing the results graphically. See Figure VII.13. The higher the support for the system, the more favorable the attitude toward citizen judges.




Figure VII.13 View of Citizen Judges:
Relationship to System Support

We can also examine respondents' views toward the citizen judges by department. Figure VII.14 shows the results. As can be seen, there are few differences, once the confidence intervals are taken into account, with the exception of El Beni, where opinion is more favorable than in other departments.




Figure VII.14 Opinion on Citizen Judges Confidence Intervals by Department

Evaluation of the Police: Comparisons 1998-2000

The survey included a series of items measuring people’s satisfaction with their contact with the police. An extensive analysis of those questions was carried out in the 1998 survey report, so in this study the focus is on change or stability in those views.

The first question in the series asked how easy or difficult it is to report a crime to the police (AOJ1). Figure VII.15 shows the result. As can be seen, there is no significant difference between 1998 and 2000. The modal respondent says that it is difficult to report a crime.




Figure VII.15 How Hard Is It to Report a Crime?
1998 vs. 2000

The second question in the series asks whether respondents believe that they will be treated justly when resolving a matter with the courts (AOJ2). Figure VII.16 shows the results. The modal respondent selected the middle category in both 1998 and 2000, and more respondents expected unjust treatment than just treatment. There were no significant differences between the years.




Figure VII.16 Expected Treatment in the Courts: 1998 vs. 2000

Victimization of crime did not change between 1998 and 2000, as shown in Figure VII.17. A bit less than one-quarter of the population reported being a victim of crime within the last year.



Figure VII.17 Crime Victimization, 1998 vs. 2000

A majority of Bolivians do not report crimes, as shown in Figure VII.18. There is no significant change between 1998 and 2000.




Figure VII.18 Reporting of Crimes: 1998 vs. 2000

We next focused on the subset of the population who had dealings with the police or the PTJ. We asked how satisfied people were with their treatment (AOJ4). The results are shown in Figure VII.19. The differences are not significant, with a slight majority in both years saying that they were very satisfied or somewhat satisfied.




Figure VII.19 Treatment by the Police, 1998 vs. 2000

Treatment expected in the courts (AOJ6) is shown in Figure VII.20 (compare with responses to AOJ2, which deals with expected justice in courts). In this case, there is a difference, but no real pattern emerges. Those who expected very good treatment declined, while those who expected very poor treatment also increased. At the same time, a higher percentage in 2000 expected to be treated well than in 1998.




Figure VII.20 Expected Treatment in the Courts, 1998 vs. 2000

The final item in the series (A0J7) asks about treatment by the office of the public prosecutor. Figure VII.21 shows the result. As with the previous variable, there are minor shifts over the two years, but no clear pattern.




Figure VII.21 Treatment in the Offices of the Prosecutor:
1998 vs. 2000

Conclusions

The rule of law plays a crucial role in democracy. In this chapter we have found mixed support for key civil liberties in the criminal justice area. In addition, we have found mixed results in terms of citizen evaluation of the criminal justice system. We did, however, find strong increases in knowledge of the new criminal code, and a favorable view of the citizen judge provision of that code.

Chapter VIII. Local Government

Bolivia is at the forefront in the movement to decentralize central government services in Latin America. It achieved this distinction with the passage of the Popular Participation Law in 1994 and the Administrative Decentralization Law in 1995. The report of the 1998 survey extensively analyzed local government, comparing Bolivia to other countries in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project. In addition, it explored the factors that help explain variations in levels of participation in and satisfaction with local government. There is no need to repeat that analysis here. The focus of this chapter instead is to compare the results from 1998 with those of 2000. An additional element in the present analysis is to examine the impact of local contextual factors on municipal participation and satisfaction. This can be done with the new municipal-level data base developed for this project.

Level of Participation

The first issue to deal with is the level of citizen participation in local government. We asked about such participation (NP1) in both surveys, focusing on the twelve months prior to the survey. Figure VIII.1 shows the results. As can be seen, for the nation as a whole, participation in local government has declined from 18% of respondents to 15%, a difference that is small in absolute terms, but nonetheless statistically significant.




Figure VIII.1 Participation in Municipal Meetings:
1998 vs. 2000

What factors explain why some Bolivians participate in local government while others do not? In order to determine this, a logistic regression was run (since the dependent variable was dichotomous). The focus is on the 2000 data set. The results are presented in Table VIII.1. The findings are highly revealing. First, participation in local government is far higher in rural areas than urban. Specifically, for each increment on the 5-point scale of urban/rural residence, the odds of participating increase by 42%. Second, females are far less likely than males to participate; the odds of a female participating are 50% less than that of a male. Third, age matters; for each year's increase in age, the odds of participating increases by 2%. Fourth, income also has an impact on participation; for each point increase in the 9-point scale of income used in this study, the odds of participation increase by 15%. Fifth, although not shown in this regression, ethnicity (defined by the dummy variables introduced earlier in this report) makes no difference in municipal participation. These findings are relatively conventional, however, in that they show that participation is heavily influenced by demographic and socioeconomic factors, a point made in detail in the 1998 study. That is, we know that rural Bolivians participate more in local government than those who live in urban areas, but that within each area, it is the better educated, older males who participate most.

Table VIII.1. Logistic Regression: Predictors of Participation in Municipal Meetings

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp (B)
UR	.3521	.0616	32.6328	1	.0000	.1151	1.4221
PSA5	.0116	.0031	14.1946	1	.0002	.0726	1.0117
Q1	-.7007	.1164	36.2131	1	.0000	-.1216	.4963
Q2	.0167	.0039	18.2935	1	.0000	.0839	1.0168
Q10	.1383	.0452	9.3480	1	.0022	.0564	1.1483
PERC96	.0101	.0045	5.0857	1	.0241	.0365	1.0102
MNRMAYCH	.4223	.1903	4.9255	1	.0265	.0356	1.5254
LITRATE	-.0116	.0044	6.8616	1	.0088	-.0459	.9885
Constant	-2.2205	.5576	15.8603	1	.0001		

Several more important findings emerge from this analysis. The regression shows that those who support the system more strongly participate significantly more in municipal meetings. Recall that measures of system support focus on national-level government rather than local government, yet those with higher levels of support in the Bolivian system of government are more likely to participate in local government.

Another key finding from the logistic regression is that ecological characteristics matter in explaining participation. For the first time in the 2000 survey, we included several measures of the characteristics of the *municipio* in which the interviews took place. We find that participation increases in *municipios* that received a higher per capita amount of social investment funds in 1996. We also found that those who lived in municipalities that had an MNR mayor in the period 1996-1998 were more likely to participate. Finally, in *municipios* that have higher rates of literacy, participation goes down. This means that in more

developed *municipios*, participation is lower, but, based on the other variables shown in the regressions, within any given *municipio*, better educated Bolivians participate more.

Overall, then, we find that while the better educated, wealthier, older males with stronger support for the system are most likely to participate in local government, that participation is conditioned by factors in the environment in which Bolivians live. Participation declines in more urban, more developed *municipios* but increases in proportion to increases in social funding and the mayor's association with the party of the incumbent president.

Demand-Making

Attending a municipal meeting is not the same thing as making demands on local government. Some who have attended such meetings may have done so merely as spectators. The survey asks (NP2) about demand-making. We compare the results from 1998 with those of 2000 in Figure VIII.2. As can be seen, there is no significant change since 1998.




Figure VIII.2 Demand-Making, 1998 vs. 2000

We can now see whether the variables that helped explain participation also help explain demand-making. Table VIII.2 shows the results of the logistic regression. The patterns are very similar, with urbanization, system support, gender, age, income, and development of the *municipio* (measured by literacy) all proving to be significant predictors.

Demand-making is not, however, influenced by per capita social investment funds or by the presence of a mayor of the same party as the president.

**Table VIII.2. Predictors of Demand-Making on Local Government
(Logistic Regression)**

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp (B)
UR	.1316	.0600	4.8057	1	.0284	.0336	1.1406
PSA5	.0089	.0028	9.9099	1	.0016	.0564	1.0089
Q1	-.4579	.1055	18.8276	1	.0000	-.0823	.6326
Q2	.0144	.0036	15.7960	1	.0001	.0745	1.0145
Q10	.1206	.0406	8.8019	1	.0030	.0523	1.1281
PERC96	.0001	.0048	.0007	1	.9783	.0000	1.0001
MNRMAYCH	.3039	.1923	2.4986	1	.1139	.0142	1.3552
LITRATE	-.0100	.0045	4.9638	1	.0259	-.0345	.9900
Constant	-1.6758	.5426	9.5380	1	.0020		

The follow-up question on demand-making asked about satisfaction with the response of the municipal government to the demand made. No significant difference emerged between 1998 and 2000, with about 40% expressing satisfaction in each year.

