
Political Culture of Democracy in Guatemala, 2010
Democratic Consolidation in the Americas in Hard Times

IX STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC CULTURE OF GUATEMALANS

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Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While their primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, the surveys also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID. *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and donors to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

AmericasBarometer builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country and training local researchers. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University first develops the questionnaire and tests it in each country. It then consults with its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument, and involves them in the pretest phase. Once this is all set, local surveyors conduct house-to-house surveys. With the help of its partner, the Population Studies Center at the University of Costa Rica (CCP), interviewers are now entering the replies directly into Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) in several countries. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt’s team reviews it for accuracy and devises the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer's* biggest supporter, this year the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the Swedish Development Corporation (SIDA), Princeton University, the University of Notre Dame, and York University and Université Laval (Canada) helped fund the surveys as well. Vanderbilt University’s College of Arts and Science made a major contribution to the effort. Thanks to this support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses. Also new this year, the country reports now contain three sections. The first one provides an overall assessment of the economic crisis. The second section deals with particular themes key to democracy. Finally, the third section delves into country-specific themes and priorities.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson’s leadership of *AmericasBarometer* and welcomes Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister to his team. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Regards,

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Prologue: Background of the Study

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This study serves as the latest contribution of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2010 study is the largest we have undertaken, and we believe that it represents the largest survey of democratic values ever undertaken in the Americas. It covers every independent country in mainland North, Central and South America, and all of the larger (and some of the smaller) countries in the Caribbean. In 2010 we added, for the first time, Trinidad & Tobago, as well as Suriname. The study involved the tireless efforts of our faculty, graduate students, national team partners, field personnel, donors and, of course, the many thousands of citizens of the Americas who took time away from their busy days to be interviewed. This prologue presents a brief background of this study and places it in the context of the larger LAPOP effort.

LAPOP, founded over two decades ago, is hosted (and generously supported) by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, 24 countries throughout the Americas were included. Finally, in 2010 the number of countries increased to 26. All reports and respective data sets are available on the LAPOP website: www.LapopSurveys.org. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided the principal funding for carrying out these studies. Other donors in 2010 are the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA); York University and Université Laval in Canada; and Princeton University, Notre Dame University, and Vanderbilt University in the United States.

We embarked on the 2010 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments, and the international donor community. We are confident that the study can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, but that it will also serve the academic community, which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values and behaviors are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The Inter-American Development Bank provided a generous grant to bring together leading scholars from around the globe in January 2009 to consider how the sharp economic down might influence democracy in Latin America and

the Caribbean. The scholars who attended that meeting prepared proposals for inclusion of question modules in the 2010 round of surveys. All of those proposals are available on the LAPOP web site.

The LAPOP Central Team then considered each of these proposals and, as well, sought input from its country teams and the donor community. The initial draft questionnaire was prepared in early 2009, and we began the arduous task of determining which items from prior **AmericasBarometer** surveys would be cut so as to make room for at least some of the new items being proposed for 2010. We were able to keep a very strong core of common questions, but deleted some items and modules on which we had already conducted extensive research and believed we had a good understanding of the issues involved.

We then distributed the draft questionnaire to our country teams and donor organizations and built a Wiki on which we placed the draft so that all could make comments and suggestions. We began pretesting the instrument, first here on the Vanderbilt campus, then in the local Hispanic community, and then in countries throughout the hemisphere. Very slowly, over a period of months spent testing and retesting, we refined the survey by improving some items and dropping modules that were just not working. We sent repeated versions to our country teams and received invaluable input. By late October, we had a refined working draft of the core questionnaire.

We then brought all of our country teams and several members of the donor community to San Salvador, El Salvador in November. Building on experiences from the 2004, 2006 and 2008 rounds, it was relatively easy for the teams to agree upon the final core questionnaire for all the countries. The common nucleus allows us to examine, for each country, and between nations, themes such as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, participation of civil society and social capital, the rule of law, evaluations of local governments and participation within them, crime victimization, corruption victimization and electoral behavior. For 2010, however, we also focused on new areas, especially the economic downturn and how it was affecting citizens. Each country report contains analyses of the important themes related to democratic values and behaviors.

A common sample design has been crucial for the success of this comparative effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probabilistic sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals per country.¹ Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication.

The El Salvador meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. For 2010 the reports are centered on the economic downturn. Part I contains extensive information on the economic problem as it affected citizens and shows in what ways economic issues are related to key support for democracy variables. Yet, we did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. So, we included a Part II, in which each team developed their own discussion of those common core issues, and, finally a Part III of each report, in which each country team was given the freedom to develop its own discussion relevant to their country of focus.

A common system of presenting the data was developed as well. We agreed on a common method

¹ With the exception in 2010 of larger samples in Bolivia (N=3,000), Brazil (N = 2,500), Chile (N = 1,965), and Ecuador (N=3,000).

for index construction. We used the standard of an alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7 as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an index (as opposed to a scale) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For example, for a scale of five items, if the respondent answered three or more items, we assign the average of those three items to that individual for the scale. If less than three of the five items were answered, the case was considered lost and not included in the index.

LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layperson reader, meaning that we make heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agree that those graphs should always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs are (or are not) indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also agreed on a common graphical format using STATA 10. The project’s lead data analyst, Dominique Zéphyr, created programs using STATA to generate graphs which presented the confidence intervals taking into account the “design effect” of the sample. This approach represents a major advancement in the presentation of the results of our surveys, as we are now able to have a higher level of precision in the analysis of the data.² In fact, both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study now take into account the design effect of the sample. The implementation of this methodology has allowed us to assert a higher level of certainty if the differences between variables averages are statistically significant.³ Furthermore, regression coefficients are presented in graphical form with their respective confidence intervals. For 2010 we have refined these programs further, making the results, we hope, easier to read and quicker to comprehend.

Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and then took and passed the certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus

² The design effect becomes important because of the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then make the confidence intervals either increase or decrease. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys to have better precision and not assume, as is generally done, that the data had been collected using simple random samples. While the use of stratification within the sample tends to decrease the standard error, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Although the importance of taking into account the design effect has been demonstrated, this practice has not become common in public opinion studies, primarily because of the technical requirements that it implicates. In this sense, LAPOP has achieved yet another level in its mission of producing high quality research by incorporating the design effect in the analysis of the results of its surveys.

³ All AmericasBarometer samples are self-weighted except for Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Trinidad & Tobago, Suriname and the United States. Users of the data file will find a variable called “WT” which weights each country file, which in the case of the self-weighted files, each respondent’s weight is equal to 1. The files also contain a variable called “WEIGHT1500” that makes each country file weighted to a sample size of 1,500 so that no one country would count any more than any other in a comparative analysis.

protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the appendix of each study.












Our concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified (i.e., double entered), after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, for those countries still using paper questionnaires, now a minority of all countries, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps. The first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, this occurred in only one case during the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer. The problem for that country was quickly resolved after all of the data were re-entered. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2010 round is the expansion of the use of personal digital assistants (PDAs) to collect data in 17 of the countries and the use of the Windows Mobile platform for handheld computers using the system. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed and enhanced the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the 2010 round of surveys. We have found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Another benefit of the PDAs was that we could switch languages used in the questionnaires in countries where we used multi-lingual questionnaires. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys, hopefully making it universal in the next round.








In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In Suriname we developed versions in Dutch and Sranan Tongo, as well as our standard Caribbean English. In the end, we were using versions in 15 different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the www.lapopsurveys.org web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyse their data sets and write their studies. The draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by the LAPOP Central team. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing and were sent to USAID for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 40,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the project.

Country	Institutions	
Mexico and Central America		
Costa Rica		
El Salvador		
Guatemala		
Honduras	 <p data-bbox="599 869 813 953">FOPRIDEH Federación de Organizaciones para el Desarrollo de Honduras</p>	 <p data-bbox="1037 932 1341 1005">Hagamos Democracia</p>
Mexico	 <p data-bbox="594 1131 829 1146">Opinión Pública y Mercados</p>	 <p data-bbox="940 1121 1422 1146">INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO AUTÓNOMO DE MÉXICO</p>
Nicaragua	 <p data-bbox="773 1289 1062 1320">Borge y Asociados</p>	
Panama	 <p data-bbox="829 1457 1016 1493">Centro de Iniciativas Democráticas</p>	

Andean/Southern Cone	
Argentina	
Bolivia	
Brazil	
Chile	 
Colombia	 
Ecuador	 
Paraguay	
Peru	<p style="font-size: 1.2em; font-weight: bold;"><i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i></p>
Uruguay	 
Venezuela	

Caribbean	
Dominican Republic	 
Guyana	
Haiti	
Jamaica	 <p>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA</p>
Suriname	 <p>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO</p>
Trinidad & Tobago	 <p>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO</p>

Canada and United States	
Canada	
United States	<p>VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY</p> 

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At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration and hard work of many individuals. The College of Arts & Sciences provided critical support, while the Office of the Provost provided space. Neal Tate, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt was a strong supporter of the project since its inception at Vanderbilt and facilitated its integration with the busy schedule of the Department. Tragically, Neal died during the development of the 2010 round and never saw its completion. His position was filled by Professor Bruce Oppenheimer, who supported the project above and beyond the call of his temporary duty. Professors Jon Hiskey, Zeynep Somer-Topcu and Efren Pérez of the Department of Political Science made many helpful suggestions as the research effort proceeded. Tonya Mills, Grants Administrator, and Patrick D. Green, Associate Director, Division of Sponsored Research, performed heroically in managing the countless contract and financial details of the project. In a study as complex as this, literally dozens of contracts had to be signed and hundreds of invoices paid. They deserve special thanks for their efforts. Tonya Mills, our Grants Manager and Tina Bemby, our Program Coordinator, have provided exceptional support for the project. Rubí Arana took charge of the complex task of synchronization of the many versions of each country questionnaire and our common core. Without her careful eye, we would have missed many minor but critical errors in the translations and country customization process. Fernanda Boidi, who received her Ph.D. from our program last year, played a major role in the pretesting in many countries. She invested countless hours refining the questionnaire for us and saving us from many errors. María Clara Bertini ably supported us from her perch in Quito, Ecuador by running our web page, handling the subscriptions to the data bases and by formatting many of the reports written by country teams. We also want to name all of the Ph.D. students at Vanderbilt who did so much to make this round the best ever: Margarita Corral (Spain) Arturo Maldonado (Peru), Alejandro Díaz Domínguez (Mexico), Juan Carlos Donoso (Ecuador), Brian Faughnan (USA), Matt Layton (USA), Trevor Lyons (USA), Diana Orcés (Ecuador), Daniel Montalvo (Ecuador), Mason Moseley (USA), Scott Revey (USA), Mariana Rodríguez (Venezuela), and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga (Mexico).

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below.

Country/ Institution	Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted)
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science ●Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Associate Director of LAPOP, and Associate Professor of Political Science ●Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson, Associate Professor of Spanish and Portuguese Department ●Dominique Zéphyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP ●Dr. Abby Córdova, Post-doctoral Fellow, LAPOP
Mexico and Central America Group	
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Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Senior Associate at ASIES in Guatemala and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University, USA ●Sample design and coordination of field survey: Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES
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Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. José Rene Argueta, University of Pittsburgh, USA ●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. John Booth, Regents Professor of Political Science, University of North Texas, USA
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-Director of the Estado de la Nación Project, United Nations
Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA
Caribbean Group	
Dominican Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jana Morgan, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee, USA ●Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology, Temple University, USA
Guyana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Everette Cleveland Marciano Glasgow, Development Policy and Management Consultants ●Mark Bynoe, Director, Development Policy and Management Consultants
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dominique Zéphyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP, Vanderbilt University, USA
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Chile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Juan Pablo Luna, Associate Professor of Political Science, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica

Country/ Institution	Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted)
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Argentina	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Germán Lodola, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
Venezuela	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Damarys Canache, CISOR Venezuela and University of Illinois, USA
North America Group	
United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, USA ●Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Associate Director of LAPOP and Associate Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, USA
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Simone Bohn, Assistant Professor of Political Science, York University

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 40,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
July, 2010

Executive Summary

Description of the 2010 study in Guatemala.

This report contains the IX Study of the Democratic Culture in Guatemala. It has been produced consistently every two years since 1993. The purpose of the study has been to show various aspects of the political culture of Guatemalan citizens. This includes values, attitudes and practices related to the political system. Study IX contains the results of the survey carried out at the national level in the first quarter of the year 2010. Unlike the electoral surveys or surveys measuring support for situational topics, the studies of democratic culture represent long term trends.

In the period of two years, between the last survey in 2008 and the survey completed in 2010, one of the greatest threats to democracy occurred in Guatemala. The threat posed an even greater danger than the initiation of democracy in Guatemala 25 years ago. In this period between 2008 and 2010, organized crime made a complete penetration into the Guatemalan justice system. And the fragility of various other public institutions was exposed at the same time.⁴ If the world economic crisis – a central theme of this report – affected Guatemalans in various ways, the problems of crime and insecurity were equally important for the Guatemalan population, particularly in the urban areas of the country. Added to all this were the food crisis derived from the drought of 2009 and the natural disasters which occurred in 2010. It would be difficult to catalogue this period as positive.

This Executive Summary emphasizes the main findings of the study. But further explorations are recommended to obtain a broader perspective. It is important that the reader carefully observes the figures presented for greater understanding of the results. The study of 2010 contains three fundamental parts and ten chapters. The first part analyzes the magnitude of the economic crisis throughout the American continent. It examines the impact of the crisis on the population, and in particular the effect that the crisis had on values and attitudes toward democracy. This part also examines the regional trends. Moreover, in all of the chapters what has taken place in Guatemala is referenced. Part II of the study covers three different subjects. Initially, the opinion and recent experiences of Guatemalans regarding Rule of law (security, crime and corruption) are analyzed. In addition, civil society and citizen participation are examined and finally, the relationship between Guatemalans and their local government is explored. In these two parts of the study a broad comparison is done with the situation existing in other countries on the American Continent. Part III focuses more sharply on subjects of importance to Guatemala. Examples include citizen perception of CICIG, certain cases relevant to the justice system and the Guatemalans position regarding populism and representative democracy. The final chapter explores and compares Guatemalans from generation Y with other generations regarding values and attitudes.

Chapter I. Difficult Times in the Americas: Economic Context.

In addition to discussing the impact of the economic crisis on the region as a whole, this chapter also analyzes the state of democracy in Latin and the Caribbean during the economic crisis. Also analyzed are trends in regional democratic development in recent years. A brief examination of the

⁴ For a detailed analysis see, for example, Brands, Hal. *Crime, Violence, and the Crisis in Guatemala: A Case Study in the Erosion of the State*. (Carlisle, PA, Strategic Studies Institute, 2010).

theoretical relationship between the economic crisis and democracy concludes the discussion. Though Guatemala is mentioned, the focus is on the region as a whole.

Regarding the economic aspect, Guatemala suffered the sudden attack of the crisis, but to a lesser extent than other countries on the continent. This, however, does not imply that the economy took a positive turn. There was a decline in almost all economic indicators between 2008 and 2010 in Guatemala. In the political aspect there was a decline in levels of freedom as well, according to the Freedom House Index. Guatemala did, however, continue to be a partially free state. The position of Guatemala in the Index of Failed States is also analyzed. The conclusion of the Index was that no major changes occurred in Guatemala, and therefore this country does not qualify as a failed state. However, in two other indicators—illegitimacy of the State and the existence of groups acting as a state within a state—Guatemala received a negative evaluation.

Chapter II. Perceptions and Citizen Experiences during Difficult Times in the Americas.

This chapter analyzes how the world economic crisis affected citizens of the Americas. The emphasis is on the impact of the crisis in Guatemala. Just as other Latin Americans perceived that an economic crisis existed, a majority of Guatemalans perceived the same. 61% of Guatemalans considered the crisis to be extremely serious. In Guatemala, responsibility for the crisis was assigned to the previous government (18%) as well as to the present government (14%); 13% assigned responsibility to the rich and about the same to the existing economic system. Only 10% assigned blame to the wealthy countries.

In regard to job loss, 27.4% of Guatemalans interviewed reported that they, or their family members, had lost jobs in the past two years. As a result, Guatemala is located in the medium high range of countries of the Americas. With respect to family income, 32.2% of those interviewed indicated that their income decreased in the past year. Economic problems were more severe among the rural population and in general among the poorer sectors of society. Finally, 13.2% of Guatemalans reported receiving household remittances from outside sources. In comparison with other countries, Guatemala is located in the medium range in terms of receiving remittances. Of the 13.2%, almost one half of the respondents received reduced amounts in the past year.

Chapter III. Democratic Values in Hard Times.

This chapter evaluates the impact of the economic crisis on the Americas and particularly on Guatemala. This is measured in terms of life satisfaction and other variables relating to democracy. Between 2008 and 2010 there was a decline in life satisfaction among 34% of the population. This result is associated with the perception that personal economy worsened in the past two years and that family incomes decreased.

On the one hand, neither Guatemala nor the rest of the region decreased their support for democracy as a consequence of the economic crisis. In Guatemala there was not a variation between 2008 and 2010 in relation to support for the political system. However, it was found that in the Americas the negative perception of the economy did correlate with a decrease in system support. And by contrast, system support increased when persons had a good evaluation of economic performance of the government. Guatemala presented the same pattern: those who gave a positive evaluation of economic measures taken by the government of Álvaro Colom were more inclined to give high levels of support for the system.

Satisfaction with democracy also declined in Guatemala between 2008 and 2010, falling from 52.5 to 47.8 points. Throughout the continent, including Guatemala, variables relating to the economic crisis had a negative impact on satisfaction with democracy. This was particularly true of variables which measured the perception about the state of the economy. Yet, again, the variable relating most to decreased satisfaction with democracy in 2010 were those relating to the evaluation of performance of the government regarding economic measures. In general this refers to the satisfaction of presidential performance.

Finally, this chapter measures the impact of the economic crisis on support for an eventual military coup. It was found that Guatemala was the only country on the continent in 2010 in which support for a coup increased. It climbed from 38.3 to 46 points. As in other countries, the increased support for a coup was related statistically to two factors—age and education: the younger Guatemalans and those with less education were more inclined to support a coup. Unlike the other countries, satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with the President was one of the most important predictors in support for a coup d'état in Guatemala in 2010.

Chapter IV. Rule of Law, Crime and Corruption.

This chapter analyzes two subjects related to rule of law and relevant to Guatemalan reality: insecurity and crime combined with corruption. Relating to this, the perception of those interviewed as well as different kinds of victimization are explored.

Regarding perception of insecurity, Guatemala is located in the medium range compared to the 26 countries of the Americas. The average perception of insecurity for Guatemala is 39.9 points. This is slightly below the continental average of 40.5 points. However, regarding victimization by crime, Guatemala is one of the eight countries reporting the highest levels of crime. In 2010 the level rose to 23.3% from 17.5% in 2008. Victimization of a household member is also higher in Guatemala than on the rest of the continent. While the percentage of familial victimization in the Americas is 19.4%, in Guatemala it reaches 26.9%. The perception of insecurity, as much as crime victimization (at both the personal and household level) increased significantly in Guatemala's urban areas, in comparison to its rural areas. Particularly vulnerable was the Metropolitan Zone.

Regarding the perception of corruption of public officials, Guatemala is slightly higher than the median range for the continent. Similarly, the percentage of victimization by corruption in Guatemala is higher (21.2%) than the continent as a whole (16.9%). Residents of urban areas, especially in the Metropolitan Zone, are more likely to suffer acts of crime and are also more vulnerable to victimization by corruption. The consequence of this is that citizens inhabiting urban areas show weaker support for the political system and weaker support toward rule of law. This is particularly the case in the Metropolitan Zone. It is interesting to note that crime victimization of a household member had greater impact in decreased support for the political system than direct victimization for those interviewed.

Chapter V. Legitimacy, System Support and Political Tolerance.

This chapter analyses the subject of legitimacy of the political system, political institutions and the stability of democracy in the Americas in general, and Guatemala in particular. The combination of results for support for the political system and political tolerance serve to obtain a composite measure of stable democracy.

Support for the political system remained stable in Guatemala between 2008 and 2010, but Guatemala continued as one of the countries reporting a low average in this variable. On the one hand, political tolerance increased significantly in 2010, climbing from 43.6 points in 2008 to 50.1 points in 2010. This increase in political tolerance contributed to the index of support for a stable democracy which also improved in 2010 in Guatemala: only 18.5% of the population supported a stable democracy in 2008. In 2010 that support grew to 22.7%. This amount, however, was not enough to place Guatemala above the medium range of the continent. A further matter of concern is that 26.2% of the Guatemalan population is located in the category of “democracy at risk” with low levels of support for both the political system and political tolerance.

Among the factors influencing these negative results were victimization of household members and individual victimization by corruption. Both those interviewed who had a family member victimized by crime or were directly victimized by corruption were less inclined to support a stable democracy.

This chapter also measures the legitimacy of various political institutions. The institutions which generated the greatest trust among citizens are the Army, the Office of Human Rights, the local government and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, respectively. All of these institutions reached scores above 50 points (on a scale of 0-100). At the other extreme, those institutions with the least legitimacy were the political parties, the Congress and the National Civil Police.

Chapter VI. Civil Society and Citizen Participation.

This chapter examines the subject of interpersonal trust, a key element of “social capital”. It was found that Guatemala is located in the medium low range in relation to the other countries on the continent. Guatemala shows an interpersonal trust average of 57.4 points which has not varied significantly since 2004. Guatemalan residents of rural areas and those who have a perception of greater physical security have more trust in other persons.

Following this, levels of participation of Guatemalans are analyzed. Regarding participation in social organizations (civic organizations), Guatemalans have relatively high levels. Participation is greatest in organizations and groups related to church and those related to primary and secondary schools. In most other kinds of organizations, participation is significantly lower. Surprisingly, participation in women’s groups reached an average of 13 points. This is more than the participation in guilds or those related to occupation (where average participation reached 8.7 points). Regarding participation in protests, Guatemala received an evaluation above the average in 2010.

In terms of electoral participation, Guatemalans reported lower levels than the rest of the continent. This is not surprising since various measurements through the years have reported that Guatemala has low levels of voter turnout. Finally, in terms of activism (interest in politics, trying to convince others to vote and participation in electoral campaigns), Guatemalans show lower averages than the rest of the continent.

Chapter VII. Local Government.

This chapter focuses on one specific subject: the relationship between citizens and their local government. To begin with, the percentage of participation in meetings of municipal government is measured. Guatemala is located above the medium range for the continental region in terms of participation in these meetings—reaching 15.7%. This is a positive find.

Also explored is the frequency by which citizens communicate with the local government (of their corresponding place of residence). Again, a similar percentage was reported. 15.9% of Guatemalan citizens presented a request to their local government last year. This result placed Guatemala above the medium range of the region (reporting 13.3%). Residents of rural areas who demonstrated greater interest in politics were more inclined to present these types of requests.

Finally, those interviewed were asked to evaluate the performance of their local government. The average satisfaction with local government was 51.9% points (on a scale of 0 – 100) in 2010. This was also a higher score than the average of the Americas (50.3). Satisfaction declined slightly in 2008, but not in a statistically significant way. In the year 2010, residents of urban areas and Guatemalans with higher levels of education reported more satisfaction. However, the most important variable for explaining the degree of satisfaction was the existing confidence in the municipal institution. The average confidence in the municipality of the respondent in 2010 was 51.3 points. As previously explained in Chapter V of this study, this result placed Guatemala in the group of countries with the highest level of confidence in local government.

Chapter VIII. Perspectives Regarding CICIG and Issues Related to Justice.

This chapter, like those remaining in part III of the study, does not emphasize comparisons with other countries of the continent. Rather, the subjects examined are specific to Guatemala. Chapter VIII concentrates on citizen evaluations of the CICIG and on subjects relevant to justice. Also analyzed are the perceptions of Guatemalans regarding the election of the Supreme Court of Justice, which occurred in the second half of 2009.

At the time of the survey, CICIG generated a relatively high rate of confidence in relation to the other national institutions. The level of trust in this commission reached an average of 56.8 points on a scale of 0-100 (used in the study). In comparison, the justice system as a whole generated 41.4 points of confidence. Chapter VIII makes a detailed comparison between the degree of legitimacy of CICIG and other institutions in the justice sector. Using a multi-varied analysis to find determinants which support CICIG, it was found that the particular region of the country is an explanatory factor. While residents of the Metropolitan Zone showed a weaker level of trust in the commission (50.7) than other parts of Guatemala, the Southwest region reported a much higher level—65.2 points. Those perceiving that corruption is generalized in the Guatemalan government have greater trust in the CICIG. And curiously, those whose family members were victimized by crime reported significantly lower levels of trust for this institution.

The other subject measured in this chapter is the knowledge and evaluation of the election of magistrates to the Supreme Court of Justice in Guatemala in the second half of 2009. The controversial nature of this process received wide news media coverage. Consequently, a desire to learn citizens' opinions regarding this issue existed. A striking find revealed that only 41.1% of Guatemalans interviewed were knowledgeable about the election. It may be less surprising to learn that Guatemalans from the Metropolitan Zone who pay close attention to news coverage in general had a greater degree of knowledge about the election. It was also found that citizens of older age and with more education knew more regarding the subject of the elections. Finally, those reporting to be informed were asked if they believed that the CICIG played a positive role in the process. A majority answered affirmatively (62.7%).

Chapter IX. Guatemalans, Populism and Representative Democracy.

This chapter analyses the extent to which Guatemalans support the practices and principles of representative democracy. The first step is to explore the perception of political parties which are key to a representative democracy. It was found that Guatemala is one of three countries on the American continent where citizens identify least with a specific party. While the medium range of identification with a party in the region as a whole is 35.8 points (on a scale of 0-100), Guatemala reaches only 18.3 points. Another question relating to political parties was asked of the respondents: To what extent can a democracy exist without political parties? In Guatemala, 41% answered that democracy can indeed exist without political parties. And in other Latin American the percentage of citizens who believe democracy can exist without political parties is even greater.

The next important subject of this chapter, also relating to representative democracy, is support for populism. A series of four questions was used to measure this support. Guatemala, as well as the rest of the continent, demonstrated wide support for the following idea: Those who are in disagreement with the majority represent a threat to the country. The average support for this idea garnered almost 41 points in Guatemala, slightly above the region's level of 37.8 points. Guatemalans also showed relatively high support for the idea that the people should govern directly and not through elected representatives. Two other ideas received less support: the idea that the president should limit the voice of political parties, and the idea that the president should govern without Congress. In all cases, however, support for populist measures is greater at 30 points. This implies that at least one third of the Guatemalan adult population would be disposed to disregard the principles of representative democracy. The multi-varied analysis shows clearly that the residents of the Metropolitan Zone, older citizens, and those with higher levels of education are less supportive of populism.

Chapter X. Democracy in Guatemala: Does a Generation Gap Exist?

This final chapter of the Report on Democratic Culture in the year 2010 examines the specific subject of the political culture of Generation Y. These young Guatemalans between the ages of 18 and 29 grew up in a democratic environment and are compared to those generations which preceded them. It was found that generally speaking no apparent generation gap exists regarding attitudes or opinions about democracy. However some notable and important contrasts do exist.

There were no statistically significant differences found between the young people of Generation Y and the other generations concerning the following ideas: level of support for democracy as an idea, satisfaction with how democracy functions in Guatemala, or preference for a democratic government above an authoritarian one. Although levels of political tolerance were somewhat lower among Generation Y, that difference was also not statistically significant. In a similar way, members of Generation Y showed greater support for the political system but that was not statistically significant. These young people, also known as Generation Net, did not show wide differences in their perception of freedom to exercise political rights. They did, however, feel slightly more at liberty to apply for public office. The distribution of the young people of Generation Y on the ideological scale (left-right) is also similar to the rest of the population. The majority of Guatemalans, young or not, tend to be located in the moderate range of the ideological scale.

Generational differences are apparent regarding the following subjects: In showing weaker support for authoritarian politics, Generation Y reported 34.4%, while generations over 30 reported 41.8%; regarding an eventual military coup, Generation Y showed much stronger support than the other

generations. Generation Y showed an average support for a coup of 49.6 points in 2010. The general average support was 44.4 points. These findings are cause for concern.

Finally, Generation Y showed greater openness in supporting political rights of other generations. Yet, at the same time, the younger generation is more inclined to accept illegal ways of participation in government. Examples include the takeover of buildings, the blockading of streets, and of greatest concern, taking justice into their own hands.

Part I: Hard Times and Their Effects on Democracy

Chapter I. Hard Times in the Americas: Economic Overview

Introduction

Since the last round of the AmericasBarometer in 2008, one of the most severe world-wide economic recessions since the Great Depression took place. This crisis took place in the context of what organizations like Freedom House were reporting a world-wide “democracy recession.” This economic crisis affected most nations in the world; the Americas have not been immune. Yet, many of the nations in Latin America and the Caribbean seem to have managed the crisis unusually well, no doubt mitigating its potential impact on democracy. In this study, we first briefly examine the data on the economic downturn, but then we turn to the core of our analysis, the AmericasBarometer survey data, the largest survey of democratic public opinion ever conducted in the Americas. We look at the 2008 round, which was conducted before the full weight of the crisis had been experienced, and the 2010 round, when most countries were recovering. Sparked by a massive set of financial problems in the United States, the problem reached crisis proportions in September, 2008; several months after the 2008 AmericasBarometer fieldwork had been completed. The upshot was a near-universal decline in economic growth, increased unemployment, and increased poverty levels that are still being felt, albeit unequally, around the globe.

In the prior study in this series of analyses of public opinion in the Americas, we examined the impact of various governance indicators on support for stable democracy. In this round of the AmericasBarometer 2010, we report on the characteristics of those affected by the crisis, especially those who lost their jobs and those who state that their personal economies have deteriorated. Is the crisis linked to citizens’ support for democracy and democratic principles? And ultimately, does the economic crisis threaten support for democracy?

In this chapter, we begin with a global overview of the economic crisis in terms of economic growth, unemployment, and poverty levels, followed by a regional and specific country assessment. We then document a global, as well as a regional, “democracy recession”, and then discuss democracy at the country level. We conclude by identifying the important relationships scholars have theorized and found between economic and democratic decline.

Economic Overview

The 2010 AmericasBarometer survey took place in the context of the greatest global economic crisis in the past 80 years. In terms of economic expansion, world real GDP growth showed a systematic decline from 3.9 to 3 percent by the end of 2008, and in 2009 fell to a negative 1.4 percent (see Figure I.1). Yet, as the 2010 survey began, there were projections estimating a recovery was underway.⁵ Moreover, while some countries were seriously affected by the crisis, others were not and were even able to sustain growth in the context of a world-wide slowdown. Indeed, it appears that unlike the severe crises of the past that sharply weakened Latin American and Caribbean economies, careful management of counter-cyclical policies averted many of the worst effects.

⁵ IMF, *World Economic Outlook 2009: Crisis and Recovery* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2009).

While by the time the 2010 round of surveys began, the world economy was exhibiting signs of economic recovery in a variety of countries, the effects of the crisis were still being suffered across the globe. Forty three poor countries in 2009 suffered serious consequences of the economic crisis, with many facing underperformance in vital areas such as education, health, and infrastructure. By the end of 2010, even with recovery, it is believed that as many as 64 million more people will be living in extreme poverty than in 2009, that is, on less than \$1.25 per day. Moreover, initial predictions were that more than 1 billion people were expected to go chronically hungry reversing many benefits that had been obtained from successful anti-poverty programs implemented in the previous decade.⁶




Figure I.1. World Real GDP Growth Estimates and Projections, 2007-2011 (Source IMF, World Economic Outlook (2010)⁷)

Crisis-related unemployment increases were substantial and widely felt. According to the International Labour Organization, the global unemployment rate for 2009 was estimated at 6.6 percent, corresponding to about 212 million persons. This means an increase of almost 34 million people over the number of unemployed in 2007, with most of this increment taking place in 2009. In addition, many workers fell into more vulnerable forms of employment and this, in turn, has reduced work benefits, swollen precarious employment conditions and elevated the number of the working poor. It is estimated that vulnerable employment increased by more than 100 million workers between 2008 and 2009.⁸ Furthermore, even though “the extreme working poor,” that is, individuals living on less than \$1.25 per day, was reduced by 16.3 percentage points between 1998 to 2008, by the end of 2008, the extreme working poor remained at a total of 21.2 percent of all employment, implying that around 633 million workers were living with their families on less than \$1.25 a day worldwide.⁹

All these figures point to the severity of the impact of the economic recession around the world. Yet, the crisis did not impact all regions or countries uniformly. While some regions and countries experienced pronounced economic setbacks, such as the United States, the European Union, and Japan to name a few, the impact in Latin America and the Caribbean as a region was more uneven and not as

⁶ See www.worldbank.org/financialcrisis/bankinitiatives.htm
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22152813~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html>

⁷ IMF, *World Economic Outlook 2010: Rebalancing Growth* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2010).

⁸ ILO, *Global Employment Trends: January 2010* (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 2010), 42.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 22.

severe in many countries.¹⁰ Recent data from the World Bank indicate that after nearly a decade of strong performance, GDP growth in Latin America and the Caribbean decreased from an average of 5.5 to 3.9 percent between 2007 and 2008, and fell even further in 2009 (2.6%).¹¹ Economic recovery, however, seems to be underway based on the latest projections available as of this writing, and show that real GDP growth may increase from 3.1 and 3.6 percent in 2010 and 2011, respectively.¹² On the other hand, other projections from the Inter-American Development Bank suggest that Latin American exports are likely to decrease significantly for a time until world-wide demand is restored. Similarly, terms of trade between Latin American and advanced industrialized countries are also likely to deteriorate, as the prices of primary commodities have fallen.¹³

The financial disaster has had a negative impact on the labor market. The unemployment rate is estimated to have increased to 8.5 percent in the first quarter of 2009 compared to 7.8 percent during the same period in 2008, suggesting that more than one million more Latin American workers were unable to find jobs (UN 2010). Similarly, even though the working poor (i.e., those living on less than \$2 a day) decreased by 6.2 percentage points between 2003 and 2008, best estimates are that a reversal took place in 2009.¹⁴ Furthermore, the extreme working poor (i.e., those living on less than \$1.25) rose from 7 to 9.9 percent in 2009.¹⁵ These are just some examples of the serious effects that the financial crisis has had on Latin America.

The economic crisis in the U.S. and other advanced industrial nations also affected the level of remittances (that is, money sent home by family members working abroad) on which so many families in Latin America depend. For example, some estimates suggest that remittances constitute more than half the income for about 30% of recipient families, helping to keep these families out of poverty.¹⁶ Remittances represent an important percentage of inflows to many local economies. Seven of the region's nations receive 12% or more of GDP from their families abroad: Haiti, Guyana, Jamaica, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. In many of these countries, remittances have become the first or second source of revenue, sometimes exceeding exports, tourism, and foreign investment (UNDP 2009). As early as 2008 the growth rates of remittances declined considerably across Latin America, even becoming negative in some countries (see Figure 1.2).

¹⁰ Following an estimated economic growth decline of 2.5% in 2009, the U.S. is expected to grow by 2.1% in 2010. Japan, on the other hand, the country that most severely felt the consequences of the crisis (-5.4%) compared to other industrialized nations is expected to grow only marginally in 2010 (0.9%).

See <http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/wesp2010files/wesp2010pr.pdf>

¹¹ World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects: Crisis, Finance, and Growth 2010* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2010).

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Eduardo Fernandez-Arias and Peter Montiel, "Crisis Response in Latin America: Is the 'Rainy Day' at Hand?" (Inter-American Development Bank, 2009).

¹⁴ World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects: Crisis, Finance, and Growth 2010* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2010).

¹⁵ ILO, *Global Employment Trends: January 2010*, 30.

¹⁶ See <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1910986> and <http://www.ifad.org/events/remittances/maps/latin.htm>




Figure I.2. Declines in Remittances to Latin America, 2007-2009 as reported by the World Bank

Figure I.2 shows that throughout the year 2009, the growth rate of remittances decreased and turned negative in Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, and Jamaica, all countries that are major recipients of remittances. For example, remittances in Mexico decreased by 13.4 percent in the first nine months of 2009 from a consistent remittance growth rate of over 25 percent in 2006. Declines in remittances were also registered in South American countries, such as Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.¹⁷

The most recent data available as of the writing of this report shows that while the crisis was the worst experienced in the region over the last two decades, by 2010 recovery was underway.¹⁸ As shown in Figure I.3, drawn from a recent IDB study, which is based on the seven largest economies in the region (collectively accounting for 91% of the region's GDP), the growth decline in 2009 was -2.0%, but the rebound in growth for 2010 is forecast to be a positive 3.7% growth rate.¹⁹

¹⁷ See <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/MigrationAndDevelopmentBrief11.pdf>

¹⁸ Alejandro Izquierdo and Ernesto Talvi, *The Aftermath of the Global Crisis: Policy Lessons and Challenges Ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean* (Washington, D. C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 2010).

¹⁹ These data are based on the seven largest economies of the region (they represent 91% of the regional GNP).




Figure I.3. Annual Change in Real GDP in Latin America, 1991-2010
(Source: Izquierdo and Talvi, 2010, p. 25)

The Mexican economy, for instance, experienced the steepest contraction compared to other countries in the region, dropping from a growth rate of 3.4 percent in 2007 to -6.5 percent in 2009. The general economic problems world-wide were exacerbated in Mexico in part due to the outbreak of the AH1N1 flu virus that produced declines in the important tourism industry. Brazil, in contrast, one of the relatively least affected countries in the region, still experienced a reduction in growth from 5.7 to -0.2 percent between 2007 and 2009. Projections for both countries indicate economic growth is expected to recover to between 3.5 and 3.9 percent in 2010-2011. The change from 2008-2009 in real GDP is shown in Figure I.4. As can be seen, all but eleven of the countries covered by the AmericasBarometer suffered declines in GDP.

The changes in the growth rates between 2008 and 2009 varied from country to country. For example, in Ecuador the rate of economic growth in 2008 was 6.5%, while in 2009 it was 0.4%. The change in Mexico went from 1.3% in 2008 to -6.5% in 2009.²⁰

²⁰ Data on economic growth come from different sources and are not always consistent across time or between sources; as various parts of this report were written, we used the databases that seemed most trustworthy and that were available at the moment of the writing.




Figure I.4. Change in Real GDP, 2008-2009

Fortunately, the potential impact of the crisis was reduced owing to a number of factors. As the IDB’s latest analysis states:

“...even at the peak of the crisis, with the bottom of the abyss nowhere in sight, emerging markets in general and Latin America in particular, for the most part performed surprisingly well. True, following the Lehman Brothers debacle, stock and bond prices tumbled, currencies depreciated sharply and growth came to a halt as the region slipped into a recession in 2009. However, the region avoided currency and debt crises and bank runs so typical of previous episodes of global financial turbulence (1982, 1998 and 2001). The ability of the region to withstand an extremely severe shock without major financial crises was truly remarkable....²¹

According to the IDB, the consensus opinion is that a combination of low inflation, the availability of fiscal surpluses and international reserves, a largely flexible exchange rate system and sound banking systems make the impact of this crisis so much less severe than in the past.

Dimensions of the Economic Crisis in Guatemala

The Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL) has warned that the world economic crisis could have greater effects in Mexico and Central America than in the rest of the region. This relates

²¹ Izquierdo and Talvi, *The Aftermath of the Global Crisis: Policy Lessons and Challenges Ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean*, 1.

particularly to the economic ties these countries have with the United States (for example, exports and remittances). However, in the case of Guatemala, conditions in the country allowed the Bank of Guatemala to minimize the initial impact of the world economic crisis. Examples such as diversification of the destiny of exports, the high level of reserves, the favorable balance of the external debt as a percentage of the PIB, the low level of the dollar, the stable rate of exchange, the improved business climate and the risk assessment of the country (ASIES, 2010) made this possible.

The “Annual Assessment of Economic Activity of 2009 and Perspectives for 2010” done by the Department of Investigations and Economic Bureau of the Association of Investigation and Social Studies (ASIES), focuses precisely on analyzing the degree of the impact of the world crisis on the Guatemalan economy and particularly if the country entered into recession as a consequence of the same. The study concluded the following:

“The analysis completed on the economic assessment of the results of twelve indicators of income, spending and production (the three forms of PIB measurement) show that the country reduced the volume of production in 2009 as did Mexico and the rest of the countries of Central America. One of the consequences of the financial crisis of the country was the loss of at least 30,000 formal jobs in the Metropolitan Area. In addition, it was shown that the effects of the crisis could last into 2010 if employment and investment of enterprises do not return to levels observed in 2008”²².

Figure I.4 showed previously that PIB was contracted in Guatemala between 2008 and 2009, although to a lesser degree than in many countries of the region. Table I.1 shows some of the more relevant indicators related to the economic situation of Guatemala, particularly referring to the changes which occurred within the framework of the economic crisis, between 2008 and 2009. The majority of indicators show deterioration in the economic situation. Economic growth declined from 3.3% in 2008 to a minimum growth of 0.6% in 2009. Separate components, such as the sum of imports and exports were substantially reduced, in particular in dealing with the United States.

Table I.1 also shows that income from remittances to Guatemala decreased considerably between 2008 and 2009, which is not surprising. In Central America the major recipients of remittances are Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras. These countries’ total remittance income has decreased considerably, in part because the origin of this type of income is from the United States. Nicaragua, on the other hand, receives an important proportion of remittances from countries in the Latin American region.²³ The only indicator which presented a positive sign was the cost of living, or inflation. And economists report that this is not necessarily a product of a healthy economy.

No information is available at present regarding unemployment or underemployment. Therefore comparisons between years cannot be made. However, it can be observed that though unemployment is not high, underemployment is, reaching 15.4% in 2006. In the social aspect, Guatemala continues as one of the Latin American countries with the largest indexes of poverty and inequality. The most recent information available, including national as well as international, shows that in the year 2006 one-half of the population lives in poverty, while 15.2% live in extreme poverty. Hunger in the eastern and northeastern part of the country caused by the drought in 2009 demonstrated the fragility of the situation

²² ASIES, Executive Summary of the “Evaluación anual de la actividad económica del 2009 y perspectivas para 2010”, Guatemala, 2010.

²³ Fundación Konrad Adenauer, Crisis financiera mundial, su impacto económico y social el Centroamérica, Año 1, No. 1, Red Centroamericana de Centros de Pensamiento e Incidencia, Guatemala, February 2010.

for thousands of families living in poverty, and the government decreed a state of public disaster in September of that year.²⁴

Table I.1. Key Economic Indicators in Guatemala, 2008-2009

Variables	2008	2009	Variación anual	Fuente
Tasa de crecimiento del PIB	3.3%	0.6%	-2.7 %	(1)
Indicadores de gasto				
Exportaciones a EE.UU. (millones de US\$)	1,584.4	1,270.1	-19.8 %	(2)
Importaciones de EE.UU. (millones de US\$)	4,409.3	3,573.1	-18.9 %	(2)
Monto total (FOB) de las exportaciones (millones de US\$)	7,199.6	6,702.7	-6.9 %	(2)
Valor (CIF) de las importaciones (millones de US\$)	13,587.2	10,432.51	-23.2 %	(2)
Indicadores de ingreso				
Remesas familiares (millones de US\$)	4,393.5	3,849.8	-12.4 %	(2)
Ingreso de divisas por turismo (millones de US\$)	1,025.6	906.2	-6.4%	(2)
Otros indicadores				
Inflación	+ 9.4%	-0.28%	-9.12	(3)
Desempleo (2006)		1.5%		(4)
Subempleo (2006)		15.4%		
Pobreza (2006)		51 %		(4)
Pobreza extrema (2006)		15.2%		

Fuentes:

- (1) Banco de Guatemala, información proporcionada por DICE/ASIES.
- (2) ASIES/DICE, Evaluación anual de la actividad económica, 2010.
- (3) Tasa más reciente disponible. Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), información proporcionada por DICE/ASIES.
- (4) Tasa más reciente disponible. Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida (ENCOVI) 2006, información proporcionada por DICE/ASIES.

Trends in Democratic Development

While the economic recession was a major event in many countries in 2009, politically it has been accompanied by a reversal in democratic development in many parts of the developing world.²⁵ According to the Freedom House Report 2010 *Global Erosion of Freedom*, for the fourth consecutive year, freedom declines offset gains in 2009 (Figure I.5). This is the longest uninterrupted period of democracy's decline in the 40 year history of the Freedom House series.²⁶ Many countries around the world suffered an escalation in human rights violations, at the same time as non-democratic nations (e.g., Iran and Russia) became even more repressive. Even countries that had experienced increases in freedom in recent years have now undergone declines in political rights and civil liberties (e.g., Bahrain, Jordan, and Kenya).

²⁴ The food crisis affected mainly 54 thousand poor families and put in danger other 400 thousand according to the government. "Guatemala declares hunger crisis", BBC News, September 9, 2009.

²⁵ Arch Puddington, "The Freedom House Survey for 2009: The Erosion Accelerates," *Journal of Democracy* 21, No. 2 (2010).

²⁶ Freedom House includes two measures of democracy: *political rights* and *civil liberties*. Both measures contain numerical ratings between 1 and 7 for each country with 1 indicating the "most free" and 7 the "least free."




Figure I.5. Freedom in the World: Global Gains Minus Declines from 2003-2010

Examining Freedom House’s specific classification of countries (Table I.2), we find that in 2009, 89 countries continue to belong to the “free” category, representing 46 percent of the world’s 194 countries as well as 46 percent of the global population. The number of countries that are considered “partly free” decreased from 62 to 58 between 2008 and 2009, while the number of “not free” nations rose from 42 to 47 during the same period, corresponding to 20 and 24 percent of the world’s population, respectively. More than 2.3 billion individuals reside in “not free” countries, that is, ones where their political rights and civil liberties are violated in one form or another. One nation, China, makes up 50 percent of this figure. Electoral democracies also diminished to 116 from 123 in 2006 and nine of the 47 countries considered “not free” scored the lowest possible ratings in both civil liberties and political rights.²⁷

Table I.2. Global Trends in Freedom, 1979-2009

Year	TOTAL COUNTRIES	FREE		PARTLY FREE		NOT FREE	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
1979	161	51	32	54	33	56	35
1989	167	61	37	44	26	62	37
1999	192	85	44	60	31	47	25
2006	193	90	47	58	30	45	23
2007	193	90	47	60	31	43	22
2008	193	89	46	62	32	42	22
2009	194	89	46	58	30	47	24

Source: Freedom House 2010

Within Latin America and the Caribbean region, Central America experienced the greatest setbacks in democratic development, according to *Freedom House*, in the 2008-2010 period, highlighted by the 2009 coup d’état in Honduras, which resulted in the removal of this country from the “electoral democracy” category. Other decreases in freedom were registered in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and

²⁷ See <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=1120>

Venezuela.²⁸ Figure I.6 indicates that of the 35 countries in the Americas, nine are not considered “free” by *Freedom House*, that is, 26% of Latin American nations are rated “partly free” because they exhibit deficiencies in their democracies, measured in terms of political rights and civil liberties. All these figures point to a current “democracy recession” in the Americas, much as there is a “democracy recession” in the world as a whole.




Figure I.6. Free, Partly Free, and Not Free Countries in the Americas

While *Freedom House* registers a decline in freedom in the world, and declines in Latin America, this does not mean that citizens have lost faith in democracy. Rather, the Freedom House measure focuses on institutions, not political culture, which is the focus of the present study. It is central to the theory of political culture that over the long term culture and institutions should be congruous with each other, but over the short term significant incongruities can emerge.²⁹ For example, in the years prior to the emergence of competitive democracy in Mexico, political culture there exhibited strong support for democracy.³⁰ So too, it may well be that the democracy recession that is affecting institutions may be “corrected” over the long term by citizen support for democracy. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes can reinforce anti-democratic culture.

Dimensions of Democracy in Guatemala

Scholars consider that the democratic process of Guatemala began in 1985 with the arrival of the Constitution of the Republic and with the first free election of a civil president. The year 2010 marks the 25th anniversary of democratization in the country. It is the longest period in Guatemala’s political history in which the country has lived under an uninterrupted democratic regime with civil officials freely

²⁸ *Ibid*

²⁹ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

³⁰ John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Political Culture and Democratization: Evidence from Mexico, Nicaragua and Costa Rica," in *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, ed. Larry Diamond (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, "Political Culture and Regime Type: Evidence from Nicaragua and Costa Rica," *Journal of Politics* 55, no. 3 (1993).

elected. Throughout these 25 years, the process of democracy has faced many challenges. In fact, the period between the last Report of Democratic Culture published in 2008 and the present report of 2010, is both complex and alarming. In this period developed the deep crisis within the justice system.³¹ These two years were also those of Álvaro Colom’s administration who came to power in January of 2008.

Similar to the reports of democratic culture prepared in other countries of the region, political indicators are first presented which show the trends of democracy. As previously mentioned, the most common indicator is the Freedom House Index. For the case of Guatemala, it is important to examine other relevant indicators as well. One in particular is the current Failed States Index which has presented the possibility that Guatemala may be transformed into a failed state.

Table I.3 shows the evolution of both indicators in the period under analysis (2008-2010). In the Freedom House Index (an index of freedom) Guatemala continues in the same category of “partially free” as it has for years. In fact, unlike El Salvador, Guatemala has never been categorized as “free”. In 2010 the evaluation of Guatemala deteriorated in regards to political rights. The country’s evaluation was elevated from 3 to 4 based on a scale of 1—being the best and 7—being the worst.

In the Failed States Index, Guatemala did not suffer major changes. It remained in the category of a country “under warning”. Its global evaluation of 80.6 climbed to 81.2. Like the Freedom House Index, a higher evaluation is negative in the Index of Failed States. For example, the country located in position 1 (most failed) is Somalia reporting 114.3 points. Guatemala, in fact, improved its ranking compared to other countries in the world. Guatemala moved from the position of 66 in 2008 to the position of 72 in 2010.³²

Table I.3. Political indicators relevant to Guatemala, 2008-2010

ÍNDICE DE FREEDOM HOUSE				
	Libertades civiles	Derechos políticos	Índice de libertad (compuesto)	Categoría
2008	4	3	3.5	Parcialmente libre
2010	4	4	4	Parcialmente libre
ÍNDICE DE ESTADOS FALLIDOS				
	Ranking	Calificación	Categoría	
2008	66	80.6	Bajo Advertencia (warning)	
2010	72	81.2	Bajo Advertencia (warning)	

Source: Freedom House and Fund for Peace

Scale: Freedom House 1=positive 7=negative. Failed States Index 1=positive 10=negative.