Participation in the Budgets and the Municipal Annual Operating Plan (POA)

Bolivian municipal governments are supposed to develop their budgets and their Annual Operating Plan (POA) with the consultation of citizens. We asked in both 1998 and again in 2000 if our respondents were involved in this planning process (NP4). (See Figure VIII.3.) As can be seen, participation declined significantly between 1998 and 2000. The rate of participation in such meetings was lower than in municipal meetings generally in 1998, but by 2000 had declined to fewer than 9 of every 100 citizens.




Figure VIII.3 Participation in Budget or POA Planning:
1998 vs. 2000

What is the reason for this decline? It may well be that the novelty of participation in the serious work of municipal budget making and planning may be wearing off, and only those with a deep interest in the process stick with it. To determine what factors are associated with participation in municipal planning and budget-making, we ran a logistic regression analysis. (See Table VIII.3.) There are similarities in this analysis with those presented earlier in this chapter, but also differences. Once again, we see that greater urbanization decreases participation. We also find that those with higher system support participate more, as do males and older Bolivians. But neither education nor income of the respondent makes any significant impact on this form of participation. This means that individuals of both lower and upper socioeconomic status are equally likely to participate in budget making and planning, once the other factors are controlled for. Two final contextual factors make a difference. First, the less developed the area is (measured by literacy), the higher the participation. Second, the lower the municipality's total investment (in 1997), the higher the participation. This is an indication that "scarcity is the mother of invention."

Table VIII.3. Predictors of Participation in Budget Making (Logistic Regression)

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp (B)
UR	.3115	.0515	36.6507	1	.0000	.0985	1.3655
PSA5	.0088	.0025	12.0651	1	.0005	.0531	1.0089
ED	.0142	.0118	1.4410	1	.2300	.0000	1.0143
Q1	-.5818	.0962	36.6087	1	.0000	-.0984	.5589
Q2	.0162	.0033	23.9242	1	.0000	.0783	1.0163
Q10	.0431	.0432	.9980	1	.3178	.0000	1.0441
TOTFUND	-3.1E-09	1.151E-09	7.3549	1	.0067	-.0387	1.0000
LITRATE	-.0078	.0035	5.0430	1	.0247	-.0292	.9922
Constant	-2.4893	.4730	27.6917	1	.0000		

Lodging Complaints with the Vigilance Committee

One of the most direct ways that citizens can influence local government is to lodge complaints with the local vigilance committees. As is shown in Figure VIII.4, such complaints declined between 1998 and 2000.




Figure VIII.4 Lodging Complaints with Vigilance Committee: 1998 vs. 2000

The predictors are already familiar and are summarized in Table VIII.4. Here we do have some changes: urbanization, gender, and age remain significant among the individual-level variables. The level of development of the municipality does not have a significant impact, however. The level of funding does: the higher the funding, the lower the level of complaints brought to the vigilance committee.

Table VIII.4. Predictors of Lodging Complaints (Logistic Regression)

Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig	R	Exp(B)
UR	.1816	.0502	13.0798	1	.0003	.0541	1.1991
PSA5	.0026	.0024	1.1706	1	.2793	.0000	1.0026
ED	.0116	.0112	1.0725	1	.3004	.0000	1.0117
Q1	-.5658	.0910	38.6556	1	.0000	-.0984	.5679
Q2	.0154	.0031	24.1259	1	.0000	.0764	1.0155
Q10	.0596	.0402	2.2025	1	.1378	.0073	1.0615
TOTFUND	-2.2E-09	9.788E-10	4.9425	1	.0262	-.0279	1.0000
LITRATE	-.0040	.0036	1.1838	1	.2766	.0000	.9961
Constant	-2.1408	.4674	20.9794	1	.0000		

Satisfaction with Local Government

Two questions were asked both in 1998 and 2000 regarding satisfaction with local government (SGL1, SGL2). The first one asked about services received by the municipal government, and the comparison is shown in Figure VIII.5. As can be seen, there was a significant decline, but in absolute terms the decline was quite small.




Figure VIII.5 Satisfaction with Municipal Services:
1998 vs. 2000

The second satisfaction item (SGL2) asks about treatment by the municipal government when transactions were carried out. The results are shown in Figure VIII.6. We find the same pattern, with satisfaction declining insignificantly.




Figure VIII.6 Satisfaction with Treatment by Municipality: 1998 vs. 2000

Responsiveness

The final series of municipal government questions involved the responsiveness of local government versus other institutions (LGL1). Comparisons between 1998 and 2000 are shown in Figure VIII.7. As can be seen, the municipality and the community are seen as the most responsive in both 1998 and 2000. There is a shift, however, in 2000, with more Bolivians seeing the community as the most responsive and fewer seeing the local government as most responsive. There is also an increase in those who found that none of the institutions were responsive.




Figure VIII.7 Who Has Responded Better to Community Problems, 1998 vs. 2000

This question was repeated in slightly altered format in the year 2000 (LGL1A). The choice “community” was dropped to allow a comparison of government institutions alone. The results for the 2000 sample appear in Figure VIII.8. Here we see that the local government was the overwhelming favorite. Even so, nearly two-fifths of respondents said that no level of government had responded well.




Figure VIII.8 Who Has Responded Better to Community Problems: 2000 Data Without "Community" Response

We also asked in both 1998 and 2000 which level of government should be assigned more responsibility and income. Figure VIII.9 shows the results. Here we see that despite the increase in critical views of municipal government between 1998 and 2000, more Bolivians would like to see local government strengthened in 2000 as compared to 1998.




Figure VIII.9 More Responsibility and Money Should Go To.... 1998 vs. 2000

We also asked if there was a corresponding desire to pay more taxes to municipal governments in order to get better services. Figure VIII.10 shows the results. As can be seen, there is no significant change, with most Bolivians remaining opposed to paying more taxes for local government.




Figure VIII.10 Willingness to Pay More Taxes to Local Government For Better Services, 1998 vs. 2000

The final question in the series (LGL4) asks respondents how responsive they believe the municipality is to what the people want. Figure VIII.11 shows the results. As can be seen, there is no significant difference between 1998 and 2000.




Figure VIII.11 Responsiveness of Municipality, 1998 vs. 2000

The USAID Democratic Development and Citizen Participation Project (DDPC)

USAID Bolivia is assisting municipal development through the Democratic Development and Citizen Participation Project (DDPC). In the public version of this study, this section will not be included, because it concerns an internal evaluation of the project. But since this chapter deals with the DDPC, this is the appropriate place to include it.

The survey in 1998 included six municipalities from the DDPC project. Respondents were interviewed in each municipality, evenly divided between urban and rural areas. Thus the sample design for the DDPC differs from that of the country as a whole, where respondents were selected in order to provide an overall view of the county and/or a department. In this study the intention was to examine urban and rural residents in the selected municipalities. In 1999 and again in 2000, these same six municipalities were included in the survey, but an additional three were added, since new municipalities had been added to the DDPC program. This means that in 1999 and again in 2000, a target of

900 interviews was established for the special municipal sample. In 1998, however, only 600 respondents were in the target sample.

One complication in comparing the three years is that in 1998, 100 of the 600 respondents came from a municipality that was also included in the national sample. In all other sections of this report, those 100 were added to the national sample to make it complete. If we deviate from that practice and move it to the municipal sample, then the findings in this section will differ from those reported earlier in this chapter, so the decision was made to retain the 100 DDPC respondents in the 1998 sample in the national totals and to examine only 500 respondents from 1998 in the DDPC and 900 for both 1999 and 2000 for that special sample. The actual sample size differed slightly from these targets. In 1998, 499 respondents were interviewed; in 1999, the number was 895; while in 2000, the full 900 were interviewed. Such minor variations in sample size are common in large field studies such as this and are no cause for concern.

An overall look at the sample sizes for the three years is given in Figure VIII.12.