It appears contradictory that due to the serious problems confronting Guatemala in the period under analysis, Guatemala is not categorized as a country “under alert” that is, a failed state. This can be explained by the way in which the Index of Failed States is constructed. Twelve indicators of social, economic and political types are used to create the index. Table I.4 details these indicators and the results for Guatemala in 2008 and 2010. It can be observed that in 2010 the worst evaluation (the highest score) obtained is in regards to inequitable economic development, demographic pressures, crime and/or illegitimacy of the State and apparatus of a state operating within a state. The best evaluations are obtained in the aspects of relocating refugees of displaced persons and in intervention of other states or outside political actors. Between 2008 and 2010 there are few changes aside from the significant

³¹ See for instance Isaacs, Anita. Guatemala on the Brink, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 21, No. 2, April 2010.

³² The details about the Failed States Index can be found at the Fund for Peace website, or at http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140

deterioration of demographic pressures and the significant improvement of refugees and displaced persons.

In comparison to other countries, Guatemala does not appear as a failed state. In fact, no country in the Americas appears in this category. The majority of countries which qualify as failed states are those in Africa, the Mideast and Asia. In relation to other countries of Latin America, only Colombia, Nicaragua and Ecuador are in a worse category than Guatemala. This does not imply that Guatemala is out of danger—but rather that as a whole all indicators are not negative. However, it is evident that there are some components which contribute to Guatemala’s weakness. Those in particular are the political indicators of the politics of illegitimacy of the state, and the existence of security apparatus functioning as a state within a state. It is precisely this aspect in which numerous weaknesses and contradictions have been obvious, particularly in the last two years.³³

Table I.4. Components of the Index of Fallen States for Guatemala, 2008-2010

Indicador	2008	2010	
<i>Indicadores sociales</i>			
1. Presiones demográficas	6.8	7.4	Deterioro significativo
2. Movimiento masivo de refugiados o desplazados internos	6.0	5.6	Mejora significativa
3. Legado de venganza entre grupos	6.9	6.8	Mejora mínima
4. Fuga crónica o sostenida de población	6.7	6.7	Igual
<i>Indicadores económicos</i>			
5. Desarrollo económico desigual entre grupos	8.0	8.0	Igual
6. Deterioro económico severo	6.7	6.9	Deterioro mínimo
<i>Indicadores políticos</i>			
7. Criminalización y/o deslegitimación del Estado	7.2	7.1	Mejora mínima
8. Deterioro progresivo de los servicios públicos	6.6	6.8	Deterioro mínimo
9. Suspensión o aplicación arbitraria del Estado de derecho y violación masiva de derechos humanos	7.1	6.9	Mejora mínima
10. El aparato de seguridad opera como un “Estado dentro de otro Estado”	7.3	7.2	Mejora mínima
11. Surgimiento de élites fraccionadas	6.0	6.3	Deterioro mínimo
12. Intervención de otros Estados o actores políticos externos	5.3	5.5	Deterioro mínimo

Source: Fund for Peace, www.fundforpeace.org
 Scale: 1=positive 10=negative

The Relationship between Hard Times and Democracy

Should we be concerned that the economic crisis could have spilled over and affected democracy? Are the declines measured by Freedom House in 2009 partially a result of economic troubles? Or can we find evidence in the AmericasBarometer of a robust democratic culture that has withstood the challenges brought on by hard times? Over the years, many scholars have examined the apparent connection between economic crisis and democratic instability, approaching the problem from two schools of thought. The first has focused on the individual, analyzing the impact of economic crisis on democracy

³³ See Briscoe, Ivan. A Criminal Bargain: The State and Security in Guatemala. *Documento de Trabajo No. 88* (Madrid, FRIDE, 2009).

through the lens of ordinary people—in short, how do individuals react to perceived economic decline? Much of the literature tells us that certain segments of society are more vulnerable to supporting anti-democratic alternatives than others. The poor in particular seem to lead this group of “democracy’s fickle friends”³⁴, as they are seen as having led the backlash against democratic governments during times of economic crises. The current economic crisis has, as noted, produced more impoverished Latin American citizens, thereby creating potentially problematic conditions for democracy in the region.

Other research has addressed the effects of national level economic conditions on democracy, focusing specifically on how underdevelopment, sluggish economic growth, and severe income inequality affect democratic consolidation. In their often-cited analysis of the relationship between economic development and democracy, Przeworski et al.³⁵ found that no democracy had collapsed where the country’s per capita income exceeded \$6,055. In Latin America, however, only Chile and Argentina currently lie above that threshold, meaning that most Latin American countries enter the current economic crisis without the “inoculation” protection of historically adequate levels of economic development.³⁶

In terms of economic growth, Przeworski et al.³⁷ also found that “democracies in poorer countries are more likely to die when they experience economic crises than when their economies grow.” As mentioned above, economic growth in Latin America has slowed to a crawl in most of the countries placing most nations in Przeworski et al.’s danger zone. Finally, scholars have demonstrated that the grievances brought on by high levels of inequality can produce violent forms of political participation and potentially destabilize democracies.³⁸ Historically, Latin America has had the highest levels of income inequality of any region in the world.

While widespread democratic breakdown seems inconceivable in Latin America after so many years of democratic stability, the breakdown in Honduras and the continued declines in Venezuela show that democracy remains fragile in some countries. Might the economic crisis undermine citizen support for key components of liberal democracy and weaken democratic stability?³⁹ In this round of the AmericasBarometer surveys, including over 40,000 interviews in twenty-six countries, we have the data to explore that very question.

Conclusions

After having discussed the impact of the economic crisis in the region, this chapter analyzed how democracy has fared in Latin America and the Caribbean during the economic crisis. The trends of democratic development in the past few years were also analyzed. The chapter concluded with a brief discussion on the theoretical relationship between the economic crisis and democracy.

³⁴ Nancy Gina Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003).

³⁵ Adam Przeworski et al., “What Makes Democracies Endure?,” *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 1 (1996).

³⁶ Abby Córdova and Mitchell Seligson, “Economic Shocks and Democratic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean,” *Latin American Politics and Society* 52, no. 2 (2010).

³⁷ Adam Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 117.

³⁸ Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, “Insurgency and Inequality,” *American Political Science Review* 81 (1987).

³⁹ Abby Córdova and Mitchell A. Seligson, “Economic Crisis and Democracy in Latin America,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* (2009), Abby Córdova and Mitchell A. Seligson, “Economic Shocks and Democratic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean,” *Latin American Politics and Society* 52(2): 1 - 35 (2010).

The case of Guatemala was briefly analyzed in both aspects. In the economic aspect, it can be said that the country suffered the sudden attack of the crisis but in less measure than other countries on the continent. This does not imply that the economy took a positive turn, since all economic indicators were low between the years of 2008 and 2010. In the political aspect, levels of freedom decreased in that same period, according to the Freedom House Index—although Guatemala was able to remain partially free. Also analyzed was Guatemala's position in the Index of Fallen States. The conclusion drawn was that in this matter no major changes occurred. Guatemala did not qualify as a fallen State according to all criteria used by the index. However, in the indicators regarding illegitimacy of the State and of the existence of groups who act as a State within a State, the evaluation was negative.

The following chapter will focus on citizens' perceptions of the economic recession measured by Barometer of the Americas 2010. Chapter III of this study will examine how the political culture of democracy has been affected by the economic difficulties of the times. In that chapter three main variables will be analyzed (among others): support for democracy, support for the political system and satisfaction with life. These are three key variables to understanding the impact of the crisis of democracy in the region as a whole and in Guatemala since 2008.

Chapter II. Citizen Perceptions and Experiences during Hard Times in the Americas

Introduction

In the previous chapter we presented a general overview of the economic crisis on the world, on the Americas, and Guatemala's economy, followed by a summary of the trends in democracy since the 2008 AmericasBarometer study was conducted. In this chapter we concentrate on citizens' perceptions and experiences during hard times by attempting to answer the questions: 1) how did citizens perceive the crisis? 2) Who did they blame for it? And 3) how did citizens experience the crisis in the Americas? We first present a regional comparative assessment of citizens' perceptions of the crisis as well as where Guatemala is located in relation to the other countries in the Americas. We then assess citizens' experiences with economic instability in the countries included in the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey.

Perceptions of the Magnitude of the Economic Crisis

In order to look specifically at the economic crisis, the Latin American Public Opinion Project developed two new survey items. This is the first time that these items have been used in the AmericasBarometer, and they were developed especially for the 2010 round of surveys. The two items represent a sequence. First, respondents were asked if they perceive an economic crisis. Second, among those who thought that there was, we ask who is to blame for it. The following is the text of the items themselves:

CRISIS1. Some say that our country is suffering a very serious economic crisis; others say that we are suffering a crisis but it is not very serious, while others say that there isn't any economic crisis. What do you think? **[Read options]**

- (1) We are suffering a very serious economic crisis
- (2) We are suffering a crisis but it is not very serious, or
- (3) No economic crisis

CRISIS2. Who is the most to blame for the current economic crisis in our country from among the following: **[READ LIST, MARK ONLY ONE RESPONSE]**

- (01) The previous administration
- (02) The current administration
- (03) Ourselves, the Guatemalans
- (04) The rich people of our country
- (05) The problems of democracy
- (06) The rich countries **[Accept also United States, England, France, Germany, and Japan]**
- (07) The economic system of the country, or
- (08) Never have thought about it
- (77) **[Don't read]** Other

Looking at the Americas as a whole, including all 25 countries in the AmericasBarometer, we can see in Figure II.1 that the majority of citizens in the Americas perceive an economic crisis, be it serious or not very serious.




Figure II.1. Perceptions of the Economic Crisis in the Americas, 2010

Among all these countries, we see in Figure II.2 that Jamaica and Honduras have the highest percentages with respect to citizens' perceptions of a crisis; although in all of the countries a very high percentage perceives a crisis. In fact, almost in every country (including Guatemala) more than 90% of the population consider that there is an economic crisis, with the exception Panamá, Chile, Costa Rica, Surinam, Brazil, and Uruguay. In these countries, more than 70% think that there is a crisis.




Figure II.2. Percentage of the Population that Perceived There is an Economic Crisis

More specifically in the case of Guatemala, (see Figure II.3), in the first half of the year 2010 nearly 61% of the population believed that a grave economic crisis existed. 37% perceived the crisis to be somewhat serious and only 2% thought that no crisis existed. As in the other countries of the region, it is clear that the majority of Guatemalans perceived that a crisis did exist.




Figure II.3. Perception of the Economic Crisis in Guatemala, 2010

Who is to blame for the Economic Crisis?

This section examines to whom Latin Americans attribute responsibility for the economic crisis. The results for the Americas as a whole are provided first. The majority of citizens who perceive that a crisis exists in the Americas blame the current administration as well as the previous one for the economic crisis (Figure II.4). Less than 10% of the Latin Americans who perceived a crisis blamed the wealthy countries or the industrialized countries. This is contrary to what might be expected. Many persons in these countries blame themselves for the economic crisis.




Figure II.4. Who is to Blame for the Economic Crisis? According to Citizens in the Americas Who Perceive a Crisis, 2010

In Figure II.5 the results for the main regions in the Americas are examined. Even though similarities exist, there are some differences between regions that are worth noticing. For example, in the Caribbean, Mexico and Central America a large percentage of citizens blame the previous administration for the crisis. It is clear that in each country the “previous government” varied in terms of when they were elected and when they assumed responsibility for a new administration. However, generally speaking, there is a tendency to blame the previous administration rather than the one currently in charge. Another surprising find is that in the United States and Canada a greater percentage of citizens blame themselves for the crisis, in comparison with other regions of the Americas. Finally, in South America a slightly greater percentage of citizens (in comparison to other regions) blame democracy for the economic crisis, but in none of these regions does the percentage reach beyond 5% of the population.




Figure II.5. Who is to Blame for the Economic Crisis? Results by Region, 2010

More specifically in the case of Guatemala, as can be seen in Figure II.6, a slightly higher percentage of the population (about 4%) blame the previous administration (of Oscar Berger who came to power in January 2008) rather than the current administration of Álvaro Colom. 13.5% blame the wealthy people of the country or the current economic system. About 11% do not know who to blame or blame someone else for the crisis. Only 10% blame wealthy countries and a similar percentage blame their own Guatemalan citizens. Only a small percentage associates the crisis with the democratic system of government.




Figure II.6. Who is to Blame for the Crisis? Guatemala 2010

Personal Experiences with Economic Instability

In the previous section, we analyzed the magnitude of the economic crisis and who is to blame for it. Here, we explore how citizens experience the crisis.

Job Loss

This section will try to determine in what extent Guatemalans lost their jobs as a crisis consequence. The questions used in this section are the following:

OCUP1B1. Have you lost your job in the past two years? **[Read options]**
 (1) Yes, you lost your job but found a new one.
 (2) Yes, you lost your job and have not found a new one
 (3) No, you did not lose your job
 (4) No, you did not work because you decided not to work or because of disabilities

OCUP1B2. Besides you, has anyone in your household lost his or her job in the past two years? **[Read options]**
 (1) Yes (2) No

The results for the Americas as a whole are shown in Figure II.7 below. While three-quarters of the population did not report having lost a job, about 7% did, but found a new one, and 7.3% of the respondents lost jobs but did not find a new one. Looking at the households as a whole, over 16% of respondents report lost jobs.




Figure II.7. Job Loss in the Americas, 2010

To get an overall picture of job loss, a composite indicator variable was computed based on these two items, which shows if at least one household member lost his or her job in the past two years. The results are shown in Figure II.8. In Mexico, Brazil, the Dominican Republic and Colombia almost 40% of households reported at least one family member had experienced job loss. At the other extreme, in Surinam, Trinidad & Tobago and in Bolivia, 16% or less reported having to face this similar situation. Guatemala is located in the middle range with 27.4% of households reporting loss of employment in the past two years.




Figure II.8. Percentage of Households with at Least One Family Member Who Lost a Job in the Past Two Years

Figure II.9 shows in greater detail what occurred in the case of Guatemala. The first figure shows that 80.2% of Guatemalans remained employed in the last two years, a larger percentage than in the rest of the Americas (where 73.7% remained employed according to Figure II.7). At the same time fewer Guatemalans remained unemployed (6%) in comparison to the other countries as a whole (8.5%). The second figure shows that 17.8% of Guatemalan households reported at least one family member without a job in the last two years, an amount similar to the rest of the continent (where 16.1% remained unemployed).




Figure II.9. Job Loss in Guatemalan Households, 2010

Figure II.10 shows details regarding Guatemalans most affected by unemployment. It is clear that Guatemalan men of middle age with a secondary education and living in urban areas are those most affected. They present the greatest proportion of job loss in the last two years and also of those who have not found new employment. This does not imply that other sectors were unaffected, but rather to a lesser degree.




Figure II.10. Percentage of Guatemalans who lost their jobs by gender, age, education and residence

Reported Decrease in Household Income

We now examine reports by our respondents about changes in their household incomes. We asked the following question:

Q10E. Over the past two years, has the income of your household: **[Read options]**
 (1) Increased? **[Go to Q11]**
 (2) Remained the same? **[Go to Q11]**
 (3) Decreased? **[Go to Q10F]**

The results for the Americas as a whole (see Figure II.11) show that about half of the respondents say that their incomes have remained the same, with nearly 30% saying that their incomes have declined, and 20% saying that it has increased.




Figure II.11. Reported Household Income Changes in the Americas, 2008-2010

Figure II.12 shows these results by country, ranked by the percentage who says that their incomes have declined. As can be seen, there is wide variation in the Americas, with up to half of the respondents in some countries reporting a decline in income, whereas in other countries the situation is the reverse, with up to half of respondents reporting an increase income. These findings reinforce our argument that the economic slide has affected countries in very different ways in the Americas. In the case of Guatemala, one-third of the population indicated that their incomes decreased, 54.8% reported no change in income status and only about 13% indicated that their incomes increased.




Figure II.12. Has your household income decrease, remain the same, or increase over the past two years? (Percentage of Total Population)

Who Was Most Affected by Economic Hardship?

As shown in Figure II.13, a greater percentage of individuals living in rural areas reported that their household income decreased over the past two years in the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole. Moreover, the figure shows that as family wealth declines, the degree percentage of individuals reporting a decline in income increases; in other words, the poorest individuals in the region are most likely to have reported suffering a decline in their household income. While in prior LAPOP studies we have used an indicator of wealth based on an additive index of ownership of household goods, in this study we implement a new indicator using the same variables, but based on a different methodology for measuring relative wealth, one based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The methodology allows ranking individuals from poor to rich taking into account local economic conditions.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ For more information on how this indicator was computed and its reliability, see: Córdova, Abby B. 2009 “Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth using Household Asset Indicators.” In AmericasBarometer Insights Series. (<http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/AmericasBarometerInsightsSeries>).




Figure II.13. Percentage of individuals in the Americas Reporting a Decrease in Their Household Income by Area of Residence and Level of Wealth, 2010

Figure II.14 shows in what measure family income decreased for Guatemalans, differentiating as in Figure II.13 between those who reside in urban and rural areas and levels of wealth. It can be seen that in the rural areas the percentage of those reporting a decrease in family income is higher than in the urban areas, although the difference is not statistically significant. In a similar way, those located in the lower quintiles of wealth reported greater decreases in family income, but again the differences were not statistically significant.




Figure II.14. Percentage of Individuals in Guatemala who reported a Decrease in Family Income, by Area of Residence and Level of Wealth

Perceptions of Personal and National Economy

The AmericasBarometer traditionally reports on respondents’ perceptions of their personal and national economic situation. We ask respondents to consider their personal and national economic situations currently and as compared to a year prior to the interviews. Below are the items used in the survey:

- SOCT1.** How would you describe **the country’s** economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?
 (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad
 (88) Doesn’t know (98) Doesn’t Answer
- SOCT2.** Do you think that **the country’s** current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?
 (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn’t know (98) Doesn’t Answer
- IDIO1.** How would you describe **your** overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?
 (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad
 (88) Don’t know (98) Doesn’t answer
- IDIO2.** Do you think that **your** economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago?
 (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn’t know (98) Doesn’t Answer

We now couple these items with the one analyzed above asking about reports of decreases in household income. As can be seen in Figure II.15, those who perceive their personal or economic situation to be very bad are far more likely to have experienced a loss of household income when compared to those who are reporting that their personal economic situation is very good. The same findings hold, a bit less sharply, for the perception of the national economy and also for perceptions of personal and national economic situations when compared to a year earlier.




Figure II.15. Relationship between Citizens' Experiences and Perceptions of the Economy During Hard Times in the Americas, 2010

Figure II.16 presents the results for Guatemala. Within the same graph is shown that the perception of the personal economic situation and also the perception of the national economic situation are more negative among those whose incomes decreased in the past two years. The contrasts are not as marked, however, as in the rest of the continent. In the Figure of Guatemala, the categories of “very good” and “good” have been merged due to the low number of those responding to “very good”. Something similar occurs in the figures that show the retrospective perception of the economy: those who saw their income diminish in recent years perceive a major deterioration of the national and personal economy. This is in contrast with those whose income did not diminish.




Figure II.16. Relationship between Experiences of Citizens and the Perceptions of the Economy during Difficult Times in Guatemala

A final subject that is examined in this section is that of remittances, in particular regarding their impact on the Guatemalan economy (as seen in Chapter I). First, Figure II.17 shows a comparative perspective. Countries where a higher percentage of respondents reported receiving outside remittances are Guyana and Jamaica. Almost 40% of those citizens reported having received remittances. A second block made up of four countries indicates almost one fourth of the population receiving remittances. They are: El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Surinam. Guatemala, together with Honduras, Paraguay and Trinidad & Tobago form a third block in which 10% to 15% of the population receive remittances. Finally, in a large number of countries, a relatively low percentage of the population reported receiving remittances. Brazil reports the lowest, with less than 1%.




Figure II.17. Variations in Receiving Remittances in Guatemala, 2010

Finally, Figure II.18 shows the percentage of population that reported variation on remittances reception in the last 12 months. This figure only shows the results of those who said they receive remittances from abroad (13% of the total). We can see that almost a 5% pointed out have not received remittances in the last months. 42.5% stated that the remittances stayed the same, and only a 6.7% declared an increase in the remittances. On the other hand, almost half of the population who receives remittances said the remittances had decreased in the last 12 months.




Figure II.18. Variation on Receiving Remittances in Guatemala, 2010

Conclusions

This chapter has analyzed how the world economic crisis affected the citizens of the Americas. It focused on the impact of the crisis on Guatemala. Like the rest of Latin America, a substantial majority of Guatemalans perceived that there was indeed an economic crisis. In fact 61% of Guatemalans considered the crisis to be extremely serious. Guatemalans assigned responsibility for the crisis to the previous administration (18%) as much as to the administration currently in power (14%). 13% blamed the wealthy sectors of the Guatemalan population, and another similar percentage blamed the economic system of the country. Only 10% blamed other wealthy countries.

Regarding unemployment, Guatemala is located in the medium high range of countries of the Americas, reporting a job loss rate of 27.4% (at both individual and familial levels). In relation to family income, 32.2% of the respondents indicated that their incomes decreased in the past year. Economic problems were more severe among the rural areas and, in general among the poorer sectors of the society.

Finally, 13.2% of Guatemalans reported that in their households, remittances were received from outside sources. In comparison to other countries, Guatemala is located in a medium position in terms of receiving remittances. Of the 13.2%, nearly one-half reported that the remittances were reduced in the past year.

Table II.1 shows the final comparison between Guatemala and the rest of the continent in certain key economic variables. In general, Guatemalans did not report more pessimism toward the economy that the continental average. Yet it appears they have suffered more sudden attacks from the economic crisis. The difference with the regional percentages is not great except regarding the perception that the economic crisis is extremely serious.

Table II.1. Comparison between Guatemala and the Americas Variables that Measure the Economic Crisis

Medición	Variable	Región	Guatemala
Porcentaje	Percepción de que existe crisis económica	92.8	98.0
Porcentaje	Percepción de que la crisis económica es muy grave	46.6	60.9
Porcentaje	Hogares donde al menos uno de sus miembros perdió el trabajo	26.3	27.4
Promedio	El ingreso del hogar disminuyó en los últimos dos años	26.9	32.2
Promedio	Percepción de que la situación económica nacional es buena	43.1	32.8
Promedio	Percepción de que la situación económica personal es buena	51.3	47.3

Chapter III. Democratic Values in Hard Times

Introduction

Thus far, we have seen how Latin American citizens have fared during the great economic recession that began in 2008 in relation to their experiences with unemployment, household income, and their perceptions of national and personal economic well-being. In this chapter, our objective is to go a step further and see how key attitudes toward democracy have fared during these hard times.

Bad economic times have often been linked in the academic and journalistic literature to challenges to democracy. For example, some research suggests that poor individuals, whom we have seen above were hard hit by income declines in the current crisis afflicting wide swaths of the region, are particularly vulnerable to increasing support for anti-democratic alternatives during hard economic times.⁴¹ Others suggest that national economic underdevelopment and low growth rates also affect democracy, while poor national economic indicators may affect individuals support for key components of democracy.⁴²

Given the severity of the most recent economic recession in many regions of the world, and to a lesser extent in Latin America and the Caribbean, we want to know how citizens' democratic values have fared during this difficult period. Has the crisis been associated with declines in support for democracy as a system of government and satisfaction with democracy? Furthermore, has system support (i.e., political legitimacy) declined when times got tough, or have citizens rallied around governments that have dealt effectively with the crisis? And most importantly, do Latin American citizens express greater authoritarian preferences under crisis conditions? We saw in the previous chapter that the economic recession had different effects on different regions in the Americas. Through the analysis of the AmericasBarometer 2010, we will take a more detailed look into these conundrums by examining the results by region and focus on Guatemala.

The Economic Crisis Impact in Life Satisfaction

Under hard economic conditions worldwide, we want to know how the citizens of the Americas perceived the crisis. We begin by looking at the most general of all measures, that of subjective well-being, commonly referred to "life satisfaction," or "happiness." We do this because research suggests that economic conditions are linked to citizens' feelings about their lives in general, with those individuals who experience economic hard times presumably expressing low levels of subjective well-being, while those individuals who enjoy better economic conditions expressing greater happiness.⁴³ On the other

⁴¹But see the work of Bermeo, who reviews this thesis and ultimately rejects it: Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy*.

⁴²Córdova and Seligson, "Economic Shocks and Democratic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean": Ethan B. Kapstein and Nathan Converse, *The Fate of Young Democracies* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008): Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990*.

⁴³Frey S. Bruno and Alois Stutzer, *Happiness and Economics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002): Ronald Inglehart and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, "Genes, Culture, Democracy, and Happiness," in *Culture and Subjective Well-Being*, ed. Ed Diener and Eunkook M. Suh (Cambridge, Mass MIT Press, 2000).

hand, the same research takes note of contradictions between economic conditions and life satisfaction or happiness.⁴⁴

When we look at the specific case of the Americas, how satisfied with their lives are the citizens of the Americas now in the aftermath of the economic recession compared to two years ago? To respond to this question we examine two survey items, one which asks people about their current happiness and the other asks them how happy they were in 2008, the period before the crisis had become full-blown. We subtract from their reports of their current happiness their reported level of happiness in 2008 and compute national averages for each of the countries in the Americas. The questions asked are shown below:

[GIVE CARD "A"]
LS6. On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 0 to 10. 0 is the lowest step and represents the worst life possible for you. 10 is the highest step and represents the best life possible for you.
 On what step of the ladder do you feel **at this moment**? **Please choose the ladder that represents best your opinion.**
[Point out the number on the card that represents "the worst life possible" and the number that represents "the best life possible." Indicate to the interviewee that he/she can choose an intermediate score].

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	98
Worst life possible						Best life possible					Doesn't Know	Doesn't Answer

LS6A. On which step would you say you stood two years ago, that is to say in 2008?

Figure III.1 shows that there is an even split in the Americas, with about half the countries having citizens who report, on average, that they are happier today than they were in 2008, while about half of the countries have citizens who report, on average that they are less happy in 2010 than in 2008. Examining Figure III.1, we see Uruguayans, Guyanese, Brazilians, and Paraguayans are, on average, those who report the greatest increases in satisfaction with their lives in 2010 over 2008. In a similar way, the citizens of Colombia, Surinam, and Panama also show a positive change. In stark contrast, Jamaicans report that their happiness in 2010 is sharply lower than they report it was in 2008. Other countries in which average reported happiness in 2010 is lower than respondents said they had in 2008 are Belize, El Salvador, the United States, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Honduras.⁴⁵ Guatemala still remains in a positive position, but nearly of the bottom. Thus, we have our first hint that even though the economic crisis affected the Americas in many ways, it was not associated with a hemisphere-wide decline in life satisfaction/happiness. But this finding is very general, and in the following section we examine a set of items designed to measure citizens' perceptions of the economic recession.

⁴⁴ Carol Graham, *Happiness Around the World : The Paradox of Happy Peasants and Miserable Millionaires* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Carol Graham, Eduardo Lora, and Inter-American Development Bank., *Paradox and Perception : Measuring Quality of Life in Latin America* (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank : Brookings Institution Press, 2009), Carol Graham and Stefano Pettinato, *Happiness and Hardship : Opportunity and Insecurity in New Market Economies* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).

⁴⁵ To be clear, we are not comparing here the 2008 and 2010 survey, but two items from the 2010 survey that report on current (2010) and prior (2008) happiness. We do not have a panel design in this survey (we have repeated cross-sections) and do not know the actual level of happiness reported in 2008 for those interviewed in 2010.




Figure III.1. National Average Increases and Decreases in Reported Life Satisfaction in 2010 vs. 2008

A different view of these data looks a bit more carefully at each segment of the survey population to show the percentages that expressed declines or increases in life satisfaction and those that showed no difference between 2008 and 2010. The results are shown in Figure III.2. Some countries, Jamaica for example, had over half of its population expressing a decline in life satisfaction, whereas in Uruguay and Suriname, in contrast, less than one-fifth expressed a decline, and just under one-half expressed an increase. In Guatemala the situation is somewhat more balanced. Approximately one-third of the respondents indicated a decline in life satisfaction or no change in this area. But a small percentage indicated a somewhat higher increase in satisfaction (36.6) within the past two years.




Figure III.2. Perceptions of Changes in Life Satisfaction, 2008 vs. 2010 (Percentage of Total Population)

We now examine how life satisfaction changes relate to the respondents' evaluation of his/her personal retrospective economic situation. That is, in the prior chapter we examined how respondents viewed their own (and also national) economic situation at the moment of the interview and then looking back a year. Looking now only at those who expressed a decline in life satisfaction as shown in this chapter, we can see from Figure III.3 that there is a systematic link to the perception of respondent retrospective personal economic situation. This happens in almost every country included in this study. The general conclusion is that in all cases, life satisfaction decreased when individuals perceived that their personal economic conditions had deteriorated.




Figure III.3. Percentage of the Population Who Perceived a Decline in Life Satisfaction by Perceptions of their Personal Retrospective Economic Situation

Putting this finding into a broader context, we can examine multiple determinants of changes in life satisfaction. These results are shown in the regression chart Figure III.4. We need to emphasize that we are not explaining levels of life satisfaction, but the *changes* in life satisfaction reported by our respondents when we compare the level of such satisfaction that they reported possessing at the time of the interview to the one that they reported having possessed two years earlier.⁴⁶ To this regression equation, we added the traditional socioeconomic and demographic control variables including age, sex,

⁴⁶ We stress that this is not a panel design and therefore we do not have data on the same respondent in 2008 and 2010. We are relying on self reports of current and previous levels of satisfaction.

education, residence (urban vs. rural) area, and wealth quintiles. While in prior LAPOP studies we have used an indicator of wealth based on an additive index of ownership of household goods, in this study we implement a new indicator using the same variables, but based on relative wealth.⁴⁷ Also included in the regression are variables measuring economic evaluations, and government economic performance.

The results shown in the regression plot (Figure III.4) are controlled for variation by country (the “country fixed effects”), the variation that was shown in Figures III.1 and III.2 in this chapter. Each variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical (y) axis. The impact of each of those variables on attitudes of support for democracy is shown graphically by a dot, which if located to the right of the vertical “0” line indicates a positive contribution, and if to the left of the “0” line a negative contribution. Statistically significant contributors are shown by confidence interval lines stretching to the left and right of each dot; only when the confidence intervals do not overlap the vertical “0” line is the factor significant (at .05 or better). The relative strength of each variable is indicated by standardized coefficients (i.e. “beta weights”).

The results show that basic socio-economic characteristics such as education and wealth have no significant effect on satisfaction. We do see that the demographic characteristics of age and sex matter to some degree; females report a positive change over the 2008-2010 period, while older respondents report just the opposite, namely that they are *less* satisfied in 2010 than they were in 2008. This result, however, may be influenced by the normal aging process, such that older people on average suffer from more health afflictions and limitations and as such have more reason to report a decline in their life satisfaction.

A block of economic variables, however, has a consistent and in most cases far stronger impact on life satisfaction. The strongest impact by far has already been shown in Figure III.3; respondents, who have a negative retrospective perception of their own personal economic situation, have a strongly diminished sense of life satisfaction. Also associated with lower levels of life satisfaction is the respondent’s evaluation that his is experiencing a serious economic crisis. Not only does perception of one’s economic situation matter, but the objective information (drawn from the survey reporting) of a decline in household income over that same period of time (2008-2010) is associated with lower levels of life satisfaction. In a similar vein, but still having its own independent effect, is living in a household in which at least one member lost his or her job during this period.

Yet, of all of the variables in the regression that point to changes in perceived life satisfaction 2008-2010, the one that has the greatest significance is the *very strong positive impact of the perception of government economic performance*.⁴⁸ Since satisfaction with the general performance of the incumbent chief executive is also included in the regression equation (and it also has a positive effect), this means that even though individuals may perceive that they are not doing well economically, and may also have lived in a household that has suffered unemployment, when the government is perceived as managing the economy well, life satisfaction is higher. This finding points to the importance of government policy in managing the economy in times of stress.

⁴⁷ For more information on this indicator, see Córdova, Abby B. 2009 “Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth using Household Asset Indicators.” In AmericasBarometer Insights Series. <http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/AmericasBarometerInsightsSeries>.

⁴⁸ This was measured by two survey items, N1 and N12, which measure respondent evaluation of the government’s effectiveness in fighting poverty and unemployment.




Figure III.4. Determinants of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction in the Americas, 2010

When a similar regression is done only for Guatemala (Figure III.5) it is found that those who have a positive perception of the government's economic performance have higher levels in the change of life satisfaction. On the contrary, those from households in which income decreased in the last two years, and who believe their personal economic situation is bad and has worsened in the last year show less satisfaction with life. The pattern found in Guatemala is similar to the rest of the Americas. But in the case of Guatemala, fewer variables associated with dissatisfaction with life were found. In fact, in Guatemala no association between variables of the socio-demographic type and the change of life satisfaction were found.




Figure III.5. Determinants of Change Perceived in Life Satisfaction in Guatemala, 2010

Figure III.6 shows with greater clarity the relation between changes in life satisfaction and one of the relevant variables in the Guatemalan case. It is clear that those who perceive that their personal economic situations worsened in relation to the previous year report a decrease in life satisfaction.




Figure III.6. Changes in Life Satisfaction and Retrospective Perception of Personal Economy, Guatemala 2010

The Crisis and the Support for Democracy

This round of the AmericasBarometer provides evidence that, despite the economic crisis, support for democracy in the region has not declined. The results comparing support for democracy in 2008 with those in 2010 are shown in Figure III.7.⁴⁹ The dark blue bars in this chart show the *average* levels of support for democracy found in 2010 whereas the light blue bars show the average levels found in 2008.⁵⁰ The reader should note that whenever the two grey areas overlap, there is no statistically significant difference between the two years. For example, support for democracy declined in Mexico from 68.5 to 66.8, but this decline is not statistically significant. Indeed, what we find is that in many countries the change is not significant in either direction. The countries that experienced a significant decline in support for democracy in 2010 compared to 2008 are El Salvador, Canada, Peru, Venezuela, Argentina and the Dominican Republic. On the other hand, just in Chile the support for democracy increased significantly between 2008 and 2010, at least as measured by this general “Churchill” item that has been so widely used in the comparative study of democracy. In the case of Guatemala, there was a slight increase (from 60.5 to 62.8), but this is not statistically significant. It is worth noting that Guatemala, together with Honduras, Paraguay and, in particular Peru all report the lowest averages of support for democracy on the continent in 2010.

⁴⁹ Support for democracy was measured by the following question: ING4. Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements (1-7 scale)? This item, like most other LAPOP items, was recoded into a 0-100 scale to facilitate comparisons.

⁵⁰ Note that in some countries (Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname, we do not have 2008 survey data, so only one bar is shown.




Figure III.7. Average Support for Democracy across the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

While national averages in support for democracy declined significantly in only a minority of countries, this does not mean that the crisis itself did not take its toll. Support for democracy, like all attitudes, is affected by a wide variety of factors, with the economic crisis being only one of them. A given country may have been seriously buffeted by the economic decline, but if the crisis was managed well by the government, citizens are not likely to have lost faith in their systems. In order to have a better idea of the magnitude of the impact of hard times on *individual attitudes toward democracy*, we carried out a regression analysis (See Figure III.8). The figure shows the factors associated to a greater support for democracy: positive perception of President and government economic performance. The rest of positive predictors are socio-demographic variables. The education variable is an important factor of democracy support; this result is consistent with our previous studies of democracy in the Americas, and once again reinforces the notion that education is one of the most effective ways to build a political culture that is supportive of democracy. Elsewhere in this report we take note of the power of education to increase political tolerance, another key element in a democratic political culture. We also find that those who live in urban areas are more supportive of democracy than those who live in rural areas, a finding we have also reported before. Females are often found to be less supportive of democracy, and

we find this again here, even when controlling for education and other variables. While there is much dispute in terms of the theoretical impact of wealth on support for democracy, looking at the region as a whole (but controlling for the impact of country of residence, the “country fixed effects”) we find that higher levels of wealth levels are positively associated with greater support for democracy.⁵¹

What is striking about the results presented in Figure III.8 is that the economic crisis has only a limited impact on reducing support for democracy. Respondents who live in households in which a member has lost his/her job, there is a small reduction in support for democracy, it is the same among those who consider that the economic crisis is very serious, but economic perceptions play no significant role one way or the other. Among socio-demographic variables, women show less support for democracy, even controlling by education and other variables. But far more important is the very strong effect, once again, of a positive perception of government management of the economy. We find that, like life satisfaction, when citizens perceive that their government is handling the economy well, they are more supportive of democracy.




Figure III.8. Determinants of Support for Democracy in the Americas, 2010

Our conclusion is that at the very general level of support for democracy, we do not find an overall national trend in the direction of decline, nor do we find that individual perceptions and economic experiences during the crisis lowered support for democracy. This is certainly encouraging news, suggesting greater resilience of democracy than many analysts had predicted and feared. It also suggests that the democracy recession observed by Freedom House (see Chapter I) does not seem to have affected public commitment to democracy in most of the Latin American region.

It is important to analyze whether this pattern of factors influencing support for democracy in the Americas is similar for the case of Guatemala. The results of the analysis of regression for Guatemala is shown in Figure III.9. Unlike other countries in the region, in Guatemala there exists only one variable

⁵¹ John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Inequality and Democracy in Latin America: Individual and Contextual Effects of Wealth on Political Participation," in *Poverty, Participation, and Democracy*, ed. Anirudh Krishna (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

associated with a greater support for democracy: education. The higher the level of education, the greater the support for democracy. This does not imply that other factors or variables do not exist which can influence this type of support among Guatemalans. But among the variables used in the equation, only education garnered a statistically significant result.




Figure III.9. Determinants for Support for Democracy in Guatemala, 2010

Figure III. 10 shows clearly the relationship between support for democracy and education in Guatemala. As the level of education of the respondents increases the support for democracy increases in a linear way.




Figure III.10. Relationship between education and support for democracy in Guatemala, 2010

Crisis and the Support for the Political System

Belief in the legitimacy of one's government (i.e., system support) is a key requisite for political stability. In an extensive investigation based on LAPOP survey data John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson found that legitimacy emerges from multiple sources, but that the performance of government in satisfying citizen needs and demands is central.⁵² Some research suggests that there has been a steady decline in political support for the system, even in many advanced industrial democracies over the past 30 years.⁵³ Does this decline mean that low levels of system support place democracy at risk? Thus far, there is no indication of that for the advanced industrial democracies. But what of the consolidating democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean? This subject was treated in depth for the 2006 round of the AmericasBarometer data, but we look at it in this year's report in the context of the severe economic crisis.

For many years LAPOP has utilized a System Support Index based on five variables, each scored on a 1-7 based, but converted to the traditional 0-100 LAPOP system for better understanding of the results:

⁵² System Support is an index created from five questions. For a more detailed explanation of how this index was created, see Chapter V in Part II of this study. See John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

⁵³ Russell J. Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

- B1.** To what extent do you think the courts in Guatemala guarantee a fair trial? (**Read:** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
- B2.** To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Guatemala?
- B3.** To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Guatemala?
- B4.** To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Guatemala?
- B6.** To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Guatemala?

To understand the dynamics of “system support,” we compare the levels from 2008 to those in 2010. As shown in Figure III.11 some countries experience important changes in system support. For example, Honduras, in the aftermath of the coup and the elections that restored democracy to the country, support soared from its pre-coup low of 46.4 up to 60.4. It needs to be kept in mind, however, that the survey in Honduras was taken only one month after the election of the new government administration, and thus the level of support may be elevated by the well-known “honeymoon effect” that new government administrations usually get. Uruguay, Paraguay, Panama, Ecuador, El Salvador, Bolivia and Nicaragua also saw statistically significant increases in support for the political system, despite the economic crisis. On the other hand, only Canada, Jamaica, Belize and the Dominican Republic saw statistically significant (albeit quantitatively small) decreases in system support between 2008-2010. The other countries remained statistically unchanged. In Guatemala the support for the system remained basically unchanged between 2008 and 2010, moving from 48.8 points to 49.6. With this result, Guatemala in the year 2010 is located among countries with low support for the system, reporting in the range of only 40 points.




Figure III.11. Average System Support in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

In the regression analysis, we again find that perception of a very serious economic crisis correlates negatively with system support, illustrated in Figure III.12. Further, as we saw with support for democracy, low system support is present among those who hold a pessimistic view of their household and national incomes. Surprisingly, neither declines in household income nor unemployment have a significant impact on system support. Among the factors negatively associated with system support are: education and urban areas residents. In other words, more educated citizens living in urban areas tend to support less the system. Also, corruption victimization is negatively associated with system support.

The major impact on system support, as in the case with support for democracy, is perception of government economic performance. Once again, then, we see that individuals in the Americas are strongly affected by their views as to how their governments perform. Clearly we also see that satisfaction with the incumbent president matters, but what matters most is their views of government performance. This finding once again suggests that the impact of the economic crisis was mitigated by governments that are perceived to have responded effectively to the challenge. Also, on the positive side of the regression, we can see that older people and women tend to show a greater system support.




Figure III.12. Determinants of System Support in the Americas, 2010

Evidence that in many countries citizens did in fact perceive improved government economic performance between 2008 and 2010 appears in Figure III.13. Note that in Chile, Uruguay, Panama, Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras, Ecuador, Nicaragua, United States, Peru and Paraguay significant increases were found in terms of perception of government economic performance. On the other hand, only in Costa Rica, Jamaica, Guatemala and Belize were significant declines recorded by the two surveys. The most drastic decline was in Guatemala where the perception of economic performance of the government fell from 50.6 points in 2008 to 35.8 in the year 2010.




Figure III.13. Perception of Government Economic Performance in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

Direct evidence at the national level that improvements in the perception of government economic performance are in part driving levels of system support is shown in Figure III.14. In this chart, country averages are presented for both the variation in average perception of government performance and the 2008-2010 variations in system support. The results are very clear: the greater the increase in satisfaction with governments' management of the economy, the greater the increase in system support.




Figure III.14. Change in Perceptions of Government Economic Performance as a Predictor of Change in System Support (2008-2010), Country Level Analysis

Not only is this result found at the national level, we find it at the sub national level as well. In Figure III.15 we examine these same items of change in perception of government performance and change in system support, but use the sub national strata of each sample. For example, in Bolivia, each department is a separate sample stratum, and in other countries regions are used for the strata. Details of the sample designs taking note of these strata are contained in the appendix of each country report. What we see is that even at the sub national level, when the average perception of government economic performance is perceived as shifting in a more positive direction, average system support increases.




Figure III.15. Change in Perceptions of Government Economic Performance as a Predictor of Change in System Support (2008-2010), Subnational Level Analysis

Figure III.16 presents the regression of support for the political system in the case of Guatemala. A resulting variable strongly associated with support for the system in Guatemala can be seen. Specifically, the perception of the economic performance of the government is the variable presenting the most positive influence on system support in the country. This variable is more influential than victimization by crime or victimization by corruption (variables which were incorporated into this statistic model).

Other factors produced only a slight influence on support for the system in Guatemala. Those with a positive association included the favorable evaluation of the presidential performance of Álvaro Colom. Respondents who identified themselves as indigenous also tended to show greater support for the system. On the left side of the model of regression those residing in urban areas of the country, women, victims of crime, and those with a negative perception of the economy in retrospect were less inclined to support the political system of Guatemala.




Figure III.16. Determinants of Support for the System in Guatemala, 2010

Figure III.17 shows the relationship in Guatemala between system support and two of the variables which turned out to be predictors in the regression: the perception of government economic performance and the residence of the respondents. It is clear that those with a more favorable opinion of the government’s economic performance, particularly inhabitants of rural areas, reported greater support for the system.




Figure III.17. Support for the System in Guatemala by Area of Residence and Economic Perception of the Government

The Crisis and Satisfaction with Democracy

While support for democracy as a system of government continues to be high in the Americas despite the economic crisis, what about satisfaction with democracy, another variable commonly used in tracking democratic consolidation around the world? Research in the advanced industrial democracies has found that the satisfaction with democracy has been in long-term decline, a process that began some decades ago and continues, indicating that this is a process not directly linked to economic downturns.⁵⁴ During periods of economic crisis in the Americas, is it more likely that citizens will express lower levels of satisfaction with democracy? Certainly that is what the classical hypotheses, based on considerable social science literature suggest, as we noted in Chapter I. Put differently, citizens may continue to support democracy in principle as the best form of government, but in practice, they may feel that democracy has not delivered in their own countries. The question thus becomes: Are citizens of the countries of the Americas less inclined to express satisfaction with democracy in their countries when they are living in hard economic conditions? Evidence from the AmericasBarometer suggests that this may be in fact the case, at least in some countries.

An examination of Figure III.18 shows that in various countries the average of satisfaction with democracy decreased between 2008 and 2010. In Mexico, a country especially affected by the economic crisis, satisfaction declined from 50.4 points to 44.6 points on a scale of 0-100. This decline is statistically significant. Venezuela suffered the largest reduction falling from 58.8 points to 46.3 points. Also in the Dominican Republic, Canada, Guatemala, Belize, and Argentina statistically significant declines occurred. In the same way in the United States where the effects of the crisis were felt in a large measure by the majority of citizens, there was a statistically significant decrease in levels of satisfaction with democracy—falling from 57.3 to 50.6 points during this period. However, there were some countries in which satisfaction with democracy increased in a pronounced and statistically significant way. Such is the case for Honduras, a country which experienced a coup d'état in 2009.⁵⁵ In this country, satisfaction with democracy reported an increase from 44.8 points to 57.8 points. The greatest increase occurred in Paraguay. This country appeared on the lower scale of satisfaction with democracy in 2008 with a score of 30.2 points. It climbed to 49.9 points in 2010. The survey of 2008 was carried out just before the election of April 2008 which put an end to decades of domination by one party in Paraguay. Without a doubt this was a factor influencing the significant increase in democratic satisfaction obtained in the 2010 survey. Other notable increases were produced in El Salvador, where, as in the case of Paraguay, the opposition (the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) gained power for the first time in 15 years. Increases in satisfaction with democracy also occurred in Uruguay, Panamá, Bolivia and Chile. In many countries, however, there were no statistically significant changes, in spite of the serious economic crisis which has left an imprint throughout the world.

⁵⁴ Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*; Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*.

⁵⁵ Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, "Trouble in Central America: Crime, Hard Times and Discontent," *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 2 (2010).




Figure III.18. Satisfaction with Democracy in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

Moving on to the determinants of satisfaction with democracy, we see that, indeed, the economic variables have a strong influence in democracy satisfaction. We also see that negative perceptions of personal and national economic situations as well as negative perceptions of retrospective personal and national economic situations are associated with lower levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works. In addition, those whose income decreased, more educated individuals, and those who live in urban areas show lower levels of this satisfaction. Yet these effects are quite small.

More interestingly, as we found with life satisfaction, support for democracy, and system support, the major impact on satisfaction with democracy is perception of government economic performance *in addition to satisfaction with the performance of the current president*. Once again, we see that individuals in the Americas are strongly affected by their views as to how their governments perform. But we also see that satisfaction with the incumbent president matters *more* when related to satisfaction with democracy (as opposed to its lower impact on support for democracy); this suggests that while perceptions of governments as responding effectively to the crisis were important, perceptions of the presidents' performance during hard economic times are also highly important. Also, in the positive

range, older citizen are more satisfied with the democracy state in Latin America, although it has a small effect.




Figure III.19. Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy in the Americas, 2010

As with previous subjects, a continuation includes a figure of regression similar to the one presented for the Americas. This time it is focused only on the case of Guatemala. Figure III.20 shows that like the rest of the Latin American region, satisfaction with presidential performance, as much as positive evaluation of economic performance, are the most relevant variables for determining satisfaction with democracy in Guatemala. However, unlike the region, Guatemala has no economic variables which produce a great impact. The negative retrospective perception of personal economy of the respondents has some influence, but it is minimal. It is evident also that none of the socio-demographic variables seem to have a statistically significant effect in levels of satisfaction with democracy for Guatemalans.




Figure III.20. Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy in Guatemala, 2010

Figure III.21 shows clearly the relationship (previously presented) between a positive evaluation of presidential performance and satisfaction with democracy. It is evident that those who report a positive presidential performance are more inclined to feel satisfied with the existing democracy in Guatemala.




Figure III.21. Satisfaction with Democracy and Evaluation of Presidential Performance, Guatemala 2010

The Crisis and the Support for Military Coups

An extreme reaction to hard times is for the military to take over in a coup. Historically in Latin America a number of such coups have been attributed to economic crises, but militaries have also been forced from power when economic crises broke out during their period of authoritarian rule. The Honduran coup of 2009 heightened interest in military coups that many had thought were a thing of the dark past of Latin America's history. In the context of the current economic crisis, we now evaluate citizens' support for this authoritarian alternative. We asked our respondents if they would justify a coup under three distinct conditions: high unemployment, high crime, and high corruption.⁵⁶ The comparisons 2008-2010 are shown in Figure III.22. We do not have comparative data for all countries since three countries that do not have an army (Costa Rica, Panama and Haiti) were not asked these questions in 2008. In 2010, however, for those three countries we did ask about a take-over of the country by their police forces, in order to create some sort of hypothetical alternative. Moreover, the question on a military coup was not asked in Jamaica or Paraguay in 2008.

The results show that support for a coup d'état is very low in most countries and especially low in Panama and Argentina. In fact, in general the 2010 results compared with 2008 are more positive. For instance, the support for a coup d'état was very high in Honduras, and, perhaps not surprisingly, a coup occurred there in 2009. Post-coup, support for such illegal take-over of a democratic system dropped sharply in Honduras, reaching just 30 points in 2010. It may be that the coup itself resolved the problems that Hondurans were having with the regime and now they saw no reason for it; or, it could be that the experience with the coup itself lessened support for this type of action. We leave the discussion of the coup issue to the detailed country report on Honduras.