Figure VIII.12 Sample Size for Combined National and DDPC: 1998, 1999 and 2000

Participation in Municipal Meetings: DDPC vs. the Nation

We can now compare the rate of participation in the DDPC samples to the nation as a whole and also compare the evolution of participation within the DDPC samples. Figure VIII.13 shows the results. This figure brackets each mean participation score with confidence intervals so that we can see when these scores differ significantly from each other. Several key findings emerge from this chart. First, as a group, respondents in the DDPC samples have higher levels of municipal participation than the nation as a whole. The significance of this finding, however, should be tempered by the fact that we already know that participation is lower in more urban areas, and the DDPC samples reflect more rural areas. Thus it will be necessary to reexamine this finding, controlling for urbanization. (That will be done below.) Second, we can see some fluctuation in DDPC participation rates, but they fall within the confidence intervals of each sample, making the variation statistically meaningless. Third, while the national sample of 1998 was within the confidence interval of the 1998 DDPC sample, the 2000 national sample fell significantly below each of the DDPC samples.




Figure VIII.13 Participation in Municipal Meetings in Last Year: Confidence Intervals by Sample

We now examine the impact of urbanization on these findings to determine whether the higher level of participation in the DDPC is merely an artifact of its higher level of rural

residents. Figure VIII.14 shows the results. As can be seen, at each level of urbanization except the most dispersed rural settlements, levels of participation in municipal meetings of the DDPC sample exceeds those of the national sample in 2000. Thus the DDPC respondents, as shown in Figure VIII.13, clearly participate more.




Figure VIII.14 Urbanization and Municipal Participation: DDPC vs. Nation, 2000 Sample Only

Since the levels of participation are of interest to USAID, the information in Table VIII.5 gives the precise numbers.

Table VIII.5. Participation in Municipal Meetings for National and DDPC Samples: 1998, 1999, and 2000

	1998 %	1999 %	2000 %	Total %
National	17.7		14.8	14.8
DDPC	22.1	27.1	24.1	24.1
Total	18.3	27.1	17.0	17.0

Demand-Making on Municipal Government

Demands made on municipal governments differ substantially among the various samples being analyzed here. We will show these differences graphically, but Table VIII.6 presents specific numeric information, as required by USAID.

Table VIII.6. Demand-Making on Municipal Government for National and DDPC Samples: 1998, 1999, and 2000

	YEAR	Mean %	N
National	1998	17.6	2,954
	2000	17.0	2,995
	Total	17.3	5,949
DDPC	1998	19.1	498
	1999	23.5	892
	2000	24.5	889
	Total	22.9	2,279
Total	1998	17.8	3,452
	1999	23.5	892
	2000	18.7	3,884
	Total	18.8	8,228

Figure VIII.15 presents an overall graphic view of these results, showing confidence intervals. Several findings emerge. First, about 17% of Bolivians make demands on their municipal government, a figure that did not differ significantly between 1998 and 2000. Second, demand-making is significantly higher among respondents in the DDPC areas. Third, demand-making has increased substantially among those in the DDPC areas, reaching a high of 24.5% in the 2000 sample. The difference between the 1998 DDPC sample and the 2000 sample, when considered in isolation from the national samples, is statistically significant (Sig.= .018).




Figure VIII.15 Demand-Making on Local Government Confidence Intervals by Sample

Once again, we control for the impact of urbanization (the DDPC sample is more rural than the national sample), as shown in Figure VIII.16. As we can see, for each level of urbanization, the DDPC respondents score higher than the national sample on demand-making.




Figure VIII.16 Urbanization and Demand-Making
DDPC vs. National, 2000 Sample

Satisfaction with response to demand-making did not change between 1998 and 2000 in the DDPC sample. The results of these insignificant findings are not shown here.

Complaints to the Vigilance Committee

Few differences between the national and DDPC samples emerge for NP5, bringing complaints to the Vigilance Committee. This may be because the DDPC municipalities are better run, and therefore there are fewer reasons for citizens to complain. Table VIII.7 presents the results. As can be seen, the DDPC complaints for 1998 match those of the national sample. For 2000, however, the DDPC complaints are higher than the national sample. Yet, the DDPC for 1999 was higher than for 2000. It is difficult to interpret these results, since declining complaints could be a function of either better-run local government or a more alienated public.

Table VIII.7. Complaints to the Vigilance Committee for National and DDPC Samples: 1998, 1999, and 2000

	YEAR	Mean %	N
National	1998	12.0	2,951
	2000	9.8	2,972
	Total	10.9	5,923
DDPC	1998	12.3	496
	1999	16.1	889
	2000	12.7	889
	Total	13.9	2,274
Total	1998	12.1	3,447
	1999	16.1	889
	2000	10.5	3,861
	Total	11.8	8,197

This result, along with confidence intervals, is shown in Figure VIII.17.




Figure VIII.17 Complaints to the Vigilance Committee Confidence Intervals by Samples

Participation in Planning Meetings

We next compare participation in budget or planning meetings for the POA. Table VIII.8 contains the results. We have already noted that the national sample produced a decline in this sort of participation. Here we see that the DDPC samples are far higher than the national sample, but that the increase between 1998 and 1999 is reversed in 2000, with 2000 levels being virtually identical to 1998 levels. Thus, while the DDPC samples exhibit significantly higher participation in municipal planning and budgeting than do the respondents for the nation as a whole, they seem to have leveled off at around 15%.

Table VIII.8. Participation in Municipal Planning
for National and DDPC Samples: 1998, 1999, and 2000

	YEAR	Mean %	N
National	1998	11.8	2,944
	2000	8.8	2,962
	Total	10.3	5,906
DDPC	1998	15.5	498
	1999	17.8	889
	2000	15.9	883
	Total	16.5	2,270
Total	1998	12.3	3,442
	1999	17.8	889
	2000	10.4	3,845
	Total	12.0	8,176

Figure VIII.18 shows these results graphically, with confidence intervals. As can be seen, the DDPC samples are systematically higher than the national sample, with the difference being most striking in the 2000 survey.




Figure VIII.18 Participation in Planning and Budget Making Confidence Intervals by Sample

Satisfaction with Services

Table VIII.9 presents respondents' satisfaction with the services of the municipality. Satisfaction in the DDPC samples was initially lower than that for the nation as a whole, and then declined in 1999, but by 2000 satisfaction was higher than in any prior year for the DDPC samples and higher than for the nation as a whole. The increase in the DDPC sample is significant at $< .001$.

Table VIII.9. Satisfaction with Services of the Municipality for National and DDPC Samples: 1998, 1999, and 2000

	YEAR	Mean %	N
National	1998	47.1	2,887
	2000	45.8	2,868
	Total	46.5	5,755
DDPC	1998	44.9	481
	1999	40.1	870
	2000	48.5	859
	Total	44.4	2,210
Total	1998	46.8	3,368
	1999	40.1	870
	2000	46.5	3,727
	Total	45.9	7,965

Figure VIII.19 shows these results graphically.




Figure VIII.19 Satisfaction with Municipal Services Confidence Intervals by Sample

Treatment by Municipal Government

Comparisons of respondents' perceptions of how they or their neighbors were treated when they went to the municipality are contained in Table VIII.10. Here we see an insignificant decline between 1998 and 2000, but a significant increase in the DDPC samples by 2000.

Table VIII.10. Treatment by the Municipality
for National and DDPC Samples: 1998, 1999, and 2000

	YEAR	Mean %	N
National	1998	50.9	1,974
	2000	49.6	2,163
	Total	50.2	4,137
DDPC	1998	49.7	373
	1999	46.7	677
	2000	53.9	678
	Total	50.2	1,728
Total	1998	50.7	2,347
	1999	46.7	677
	2000	50.6	2,841
	Total	50.2	5,865

The results are presented graphically in Figure VIII.20. The satisfaction in the DDPC sample of 2000 is the highest of any of the samples.




Figure VIII.20 Satisfaction with Treatment by Municipality: Confidence Intervals by Sample

Solving Community Problems

In the 2000 survey we asked a somewhat altered question as to which institution would better solve community problems. In the prior surveys we asked this question, but included “community” as a valid response (LGL1). In 2000, we dropped this category (LGL2a). Figure VIII.21 shows the results. As can be seen, members of the DDPC sample are more likely to select the municipality than the nation as a whole, while at the same time are less likely to select the alienated response of “none.”




Figure VIII.21 Which Institution Has Better Solved Community Problems: DDPC vs. Nation for 2000

More Responsibility and More Funding

We also asked (LGL2) a hypothetical question as to which level of government should get more responsibility and funding. Figure VIII.22 shows the results for 2000. As can be seen, respondents choose the municipality over all other options, with a small and insignificant preference for the municipality among the DDPC respondents.




Figure VIII.22 Who Should Get More Responsibility and More Money? DDPC vs. Nation

Willingness to Pay More Taxes

We also compared the willingness of DDPC respondents to pay more taxes to those of the national sample. The results from the 2000 survey are shown in Figure VIII.23. As can be seen, there is virtually no difference among these two groups, with four-fifths of both not willing to pay more taxes.