In 2010 the coup support decreased in several countries, besides Honduras (for example, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Guyana), and only increased significantly in Guatemala, which went up from 38.3 to 46 points. As a result, Guatemala is now part of the countries with high support for a coup d'état (40 points or more), among them we can find Peru, Belize, Mexico, and El Salvador.

⁵⁶ The Index of Support for Military Coups was created from three questions. They ask: Now, changing the subject, some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? JC1. When there is high unemployment. JC10. When there is a lot of crime. JC13. When there is a lot of corruption. Response options were (1) A military take-over of the state would be justified; and (2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified. These were later recoded into 100=a military coup is justified and 0=a military coup is not justified.




Figure III.22. Justification of a Military (Police) Coup in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

Returning to the relationship between hard economic times and authoritarian tendencies, is support for military coups higher among those who perceive an economic crisis or who are unemployed? We see in Figure III.23 that unfortunately this is the case. Unemployment and the perception of a very serious economic crisis are associated with significantly greater support for military coups. Furthermore, individuals who exhibit a negative perception of the national economic situation also show a higher support for military coups. Additionally, age, wealth and education show lower pro-coup tendencies: while age, education and income increase lower is the support for military coups. Unlike the topics previously explored in this chapter, satisfaction with President performance or satisfaction with government economic performance have no influence in support (of lack of support) for military coups.




Figure III.23. Predictors of Support for Military Coups in the Americas, 2010 (Total Population)

Figure III.24 shows that in the case of Guatemala (one of the countries with higher levels of support for a military coup) some factors which influence this support in Latin America also influence this same support in Guatemala. Specifically, Guatemalans of younger age and with lower levels of education are more inclined to support a military takeover. Unlike trends in the region, economic variables do not appear to be determinants for support of a coup in Guatemala. However, additional variables are linked to this kind of illegal action. For example, satisfaction or dissatisfaction with presidential performance is a factor: those satisfied with the President’s performance demonstrate less support for a coup. And, vice versa, those dissatisfied are more inclined to support a military takeover. Those who have been victims of governmental corruption are also more inclined to support a coup.




Figure III.24. Determinants for Support of a Military Coup in Guatemala, 2010

Figure III.25 shows the relation between system support and age. Guatemalans between the ages of 18 and 35 show greater support for the eventuality of a military coup. Those showing less support are Guatemalans between the ages of 55 and 65. This would indicate that younger Guatemalans who have lived under a democratic system most of their life are more inclined to support a coup. (This could be because they have never experienced such an event). Finally, the evaluation of presidential performance has a positive correlation in support for a coup. However, a more detailed analysis shows that this is an inconsistent relation—in other words, not a linear trend but one that fluctuates.




Figure III.25. Support for a Military Coup in Guatemala by age, 2010

Finally, Figure III.26 shows the relation between the evaluation of presidential performance (Álvaro Colom) and support for a coup. Those who consider the presidential performance as “bad or very bad” show a support for a coup of 51.4 points in comparison with 45 points of the other respondents. The figure has joined two categories of bad and very bad, but making the same analysis separately. It should be noted that support for a coup is higher still (almost 60 points) among those who consider Colom’s performance as very bad. An analysis of frequency of different categories shows that 24.2% of the population consider Colom’s performance bad or very bad. 54.2% consider it neither good nor bad and 21.7% consider his performance to be good or very good.

Support for the option of a military coup is counter to the political culture of democracy. A citizen of democratic culture should believe that the only way to carry out a change of executive power, independent of one’s opinion of the president, is through choices at the ballot box or other political processes established by the constitution. This is presented in the famous phrase of the Spanish political scientist, Juan Linz (1990) who assured us that a democracy is strong when all elites and all citizens believe that the rules of democracy are “the only game in town”. It is evident that those who consider a coup to be an alternative answer to their discontent with the elected president are not attuned to the rules of any established modern democracy.




Figure III.26. Support for a Military Coup in Guatemala by Evaluation of the President, 2010

Conclusions

This chapter has evaluated the impact of the economic crisis on the Americas, particularly in Guatemala—in terms of life satisfaction and a series of variables related to democracy. It was found that for 34% of Guatemalans life satisfaction decreased between 2008 and 2010. This result in Guatemala as well as throughout the continent was associated with the perception that personal economy worsened in the past two years and that family incomes decreased.

On the one hand neither Guatemala nor the rest of the region decreased support for democracy as a consequence of the crisis; education was a far more important predictor. In relation to support for the political system, Guatemala had no variation between 2008 and 2010. But the country continued having one of the lowest scores in this variable. Unlike support for democracy, it was found that in the Americas a negative perception of the economy is correlated with less system support. In an opposite way, support for the political system increases when citizens have a good evaluation of the economic measures taken by the government. Guatemala presented the same pattern: those who reported a positive evaluation of the economic measures taken by the Alvaro Colom government were more inclined to report higher levels of support for the system. The perception of performance of the government regarding the economy decreased considerably from 50.6 points in 2008 (when President Colom had been in office only a few months) to 35.8 points in 2010.

Satisfaction with democracy (a different measure of support for democracy or support for the political system), also decreased in Guatemala between 2008 and 2010, falling from 52.5 points to 47.8 points. It was found that throughout the continent, including Guatemala, variables related to the economic crisis had a negative impact in terms of satisfaction with democracy—in particular, the variables measuring the perception about the state of the economy. But, again, the variables which most explain the decrease in satisfaction with democracy in 2010 are related to the evaluation of governmental economic performance and in general with the evaluation of presidential performance.

Finally, in this chapter the impact of the economic crisis on support for an eventual military coup was measured. It was found that in 2010 Guatemala was the only country on the continent which increased its support for a military coup. The percentage rose from 38.3 points to 46 points. As in other countries, a large measure of support for a military coup is related statistically to education and age: the younger Guatemalans and those with less education are more inclined to support a coup. Nevertheless, unlike other countries, economic variables are not predictors of greater or less support for a coup in Guatemala. Rather, in 2010, satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with the President is one of the most important predictors for support of a coup in that country.

Table III.1 shows the results obtained by Guatemala in comparison with the same measurement for the Americas as a whole. It shows that with the exception of life satisfaction (Guatemala is slightly above the medium range for the region) in other measurements Guatemala obtained poor results.

Table III.1. Comparison between Guatemala and the Americas: Life Satisfaction and Support for Democracy

Medición	Variable	Región	Guatemala
Promedio	Satisfacción con la vida	60.4	61.3
Promedio	Apoyo a la democracia	71.4	62.8
Promedio	Apoyo al sistema político	53.9	49.6
Promedio	Percepción de desempeño económico del gobierno	45.6	35.8
Promedio	Satisfacción con la democracia	52.1	47.8
Promedio	Apoyo a un golpe de Estado militar	33.1	46.0

Part II: Rule of Law, Crime, Corruption, and Civil Society

Chapter IV. Rule of Law, Crime, and Corruption

Introduction

In Part I of this report a general overview of the economic crisis and democratic development was presented. The preceding chapters focused on citizens' perception of the crisis by seeking an answer to the following question: *Who was most likely to be affected by the crisis?* In addition, a regional comparative assessment was presented of citizens' perceptions of key economic variables, followed by an evaluation of the impact of the crisis in terms of unemployment and perceptions of national and personal economic well-being. Part I concluded with an analysis of how those affected by the crisis expressed less support for democracy.

This chapter tests various key hypotheses that relate to rule of law, crime and corruption. The objective is to specify the degree to which crime and corruption can influence support for democracy. The variables used in Part I which measure the economic crisis itself are used here as additional controls or predictors, but are not the main focus of analysis.

Theoretical background

The concept of rule of law carries with it the principle of universality, without privilege for any type of person. Andrade shows that the concept can have a limited meaning (public powers respectful of legal ordinances), but current trends connect it to regimes respectful of public liberties and clearly opposed to absolutism, despotism and totalitarianism.⁵⁷ Rule of law has, according to some law scholars, certain general characteristics distinguished by the following terms:⁵⁸

- a) Authority of the law: law as the expression of the general will.
- b) Separation of powers: legislative, executive and judicial.
- c) Legality of the government: regulation of government by law and judicial control.
- d) Fundamental rights and liberties: a formal-legal guarantee that protection of rights will be carried out by the law.

A close connection exists, therefore, between democracy and rule of law, given that in a democratic system all public officials and all citizens are subject to the law. The rule of law is always legal and constitutional, and the submission of the public authority to the law guarantees the liberty of the citizen.⁵⁹ Richard Rose explains that when a regime accepts the limitation of its powers and when law, not force, prevails, it is then transformed into a democratic regime subject to the established laws. He states:

⁵⁷ Andrade, Larry. Estado de derecho, informe sobre Guatemala, Parte I. *Cuadernos de Estudio*, No. 60 (Guatemala: Universidad Rafael Landívar, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 2005).

⁵⁸ Rodríguez Zepeda, Jesús. Estado de Derecho y Democracia. *Cuadernos de divulgación de la cultura democrática*, No. 12 (México D.F, Instituto Federal Electoral, 2001).

http://bibliotecadigital.conevyt.org.mx/colecciones/ciudadania/estado_de_derecho_y_democracia.htm#presen, acceso el 16/7/2010.

⁵⁹ Azpuru, Dinorah et al. *Construyendo la democracia en sociedades posconflicto, Guatemala y El Salvador, un enfoque comparado* (Guatemala y Ottawa: F&G Editores y IDRC, 2007).

“Rule of law is not only a desirable complement for a democratic government; it is a necessary precondition for a fully democratic state to exist.”⁶⁰

In a democracy, only the judicial branch of government has the authority to keep watch through observation of these norms and to punish those in violation of them. All democracy relies on the independence and effectiveness of this governmental power. Rule of law is the basis of accountability. If in a given society elections are carried out, but the elected officials cannot be controlled as they govern, as much in a horizontal form (the control between powers through established constitutional mechanisms) as in a vertical form (the control on the part of the people, generally through elections or other procedures), the democracy will be incomplete. To the extent that public officials adhere to the rule of law, and the mechanisms of control function properly, acts of corruption which undermine citizens' confidence in the authorities can be avoided.

Rule of law, as previously mentioned, does not only imply that civil servants and public organizations must be subject to the law, but also that established rules will be applied, and that the weight of the law will fall on the transgressors. Here the subject of criminality arises. Not only civil servants, but also citizens must be subject to the law, including those with greatest economic power or established privileges in a particular society. In weak or fragile states, even if the elected officials are controlled by the mechanisms of the political system, groups can exist—often criminal—who act with impunity. In other words, groups or individuals that are above the law and engage in corruption or coercion are able to avoid punishment for breaking the law.

With reference to the subjects introduced in this chapter, it is important finally to mention that rule of law assures citizens that the law applies to all who transgress it, whether they are government officials, members of a privileged group or a single person. That is why it is necessary that a system of effective and efficient justice exists which punishes those who commit illegal acts of any kind. This is particularly important when dealing with criminal acts.

As previously mentioned, in the case of Guatemala in the years 2009 and 2010, various acts occurred that pointed to the weakness of rule of law. In fact the rule of law has been weak since democracy was initiated 25 years ago, but the depth of the crisis has become more acute in the last two years.

Perception of Insecurity and Crime

The Perception of Insecurity

One of the essential roles of any state is to offer security to the citizens who reside in the territory.⁶¹ For this reason constitutions in various countries throughout the world guarantee protection for the life of their citizens. The Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala issued in 1985 makes reference to this subject in its first three articles:

⁶⁰ Rose, Richard. *Democratic and Undemocratic States, Democratization*, C. Haerpfer, P. Bernhagen, R. Ingelhart and C. Welzel (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 12.

⁶¹ Drogus, Carol and Orvis, Stephen. *Introducing Comparative Politics* (Washington: CQ Press, 2009), p. 157.

ARTICLE 1: Protection of the person. The State of Guatemala is organized *to protect the person and the family*; its ultimate end is the realization of the common good.

ARTICLE 2: Duties of the State. It is the duty of the State to guarantee the inhabitants of the Republic life, liberty, justice, *security*, peace and the integral development of the person.

ARTICLE 3: Right to life: The State guarantees and protects human life from its conception as well as the *integrity and safety of the person*.

In this study a frequent and universally used question measures the degree of physical insecurity felt by individuals in a particular country. The question is as follows:

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat **unsafe** or very **unsafe**?

a) A comparative perspective

Figure IV.1 shows the differences in the degree of physical insecurity that citizens of the Americas perceive. Canada and the United States indicate the greatest degree of personal safety. At the other extreme Peru and Argentina are located above 50 points, followed closely by El Salvador, Venezuela, Belize, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic and Bolivia. Guatemala is located in the middle range, which seems surprising since Guatemala has been considered one of the most violent countries of the region. As will be later explained, this outcome refers to the country as a whole, which includes rural areas where levels of physical insecurity are lower than in urban areas.




Figure IV.1. Perception of Insecurity in the Americas, 2010

b) Perception of Insecurity Over Time in Guatemala

Figure IV.2 presents a comparison in insecurity levels perceived by Guatemalans who completed the democratic culture surveys in 2004, 2008 and 2010. The perception of insecurity was higher in 2004, at 45.5 points on a scale of 0-100 used in the study. This decreased slightly in 2006 and stabilized at somewhat less than 40 points in 2008 and 2010. Various reasons for the reduction include the possibility that citizens might have adopted means to protect themselves, or that they might have become accustomed to the situation. In any case, it is difficult to determine the reasons through use of public opinion surveys.




Figure IV.2. Perception of Insecurity in Guatemala, 2004-2010

Victimization by Crime

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a more precise means of measuring victimization by crime. In previous surveys those interviewed were asked: *Have you been a victim of some act of crime in the past 12 months?* In the revised round of interviewing, the question has been modified and is now accompanied by examples of possible criminal acts. In addition, the respondent is asked where the crime occurred and if any other member of the household of the person was victimized. The following revised questions are used in the questionnaire:

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

VIC2AA. ¿Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred?[Read options]
 (1) In your home (2) In this neighborhood (3) In this municipality (4) In another municipality
 (5) In another country (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months?
 (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

a) Victimization by Crime in Comparative Perspective

Figure IV.3 presents the comparative results of crime victimization in Latin American countries. It shows that the highest percentage of victimization occurred in Peru (31%). Guatemala ranked eighth place in the level of victimization, preceded by Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina, Mexico and El Salvador. Also in Uruguay, Surinam and Colombia, 20% or more of the population reported

having been a victim of crime in the past year. At the other extreme, the countries with the lowest percentage of crime victimization were Jamaica, Guyana, followed by Belize and Panama.




Figure IV.3. Percentage of Persons who were Victims of Crime in the Americas, 2010

b) Victimization by Crime Over Time in Guatemala

Figure IV.4 shows the trend of crime victimization in Guatemala. As previously mentioned, a phrase was incorporated into the original questionnaire in 2010 which may have affected the increased reporting of victimization. In any case, the graph indicates that from 2004 to the present there has been a significant increase in the percentage of victimization in Guatemala, reporting 23.3% direct victimization in the year 2010.




Figure IV.4. Victimization by Crime in Guatemala, 2004-2010

c) Victimization by Crime in Guatemala in 2010

Figure IV.5 shows the results of two questions related to individual or familial victimization of Guatemalans in the year 2010. 23% of those interviewed reported being a direct victim of some act of crime in the past 12 months. The lower section of the graph shows that in half (11.9%) of the cases only the person interviewed was a victim. But in the other half (11.3%), the respondent, as well as someone else in the home, were victims. In addition, 15.6% of those interviewed were not a direct victim, but another person in the home was victimized. In total, almost 40% of Guatemalan households suffered an act of crime in the year previous to the survey.




Figure IV.5. Crime Victimization at the Individual Level and in the Household in Guatemala, 2010

Figure IV.6 shows the results of question vic2aa, which indicate where the person interviewed suffered the criminal act. In 60% of the cases, those interviewed were victimized in their own neighborhoods or townships/parishes. Approximately 17% were victimized in their homes. Therefore a high level of insecurity exists in communities and neighborhoods where Guatemalans live. They do not necessarily have to enter dangerous areas of the city or country to be victimized.




Figure IV.6. Location of Crime Victimization in Guatemala, 2010

d) Who is Most Likely to be a Victim of Crime?

It is evident that not all Guatemalans have been victimized to the same extent. Factors exist which make some more vulnerable than others. For example, information collected (homicides per 100,000 residents) shows the Guatemalan capital to be more violent than other areas of the country.⁶² To find which factors are determinants of crime vulnerability, an analysis of regression was made. The results are shown in Figure IV.7.

The figure indicates that the location of residence is the greatest determinant for crime victimization: those who reside in urban areas, in particular the Metropolitan Zone, are the most vulnerable. A lesser determinant is education, showing citizens with higher levels of education to be more susceptible to crime victimization.

⁶² It is estimated that the rate of homicides in Guatemala City in 2006 was 108 per 100,000 inhabitants, while in the rest of the country the rate was 44.24 in 2005. In comparison, Rio de Janeiro had a 40.6 rate of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in the year 2006. See the Report on Statistics of Violence in Guatemala, United Nations Program for Development (UNPD). The Report on Human Development for Central America deals with citizen safety as part of human development. The United Nations Program for Development, Bogota: IDHAC (2009) studies in depth the subject of violence in the Central American region.




Figure IV.7. Who is most Likely to be a Victim of Crime in Guatemala? 2010

Figure IV.8 shows striking differences existing between the rural and urban areas of the country, as well as the Metropolitan Zone and other regions of Guatemala. In urban areas about 30% of those interviewed reported that they or some member of their household were a victim of crime in the past year, while only 17% of persons in rural areas were victimized. The right side of the graph indicates that in the Metropolitan Zone about 40% of persons were either a direct victim or were another victimized member of the household. In comparison, the rest of the regions of the country have a relatively low percentage of victimization, with the northwest region showing the highest of these at 21%.

These graphs explain why Guatemala as a whole has crime rate that scores in the medium range compared to other countries in the Americas. The total percentage of the country places Guatemala eighth on the victimization scale. Nevertheless, if only the percentage of victimization of the Metropolitan Zone is taken into account (40.7%), Guatemala ranks above all other countries in the region, with a victimization percentage markedly greater than any other. And it is important to keep in mind that other countries of the region have far larger urban populations.




Figure IV.8. Victimization by Crime in Guatemala by Residence and Region (2010)

Figure IV.9 shows victimization according to region and year. In every region there was an increase of victimization in the year 2010 (keeping in mind the effects of the modified questionnaire previously mentioned). Nevertheless, it is evident that the increase has been the greatest in the Metropolitan Zone. In spite of this, between the year 2008 and the year 2010 no region reported significant statistical differences. Yet between 2004 and 2010 the Metropolitan Zone, the Northwest region and the Northeast region did report significant statistical differences.




Figure IV.9. Victimization by Crime in Guatemala, by Region and Year

From the results obtained in the variation of crime victimization, it is important to determine if the perception of physical insecurity is higher in urban areas as well as certain regions of the country. Figure IV.10 shows the results of statistical regression using the perception of insecurity as a dependent variable. It shows clearly that Guatemalans who live in the Metropolitan Zone (and in the Southwest) are more conditioned to feel physical insecurity. In addition to region, two other factors are statistically associated with a greater perception of insecurity—having a high level of education and being indigenous.




Figure IV.10. Determinants of the Perception of Insecurity in Guatemala, 2010

Finally, in this section, Figure IV.11 shows how the perception of insecurity varies from region to region in Guatemala, as well as the variation that exists between those who have higher levels of education and those who have less. It is evident that those who live in the Metropolitan Zone indicate much higher levels of insecurity (in the range of 50 points). This also explains how Guatemala, compared to other countries, is positioned in the medium range and not high on the scale (see Figure IV.1): the perception of insecurity in the Metropolitan Zone is the highest on the continent, while the rest of the regions' perception is relatively low.




Figure IV.11. Perception of Insecurity in Guatemala by Region of the Country (2010)

Corruption

Measuring Corruption

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of items to measure victimization by corruption. These items were originally tested in Nicaragua (Seligson, 1999, Seligson, 1997) and have been improved and perfected in various studies since. Definitions of corruption vary from culture to culture. Therefore, to avoid ambiguity, questions like the following are asked in order to define corrupt practices: *“In the past year have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?”* Similar questions are asked concerning bribes at the local government level, in public schools, in the work environment, in the court system, at health centers and in other places. This series of measurement offers two types of information. On the one hand, it allows investigation into where the corruption is most prevalent. It also helps in designing corruption victimization scales which can distinguish between those individuals victimized in only one setting and those victimized in multiple institutional settings. As shown in studies of crime victimization, being a victim once or being victimized in multiple settings has different implications. The whole series measures corruption in the following way:

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the city/town /Village council office? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document like a permit, for example, did you have to pay any money beyond that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

An item related to this topic but that measures the perception (rather than victimization) of corruption, was also included in the questionnaire:

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is [Read] (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) Doesn't Know (98) Doesn't Answer

Perception of Corruption

a) Perception of Corruption in Comparative Perspective

As in previous sections of this study, results obtained throughout the continent are shown on Figure IV.12. Guatemala is highlighted in the dark blue bar which indicates how it compares to the other countries. Figure IV.12 places Guatemala in the middle in terms of perception of corruption. The greatest perception of corruption is shown in the two Caribbean countries of Trinidad & Tobago and Jamaica, both with more than 80 points. However, these points are not significantly higher than other countries whose points range in the 70s, including Guatemala. Only in Canada and Surinam does the range fall beneath 60 points.




Figure IV.12. Perception of Corruption in the Americas, 2010

b) Perception of Corruption Over Time in Guatemala

Figure IV.13 shows how the perception of corruption in Guatemala evolved in the years between 2004 and 2010. In the year 2010 there was a statistically significant decline compared to the years 2006 and 2008, but not to the extent of levels perceived in 2004, which reached 70.5 points.




Figure IV.13. Perception of Corruption in Guatemala, 2004-2010

Victimization by Corruption in 2010

a) Victimization by Corruption in Comparative Perspective

As previously mentioned, many persons without directly experiencing corruption perceive that it exists. Their perceptions can be formed by news coverage in the media or by listening to conversations of groups helping victims. This section shows the results of victimization by corruption—that is, the composite index of victimization.

The comparative view can be seen in Figure IV.14. This view is unlike a previous graph that showed the comparative perception of corruption in which Guatemala appeared in the middle of the scale. Figure IV.14 instead ranks Guatemala higher among the countries with greater victimization of corruption, at 21.2%. Nevertheless, Guatemala’s place on the graph is still located beneath Mexico, Bolivia and Peru, all with percentages of 30% victimization. Even Paraguay and Brazil rank higher. Guatemala’s victimization percentage is nearly the same as Ecuador and close to Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Belize, Guyana and Honduras. Among the Central-American countries Guatemala ranks highest in victimization by corruption, while Nicaragua, El Salvador and in particular Costa Rica rank the lowest. The United States, Chile and Canada are countries of the Americas showing the lowest levels of victimization by corruption.




Figure IV.14. Victimization by Corruption in the Americas, 2010

b) Victimization by Corruption Over Time in Guatemala

It was previously shown that the perception of corruption in the government decreased in the year 2010. Figure IV.15 indicates that in terms of victimization by corruption, the contrary is true. Victimization by corruption did increase slightly, and differences in previous years are not statistically significant. In the year 2010, 19.7% of the population reported being victim of at least one act of government corruption.




Figure IV.15. Percentage of the Population Victimized by Corruption in Guatemala, 2004-2010

c) Victimization by Corruption in Guatemala in 2010

Figure IV.16 shows that 79% of Guatemalans were not a victim of any act of corruption in the year preceding the survey. Among those victimized, 14.8% reported having paid one bribe in that period. Almost 5% were victimized on two occasions, and 1.7% were victimized three or more times.




Figure IV.16. Victimization by Corruption in Guatemala, 2010

d) Who is Most Likely to be the Victim of Corruption?

Repeating what has been done throughout the study, it is important to show the frequency with which the acts occur. But it is even more relevant to determine the factors associated with the acts. In other words, it is important to recognize the relationship between cause and effect. In terms of victimization by corruption, the analysis of regression reveals that in Guatemala such factors as geography and demographics play a part in victimization. The analysis shows that Guatemalan men who identified themselves as indigenous in the survey and who live in an urban environment—particularly in the Metropolitan Zone and in the Southwest region of the country—are more susceptible to victimization. This can be observed in Figure IV.17.




Figure IV.17. Determinants of Victimization by Corruption in Guatemala (2010)

In order to observe more clearly the connection between victimization and other factors, Figure IV.18 provides details. It shows that while 25.6% of the men indicated having been victimized, only 16.8% of the women indicated the same. The graph also shows a marked difference according to residential environment. Those interviewed who live in urban areas had a victimization rate of 24.1% in comparison to 18.7% in rural areas. The differences between regions and between Guatemalans identifying themselves as ladinos (Spanish-speaking Indians) or indigenous is not so marked. But it is statistically significant according to what was observed in the analysis of regression.




Figure IV.18. Corruption Victimization by Gender, Residential Area, Region and Ethnicity, Guatemala 2010

The Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption in a Democracy

Beyond knowing which Guatemalans are most affected by insecurity, crime and corruption, it is also necessary to determine if these factors have had a negative impact on democracy. An analysis of regression is again useful. But this time, perception of insecurity, crime victimization, perception of corruption and corruption victimization are used as possible predictors in the equation. How these factors influence support for the political system and citizens' respect toward rule of law will be evaluated. This in turn will help to measure the support for democracy. Chapter V will deal with how to measure support for the political system.

Figure IV.19 shows the results related to political support for the system. It indicates that the only factor associated with less support for the system in Guatemala in 2010 is that of respondents who reported crime victimization of a resident in their home. The effect of this variable is greater than the direct victimization of the respondents. Also, neither perception of insecurity, nor the belief that crime threatens the future of the country, have a direct effect on decreased support for the political system. This does not mean that if the levels of crime and violence continue to rise, the support for the system will not be affected. But in the year 2010, only victimization of a family member has a statistically significant implication.

The regression also indicates that the perception that government will improve security is a highly relevant determinant in support for the political system. Those who believe that the government will employ political forces to provide security are much more inclined to support the system. Satisfaction with the performance of the President is also important, but to a lesser degree. It is clear that government

policies of security are not the only determinant factor of support. The regression also shows that a positive perception of the personal as well as national economic situation has a favorable effect on support for the system.

Among the geographic and socio-demographic factors influencing support for the system, those living in urban areas demonstrate somewhat less support, though the effect is minimal. On the positive side of the figure (the lines to the right) those with more income show slightly more support, as well as Guatemalans who have identified themselves as indigenous.




Figure IV.19. Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Support for the Political System in Guatemala, 2010

Figure IV.20 shows the relationship between support for the political system and various factors that appear in Figure IV.19 as predictors of the same. The most striking connection appears in the first square. Among those who believe that the government of Alvaro Colom is improving security, the average support for the system is much higher. Other factors also have a positive connection, although not so evident.




Figure IV.20. Determinants of Support for the System in Guatemala

Figure IV.21 shows two other connections—the first between support for the system and the residential area of respondents—the second between support for the system and crime victimization of a member of the household (the most relevant one for this chapter). While respondents from rural areas indicate support for the system at 54.3 points, those from the urban areas show only an average of 44.3 points. Among those with family members victimized by crime and those whose members were not, the difference is marked. The average support for the system of those whose family members were not victimized was 52 points; in contrast those whose family members had been victimized reached only 43.5 points on the scale.




Figure IV.21. Impact of Victimization by Crime in the Household and Residence on System Support in Guatemala, 2010

Support for Rule of Law and the Impact of Crime and Insecurity

Beyond the impact of crime and insecurity on the support of the political system, these problems can also exert a negative influence on how persons perceive and respect (or do not respect) rule of law. The question used to measure respect toward rule of law is the following:

AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?
 (1) Should always abide by the law (2) Occasionally can cross the line (88) Doesn't Know
 (98) Doesn't Answer

a) A Comparative Perspective of Respect for Rule of Law

In a comparative perspective, Figure IV.22 locates Guatemala in the middle of the scale at 61.6% support for rule of law. This is a striking contrast with countries like Belize, Jamaica, Venezuela, and Brazil which all have a high support for rule of law, in the range of 70% or more. At the other extreme, countries which indicate less support for rule of law are El Salvador, Ecuador, and Peru. In all of these countries less than 50% of the population indicates that authorities should always respect the laws.




Figure IV.22. Support for the Validity of Rule of Law in Comparative Perspective, 2010

b) Support for the Validity of Rule of law in Guatemala

Figure IV.23 shows in greater detail the distribution of support for the validity of rule of law in Guatemala. Even though Guatemala is not ranked low on the scale of countries, the situation is far from ideal. Almost 40% of the population reports that on occasion the authorities should act outside the law in order to combat crime.




Figure IV.23. Support for the Validity of Rule of Law in Guatemala, 2010

c) Impact of Crime Victimization and the Perception of Insecurity on the Respect for Rule of law

In order to measure the impact of crime victimization and the perception of insecurity on the support for rule of law, a regression is used. It is similar to the one which measured determinants for support of the political system. Figure IV.24 shows the results. Again it is found that inhabitants of urban areas show less support for rule of law. Crime victimization and perception of insecurity also have an effect, though minimal, on this support. Two socio-demographic variables have a connection as well—gender and self-identified ethnicity. Women, including those identifying themselves as indigenous, tend to show greater support for rule of law.




Figure IV.24. Determinants for Support of the Validity of Rule of Law in Guatemala, 2010

The last figure of this chapter (IV.25) provides details of determinants for greater or lesser support for rule of law in Guatemala in 2010. Crime victimization and perception of insecurity do have a slight effect on support for rule of law. Those victimized and those who feel insecure (unsafe) are less inclined to support it. On the one hand, it is clear that inhabitants of rural areas as well as those identifying themselves as indigenous show greater support. More facts are needed to explain this data. But it is probable that lesser standards defining crime, as well as the experience of violence and repression suffered by the population in the interior of the country during the armed conflict, has caused these citizens to have more support for upholding the laws. The same figure shows that women have a higher support for rule of law than men, and that the difference is statistically significant.




Figure IV.25. Variables Related to Support for the Validity of Rule of Law, Guatemala 2010

Conclusions

This chapter has examined two subjects relative to rule of law which are significantly connected to Guatemalan reality: on the one hand the subject of insecurity and crime, and on the other hand the subject of corruption. In cases, perception as well as victimization of those interviewed is explored.

In terms of perception of insecurity, Guatemala is located in the middle of the scale of countries of the Americas included in the study. With a perception of insecurity averaging 39.9 points, Guatemala ranks slightly below the continental average of 40.5. Nevertheless, Guatemala is one of the eight countries with a higher level of victimization—elevated in 2010 to 23.3% in comparison to 17.5% in 2008. Victimization of a member of the household is also higher in Guatemala than in other parts of the continent. The percentage of victimization of family members in the Americas is 19.4%. In Guatemala it reaches 26.9%. Perception of insecurity as well as crime victimization (at both the personal and the familial level) increase significantly in urban areas of the country in comparison to rural areas, with the Metropolitan Zone being particularly vulnerable. It is interesting to note that crime victimization of a family member has more effect on the decrease of support for the political system than direct victimization of the respondents.

Regarding perception of corruption of public officials, Guatemala ranks slightly above half of the continent. Similarly, the percentage of victimization by corruption in Guatemala is higher (21.2%) than in the continental countries combined (16.9%). Inhabitants of urban areas of the country, especially those in the Metropolitan Zone, are not only more vulnerable to acts of crime, but also to victimization by corruption. These determinants are clear. Citizens who live in urban areas, in particular the Metropolitan Zone, show lower levels of support for the political system and less support for the rule of law.

Table IV.1 shows the comparison between Guatemala and the Americas as a whole in variables previously discussed. As shown, in the majority of indicators, Guatemala shows results below the medium range, although in some cases the differences are small.

Table IV.1. Comparison between Guatemala and the Americas: Insecurity, Crime, and Corruption

Medición	Variable	Región	Guatemala
Promedio	Percepción de inseguridad	40.5	39.9
Promedio	Creencia que la delincuencia amenaza el futuro del país	82.7	89.0
Porcentaje	Victimización por delincuencia personal/individual	19.2	23.3
Porcentaje	Victimización por delincuencia de miembro del hogar	19.4	26.9
Porcentaje	Victimización total, individuo y miembro del hogar	31.1	38.9
Promedio	Percepción de corrupción	72.4	75.5
Porcentaje	Victimización por corrupción	16.9	21.2
Promedio	Apoyo al Estado de derecho	60.3	61.6

Chapter V. Legitimacy, System Support, and Political Tolerance

Introduction

Legitimacy of a political system has been understood as an essential element for democratic stability.⁶³ Recent investigations have emphasized the importance of legitimacy in many aspects of democracy (Booth and Seligson 2009, Gilley 2009, Gibson 2005). This chapter examines the theme of legitimacy, continuing the discussion in previous studies published by LAPOP, particularly those focusing on the combined effect of political legitimacy and political tolerance as predictors of democratic stability in the future. In this sense, these scenarios of greater legitimacy and political tolerance are understood as more favorable to the development of a stable democracy.

Theoretical Background

The Legitimacy and Tolerance Equation

In previous studies of the AmericasBarometer, political legitimacy (defined in terms of support for the system) and tolerance toward political opposition have been used together to create a kind of cautionary guide for those democracies which might be especially fragile. The theory indicates that both support for the political system and political tolerance are necessary to maintain democratic stability in the long term. Citizens must have faith in the legitimacy of their political institutions and also must be disposed to tolerate the rights of others. Within these contexts, majority rule can exist, accompanied by rights for minorities. This combination of attributes is often seen as the quintessential definition of democracy (Seligson, 2000). Ideally, a political system should be able to rely on high levels of support and high levels of political tolerance. Nevertheless, there exists different combinations in which a society confers legitimacy upon its institutions and guarantees the right of opposition to the minorities.

Before examining the results, it is necessary to explain how the indicators of support for the system and for tolerance are constructed. Support for the system is a composite measurement (an index) which indicates the degree to which individuals place trust in the political institutions of the country, respect them and feel protected by them. The result is the average of answers drawn from the following questions:

⁶³ Dictatorships, of course, can garner popularity and support from wide sectors of the population. But when this cannot be sustained, they may use repression as a last resort. In democracies, governments attempting to use repression generally fall rapidly.

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.

B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (**Read:** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)

B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?

B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?

B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?

B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

Following the usual procedure, the original scale of 1-7 is transformed into a new scale of 0-100 in which 0 represents the least support for the system and 100 the maximum support possible.

It is important to keep in mind how the index of political tolerance is constructed. Citizens are asked how willing they are to support political rights for those who do not support the system of government of the country. The following questions are used:

D1. There are people who only say bad things about the Guatemala form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale: [**Probe: To what degree?**]

D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.

D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Guatemala form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?

D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?

The original answers of those interviewed are on a scale of one to 10, in which one indicates strongly disagree and 10 indicates strongly agree. The low values indicate low tolerance for political rights for those who do not agree with or support the form of government or have low political tolerance. The original values for each question were converted onto the usual scale of 0-100. To create an index, a simple average was made of the answers to the four questions.

From a theoretical point of view, the purpose is to analyze how the support for the system (legitimacy) is interrelated with tolerance. To do this it is necessary to dichotomize scales into "high" and "low".⁶⁴ Table V.1 shows the four possible combinations of support for the political system (legitimacy) and political tolerance.

⁶⁴ Each one of these scales ranges from 0 to 100, so that the medium point selected is 50. Thus values in support of the system which are less than 50 are categorized as "low", and values in support of the system which are above 50 are considered "high". In a similar way, regarding political tolerance, values less than 50 are considered "low" and values above 50 are considered "high."

Table V.1. Comparison between Guatemala and the Americas: Insecurity, Crime, and Corruption

	Tolerance	
System Support (legitimacy)	High	Low
High	Stable democracy	Authoritarian stability
Low	Unstable democracy	Democracy at risk

Within political systems where citizens have a high level of support for the system and a high political tolerance, it is predicted that these systems will be more stable. That is, they are going to have a *stable democracy*. This prediction is based on the logic in which contexts, not constraints, are needed for a high degree of legitimacy to insure a stable system. If citizens do not support their political system, and they have the liberty to act, a change of system will appear as an inevitable result. Systems that are stable, however, will not necessarily be democratic unless the rights of the minorities are assured. Such security will come, of course, with constitutional guarantees. But if the citizens are not willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be scarce opportunities for minorities to compete or obtain positions of power. Under these conditions, the majorities can usually suppress the rights of the minorities. Systems which are politically legitimate, which can rely on a high degree of citizen support for the political system and which have citizens reasonably tolerant of the rights of minorities are those most likely to enjoy a stable democracy (Dahl 1971).

When support for the system is maintained at a high level but tolerance is low, that is, when it is in the context of *authoritarian stability*, the system does tend to maintain itself (by the high degree of support). However, within this context, the average democratic government is endangered and could move toward authoritarianism (oligarchy), where democratic rights are restricted.

A situation of low support for the system is expressed in the two lower squares of Table V.1, and both can be directly tied to situations of instability. Instability, nevertheless, does not translate into a reduction of civil liberties, since instability can allow the system to examine its level of democracy, especially when values move toward tolerance. However, in a situation of low support and high tolerance it is difficult to predict if the instability will lead to greater democratization or to a prolonged period of instability characterized by violence; this describes a scenario of *democratic instability*.

On the other hand, in situations of low support and low tolerance, a democratic rupture can be the eventual outcome. Evidently a democratic rupture cannot be predicted solely from opinion surveys, since in this process many factors play a part. The role of elites, the position of the military and the support or opposition of international players are crucial in the process of a democratic rupture. Nevertheless, systems in which public opinion does not support the basic institutions of the nation, nor support the rights of minorities are vulnerable to a democratic rupture. This is described within the context of *a democracy at risk*.

It is important to keep in mind two explanations relevant to this outline. First, it is necessary to consider that the relationships discussed here only apply to systems which are already institutionalized democracies. That is, they are systems which carry out competitive elections and which permit full citizen participation. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have totally different implications. For example, low support for the system and high tolerance would produce a rupture in the authoritarian regime which would subsequently be replaced by a democracy. In the second place, the supposition made is that in the long term, attitudes of citizens, as well as elites make a difference in the type of regime. In

practice, attitudes and the type of regime can remain incompatible over a long period of time. In fact, both Seligson and Booth have demonstrated the case of Nicaragua. This incompatibility should have been remedied by the fall of the Somoza regime. But in Nicaragua’s case, the existing system was authoritarian, and repression was used for a long time to maintain the authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of its citizens (Booth and Seligson 1991; Seligson and Booth 1993; Booth and Seligson 1994).

Support for the Political System

a) Components of Support for the System in Guatemala in 2010

FigureV.1 shows the individual results of support for the system in Guatemala in the year 2010. As can be seen, the highest level of support is for the item indicated “respect for political institutions”, with points of 61.2 on a scale of 0-100. Approaching this high level without statistically significant difference is the item “support for the political system” with 58.8 points. However, there is a drastic difference among the three remaining components. The lowest support comes from the item which measures the degree to which citizens believe that their basic rights are well-protected by the Guatemalan political system. This item reaches only 39.9 points on the scale. Confidence in the judicial system that does not guarantee a fair trial also ranks low in points. Finally, pride in the political system ranks relatively low at 44.9 points total.




Figure V.1. Components of Support for the System in Guatemala, 2010

b) Support for the System in Comparative Perspective

As explained earlier in this chapter, when these five components are combined, an index of support for the system can be constructed. Figure V.2 shows the result of this index for different countries of America. As shown, Guatemala is located on the lower part of the scale but not among the lowest ranked countries of the study. With a total score of 49.6 points, the result for Guatemala is statistically similar to that of Nicaragua, Brazil, Venezuela and Jamaica. The country on the continent showing the highest level of support for the political system is Uruguay with a score of 68 points. This ranks above even countries like Canada and the United States. (The score of 53.5 for the United States is particularly surprising). Among the select group of countries with scores ranging in the 60s including Uruguay, are Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia and surprisingly, Honduras. At the other extreme, the country with the least support of this group is Trinidad & Tobago with 44 points.




Figure V.2. Support for the System in Comparative Perspective

c) Support for the Political System Over Time

As in previous chapters, in addition to examining the existing situation regarding support for the political system in the year 2010 (when information is current), it is also important to evaluate the results over time. Figure V.3 shows results for Guatemala. It indicates no drastic changes in support for the system between the years 2008 and 2009. In fact, global support increased slightly, though not in a statistically significant way. In 2010, levels returned to those of the year 2004. The only year reporting more than 50 points was in 2006, when support for the system reached 52.2 points.




Figure V.3. Support for the Political System in Guatemala, 2004-2010

Political Tolerance

a) Components of Political Tolerance in Guatemala in 2010

As previously explained, the other important component of legitimacy is political tolerance. The four items which measure political tolerance and their results for Guatemala are shown in Figure V.4. The least tolerance is indicated in the case of the right to postulate and the right of freedom of expression. Neither of these reaches the positive reference line of 50 points. On the contrary, tolerance for the right to vote and to participate in peaceful demonstrations does fall in the positive range of 52.8 and 55.9 respectively. In comparison with the components of support for the system, no item falls beneath the range of 40 points, but neither does it reach 60 points on the scale of 0-100.




Figure V.4. Components of Political Tolerance in Guatemala, 2010

b) Political Tolerance in Comparative Perspective

In a comparative perspective with other countries on the continent, Guatemala is located in the lower block but not among the lowest countries on the scale. As in the case of support for the system, when four items of tolerance are combined, a global index is constructed. The index for tolerance for Guatemala in the year 2010 reaches 50.2 points, equal to that of Ecuador and similar to that of Panama. Other countries with an index of tolerance in the range of 50 points are Brazil, Belize, Jamaica, Chile and Colombia. Among the select group of countries with a tolerance score of 60 points or more are Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Argentina. This last country is located high on the scale in terms of tolerance but very low in terms of support for the system. The contrary occurs in the United States. In terms of political tolerance it reaches a high score of 70.4 points, but in terms of support for the system, the United States scores in the range of 50 points. Similarly, in El Salvador results show highly favorable support for the system but report the lowest support for political tolerance on the scale—only 45.1 points.




Figure V.5. Political Tolerance in Comparative Perspective, 2010

c) Political Tolerance Over Time

In analyzing levels of political tolerance that have occurred over time in Guatemala, a positive change can be seen. In fact it is statistically significant in the year 2010. The index of tolerance reached 50.2 points, passing the line of reference of 50 points used in this study. The increase is substantial in relation to the year 2008, when the score for this index was only 43.6 points. As mentioned earlier, the reasons for this cannot be determined with exactitude by means of an opinion survey. But it is probable that the closeness of the elections in 2007 may have influenced less tolerance for the survey made at the beginning of 2008. The result of 2010 is the second most favorable in the country, keeping in mind that in 2004 it was also relatively low. Again, it is probable that at the time of completing the survey in 2004, general elections had recently ended which may have influenced a lesser degree of tolerance.




Figure V.6. Political Tolerance in Guatemala, 2004-2010

Support for a Stable Democracy

An explanation on how support for the system combined with political tolerance produces a perspective on the probability of support for a stable democracy was given at the beginning of this chapter (see Table V.1). Table V.2 shows the results of possible combinations for Guatemala in the year 2010. In general terms it can be said that Guatemalans are distributed equally among the different cells, since about a quarter of each cell is occupied by them. These results, nevertheless, do not represent an optimum scenario. Ideally, the greatest percentage of citizens should be located in the first cell, that of a stable democracy which represents the combination of citizens with high political tolerance and high support for the system. In Guatemala only 22.7% of the citizens are located in that cell.

On the contrary, the box designated “democracy at risk” is a matter of concern. This last box represents the combination of citizens with low levels of political tolerance and low support for the system. 26.2% of the Guatemalan citizens are located in that cell.

Table V.2. Empirical Relationship between Support for the System and Political Tolerance, Guatemala, 2010

System Support (legitimacy)	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy 22.7%	Authoritarian Stability 27.0%
Low	Unstable Democracy 24.1%	Democracy at Risk 26.2%

a) Support for a Stable Democracy in Comparative Perspective

In order to have a fixed comparison that can be evaluated whether the results obtained in Guatemala are favorable or not, Figure V.7 shows the index of support for a stable democracy in the countries of the Americas. Figure V.8, on the other hand, shows the percentages of citizens of different countries who fall into the cell of “democracy at risk”.

In terms of percentage of citizens located in the cell designated “stable democracy”, the results are not positive for Guatemala. It is one of the four countries with the least number of citizens in that cell. The 22% reported for Guatemala is almost equal to that of Bolivia. Only Ecuador, Peru and Paraguay rank lower than Guatemala. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the majority of countries have a relatively low percentage—less than 30% in the “stable democracy” cell. The most stable countries in which 40% or more of the population are located in the favorable cell are Uruguay, Costa Rica, Surinam, Canada and The United States respectively. This is not surprising, since four of these countries are generally considered to be strong democracies and receive the evaluation of “free countries” in the Freedom House index.




Figure V.7. Support for a Stable Democracy in Comparative Perspective

On the opposite side are located citizens in the category of “democracy at risk”. Figure V.8 shows Guatemala among five countries with the highest percentage of citizens on that scale. Nevertheless, it is far below Paraguay and Peru (with larger percentages of 30%) or Bolivia and Ecuador which have similar percentages. Again, the countries with the most favorable locations on the scale, this time with the lowest percentages of citizens in the category of “democracy at risk”, are in order—Costa Rica, Uruguay, Surinam, the United States and Canada. The case of the two Latin American countries stands out, since less than 10% of their citizens are located in the category of democracy at risk.




Figure V.8. Percentage of Citizens in the Cell of “Democracy at Risk” in the Americas, 2010

Figure V.9 shows more clearly where the different countries in the boxes of Table V.1 are located. Guatemala, as a whole, is located in the square designated “unstable democracy”, but is almost on the dividing line between that square, the “stable democracy” square and the one designated “democracy at risk.”




Figure V.9. Location of Countries of the Americas in squares of Stable Democracy, 2010

Figure V.10 shows in greater detail the location of each country in terms of tolerance and support for the system. Some countries have high levels of tolerance but low levels of support for the system (Argentina and Trinidad & Tobago for example). Others, on the contrary, show a high support for the system but low tolerance (El Salvador for example). Guatemala is the only country with levels in both variables located in the middle. Clearly, the ideal case is shown by countries such as Costa Rica and Uruguay which show high levels of tolerance and high support for the political system.




Figure V.10. Tolerance and Support for the Political System in the Americas, 2010

b) Support for a Stable Democracy Over Time

The longitudinal analysis shows that the percentage of citizens in the category of “stable democracy” increased between 2008 and 2010, as seen in Figure V.11. This is a positive result. In the years 2008 only 18.5% were in that same category. In the period under analysis, however, the percentage still remains far below the 26.8% reached in 2006. Also, this percentage is far below other countries in the region with more stable democracies.




Figure V.11. Support for a Stable Democracy in Guatemala, 2004-2010

c) Who is Most Inclined to Support a Stable Democracy?

As previously mentioned, it is important to recognize which citizens are most inclined to support democracy. The analysis of regression shown in Figure V.12 indicates which groups of citizens are more inclined to offer this support. It includes women, citizens victimized by one or more acts of corruption and those with a member of their household victimized by crime. It also includes those who believe the government is improving security.




Figure V.12. Who is more Inclined to Support a Stable Democracy in Guatemala? 2010

Figure V.13 indicates in detail that 26.2% of men show support for a stable democracy, while only 18.7% of women demonstrate this support. Another marked difference is between Guatemalans whose families suffered an act of crime and those who didn't. While only 13.2% of the first group supports a stable democracy, the percentage rises to 26.4% among those who suffered no direct victimization by crime.

The difference between victims of corruption and non-victims is also statistically significant, but not as marked as the ones just mentioned. 24.1% of those who were not victims support a stable democracy, but among those who were victims the percentage falls to 17.7%. Finally, the same Figure V.13 shows evidence that among citizens who believe the government has improved security, support for stable democracy rises above 50%. The opposite occurs with citizens who believe that the political security of the state is ineffective. This signals the fragile state of democracy regarding the future of Guatemala, where any government is likely to fail in its policies of public security.




Figure V.13. Determinants of Support for a Stable Democracy in Guatemala (2010)

Legitimacy of Political Institutions

In addition to the legitimacy that a political system may have as a whole, it is important for the analysis to measure more tangible levels. It is therefore relevant to measure the legitimacy of public institutions, especially those which uphold any democratic system. The following two figures show citizen evaluation of a series of political institutions. Three of the organizations appearing on the list are not institutions of the state but are used as parameters of comparison. These institutions are the Catholic Church, the Evangelical Church and the communication media which are marked in a different color to differentiate them from those of a political nature.

Legitimacy is measured on the scale of 0-100 used throughout this study. Figure V.14 indicates that the non-political organizations are those which garner the greatest support from citizens: Both the Catholic Church and the Evangelical Church have levels of support around 65 points, and the communication media has support of nearly 60 points. In comparison, the greater part of the institutions included in this graph have a relatively low average of support (under the line of reference of 50 points). The exceptions are the Army scoring the highest with 55.9, the municipal government (of the respondents) with a score of 51.3 points and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal with 50.9 points. The remaining institutions, unrelated to sectors of justice, score less than 45 points. The low level of legitimacy for the Congress as well as the political parties is a matter of concern. Their scores are 36.6 points and 29.1 points respectively.




Figure V.14. Confidence in the Institutions of Guatemala, 2010

Figure V.15 separates the rest of the institutions relating to justice and security for the purpose of greater understanding and for the relevance of the subject regarding Guatemala today. Again, churches are included as a parameter of comparison. Also included is the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). It shows that among the institutions in the sector of justice of Guatemala, CICIG receives the highest evaluation, scoring 56.8 points on the scale of 0-100. Chapter VIII of this report will examine this subject in further detail.