Figure VIII.23 Willingness to Pay More Taxes:
DDPC vs. National Sample

Responsiveness of the Municipality

The final question is the series (LGL4) asks about the degree to which the municipality is seen as being responsive to popular wishes. Figure VIII.24 shows the results. Here we can see that among the DDPC respondents in 2000, there was a small but significant difference between the DDPC and national samples, with the DDPC sample believing that the municipality was more responsive.




Figure VIII.24 How Often Does Municipality Respond to Community? DDPC vs. National 2000

We can provide an overall score for the above measure of responsiveness by converting the responses into the by now familiar 0-100 scale. Table VIII.11 shows the results.

Table VIII.11. Responsiveness of the Municipality: DDPC vs. National Sample

	Mean %	N
National	43.1	2936
DDPC	46.3	882
Total	43.8	3818

Evaluation of the Uninominal Deputy System

Bolivia recently reformed its system of representation in the national legislature by creating two forms of electing deputies. The traditional system, which is based on closed party list proportional representation, involves electing deputies from lists of candidates presented by political parties. The number of deputies elected from each party list depends

upon the proportion of votes garnered by that party each given constituency. The new system, copied largely from the Germany system, is based on the construction of single-member electoral districts in which only one deputy is elected from each given district. The presumed advantage of the single-member districts is that voters are electing an individual rather than a party to office, thereby hoping to ensure greater individual accountability of elected officials.

In both the 1998 and 2000 national surveys, respondents were asked (VB7), “In your opinion, who better represents you: 1) the multi-member party list deputy, or 2) the single-member district deputy?” In the 1999 DDPC survey this question was asked, but the format changed somewhat. In 1999, we added a response option: “none.” This means that the the 1998 survey is not directly comparable to the 1999 and 2000 surveys. Figure VIII.25 shows the results. As can be seen, those preferring the party-list system are a very small percentage (8%) of the respondents in either year. Furthermore, those preferring the single-member district system is the largest category in both years. But, those who selected the single-member district system declined in 2000, no doubt because of the introduction of the new response choice (“none”). That choice also helped reduce the “don’t know” and “don’t know which is which” responses in 2000 as well. These findings suggest that many Bolivians are not yet familiar with the new system and are uncertain of its presumed advantages, yet it is clear that far more prefer it to the old (and still functioning) multi-member system.




Figure VIII.25 Which System Better Represents You?

Conclusions

Local government participation in Bolivia is an important component of democracy. Many Bolivians are active in local government, especially those in more rural areas. The DDPC project areas are more active than the nation as a whole, and important increases in some aspects of participation in local government emerge in the comparisons of the 1998 sample with the 2000 sample.

Chapter IX. Gender and Democracy

One of the main differences between the dramatic economic growth in Asia versus the slower growth in Latin America has been the role played by women in the economy. In Asia, women have been given opportunities for education similar to those available to men. The result is that women have gone on to hold good jobs and have become full players in their economies. Along with economic growth has come the emergence of democracy in Asia.⁷⁷ In Latin America, by contrast, women's education has been more limited and women's role in the workplace more restricted. In Bolivia, these patterns have been obvious for many years, and evidence of a large gap between men and women is evident in the surveys being analyzed in this study. This chapter focuses on the gap between males and females in employment, education, awareness of current affairs, and participation in civil society in Bolivia.

Perception of Discrimination Against Women

The survey asked whether respondents felt that there is discrimination against women in Bolivia (DM1). The results are shown in Figure IX.1. Overwhelmingly, Bolivians perceive gender discrimination. There is no significant difference between opinions expressed in 1998 and 2000 on this issue.

⁷⁷Nancy Birdsall, David Ross, and Richard Sabot, "Inequality and Growth Reconsidered: Lessons from East Asia," *World Bank Economic Review* 9 (1995): 477-508.




Figure IX.1 Believe that in Bolivia there is Discrimination
Against Women: 1998 vs. 2000

We followed this question with one measuring perceptions as to the seriousness of gender discrimination (DM2). Among those who said that there is discrimination against women, 60% said that it was a serious or very serious problem. Figure IX.2 shows the results for the 2000 sample.




Figure IX.2 How Serious is Discrimination Against Women?
2000 Sample

Figure IX.3 compares 1998 with 2000, showing the differences between men and women. For this chart, the question is recoded to provide a 0-100 response format. Between 1998 and 2000, there was a significant increase ($\text{sig.} = .02$) in the perception that discrimination against women was a serious problem. Not surprisingly, women perceive discrimination as being more serious than men do.




Figure IX.3 How Serious is Discrimination Against Women?
1998 vs. 2000 by Gender

The survey next attempted to probe the specific ways in which Bolivians believe that women are discriminated against. Question DM3 asked whether respondents believe that men and women have equal opportunity to obtaining work. Figure IX.4 shows the results for both 1998 and 2000. Even though there is widespread belief that discrimination against women exists in Bolivia, as shown above, the population is almost evenly divided as to whether this discrimination extends to the crucial area of employment. Indeed, in 2000 there is a small but significant increase in the number of respondents who believe that such discrimination does not exist.




Figure IX.4 Do Woman Have Equal Employment Opportunities with Men? 1998 vs. 2000

A much clearer picture emerges when we break down these results by gender, as shown in Figure IX.5. There it can be seen that men and women are divided, with women seeing far less opportunity for employment than men, even though in 2000 their optimism increased along with that of men.



Figure IX.5 Women Have Equal Employment Opportunity with Men: 1998 vs. 2000 for Males vs. Females

What variables, in addition to gender, help to explain these views on employment discrimination? We examine this question with the 2000 data set, using logistic regression as the analytical technique. Table IX.1 shows the results. Income and education played no role, so they were excluded from the equation. The most important difference was gender. The odds that females see equal employment opportunities are 39% less than for males. The more urban the residence of the respondent, the *more* likely it is that the individual will believe that there is employment discrimination, the odds being 23% greater for each increase in urbanization on the four-point scale used in this study. Similarly, there is a 27% increase in the odds of seeing equality if one is white, but a 43% decline in the odds if one is *cholo*. Among the black population, there is a much greater sense that women have equal employment opportunities.

Table IX.1. Predictors of Belief that Women Have Equal Employment Opportunities:
Logistic Regression Results

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
UR,Urban/ Rural residence	.204	.031	44.219	1	.000	1.226
Q1 Sex	-.488	.076	41.456	1	.000	.614
BLANCO	.239	.088	7.341	1	.007	1.270
CHOLO	-.569	.229	6.194	1	.013	.566
INDIGENA	-.631	.140	20.249	1	.000	.532
NEGRO	.766	.372	4.234	1	.040	2.151
Constant	.383	.134	8.092	1	.004	1.466

We can examine these results graphically. We have already examined the impact of gender, and the impact of urbanization is shown in Figure IX.6. Here we can plainly see that as we move from urban to rural areas, there is an increased belief that women have equal opportunities for employment. It is also clear that within each level of urbanization, there is a wide gap between the views of males and females on this issue.




Figure IX.6 Do Women Have Equal Employment Opportunity? By Urbanization and Gender

The impact of ethnicity is shown in Figure IX.7. Blacks and whites believe more strongly that there is equal opportunity in employment than do *mestizos*, *cholos*, and Indians. For each ethnic group except blacks, however, men hold this belief to a greater extent than do women.




Figure IX.7 Do Women Have Equal Employment Opportunity? By Ethnicity and Gender

The final item in this series on discrimination against women focuses on the workplace, asking (DM4) what are the most common problems that women face in the workplace. Table IX.2 shows the results. As can be seen, there are a number of problems, none of which predominates.

Table IX.2. Problems Women Have in the Workplace

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
No jobs if pregnant	738	24.6	25.6	25.6
Sexual harassment	581	19.3	20.2	45.8
Difficulties in getting permission to take care of children	387	12.9	13.4	59.2
Lower pay than men	725	24.1	25.1	84.3
Problems in promotion	302	10.0	10.5	94.8
None	150	5.0	5.2	100.0
Total	2883	95.9	100.0	
Don't know	123	4.1		
	3006	100.0		

Empirical Evidence of Discrimination

It is difficult to measure with the survey the ways in which women suffer discrimination in Bolivia. One obvious factor that one would want to include is income, but since the survey provides income data only for families, not individual respondents, we cannot merely compare incomes of households in which females were the respondents as opposed to those in which males were the respondents. We can, however, compare levels of education. Figure IX.8 shows the comparisons. As can be seen, men have significantly higher levels of education than women in both 1998 and 2000.