The Guatemalan institution with the best evaluation is the Office of Human Rights which passes the line of reference at 50 points. The Court of Constitutionality, the Public Ministry and the Supreme Court of Justice follow. All other institutions included in the term “system of justice” show support within the range of 41 to 44 points. The institution receiving the lowest evaluation is the National Police with only 31 points. This score is the second lowest of all institutions of the state. Political parties score the lowest at 29.1 points.




Figure V.15. Confidence in Institutions of the Judicial Sector in Guatemala, 2010

Finally the next two figures show the analysis of legitimacy of institutions over time. The second figure shows the institutions related to the justice sector. As Graph V.16 indicates, only two political institutions, the Army and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, improved their citizen evaluation in the year 2010, although in neither of the two cases is the difference statistically significant in relation to the year 2008. But in the case of the Army, the difference is significant in relation to the year 2004. On the contrary, the national government, the municipal government (of the person interviewed) and the political parties suffered a statistically significant decline in citizen confidence. Though not as marked, the legitimacy of confidence in the Congress also declined.




Figure V.16. Confidence in the Institutions in Guatemala, 2004-2010

Figure V.17 shows changes which occur in the legitimacy of institutions of justice. In the year 2010 two institutions, the Court of Constitutionality and the Office of Human Rights, increased their legitimacy in a statistically significant way. The notable change occurred in the Office of Human Rights. In contrast, the other institutions of the justice sector suffered a decline. However, in the case of the justice tribunals, the Supreme Court of Justice and the Public Ministry, the difference is not statistically significant. The only statistically significant decline was that suffered by the National Civil Police which fell from 40.3 points to 31 points.




Figure V.17. Confidence in the Institutions of Justice in Guatemala, 2004-2010

Attitudes toward Democracy

Support for Democracy

In the previous section, aspects related to the political system and institutions were examined. To continue, support for a democratic regime as an alternative is further examined. Chapter III of this report indirectly dealt with this subject by exploring the impact of economic crisis on support for democracy. Here it is examined more specifically. The question used to measure support for democracy is the following:

ING4. Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? (Scale 1 – 7)

This question, like the majority of those used in the LAPOP reports, was converted onto a scale of 0-100 to facilitate comparisons and understanding. Figure V.18 indicates that in the converted scale all countries receive scores above 60 points, which is positive. Nevertheless, some countries like Uruguay and Costa Rica score much higher than the average, receiving 86.2 and 80.4 respectively. In 13 countries support for democracy is in the range of 70 points, and 10 countries show a range of 60 points—among them Guatemala. However, Guatemala is located at the end of the list together with El Salvador, Paraguay, Honduras, and Peru. All score below 65 points.




Figure V.18. Support for Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2010

Figure V.19 indicates that support for democracy in Guatemala increased slightly in 2010 in relation to the year 2008, rising on the scale from 60.5 to 62.8 points. This is a much higher average than in 2004 when support only reached 57.4, but lower than in 2006 when it reached almost 70 points.




Figure V.19. Support for Democracy in Guatemala, 2004-2010

Satisfaction with Democracy

Citizens can support democracy, that is, can believe it is the best possible system for their country, yet still feel dissatisfied with the way in which it functions at any particular moment in time. This subject was examined indirectly in Chapter III. The question used to measure satisfaction with democracy is the following:

PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Guatemala?
 (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (88) DK (98) DA

Figure V.20 shows the distribution of answers to this question in Guatemala in 2010. 46.6% indicate dissatisfaction and 7.2% indicate great dissatisfaction with the way government functions in their country. This totals nearly 54% of the citizens. 40.6% feel satisfied, and a minority of 5.6% feels very satisfied.




Figure V.20. Satisfaction with Democracy in Guatemala, 2010

It is also important to have a parameter of comparison with other countries. Figure V.21 shows the comparison using the scale of 0-100. Guatemala appears in the lower block, where the average level of satisfaction is low. Although Guatemala is not last on the scale, the difference compared to other countries is statistically insignificant. Where the difference becomes marked is in the block of countries located above the 50 point range of satisfaction. Brazil, Bolivia, Honduras and Canada are included in this range. Above them is Uruguay with 67.9 points and Costa Rica and Panama, both with 62.5 points.




Figure V.21. Satisfaction with Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2010

Finally Figure V.22 shows the average range of satisfaction with democracy in Guatemala. Between 2008 and 2010 satisfaction declined significantly, falling from 52.1 points in the first quarter of 2008 (at the time of the survey) to 47.8 points in the first quarter of 2010.




Figure V.22. Satisfaction with Democracy in Guatemala, 2004-2010

Conclusions

This chapter has analyzed the subject of the legitimacy of the political system, the political institutions and the stability of democracy in the Americas in general and Guatemala in particular. The combination of the results for support for the system and political tolerance serve to give a composite measure of stable democracy.

Support for the political system in Guatemala between 2008 and 2010 remained stable. Yet Guatemala is still one of the countries of the Americas with the lowest average in this variable. On the one hand, political tolerance increased significantly in the year 2010, climbing from 43.6 points in 2008 to 50.1 points in 2010. This increase in political tolerance also contributed to the increased support for a stable democracy in Guatemala in 2010. In 2008 only 18.5% of the population supported a stable democracy. In 2010, that support increased to 22.7%. This, however, did not place Guatemala above the medium range for the region. Also a matter of concern is the 26.2% of the Guatemalan population located in the category of “democracy at risk”. Their level of support for the political system and for political tolerance remains low.

Among the factors influencing these negative results are crime victimization of family members and corruption victimization of individuals. Those respondents whose family members have been victimized or those who have suffered a direct act of victimization by corruption are less inclined to support a stable democracy.

This chapter also measures the legitimacy of various political institutions. The institutions which generate the greatest confidence among the population are the Army, the Office of Human Rights, the local government of the municipality (of the person interviewed) and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, respectively. All indicate scores ranging above 50 points. At the other extreme, institutions with less legitimacy are the political parties, the Congress and the National Civil Police. However, the political

institutions as a whole garner less legitimacy than the non-political institutions –for example, the churches.

Table V.3 shows a comparison of the principal variables used in this chapter. It compares the results obtained in Guatemala with those of the Americas and indicates that Guatemala is located below the ideal medium of all the indicators.

Table V.3. Comparison between Guatemala and the Americas: Indicators of Political Legitimacy

Medición	Variable	Región	Guatemala
Promedio	Apoyo al sistema político	53.9	49.6
Promedio	Tolerancia política	56.1	50.2
Porcentaje	Apoyo a la democracia estable	30.2	22.7
Porcentaje	Población en categoría de democracia en riesgo	19.8	26.2
Promedio	Apoyo a la democracia	71.4	62.8
Promedio	Satisfacción con la democracia	52.1	47.8

Chapter VI. Civil Society and Civic Participation

Introduction

This chapter examines a series of subjects related to citizen participation of various kinds within a democracy. Democratic ideas, not formulas, emphasize that a strong, active civil society is a condition *sine qua non* of any democracy. In the same sense, it is inconceivable that a democracy could exist without this kind of citizen participation in today's world. An understanding of democracy goes beyond describing the institutions and rules established to regulate the political game. It includes the concept of "social capital" which refers to the combination of values and practices of citizens who play an important part in creating a more stable democracy.

First, the chapter examines two relevant subjects associated with "social capital": interpersonal trust and civic participation in community life and in various organizations. Next, a less common but equally important kind of participation is studied: protests and legal demonstrations. Following this, a kind of participation most often linked to democracy is examined—that which occurs in the electoral process. Finally, a perspective is offered on two subjects linked to the previous ones: the interest citizens have in politics and their degree of political activism.

Theoretical Background

The term "civil society" refers to a group of social organizations not tied to the state but found among the family (the other extreme of the state). Nevertheless, as Ottawa indicates, the term is more complex. Civil society does not encompass the whole of society. Neither does it include the entire network of institutions and relationships in society. Rather it is a part of the whole.⁶⁵ The distinction between civil society and the rest of society is not always easy. What is clear is that civil society does not include individuals themselves or the family. It generally refers to volunteer organizations not tied to the state or government but which have some influence and consequence in national life.

Another distinction is often made between the terms civil society and political society. Political parties are usually considered part of the political society, because their ultimate aim is to gain access to power in government. Organizations of civil society do not seek power *per se*, although they often influence public policy and decision-making of those in power. Doubt arises as to whether organizations without political aims can be considered part of civil society. Ample academic debate exists regarding this subject. But generally organizations of civil society differ from others, because they do seek to influence public policy and decision-making at the local, state or national levels of government.

In any case, in order for a democracy to be strong, beyond the formalities of regular elections and electoral competition between political parties, an active civil society, independent of government, is required. Diamond points out that aside from political parties and elections, citizens in a liberal democracy should have channels of expression and representation of their interests and values, including

⁶⁵ Ottoway, Marina. *Civil Society, Politics in the Developing World*, Burnell, P. and Randall, V., Publishers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 2nd. edition, p. 167.

associations and various movements in which they can voluntarily participate.⁶⁶ Authoritarian regimes generally restrict the organization of citizens into groups, in particular those who try to influence politics. Semi-authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, can allow greater participation in organizations but try to infiltrate or co-opt them in order to serve the aims of the regime. Finally it should be made clear that organizations of civil society can be of various and distinct types; economic, cultural, educational, civic, developmental or focused on other particular subjects.

Another important concept in this chapter is described as “social capital” which was popularized in the 90s after the publication of an investigation directed by political scientist Robert Putnam in Italy. Putnam asked why some democratic governments succeeded and others failed. To find the answer he began a comprehensive investigation in Italy. He concluded that democracy was more successful in regions where the following conditions existed: 1) Civic organizations with high participation. 2) Citizens cooperating for the benefit of all. 3) High interpersonal confidence among citizens.⁶⁷

As mentioned before, this chapter will examine the level of interpersonal confidence existing in the Americas, and Guatemala in particular. It will also examine the degree of citizen participation in non-political organizations, many of which form part of the civil society.

Beyond civic participation independent of politics, it is also important to study what Dalton refers to as conventional political participation.⁶⁸ This includes voting in elections as well as other forms of political activism: participating in political campaigns, persuading others to vote a certain way, contacting authorities to initiate petitions or requests, protesting or participating in demonstrations relative to subjects of collective interests, and also includes the new form of activism –via the internet. This chapter explores these various kinds of conventional political participation.

Interpersonal Trust

Interpersonal trust has become a fundamentally important factor in building social networks which at the same time strengthen a democratic society. The commonly used question for measuring the degree of interpersonal trust is the following:

IT1. Now, speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...? **[Read options]**
(1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) Not very trustworthy (4) Untrustworthy
(88) DK (98) DA

a) Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective

Figure V.I.1 indicates that the countries with greatest interpersonal trust are Costa Rica, Canada and the United States—countries which have stable, consolidated democracies. Their high scores of confidence are based on the 0-100 scale used throughout the study. In the following block of countries are

⁶⁶ Diamond, Larry. *Developing Democracy, Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1999), p. 221.

⁶⁷ Putnam, Robert. *Making Democracy Work, Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1993).

⁶⁸ Dalton, Russell. *Citizen Politics, Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2008).

Uruguay and Chile which have made significant progress towards democratization in recent years (actually considered *free countries* by Freedom House). It is interesting to see Honduras and El Salvador located in this same block with scores in the range of 60 points. Guatemala is located in the medium-low range with those scoring around 50 points. The majority of Latin-American countries are found in that range. Belize and Peru, however, are located at the lowest end with scores in the range of 40 points.




Figure VI.1. Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective, 2010

b) Interpersonal Trust Over Time

Figure VI.2 indicates how interpersonal trust has evolved in the case of Guatemala. In 2010 it decreased slightly, but the difference is statistically insignificant. In fact, the interpersonal trust level has remained fairly constant since 2004 with just a slight increase in 2008.




Figure VI.2. Interpersonal Trust in Guatemala, 2004-2010

c) Interpersonal Trust in Guatemala in 2010

Figure VI.3 divides into parts the results obtained in 2010 in Guatemala. About one quarter of the Guatemalan population considers the people in the community to be very trustworthy. 33.2% consider them to be somewhat trustworthy. On the negative side, one-third of Guatemalans (31.1%) consider people in their communities to be not very trustworthy, and 10.5% consider them to be untrustworthy. In total it can be said that about 41% of Guatemalans distrust other people.




Figure VI.3. Interpersonal Trust in Guatemala, 2010

d) Determinants of Interpersonal Trust

Besides knowing the distribution of the results related to interpersonal trust, it is important to determine which factors influence trust or distrust in others. The analysis of regression shown in Figure VI.4 indicates two influencing factors. On the hand, residents of urban areas are more distrustful. But the variable exerting the most influence in degree of trust is the perception of insecurity. And it is not surprising that those who do not feel safe in their community also distrust others.




Figure VI.4. Determinants of Interpersonal Trust in Guatemala (2010)

Figure VI.5 shows clearly the relationship between distrust, area of residence and perception of insecurity. Inhabitants of urban and rural areas who feel safe have much higher levels of trust. In fact, they are similar to levels existing in Costa Rica, the United States and Canada. But as the perception of insecurity increases, the level of trust decreases. Guatemalan citizens who feel very insecure have extremely low levels of trust. Inhabitants of urban areas who feel insecure have only a 28.8 point average of trust in other people. Clearly inside Guatemala great differences exist. But more than cultural or democratic factors, the perception of insecurity has the most influence on low levels of interpersonal trust.




Figure VI.5. Interpersonal Trust in Guatemala, by Area of Residence and Perception of Insecurity (2010)

Civic Participation

We now measure another important component of “social capital”—citizen participation in various organizations of society. A battery of questions is used in this study to learn the levels of participation of the respondents. They are asked how often they participate in organizations or contribute to certain activities in the community. The specific questions are as follows:

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK	DA	
CP5. Now, changing the subject. In the last 12 months have you tried to help to solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood? Please, tell me if you did it at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year or never in last 12 months.	1	2	3	4	88	98	
I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. [Repeat for each question “once a week,” “once or twice a month,” “once or twice a year” or “never” to help the respondent]							
	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK	DA	
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP7. Meetings of a parents’ association at school? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP9. Meetings of an association of professionals, merchants, manufacturers or farmers? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP13. Meetings of a political party or political organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP20. [Women only] Meetings of associations or groups of women or home makers. Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	DA 98	N/A 99

a) Participation in Meetings of Civic Organizations

Figure VI.6 indicates the frequency of citizen participation in various organizations in Guatemala. As in previous chapters, each question has been converted to fit the scale of 0-100 in order to improve understanding. It is clear that the greatest participation occurs in meetings of religious organizations of various denominations. The average score reaches 66.9 points. On the same scale, participation in parent associations averages 30.1 points. Other community meetings or councils for improvement show an average participation of 23 points, while guild associations report 8.7 points. It is interesting to observe on the figure that meetings of women’s groups report 13 points, because these groups are different from the other organizations where the majority of participants are women.




Figure VI.6. Participation in Meetings of Civic Organizations in Guatemala (2010)

b) Participation in Meetings of Civic Organizations Over Time

It is important to determine if changes have occurred in relation to citizen participation through the years. Figure VI.7 shows that levels of participation varied little between 2008 and 2009. In fact they have remained stable in recent years. In 2010 the only statistically significant increase in participation occurred within religious organizations.




Figure VI.7. Participation in Meetings of Civic Organizations by Year in Guatemala

Finally, in this section Figure VI.8 shows the level of citizen collaboration in solving community problems. It indicates that about one-fifth of Guatemalans contribute actively at least once or twice a month, and that 4.3% collaborate one or more times a week.




Figure VI.8. Collaboration in Resolving Community Problems, Guatemala 2008-2010

Participation in Protests and Demonstrations

The measurement of participation in protests is done using the following question. It must be emphasized that the question was modified in 2010. Therefore it is not possible to do a comparison of that time.

PROT3. In the **last 12 months**, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

a) Participation in a Demonstration or Protest March in Comparative Perspective

According to the results of Figure VI.9, levels of participation in protests and demonstrations in the Americas are not high. Only Argentina, the United States, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay and Bolivia reported more than 10% participation in the twelve months prior to the survey. In fact the majority of countries reported participation of less than 7%. Guatemala is located high on the scale, with 8.6% of citizen participation in demonstrations. The levels of Guatemala are similar to those of Venezuela but greater than those reported in the other Central American countries with the exception of Nicaragua.




Figure VI.9. Participation in a Demonstration or Protest in Comparative Perspective, 2010

Electoral Participation

Participation in elections, that is the act of casting a vote in an election, is considered essential to any representative democracy. Often, one indicator of a strong democracy is necessarily a high percentage of voter turn-out at the ballot box. Clearly there are other essential elements such as a great number of partisan options and ideologies and freedom to vote without coercion and transparency in vote counting. But even if a functional system exists with partisan options, ideologies and liberty to vote, a democracy can be diminished by lack of participation. This study uses the following question to measure the degree of participation. It is important to keep in mind that this question was answered only by respondents who had previously indicated being registered to vote.

VB2. Did you vote in the last presidential elections of 2007?
(1) Voted (2) Did not vote

a) Electoral Participation in Comparative Perspective

As in previous sections of this study, a comparative perspective is presented, this time using Figure V.10. The numbers represent the percentage of citizens who responded positively to the question concerning their participation in the last elections. It is important to understand that these percentages do not necessarily coincide with the official results of participation for a number of reasons. First, in many countries of the world a certain increase in numbers reported is artificial, because some persons report what is desirable rather than factual. This is particularly true in countries where voting is believed to be obligatory. Second, in many countries voting registration centers can have citizens still registered who have moved to other areas, so the percentages of actual voters is in reality lower.

In any case, these percentages represent parameters for comparison. Figure VI.10 emphasizes that in every country of the Americas percentages of participation are above 55%. In countries like Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay the percentage is above 90%. In Costa Rica and Jamaica it is less than 60%. Guatemala is located in the lower medium range, reporting 69% electoral participation.




Figure VI.10. Percentage of Citizens who Voted in the Last Presidential Elections

b) Electoral Participation Over Time

Figure VI.11 shows the results of the same question concerning electoral participation for Guatemala only, but from a longitudinal view. The percentage reported for voter turn-out fell slightly in 2010 in comparison with 2008 but not in a statistically significant way. Another factor which might have influenced the results is that the survey took place a few months after the 2007 elections, while the survey of 2010 happened more than a year later. In any case, the percentage reported is above that of 2004 and 2006. The official facts coincide with the increase in the election participation of 2007.




Figure VI.11. Percentage of Those Who Reported Voting in the Last Elections in Guatemala, 2004-2010

c) Predictors of Electoral Participation

In addition to questions concerning the number of citizens who vote, any electoral study should focus on the question, “Who is voting?” This can be determined through an analysis of regression. Figure VI.12 indicates that Guatemalans who cast a vote in the last election tended to be heads of the family, were in the older age range of the population and had higher levels of education. The other part of the equation shows that women reported lower levels of casting votes. These facts can help in creating programs to increase voting at the time of elections.




Figure VI.12. Determinants of Electoral Participation in Guatemala

The following two figures show in detail the predictors of electoral participation identified in the analysis of regression. The first one, Figure VI.13, shows clearly that men have a higher level of participation than women, with a variance of more than 12 percentage points—which is statistically significant. In the case of age, the figure indicates that levels of participation are significantly lower among younger voters. Those in the age range of 46-55 years tend to vote more.




Figure VI.13. Electoral Participation in Guatemala by Age and Gender

Figure VI.14 indicates that in the majority of countries in the world citizens with higher levels of education tend to vote more. But it is interesting to note that in the case of Guatemala, citizens with no

education reported higher levels of participation than those with primary and secondary education. Finally it is important to understand that those who reported having at least one child had levels of participation reaching almost 76%. But those with no children reported a participation of 50%. If age of the respondents is an important factor (it is more probable that older persons have children), the regression showed that there exists an independent effect of this variable.




Figure VI.14. Electoral Participation in Guatemala by Education and Parenthood

Interest in Politics and Activism

Another important subject related to participation is the amount of interest citizens have in politics and how active they are in recruiting others to become politically active.

In order to measure the interest a person may have in politics, the following question is used which was modified to the scale of 0-100 for purposes of analysis:

POL1. How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?
 (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA

a) Interest in Politics in Comparative Perspective

Figure VI.15 shows primarily a comparative perspective. Guatemala is among the countries of the Americas where citizens have indicated little interest in politics. With the average range of interest at 31 points, Guatemala ranks above only Ecuador, Chile and Guyana and is in close range of Brazil. At the other extreme appears the United States with an average interest of 72.5 points. The Latin American country with the highest average of interest is Uruguay, reaching 50.4 points, similar to Canada. The majority of other countries are located in the range of 30-39 points.




Figure VI.15. Interest in Politics in the Americas, 2010

Figure VI.16 shows the distribution of interest in politics in Guatemala in 2010. Only 8.4% of the respondents indicated that they had a great deal of interest in politics. About 15% indicated having some interest. But the majority had little (38.9%) or no interest in politics (37.8%).




Figure VI.16. Interest in Politics in Guatemala, 2010

b) Interest in Politics Over Time

It is important to question if the low levels of interest in politics in Guatemala are new or if they have been reported over an extended period of time. Figure VI.17 indicates that since 2006 (when the question first appeared in the questionnaire) low levels of interest have been reported. Yet there is also a positive tendency, given that in the year 2010 interest climbed to a 31 point average in comparison with 22 points reported in 2006. It should be noted that this is a statistically significant difference.

To understand the reason for the increase in interest in politics in 2010, an analysis of regression was made (not shown on the graph). It indicates that there are three factors related to interest in politics of that year in Guatemala: satisfaction with presidential performance, educational level of the respondents and being indigenous. So those most satisfied with the President’s performance in office, having more education and identifying themselves as indigenous do demonstrate greater interest in politics, at least in the year 2010.




Figure VI.17. Interest in Politics in Guatemala (2004-2010)

Political Activism

In a democracy, including consolidated democracies; citizens generally are not as involved in political activism as they are during the electoral campaigns, when participation is high. Except for the electoral campaigns, it is probable that only a small percentage of citizens are involved in political activism. Two questions in this study measure levels of activism:

PP1. During election times, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate? **[Read the options]**
 (1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely (4) Never (88) DK (98) DA

PP2. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential elections?
 (1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) DK (98) DA

Figure VI.18 shows the distribution of answers to these two questions in Guatemala in 2010. While only 9.3% indicated having participated actively in an electoral campaign, nearly 23% reported having tried to convince others to vote.




Figure VI.18. Political Activism in Guatemala, 2010

Conclusions

This chapter has examined the subject of interpersonal trust, a key element in defining social capital. Guatemala is found in the medium-low range in relation to other countries on the continent, with an average interpersonal trust of 57.4 points. The level of interpersonal trust has not varied significantly since 2004. Guatemalan residents in rural areas and those with a perception of greater physical security have a greater degree of trust in other people.

To continue, the chapter analyzed various types of participation involving Guatemalans. The first type was participation in social organizations, in other words, civic participation. Guatemalans have relatively high levels of participation in a number of organizations. However, these groups or organizations are principally related to church (without specific religious denomination). The population also frequently participates in groups related to schools, both primary and secondary. But regarding other types of organizations, participation is significantly lower. Surprisingly, however, participation in groups of women reaches an average of 13 points, more than those related to guilds or occupations (with an average of 8.7 points). Table VI.1 indicates the difference of average participation in Guatemala vs. other

countries on the continent. It is notable that Guatemala has higher levels of participation in every type of organization, even though Guatemala generally falls below the average of the Americas in the other variables. And in terms of participation in protests, Guatemala receives an evaluation above the average in 2010.

Regarding electoral participation, Guatemala reports lower levels than those of the rest of the continent. This is not surprising since various measurements show Guatemala with low levels of electoral participation over time. Finally, in terms of activism (interest in politics, trying to convince others to vote and participating in electoral campaigns), Guatemala again shows lower averages than the rest of the continent. The comparison of averages is shown in Table VI.1.

In global terms, civil society appears stronger in Guatemala than the political society. Citizens show a relatively high interest in forming various organizations. But they continue to view politics as something external and not necessarily relevant to their lives.

Table VI.1. Guatemala vs. Las Americas: Comparison of Levels of Trust, Participation and Activism

Medición	Variable	Región	Guatemala
Promedio	Confianza interpersonal	59.3	57.4
Promedio	Participación en organizaciones religiosas	42.2	66.0
Promedio	Participación en grupos relacionados con la escuela	21.9	30.1
Promedio	Participación en grupos comunitarios/comités de mejoras	14.1	23.0
Promedio	Participación en grupos gremiales o campesinos	7.3	8.7
Promedio	Participación en grupos de mujeres	8.1	13.0
Promedio	Participación en protestas	7.6	8.6
Porcentaje	Participación en elecciones (voto)	76.2	69.0
Promedio	Interés en la política	38.9	31.0
Porcentaje	Tratar de convencer a otros de cómo votar	31.2	23.0
Porcentaje	Trabajo en campañas electorales	10.9	9.3

Chapter VII. Local Government

Introduction

This chapter analyzes how citizens perceive their local government. In the case of Guatemala, local government is referred to as municipal government and operates in the same way. The chapter includes an evaluation of how often citizens participate in meetings convened by their municipal government, how many citizen petitions or requests are presented to the government and how satisfied citizens are with government's response to their requests. Finally, the citizens' relationship (good or bad) with their local government is evaluated. In turn, the citizens' perception of this municipal government is measured in relation to its effect on support for the political system.