Figure IX.8 Gender and Education, 1998 and 2000

Not only are females less well educated, but also they have significantly less information about politics than males. Figure IX.9 shows the comparison for the GI series of questions. The gender gap is obvious here; on each variable, males have much more political information than females, and when males and females are asked to name the presidents of Argentina and Brazil, the difference is greater than 100%.




Figure IX.9 Political Information and Gender, 2000

To what extent do these differences merely reflect the higher level of education found among males than females? We can answer this question by running an analysis of variance, controlling for education as a covariate. The results are shown in Figure IX.10 for the question that asked respondents to name the president of Brazil. As can be seen, while the differences narrow a bit when education is controlled (females increase their level of knowledge while males decrease), the difference is still two to one.




Figure IX.10 Ability to Name President of Brazil:
Gender Differences Controlled for Education

We can examine the impact of education on the entire series of five information questions included in the survey (GI1-GI5) by creating an overall index of respondent information, with a range from 0 to 5, and then comparing males to females, controlling for differences in education. The results are shown in Figure IX.11. As can be seen, whereas female respondents average a correct score of .9, males average 1.5, even after education is controlled for.




Figure IX.11 Estimated Marginal Means of Degree of Political Information Controlled for Education

What do these results show? They suggest that unequal access to education is only part of the problem faced by females in Bolivia. Their knowledge of politics is far more limited than that of men, a factor that has serious consequences for their ability to change the rules of the game and obtain greater parity with males. Our analysis shows that even when the impact of education is accounted for, females remain at a disadvantage, thus suggesting a cultural difference.

How might this cultural difference be reduced or eliminated? Exposure to the media might help. Are there differences in media exposure among males and females in Bolivia? The questionnaire contains three questions on that subject, variables A1, A2, and A3. These questions ask whether the respondent normally listens to news programs on the radio or TV, or if the respondent regularly reads news in the newspapers. Comparisons by gender are shown in Figure IX.12. Here there appear to be some surprises. We see that females and males have nearly the same level of exposure to TV news. Indeed, four-fifths of Bolivians watch the news on television. Radio, and to a larger extent newspapers, are more likely to be in the purview of males than of females in Bolivia.




Figure IX.12 Exposure to News in the Media:
Males vs. Females, 2000

Which of these three media, if any, has an impact on increasing political information? A correlation between media exposure and information turns out to be insignificant for radio news, but significant for both television and newspapers ($r = .22$ for television and $.26$ for newspapers). Figure IX.13 shows the impact of newspaper news readership on political knowledge. Among those who did not give the right answer on this question, for both males and females, their scores regarding reading news in the newspapers was in the 50% range, compared to nearly 80% among males who got the right answer, and 62% among females. A similar pattern is found for watching TV news. Thus it is fair to conclude that if females increased their consumption of news their knowledge of political information would increase, but there would still be a gap between females and males. Put in other terms, females who read newspaper news are more knowledgeable (if only slightly) about political information than males who do not read newspaper news. Thus, women can close part of the gap by accessing the news media.



Figure IX.13 Ability to Name President of Brazil:
Impact of Newspaper News Readership and Gender

Behavioral Implications of the Gender Gap

Voting Behavior

One important way in which the gender gap affects political behavior is in voting. Figure IX.14 shows that males are significantly more likely than females to have been registered to vote at the time of the 1997 presidential election (VB1). Yet even though the difference is significant, in absolute terms the variation is only 5%.




Figure IX.14 Voting Registration by Gender: 2000 Sample

In the 2000 study we also asked whether respondents intended to vote in the next election. As can be seen in Figure IX.15, males are more likely to intend to vote, but the gap in absolute terms is quite small. In terms of voting behavior, then, it appears that the gender gap has significant but substantively small implications.




Figure IX.15 Voting Intention by Gender: 2000 Sample

Municipal Participation

Beyond voting, participation in local government is a very important aspect of political life in Bolivia, as is shown earlier in this study. What about the impact of gender on this form of politics? Figure IX.16 shows that gender makes a significant difference, one that is large in absolute terms. Males are nearly twice as likely to have participated in municipal meetings as females.




Figure IX.16 Municipal Participation by Gender: 2000 Sample

There is also a strong and significant gender gap in demand-making, which this study argues is more important than mere participation at municipal meetings. (See Figure IX.17.) While 20% of males have made demands on their local governments in the year prior to the survey, this number is only 14% for females.




Figure IX.17 Municipal Demand-Making by Gender: 2000 Sample

Similar gaps are found by gender in participation in meetings to plan the municipal budget. These results are shown in Figure IX.18. Males participate at almost twice the rate as females.




Figure IX.18 Participation in Municipal Budget-Making by Gender: 2000 Sample

Finally, we find that complaints to the important vigilance committee of the municipality are also heavily within the purview of males in Bolivia. Figure IX.19 shows the results.




Figure IX.19 Complained to Vigilance Committee by Gender:
2000 Sample

Participation in Civil Society

Although it is clear that women are far less active than men in local government, the picture is rather different at the community level. There we find women more active than men in church groups as well as in civic associations. Figure IX.20 shows the results. Men are far more active in professional associations and unions, activities that are job-related, an area where (as we have already seen) women are at a disadvantage.




Figure IX.20 Civil Society Participation and Gender: 2000 Sample

Contacting public officials is also an important part of politics. The survey asked (CP1-4) a series of questions about contacting such officials. Figure IX.21 shows the results. In each case, the differences exist, with men more apt to contact public officials than women, but the differences are often small.




Figure IX.21 Contacting Public Officials by Gender: 2000 Sample

The final area for comparison is to what extent males and females participate in work that is related to resolving community problems. As can be seen in Figure IX.22, males are significantly more active than females in this area.




Figure IX.22 Working to Resolve Community Problem:
Males vs. Females, 2000 Sample

Conclusions

This chapter has shown that there is a wide gap between Bolivian men and women in a number of respects: perceptions of gender discrimination, unequal opportunities in employment, education, exposure to the news media, and participation in civil society. This gap manifests itself socioeconomically as well as behaviorally. Even when statistical controls are introduced for education, the gender gap persists in Bolivia.

Appendix: Questionnaire Used in 2000: Spanish Version

**CUESTIONARIO 1230
2000****Gobernabilidad****Julio**

rev. 8, 16 mayo, 2000

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Ciudad _____ Localidad _____ Bar./UV _____ Mnz. _____ Viv. _____ Dirección _____

Estrato: Público [1] DDPC Urbano [2] DDPC Rural [3] **UR.:** Urbano [1] Urbano [2] Rural compacto [3] Rural disperso [4]

500 >20.000 2 a 20 mil 500 a 2 mil menos

Cantón _____ Distrito electoral _____ Provincia _____ Municipio _____

UPM _____ **Departamento** La Paz [1] Santa Cruz [2] Cochabamba [3] Oruro [4] Chuquisaca [5] Potosí [6] Pando [7]

Tarija [8] Beni [9]

Q1. Sexo (*no pregunte*) Hombre [1] Mujer [2]**Día del intento:** Lu [1] Ma [2] Mi [3] Ju [4] Vi [5] Sa [6] Do [7] **Hora de inicio:** _____:_____ **Fecha** _____/_____/2000
_____ día _____ mes**Buenos días/tardes. Mi nombre es:** _____ **Soy encuestador (a) de la empresa Encuestas y Estudios y de la Universidad de Pittsburgh de los Estados Unidos. Estamos realizando un estudio para conocer las opiniones de la gente sobre diferentes aspectos de la situación nacional. Ud. ha sido seleccionado (a) por sorteo para hacerle una entrevista y quisiéramos pedirle que colabore con nosotros, dedicándonos unos minutos de su tiempo. Le reitero que todas sus respuestas serán confidenciales.****Para empezar, acostumbra escuchar algún programa de noticias..** (*lea las opciones y espere la respuesta para cada inciso*)**A1. Por radio** Si [1] No [0] NR [8]**A2. Por la televisión** Si [1] No [0] NR [8]**A3. Lee noticias en el periódico** Si [1] No [0] NR [8]**A4. En su opinión, cuál es el problema más grave que enfrenta el país?** (*Una sola respuesta, si menciona más de uno pregunte por el más importante*)

Desempleo [1] Inflación, precios altos, costo de vida [2] Pobreza [3] Delincuencia [4] Peligro de golpe de estado [5]

Falta de tierras para cultivar [6] Falta de crédito [7] Corrupción [11] Problemas ecológicos [12] drogadicción [13]

Violencia doméstica [14] narcotráfico [15] Otros (*especifique*) _____ No hay problemas [50] NS [88]

A veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolverlos solos. Algunos tratan de resolver tales problemas pidiendo ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno. Alguna vez ha pedido ayuda o cooperación (lea las opciones y espere la respuesta para cada inciso)

CP1. Al Presidente de la República	Si [1]	No [2]
NS/NR [8]		
CP2. A Algún diputado o senador	Si [1]	No [2]
NS/NR [8]		
CP3. Al Alcalde o concejal	Si [1]	No [2]
NS/NR [8]		
CP3A. A la autoridad originaria o autoridad de la comunidad indígena	Si [1]	No [2]
NS/NR [8]		
CP3B. Al comité de vigilancia del municipio	Si [1]	No [2]
NS/NR [8]		
CP4. A alguna oficina del gobierno nacional, ministerio, prefectura o, policía	Si [1]	No [2]
NS/NR [8]		

SOCT1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general la situación económica del país? Diría Ud. que es muy buena, buena, regular, mala o muy mala?

Muy buena [1] Buena [2] Regular [3] Mala [4] Muy mala [5] No sabe [8]

SOCT2. ¿Considera Ud. que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses?

Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3] No sabe [8]

SOCT3. Y en los próximos doce meses, ¿Cree ud. que la situación económica actual del país será mejor, igual o peor que ahora?

Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3] No sabe [8]

Ahora le voy a leer algunas preguntas sobre esta comunidad y los problemas que tiene.

CP15A. ¿Cuánta influencia cree que Ud. tiene sobre las decisiones que toman los grupos de esta comunidad? ¿Diría que Ud. tiene mucha, poca o ninguna influencia?

Mucha [1] Poca [2] Ninguna [3]

CP5. ¿Alguna vez ha trabajado o tratado de resolver algún problema de la comunidad o de los vecinos de aquí?

Si [1] No [2] => CP6

CP5A. Si responde si a CP5 => Ha contribuido con materiales o dinero para ayudar en algún problema o alguna mejora?

Si [1] No [2] NS [8] NDR [9]

CP5B. Si responde si a CP5 => Ha dado su propio trabajo o mano de obra?

Si [1] No [2] NS [8] NDR [9]

CP5C. Si responde si a CP5 => Ha asistido a reuniones sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?

Si [1] No [2] NS [8] NDR [9]

CP5D. Si responde si a CP5 => Ha tratado de organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema local o para lograr alguna mejora?

Si [1] No [2] NS [8] NDR [9]

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste Ud. a sus reuniones frecuentemente, asiste de vez en cuando, asiste casi nunca o nunca asiste.

Asiste Ud a.....	Frecuente mente	De vez en cuando	Casi nunca	Nunca	NS/NR
CP6. Algún comité o sociedad de la iglesia o templo?	1	2	3	4	8
CP7. Asociación de padres de familia de la escuela?	1	2	3	4	8
CP8. Comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad?	1	2	3	4	8
CP9. Una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, campesinos o productores?	1	2	3	4	8
CP10. Sindicato Obrero?	1	2	3	4	8
CP11. Cooperativa?	1	2	3	4	8
CP12. Alguna asociación o comité cívico (grupos de mujeres, etc)	1	2	3	4	8
CP13. Juntas vecinales?	1	2	3	4	8
CP14. Organización territorial de base (OTB's)?	1	2	3	4	8

L1. En esta tabla (entregue tabla # 1) hay una escala que va de izquierda a derecha, donde 1 es de extrema izquierda y 10 de extrema derecha. Cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, se dice que una persona es de izquierda o que es de derecha. Mejor todavía, Ud. mismo cuando califica a una persona dice ese es de izquierda y ese es de derecha ¿En esta escala, políticamente Ud. dónde se ubicaría.?

Izquierda 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Derecha
NS [88]

LS3. Ahora, algunas opiniones: Hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? Diría Ud. que se encuentra 1) muy satisfecho, 2) algo satisfecho, 3) algo insatisfecho o 4) muy insatisfecho?

Muy satisfecho [1] Algo satisfecho [2] Algo insatisfecho [3] Muy insatisfecho [4]
NS [8]

IT1. Hablando en general de la gente de este lugar, diría Ud. que la gente en general es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable o nada confiable?

Muy confiable [1] Algo confiable [2] Poco confiable [3] Nada confiable [4]
NS/NR [8]

IT2. ¿Cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente se preocupa sólo por sí misma o cree que la gente trata de ayudar al prójimo?

Preocupada por sí misma [1] Ayuda al prójimo [2]
NS/NR [8]

NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o presentado una solicitud a alguna oficina pública, funcionario o concejal de la Alcaldía durante los últimos 12 meses?

Si [1] No [2] => *Pase a NP4* NS/NR [8]

NP2A. Si solicitó algún tipo de ayuda => ¿Quedó contento con la respuesta que le dieron?

Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8] NDR
[9]

NP4. ¿Ha participado en alguna reunión para discutir o planificar el presupuesto o planificar el POA (Plan Operativo Anual) de la municipalidad?

Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

NP5. ¿Ha llevado alguna queja al Comité de Vigilancia del Municipio?

Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

SGL1. Diría Ud. que los servicios que la alcaldía está dando a la gente son excelentes, buenos, regulares, malos o pésimos?

Excelentes [1] Buenos [2] Regulares [3] Malos [4] Pésimos [5] NS [8]

SGL2. ¿Cómo le han tratado a Ud. o a sus vecinos cuando han ido a la municipalidad para hacer trámites? Le trataron muy bien, bien, regular, mal o pésimo?

Muy bien [1] Bien [2] Regular [3] Mal [4] Pésimo [5] Nunca hizo trámites [90] NS [8]

LGL1. En su opinión, ¿Quién ha respondido mejor a tiempo de ayudar a resolver los problemas de esta comunidad?. ¿El Gobierno Central, el Congreso, la alcaldía o la comunidad?

El gobierno central [1] El congreso [2] La alcaldía [3] La comunidad [4] Ninguno [5] Todos por igual [6]
NS/NR [8]

LGL1A. Y de las instituciones que le mencionaré a continuación, ¿Cuál ha respondido mejor a tiempo de ayudar a resolver los problemas de esta comunidad? ¿El Gobierno central, el Congreso, la alcaldía o la prefectura?

El gobierno central [1] El congreso [2] La alcaldía [3] La prefectura [4] Ninguno [5] Todos por igual [6]
NS/NR [8]

LGL2. En su opinión, se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a la Alcaldía o debemos dejar que el Gobierno Central asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales (como el agua, recojo de basura, etc.)

Más a la alcaldía [1] Más al gobierno [2] No cambiar nada [3] Más a la alcaldía si da mejores servicios [4] NS/NR [8]

LGL3. ¿Estaría dispuesto a pagar más impuestos a la municipalidad para que ésta pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales, o cree que no vale la pena pagar más?

Más impuestos/tasas [1] No vale la pena pagar más [2]
NS [8]

LGL4. ¿Cree Ud. que la municipalidad responde a lo que quiere el pueblo casi siempre, la mayoría de las veces, de vez en cuando, casi nunca o nunca?

casi siempre [1] la mayoría de las veces [2] de vez en cuando [3] casi nunca [4] nunca [5]
NS [8]

Algunas personas dicen que se justificaría, bajo ciertas circunstancias, un Golpe de Estado por los militares, es decir cuando los militares toman el poder. En su opinión, un golpe de Estado por los militares se justifica o no se justifica (lea los incisos y espere la respuesta).

JC1. Si el desempleo es muy alto?	Se justifica [1]	No se justifica [2]
	NS/NR [8]	
JC4. Si hay muchas huelgas estudiantiles en las universidades?	Se justifica [1]	No se justifica [2]
NS/NR [8]		
JC9. Si hay un gran número de huelgas por trabajadores sindicalizados?	Se justifica [1]	No se justifica [2]
NS/NR [8]		
JC10. Si los empleadores acortan mucho los sueldos de sus empleados?	Se justifica [1]	No se justifica [2]
NS/NR [8]		
JC11. Si el nivel de delincuencia es muy alto?	Se justifica [1]	No se justifica [2]
NS/NR [8]		

JC15. Algunas personas prefieren vivir bajo una democracia porque protege los derechos humanos e individuales, a pesar de que a veces pueda ser ineficiente y desordenada. Otros prefieren vivir bajo una dictadura por su orden y eficiencia. Qué prefiere más Ud. una democracia o una dictadura?

Una democracia [1] Una dictadura [2] NS/NR
[8]

BC15. ¿Podrían ocurrir motivos por los cuales justificaría Ud. un golpe de estado que interrumpa el proceso democrático Boliviano?

Si [1] No [2]
NS[8]

BC16. ¿Considera Ud. que hay alguna razón por la cuál se justifica la violencia cometida por los militantes políticos?

Se justifica [1] No se justifica [2]
NS [8]

BC17. En el mes de abril de este año hubieron protestas violentas en varias regiones de Bolivia. ¿En su opinión, se justificaba entonces un golpe de Estado acabando con el gobierno electo, o no se justificaba?

Golpe justificado [1] Golpe no justificado [2] No sabe [8]

BC18. Si ocurren otras protestas parecidas en el futuro, ¿en su opinión, se justificaría un golpe de Estado que acabe con con el gobierno electo o no se justificaría?

Golpe justificado [1] Golpe no justificado [2] No sabe [8]

Ahora (*entregue tabla # 2*) vamos a usar esta tabla... Esta tabla contiene una escalera de 7 gradas, cada una indica un puntaje que va de 1 que significa nada, hasta 7 que significa mucho. Por ejemplo si yo le pregunto: "hasta qué punto le gusta ver TV?", si a Ud. no le gusta nada elegiría el puntaje de 1; si por el contrario, le gusta mucho ver TV me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho, Ud. elegiría un puntaje intermedio. Hagamos la prueba. "hasta qué punto le gusta ver TV?" léame el número por favor. (ASEGURESE QUE ENTIENDA) Usando esta tarjeta

	Escalera							NS/NR
	Nada						Mucho	
B1. Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los tribunales de justicia de Bolivia garantizan un juicio justo?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B2. Hasta qué punto tiene respeto por las instituciones políticas de Bolivia?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B3. Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político boliviano?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B4. Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político boliviano?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B6. Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el sistema político boliviano?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B30. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B11. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Corte Nacional Electoral?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B13. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Congreso?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B18. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la policía?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B20. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Iglesia Católica?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B21. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los periodistas?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B21A. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Presidente?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B22. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Gobierno Municipal?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B22B. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la autoridad originaria?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B22C. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el comité de vigilancia municipal?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B22D. Hasta que punto tiene confianza en las Organizaciones Territoriales de Base OTBs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B23. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los sindicatos?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B23A. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Ministerio Público o fiscales?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B23B. Hasta que punto tiene confianza en los Defensores Públicos?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B23C. Hasta que punto tiene confianza en la Defensora del Pueblo?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B23D. Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Consejo de la Judicatura?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B23E. Hasta que punto tiene confianza en el Tribunal Constitucional?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
B31. Hasta que punto tiene confianza en las organizaciones no gubernamentales, las ONGs, que trabajan en la comunidad?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

Ahora, en esta misma tabla, hasta qué punto diría Ud. que el Gobierno actual (*seguir con tabla # 1*)

N1. Combate la pobreza.

NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO

N1 No. _____

N3. Promueve y protege los principios democráticos.

NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO

N3 No. _____

C3. ¿Una ley que prohibiera las manifestaciones públicas?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
C5. ¿ Con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaría que se prohibiera reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político boliviano?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
C6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaría que el Gobierno censure la propaganda de sus enemigos políticos?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88

¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está Ud. más de acuerdo?

NEWTOL4. El Estado debería 1) tener el derecho de prohibir la expresión de opiniones contrarias que puedan dañar a nuestra nación o 2) el Estado no debería tener el derecho de prohibir la expresión de cualquier idea, incluso si tenemos que pagar un precio por ello.

Prohibir la expresión [1] No prohibir la expresión [2] NS [8]

NEWTOL5. 1) Los homosexuales deberían tener el derecho de organizarse y vestirse de la manera que quieran o 2) los homosexuales dan un mal ejemplo a nuestros niños y por lo tanto deberían ser controlados por el gobierno.

Tienen derecho [1] Deben ser controlados [2] NS [8]

NEWTOL6. Los ciudadanos que apoyan el retorno de los militares al gobierno en Bolivia deberían 1) tener el mismo derecho a organizarse que cualquier otro o 2) los grupos que apoyan un gobierno militar deberían ser prohibidos de organizarse.

Mismo derecho [1] Prohibidos de organizarse [2] NS [8]

AOJ1. ¿Cree Ud. que avisar o denunciar un delito a la policía o autoridad es fácil, difícil o muy difícil?

Fácil [1] difícil [2] muy difícil [3] N S / N R [8]

AOJ2. Cuando uno tiene que resolver algún caso en los juzgados o tribunales, Ud. cree que se lo trata siempre con justicia, a veces se lo trata con justicia o no se lo trata con justicia?

Se lo trata con justicia [1] A veces se lo trata con justicia [2] No se lo trata con justicia [3] N S / N R [8]

AOJ3. Durante los últimos 12 meses ha sido Ud. víctima de robos o agresiones?

Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

AOJ3B. Durante los últimos 12 meses algún miembro de su familia ha sido víctima de robos o agresiones?

Si [1] No [2] NS/NR [8]

AOJ3A. Si ha sido víctima el o su familia => Ha denunciado o dio aviso a la policía o PTJ o a la autoridad de la comunidad este robo o agresión

Policía [1] Autoridad de la comunidad [2] No lo denunció [3] N S / N R [8] NDR [9]

AOJ4. De los trámites que Ud. o alguien de su familia ha hecho en la Policía o PTJ, se siente muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho o insatisfecho de los resultados obtenidos?

Muy satisfecho [1] Algo satisfecho [2] Insatisfecho [3] Nunca hizo trámites [90] N S / N R
[8]

AOJ5. ¿Cómo diría que lo atienden en la policía o PTJ cuando tiene que tratar algún asunto con ellos? Muy bien , bien, mal o muy mal?

Muy bien [1] Bien [1] Mal [3] Muy mal [4] Nunca hizo trámites [90] N S / N R
[8]

AOJ6. Cuando tiene que tratar algún asunto en los juzgados, por lo general, cómo lo atienden? Muy bien , bien, mal o muy mal?

Muy bien [1] Bien [1] Mal [3] Muy mal [4] Nunca hizo trámites [90] N S / N R
[8]

AOJ7. Cuando tiene que tratar algún asunto en las oficinas del Ministerio Público o fiscales, cómo lo atienden? Muy bien , bien, mal o muy mal?

Muy bien [1] Bien [1] Mal [3] Muy mal [4] Nunca hizo trámites [90] N S / N R
[8]

AOJ8. ¿Ha oído hablar sobre el nuevo Código de Procedimiento Penal?

Sí [1] No [2]
NS[8]

AOJ9. ¿El nuevo Código de Procedimiento Penal incorpora “jueces ciudadanos” para que junto al juez ayuden a decidir la culpabilidad y pena en los juicios. Usted diría que esto es muy bueno, algo bueno, algo malo o muy malo

Muy bueno [1] Algo bueno [2] Algo malo [3] Muy malo [4] N S / N R
[8]

AOJ10. ¿Con cuáles de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo? Para poder luchar contra la delincuencia, las autoridades: 1) Nunca deberían romper las reglas, o 2) Algunas veces tienen que romper las reglas

nunca romper reglas [1] algunas veces romper las reglas [2] No sabe/no responde [8]

AOJ11. Cuando se tienen serias sospechas acerca de las actividades criminales de una persona, ¿cree usted que: 1. Se debería esperar a que el juzgado dé la orden respectiva, o 2. La policía puede entrar a la casa de esta persona sin necesidad de una orden judicial

se debería esperar [1] la policía puede entrar [2] No sabe/no responde [8]

AOJ12. ¿Qué cree usted que es mejor? 1. Vivir en una sociedad ordenada aunque se limiten algunas libertades, o 2. Respetar todos los derechos y libertades, aún si eso causa algo de desorden

vivir en sociedad ordenada [1] respetar derechos y libertades [2] No sabe/no responde [8]

OJ13. ¿Qué tan seguro se siente usted de caminar solo por la noche en su vecindario? Usted se siente, muy seguro, más o menos seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro

muy seguro [1] más o menos seguro [2] algo inseguro [3] muy inseguro [4] no sabe/no responde [8]

AOJ14. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes tres frases está usted más de acuerdo?

- [1] La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno
 [2] En algunas circunstancias, un gobierno autoritario es preferible a uno democrático
 [3] Me da lo mismo un régimen democrático que un régimen no democrático

AOJ15. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? Mano dura [1] Participación de todos [2] No responde [8]

AOJ16. En general, ¿diría Ud. que está muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con el funcionamiento de la democracia en Bolivia?

Muy satisfecho [1] algo satisfecho [2] algo insatisfecho [3] muy insatisfecho [4] No responde [8]

Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida

Ahora para hablar de otra cosa...	No	Si	NS
EXC1. Ha sido acusado durante los dos últimos años por un agente de policía por una infracción que Ud. no cometió?	0	1	8
EXC2. Algún agente de policía le pidió una coima (o soborno)?	0	1	8
EXC4. ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando una coima a un policía en los dos últimos años?	0	1	8
EXC5. ¿Ha visto a alguien pagando una coima a un empleado público por cualquier tipo de favor en los dos últimos años?	0	1	8
EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una coima en los dos últimos años?	0	1	8
EXC11. Para tramitar algo en la municipalidad (como una licencia por ejemplo) durante los dos últimos años. ¿Ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	0	1	8
EXC13. En su trabajo, le han solicitado algún pago no correcto en los dos últimos años?	0	1	8
EXC14. ¿Conoce a alguien que ha tenido que pagar una coima en los estrados judiciales en los dos últimos años?	0	1	8

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos esta muy generalizada, generalizada, poco generalizada o nada generalizada?

Muy generalizada [1] Generalizada [2] Poco generalizada [3] Nada generalizada [4]
 NS/NR [8]

ACR1. Voy a leerle tres frases. Por favor dígame cuál de estas tres describe mejor su opinión:

- [1] La forma en que nuestra sociedad está organizada debe ser completa y radicalmente cambiada por medios revolucionarios
 [2] Nuestra sociedad debe ser gradualmente mejorada o perfeccionada por reformas
 [3] Nuestra sociedad debe ser valientemente defendida de los movimientos revolucionarios

	Respuesta
G11. Recuerda cómo se llama el Presidente de los Estados Unidos	
G12. Recuerda cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil	
G13. Recuerda cómo se llama el Presidente de Argentina	
G14. Recuerda cuántos diputados hay en el Congreso	
G15. Recuerda cómo se llama el diputado uninominal de esta circunscripción	

DM1. ¿Considera Ud. que en Bolivia hay discriminación contra las mujeres?

Si [1] No [2] => *pase a DM3*
NS/NR [8]

DM2. Si hay discriminación => Considera que la discriminación contra las mujeres es muy grave, grave, más o menos grave o no muy grave?

Muy grave [1] Grave [2] Más o menos grave [3] No muy grave [4]
NS/NR [8] NDR [9]

DM3. ¿Tienen las mujeres igualdad de oportunidades para conseguir empleo?

Si tienen [1] No tienen [2]
NS/NR [8]

DM4. Según su experiencia el problema más común de las mujeres en el trabajo es ... (lea las opciones, anote una sola respuesta,)

No les dan empleo si dicen que están embarazadas [1] Las enamoran los jefes (patrones) o compañeros [2]
Es mal vista por pedir permiso para atender a sus hijos [3] Les pagan menos que a los hombres [4]
Les cuesta mucho ascender a un mejor puesto [5] No tiene ningún problema [6]
NS/NR [8]

Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión?

Católico (participante) [1] Católico (no participante) [2] Evangélica [3] Ninguna [6] Otro
_____ NS/NR [8]

Q4. ¿Cuántas veces ha asistido a la iglesia (culto o templo) durante el mes pasado? _____ veces (88= NS/NR)

Ahora para terminar, algunas preguntas que nos sirven sólo para fines estadísticos. En su casa Ud. tiene

	No	Uno	Dos o +	NS/NR
R1. Televisor a color	0	1	2	8
R2. Televisor en Blanco y Negro	0	1	2	8

	No	Si	NS NR
R3. Heladera/refrigerador	0	1	8
R4. Teléfono	0	1	8
R5. Automóvil o camión	0	1	8
R6. Lavaropa	0	1	8
R7. Microondas	0	1	8
R8. Motocicleta	0	1	8
R9. Tractor	0	1	8
R10. Energía eléctrica	0	1	8
R11. Agua potable	0	1	8
R13. Bicicleta	0	1	8
R14. Alcantarillado	0	1	8

R12. Anote si es posible, sin preguntar. Piso de las habitaciones de la casa

Tierra [1] Madera [2] Cemento, ladrillo, terrazo, baldosa [4] cerámica o mosaico [5] no se pudo ver [90]

OCUP1. ¿En qué trabaja Ud?. (Sondee para poder codificar entre las categorías abajo mencionadas. Si es desocupado (a) anote su ocupación usual)

1.- Auto Empleados		2- Empleados de Tiempo Completo:		3.- Trabajadores de tiempo parcial o sin remuneración	
Propietarios o socios de negocios o empresas grandes o medianas	1	Directivos superiores de empresas o negocios	6	Amas de Casa	12
Propietarios o socios de negocios o empresas chicas	2	Directivos intermedios de empresas o negocios	7	Estudiantes	13
Agricultores dueños o inquilinos de su tierra	3	Personal o empleados de Planta	8	Jubilados y Rentistas	14
ganaderos dueños de su ganado	4	Obreros	9	Trabajadores ocasionales	15
profesionales independientes	5	Campesinos empleados en faenas agrícolas	10		
		Comerciantes y artesanos empleados	11		

OCUP2. Sólo para agricultores dueños de tierra o inquilinos => **Cuántas hectáreas de tierra es dueño o se alquila?** _____ (Use decimales si es necesario).

DESOC1. Para todos => **¿Ha estado desocupado durante el último año?**

Si [1] No [2] => Pase a ED

Estudiante, Ama de casa, Jubilado [9]

DESOC2. Si responde Si => **¿Por cuántas semanas durante el último año no ha tenido trabajo?** _____ semanas NDR [9]

ED. Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que Ud. aprobó (encierre en un círculo el último año que aprobó el entrevistado(a))

- Ninguna : 0
- Básico: 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 => Primaria
- Intermedio: 6 - 7 - 8 => Primaria
- Medio: 9 - 10 - 11 y 12 => Secundaria
- Técnica o Universidad : 13 - 14 - 15 - 16 - 17 - 18

Q2. Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años

Q10. En cuál de los siguientes rangos (muestre la tarjeta de ingresos) ubicaría el INGRESO TOTAL MENSUAL de todas las personas de su hogar?

- Nada [0] Menos de 250 Bs. [1] De 251 a 500 Bs. [2] De 501 a 1000 Bs. [3] De 1001 a 2000 Bs. [4]
 De 2001 a 5000 Bs. [5] De 5000 a 10.000 Bs. [6] De 10.001 a 20.000 Bs. [7] más de 20.001 [8]
 NS/NR [88]

Q11. Cuál es su estado civil (No lea las alternativas)

- Soltero [1] Casado [2] Unión libre, concubinato [3] Divorciado [4] Separado [5]
 Viudo [6] NS/NR [8]

Q12. Cuántos hijos tiene Ud. _____ hijos No tiene hijos [0]

ETID. Ud. se considera una persona de raza blanca, mestiza, indígena o negra?

- Blanca [1] Chola [2] Mestiza [3] Indígena [4] Negra [5] Otra _____
 NS/NR [8]

LENG1. Qué idioma ha hablado desde pequeño en su casa? (acepte más de una alternativa)

- Castellano [1] Quechua [2] Aymarará [3] Otro (nativo) [4] _____ Otro extranjero [5] _____
 NS/NR [8]

GRACIAS, HEMOS TERMINADO

LCUEST. Idioma de la entrevista: Castellano [1] Quechua [2] Aymarará [3]

VEST. El entrevistado vestía: Traje indígena/nativo [1] Traje moderno/occidental [2]

Hora terminada _____:_____ tiempo de duración de la entrevista _____ minutos

Nombre del Entrevistado _____

YO JURO QUE ESTA ENTREVISTA FUE LLEVADA A CABO CON LA PERSONA SELECCIONADA

_____ (firma del encuestador)

Firma y código Supervisor _____ Cod. _____

Firma y código Validador _____ Cod. _____

Tabla # 1

Izquierda 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Derecha

Tabla # 2

Mucho	7
	6
	5
	4
	3
	2
Nada	1

Tabla #3:

Aprueba	1
	2
	3
	4
	5
	6
	7
	8
	9
Desapreuba	10

Tabla de Ingresos

0. Nada
1. Menos de 250 Bs.
2. De 251 a 500 Bs.
3. De 501 a 1000 Bs.
4. De 1001 a 2000 Bs.
5. De 2001 a 5000 Bs.
6. De 5001 a 10.000 Bs.
7. De 10.001 a 20.000 Bs.
8. más de 20.001 Bs.