Theoretical Background

A major part of academic studies and publications concerning democracy tend to pass over or deal tangentially with the subject of local government. Moreover, these studies focus on concerns of macro-politics, for example the development of institutions of national importance and citizen participation in national elections. However, in the past two decades international organizations, non-governmental organizations of development and various governments throughout the world have realized the importance of strengthening local governments. As Oxhorn points out, since the beginning of the 90s a surge of initiatives to decentralize national government and empower local and regional ones has occurred throughout the world.

“Decentralization has been considered a strategy for democratizing the State and to increase the access for citizens in order to allow greater participation in public politics.”⁶⁹

Burgos further explains that decentralization has various dimensions. The political dimension refers to the way in which territorial power is distributed among the various levels of government, including municipal government. He emphasizes that the process has a clear relationship to a democratic regime, because in an authoritarian regime it is not possible to delegate duties to other levels of political power. The administrative dimension of decentralization refers to the maximum utilization of public resources. The financial dimension relates to transfers of positions in national government, the ability to tax and to public spending. Finally, the social dimension refers to the transfer of the administrations of public services to community institutions of various kinds.⁷⁰

In the case of Guatemala specifically, the Constitution of 1985 established important parameters for decentralization. These were made stronger through the laws resulting from the Peace Accords. Throughout the years the Municipal Code has experienced various reforms, and most recently, Decree 12-2002 was reformed by means of Decree 22-2010.

⁶⁹ Oxhorn, Philip. Decentralization, Civil Society and Democratic Governance. *Decentralization*, No. 1, June 2001 (Washington D.C., Woodrow Wilson Center).

⁷⁰ Burgos, Amílcar. Decentralization: A proposal for debate. *Work Notebooks*, No.1 (Konrad Adenauer Foundation of Guatemala, 2008).

As Torres-Rivas and Cuesta has noted, the process of globalization has also aided in strengthening the power of local government.⁷¹In previous studies of democratic culture it has been found that Guatemalans feel more closely identified with their municipal government than with their national government. This chapter analyzes if this trend is continuing and to what measure that relationship between citizen and local government affects democracy.

Participation in Meetings of Local Government

One question used in the study to measure the degree of involvement an individual has with his local government is the following:

NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or village meeting in the past 12 months?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

a) Participation at the Local Level in Comparative Perspective

The results of participation in meetings of local government in a comparative perspective are shown in Figure VII.1. It shows Guatemala among the countries with the greatest participation (15.7%) and with a level similar to that of Canada. Only the Dominican Republic and the United States show higher levels (27.3% and 24.9% respectively). Although the majority of the countries on the continent are located between 7% and 14% of participation in municipal meetings, Panama and Chile do not reach levels of 5%.

⁷¹ Torres Rivas, Edelberto and Cuesta, Pilar. *Notas sobre la democracia y el poder local. Democracy Series* (United Nations Program for Development, Guatemala, 2007).




Figure VII.1. Participation in Meetings of Local Government in Comparative Perspective

b) Participation in Local Governments Over Time

Participation in meetings of municipal governments has remained at the same level, with the exception of the year 2006. Figure VII.2 indicates that the highest level of participation (17.3%) occurred in 2004, but the difference in the year 2008 and 2010 is not statistically significant.




Figure VII.2. Participation in Meetings of Local Government in Guatemala, 2004-2010

Presentation of Requests to Local Government

If in fact participation in meetings of local government is the most direct way of influencing decisions for the municipality, citizens also have various other options. A common practice in many democratic societies is to make petitions or requests for help to the local government. In this study two questions relate to this activity. One directly asked by the respondents was whether or not they had presented a request in the past twelve months to their local government. The second question asked if the problem presented by the request was satisfactorily resolved. The exact questions contained in the questionnaire of 2010 (and in years before) are as follows:

NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months?				
(1) Yes	(2) No	(88) Doesn't know	(98) Doesn't answer	
MUNI10. Did they resolve your issue or request?				
(1) Yes	(0) No	(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A

a) Requests to the Municipal Government in Comparative Perspective

Figure VII.3 indicates that in general the percentage of citizens who asked the local government for help is slightly higher in comparison with those who attended meetings of their local government. Guatemala again is located among the countries with the highest levels. 15.9% of the citizens reported presenting requests to their respective local governments. Uruguay, Canada, Surinam and Mexico report somewhat higher percentages, but this is not statistically significant. The average is in fact similar in all countries except three—Honduras, Costa Rica and Panama. These countries report percentages of requests to local government at less than 10%.




Figure VII.3. Presentation of Requests to the Municipal Government in Comparative Perspective, 2010

b) Presentation of Requests to Municipal Government Over Time

Figure VII.4 shows that the percentage of petitions presented to the local government in Guatemala increased significantly in the year 2010 relative to 2006 and 2008. It did not reach the high of 17.5% reported in 2004, however.




Figure VII.4. Presentation of Requests to the Municipal Government in Guatemala, 2004-2010

c) Presentation of Requests to Municipal Government in Guatemala, 2010

When the results for Guatemala in the year 2010 are analyzed, Figure VII.5 shows that in 43% of the requests presented (15.9% of Guatemalans presented requests); the citizens were satisfied with how the government resolved their issues.




Figure VII.5. Presentation of Requests to Local Government and Resolution of the Same, Guatemala 2010

d) Who is More Likely to Seek Assistance or Present a Request to the Local Government?

It is now interesting to examine which factors influence Guatemalans in seeking help from their local government. The analysis of regression shown in Figure VII.6 gives a perspective on these determinants. It indicates that citizens residing in an urban environment are less inclined to present

requests, whereas citizens of rural areas use this instrument of local government more frequently. Another important predictor is the experience of having attended local meetings. Persons who attend meetings are more inclined to present requests. The last factor related to petitioning is victimization by corruption. It is important to clarify that this is not necessarily a causal relationship, but rather the opposite determinant is present. Those presenting requests are more inclined to be victims of corruption and therefore are probably seeking help. Also, it has been found that those with a greater interest in politics tend to be more inclined to present requests.




Figure VII.6. Determinants of Presentation of Requests to the Municipality, Guatemala 2010

Figure VII.7 shows a visual form of all the relationships previously examined. It indicates that those with a very high interest in politics more frequently present requests to their local government (30.9%). In a similar way, inhabitants of rural areas and who also attend municipal meetings have a higher percentage of requests. On the other hand, those who presented these requests were more victimized by corruption. This does not come as a surprise, since by being more exposed; they were probably more vulnerable to corruption victimization.




Figure VII.7. Predictors of Presentation of Requests to Local Government in Guatemala, 2010

Satisfaction with Services of the Local Government

It was previously shown in this chapter how citizens interact with their local government by either participating in meetings or by presenting requests. Only about 15% of Guatemalans take part in one or the other of these activities. Nevertheless, all Guatemalans regardless of their involvement receive services provided by their municipal government. In order to evaluate the degree of citizen satisfaction with these services, the questionnaire included the following question (reconverted to the scale of 0-100 for better understanding):

SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are...? [Read options]
 (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad
 (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

a) Satisfaction with Services of Local Government in Comparative Perspective

Figure VII.8 presents a comparative perspective. The highest average of satisfaction (in the range of 54 to 56 points) is in Colombia, Canada, Uruguay, Nicaragua and Ecuador. Guatemala is in the second block of countries, indicating a relatively high level of 51.9 points— similar to that of the United States, Honduras and Paraguay. Also the difference among the third block of countries showing averages between 47 and 50 points is not statistically significant. Countries reporting the lower levels of satisfaction are Belize, Jamaica and Surinam, and in these cases the differences are statistically significant.




Figure VII.8. Satisfaction with Local Government Services in Comparative Perspective, 2010

b) Satisfaction with Services of Local Government Over Time

Figure VII.9 shows that although the level of satisfaction with local government in Guatemala has remained relatively high, it decreased significantly between the years 2008 and 2010, returning to the levels of 2004.




Figure VII.9. Satisfaction with Services of Local Government in Guatemala, 2004-2010

c) Satisfaction with Local Government in Guatemala 2010

Upon further examinations of Figure VII.10, the indication is that 33% of Guatemalans consider the services provided by their municipality to be good or very good. A greater percentage (44.7%) considers them to be adequate. Approximately 22% of the population considers them to be inadequate or very poor.




Figure VII.10. Distribution of Satisfaction with Municipal Services in Guatemala, 2010

d) Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Government Services

Which factors determine whether or not Guatemalans are more or less satisfied with services provided by their municipality? Figure VII.11 presents a regression which examines this question. It indicates that residents of urban areas who have higher levels of education and who have more confidence in their local government show greater levels of satisfaction. Interestingly, this same group is more satisfied with the way in which their President performs his duties. And, they are more satisfied, as well, with the performance of those in local government.




Figure VII.11. Determinants of Satisfaction with Services of Municipal Government in Guatemala, 2010

Figure VII.12 and Figure VII.13 show in detail these statistical relationships. The first figure indicates two determinants: that higher education produces greater satisfaction with local government—and that the urban population reports higher levels of satisfaction than the rural residents of the country.




Figure VII.12. Satisfaction with Local Government by Education and Area of Residence

Figure VII.13 indicates that greater confidence in local government produces greater satisfaction with services rendered. This same figure shows that those satisfied with presidential performance on the national level are inclined to be more satisfied with their local government. It should be emphasized that this relationship can lead to two paths; that is, those who find themselves satisfied with the performance of their local government tend to attribute that satisfaction to the national government and vice versa. In Guatemala there are various ways and occasions when the national government works closely with the local government.




Figure VII.13. Satisfaction with Municipal Services by Trust in Local Government and Evaluation of Presidential Performance, 2010

Impact of Local Government on Support for the Political System

The last figure of the previous section indicates a connection between satisfaction with local government and satisfaction with presidential performance. Now the question becomes: Do perceptions and citizens’ experiences with local government also influence levels of support for the political system? To examine this question, an analysis of multiple regression is again presented in Figure VII.14.

Figure VII.14 indicates that satisfaction with local government has no influence on support for the political system. But confidence in local government does influence this support. In other words, greater confidence in local government produces greater citizen support for the political system. Though confidence in municipal government does not have the same impact as confidence in the justice system, the impact is statistically significant. It should be emphasized that citizens who place trust in political parties, the Congress and in the CICIG are also more inclined to support the political system. Finally, women show slightly less support for the political system. This subject was closely examined in Chapter V of this study.




Figure VII.14. Impact of Perception of Municipal Government on Support for the Political System, Guatemala 2010

The direct connection between confidence in municipal government and greater support for the system is shown in Figure VII.15.




Figure VII.15. Confidence in Municipal Government and Support for the Political System, Guatemala 2010

Conclusions

This chapter has focused on the following subject—the relationship between citizens and their local government. Within this context, four specific subjects have been examined. Initially, the percentage of participation reported at local meetings was measured. Guatemala is located above the medium range in terms of this participation (15.7%), which is a positive find.

Next, the frequency by which Guatemalans communicate with their municipal government (in corresponding place of residence) was examined. A similar percentage of 15.9% of citizens presented requests to their local government in the past year, and this result also placed Guatemala in the medium range of 13.3%. Residents of rural areas who indicated greater interest in politics were more inclined to present these kinds of requests.

The respondents were also asked to evaluate the performance of their local government. The average rate of satisfaction was 51.9 points (on the scale of 0-100). This average was higher than that of the Americas (50.3). Though satisfaction decreased slightly in relation to the year 2008, the decline was not statistically significant. In 2010, urban residents and Guatemalans with higher education tended to be more satisfied with their local government. But the most important variable for explaining the degree of satisfaction was the confidence citizens placed in their municipal institution. The confidence level reached 51.3 points in Guatemala in 2010. And as previously explained in Chapter V, this places Guatemala in the highest range of confidence in local government.

As in previous chapters, Table VII.1 shows the results for Guatemala in 2010 in comparison to the regional results. It should be emphasized that this is the only example in which Guatemala is found above the medium range in all variables in the continent as a whole.

Table VII.1. Guatemala vs. the Americas: Relationship with Local Government

Medición	Variable	Región	Guatemala
Porcentaje	Participación en reuniones del gobierno local	11.0	15.7
Porcentaje	Presentación de solicitudes al gobierno local	13.3	15.9
Promedio	Satisfacción con servicios del gobierno local	50.3	51.9
Promedio	Confianza en el gobierno municipal	50.4	51.3

Part III: Beyond the Economic Crisis

Chapter VIII. Perspectives on the CICIG and Related Subjects of Justice

Introduction

The period between 2008 and 2010 has been particularly complicated regarding the arena of administration of justice in Guatemala. The system has been deteriorating for years with levels of corruption increasing and levels of effectiveness decreasing. A particular example is the period of combating impunity of certain persons outside the jurisdiction of the State. The International Commission Against Impunity (CICIG) was established in December, 2006 in conjunction with an agreement between the Guatemalan government and the Organization of United Nations, precisely for the purpose of aiding the investigation of illegal and clandestine groups operating in the country. Their mandate was extended to the year 2009 and expires in September, 2011. Various countries have shown strong support for this Commission.⁷²

Due to the nature of this study, it is not possible to evaluate the work carried out by the CICIG nor its impact on the justice system. There is, however, an important effort to fight against the scourge of impunity which has overwhelmed the country's internal capacity to combat it. The only objective of this chapter is to examine the opinions of Guatemalans regarding CICIG and certain cases of high profile investigated by the Commission—specifically the case against ex-president Alfonso Portillo and the case of the assassination of the lawyer, Rodrigo Rosenberg. The CICIG also played an important part in the selection process of the Supreme Court of Justice in the second half of the year 2009. The opinion of Guatemalans regarding this process is also explored in this chapter.

Included in the questionnaire of the study of democratic culture administered in the first quarter of 2010 are questions relating to these previously mentioned subjects.⁷³ The respondents were asked to evaluate these subjects using the scale of 1-7points—1 signifying nothing and 7 signifying a lot. For clearer understanding these answers, as in others in the study were converted to a scale of 0-100.

B60. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la CICIG (Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala)?

B61. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba que misiones internacionales como la CICIG se involucren en mejorar el sistema político guatemalteco?

B62. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que es positivo para el país el resultado de la investigación del asesinato de Rodrigo Rosenberg?

B63. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que es positivo para el país el haber capturado al expresidente Portillo, quien está acusado de corrupción?

Opinion Concerning CICIG and Other Cases Relevant to Justice

Figure VIII.1 makes a comparison of the levels of approval and confidence which various institutions and cases relevant to justice generate among Guatemalans. It indicates that at the time of the survey, CICIG generated a relatively high degree of confidence, particularly in comparison to other political institutions in the country (see Chapter V of this study). In general, Guatemalans seem to have a

⁷² Additional information regarding origins, mandates and objectives of the CICIG can be found on the web site of the mission: www.cicig.org.

⁷³ The survey was completed before the resignation of Dr. Carlos Castresana as Director of the CICIG.

high degree of approval toward international involvement in improving the political system of the country. The resolution of the cases of both Rosenberg and Portillo indicate an approval average above the line of reference (50 points). This contrasts with the confidence in the Guatemalan system of justice which reaches only 41.4 points on the scale. It is important to clarify that almost 30% of the respondents did not respond to questions regarding CICIG, the international mission or the Rosenberg case. They may have been uninformed on the subject or simply chose not to respond. A smaller percentage, only 13%, reported being uninformed on the case of Portillo.




Figure VIII.1. Approval and confidence in CICIG, International Missions and Cases Relevant to Justice, Guatemala 2010

Determinants of Confidence in CICIG

It is important to determine which conditions generate greater or lesser support for the CICIG mandate in Guatemala. Through analysis of the multiple regression shown in Figure VIII.2, it establishes that among socio-demographic variables, only the level of economic income has a slight influence on support for the CICIG. Nothing else—not age, sex or ethnicity—associates itself in support (or lack of support) for this institution. More influential are the experiences and perceptions of the respondents, as well as geographical variables. For example, those who reside in the Metropolitan Zone indicate less support toward CICIG, though the effect is insignificant. The variables having the greatest effect are the belief that government is improving security, the perception that corruption exists among public officials and that a member of the household (of the respondents) had been a victim of crime. The first two variables have a positive effect—the greater the perception of corruption, the greater the support for CICIG, and the greater the belief that government is improving security, the greater the support for CICIG. But if a household member were victimized by crime, the opposite effect occurs: those whose family members were victimized have less confidence in this institution.




Figure VIII.2. Determinants of Confidence in CICIG, Guatemala, 2010

Figure VIII.3 shows how levels of confidence vary in different regions of the country regarding CICIG. It indicates that the difference between the Metropolitan Zone, which includes the Department of Guatemala, and the majority of other regions is statistically significant (with the exception of the Southeast). While the Metropolitan Zone shows a confidence level of 50.7 points, the other regions report much higher: the Southwest region of the country reaches 65.2 points on a scale of 0-100. The CICIG generates its highest rate of confidence and legitimacy in that region.




Figure VIII.3. Legitimacy of CICIG by Region, Guatemala 2010

Figure VIII.4 shows the difference existing among Guatemalans whose close family members have been victimized by crime and those who have not. Support toward CICIG reaches 52.4 points among those victimized but 60 points among those not victimized. The same figure shows differences among those who perceive that corruption exist among public officials. The differences are not as clear in these cases. Only those who believe that corruption is somewhat generalized have less trust in CICIG, but the difference with the others is minimal. These two findings are interesting as it appears that both victims of crime and victims of corruption tend to decrease their levels of support for CICIG. This happens also in the case of national institutions.




Figure VIII.4. Legitimacy of CICIG by Crime Victimization of Family Members and Perception of Corruption, Guatemala 2010

Figure VIII.5 shows two variables which directly affect the degree of trust in CICIG. The first figure indicates that those who believe the Guatemalan government is improving security have a higher level of support for CICIG. It is evident that those who show greater confidence in the justice system tend to give greater support to CICIG. Logically, the opposite regarding this last finding seems true. Guatemalans with less confidence in government work or in the justice system would seem more inclined to support an institution such as CICIG. But in practice it appears that Guatemalans associate CICIG with their own political system and perceive it as an institution which supports the efforts being carried out by that system.




Figure VIII.5. Legitimacy of the CICIG by Belief in Political Security of the Government and Confidence in the Justice System, Guatemala 2010

The Election of the Supreme Court of Justice in 2009

As previously mentioned in this chapter, the CICIG played an important role in allowing transparency of the election process of the Magistrate of the Supreme Court of Justice. This was carried out in the second half of the year 2009. Along with the CICIG, several social groups supported the transparency initiative and were also instrumental in revising the process—choosing persons more suitable for these responsibilities. In the LAPOP questionnaire of 2010, the following questions concerning this process were asked:

GUAJUS1. ¿Se enteró usted del proceso de elección de magistrados de la Corte Suprema de Justicia que se realizó en septiembre del año pasado (2009)? (1) Sí (2) No

GUAJUS2. ¿Considera usted que el proceso de elección de magistrados fue transparente? (1) Sí (2) Regular (3) No (88) NS (98) NR

GUAJUS3. ¿Cree usted que las acciones de la CICIG fueron positivas para la elección de magistrados a la Corte Suprema de Justicia? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR

GUAJUS4. ¿Cree usted que las acciones de los grupos sociales fueron positivas para la elección de magistrados a la Corte Suprema de Justicia? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR

Figure VIII.6 shows the distribution of answers to the first question. It indicates that more than half the population (58.9%) was not informed about the election process. Only 41.1% reported being informed. This is an example of the importance of the process for the system of justice and for full coverage given by the news media. A breach still exists between the level of information of the

Guatemalans and what is actually happening. Lack of knowledge of the process also can be related to the lack of interest Guatemalans show regarding politics (see Chapter VI in this study).




Figure VIII.6. Knowledge of the Election of Magistrates to the Supreme Court of Justice, Guatemala 2010

Rather than speculate on why nearly 60% of Guatemalans had no knowledge regarding the Supreme Court elections, an analysis of multiple regression identifies factors which can be statistically associated with this phenomenon. Figure VIII.7 shows the result of this analysis, using knowledge of the election as an independent variable. It indicates various socio-demographic and geographic factors which explain why some Guatemalans were more informed than others. It is evident that citizens with greater education, more advanced in age, and who reside in the Metropolitan Zone had more knowledge of the subject. An additional factor is the degree of attention given by the news media.




Figure VIII.7. Determinants of Knowledge of the Election of Magistrates to the Supreme Court of Justice, Guatemala 2010

Figure VIII.8 shows in greater detail the differences existing in the degree of knowledge regarding the Supreme Court election. Although the youngest segment of the population reports a slightly lower percentage, age differences are not as marked as expected. Only Guatemalans over 66 years old report a knowledge less than 30%. Nevertheless, level of education does have a marked influence on the existing differences. While only 20% of Guatemalans without education were informed about the process, 77% of Guatemalans with higher education were informed. This shows a clear lineal relationship—the higher the education level, the greater the knowledge of the election.

The region of the country is also a clear determinant. 61% of citizens living in the Metropolitan Zone were informed about the election process. Those residing in other regions of the country were less informed. This was particularly true in the Southeast, where only 26% were informed about the process. The degree of attention given to the news media is another predictor of knowledge regarding the CSJ election. Not unexpectedly, those who used the media were more informed than those who did not.




Figure VIII.8. Knowledge of the Election of Supreme Court of Justice by Age, Education, Region and Attention to News, Guatemala 2010

Three questions were asked relating to the subject of the elections of CSJ, but only 41% of Guatemalans indicated having knowledge of this process. The first question asked if citizens believed the election had transparency. Figure VIII.9 shows that 21% believed the process was transparent, 41% thought it was somewhat transparent, and 38% considered the process to be without transparency. The second question asked if the respondents believed that the CICIG played a positive role in the election. The result can also be seen in Graph VIII.9: almost 63% of the respondents considered the actions of the CICIG to be positive. The last question asked how those interviewed evaluated the role of social groups in seeking transparency for the process. 57.9% indicated that these groups played a positive role. This last finding is not indicated on a figure.




Figure VIII.9. Perception of the Election Process of Magistrates of the CSJ and the Role of the CICIG

The Law of Access to Information

A final subject examined in this chapter and relating to previous ones is the new Law of Access to Information. Two questions concerning this law were included in the questionnaire of 2010:

GUAJUS5. ¿Ha oído usted algo acerca de la nueva ley de acceso a la información?

GUAJUS6. ¿Cree usted que la ley de acceso a la información va a contribuir a que el gobierno sea más transparente?

Figure VIII.10 shows the results of the first question. In a way similar to the election of CSJ, the majority of citizens (64.4% in February 2010) were not informed about the existence of the new law.




Figure VIII.10. Knowledge about the Law of Access to Information, Guatemala 2010

A following question was done to the 35% of the respondents who reported being informed about the new law. Figure VIII.11 shows that 53.1% of the respondents believed the law contributes to transparency in the justice system.




Figure VIII.11. Opinion Regarding the Law of Access to Information, Guatemala 2010

Conclusions

This chapter did not emphasize comparisons among countries on the continent. Instead, the subjects focused on Guatemala in particular. Chapter VIII examined citizen evaluation of CICIG and other subjects relevant to justice. The case of Rosenberg and the case of Portillo were two such examples. In addition, analysis was made of how Guatemalans perceived the election of the CSJ which occurred in the second half of the year 2009.

At the time of the survey, CICIG generated a relatively high level of confidence in relation to other national institutions. It reached an average of 56.8 points on a scale of 0-100 used in the study. In comparison, the system of justice as a whole generated 41.4 points of confidence. Chapter V gave a detailed comparison between the degree of legitimacy of the CICIG and other institutions in the sector of justice. A multi-varied analysis was used to find determinants for support of CICIG. Region of the country was discovered to be a strong determinant. Residents of the Metropolitan Zone indicated a lower level of confidence in the commission (50.7 points) than in other parts of Guatemala. The Southwest region reported a much higher level with 65.2 points. And those who perceived that corruption is generalized in the Guatemalan government also reported greater confidence in the CICIG. Yet curiously, those whose family members were victimized by crime reported significantly lower levels of confidence in the institution.

Another important subject analyzed in the chapter was the knowledge and evaluation of the election of magistrates to the Supreme Court of Justice in Guatemala in the second half of 2000. The controversial nature of the process generated extensive coverage in the news media. Therefore it became necessary to learn the opinions of citizens regarding the issue. The most outstanding discovery revealed that only 41.1% of Guatemalans interviewed indicated that they were informed about the election process. It may not be surprising that residents from the Metropolitan Zone who followed the news coverage had a higher degree of knowledge concerning the election. It was also discovered that older age and more education increased knowledge of the subject. And finally, those reported to be informed were asked if they believed that the CICIG played a positive role in the process. A majority answered in the affirmative.

Chapter IX. Guatemalans, Populism, and Representative Democracy

Introduction

Notwithstanding various definitions of democracy, it is generally and currently accepted that representative government is a condition *sine qua non* of any liberal democracy. This conception of democracy implies (among other things) the following principles: Existence of political parties as vehicles of citizen representation; free competition between political parties who seek to represent the citizens; and respect for the rights of minorities. In recent years some Latin American countries have gained power through governing polls which ignore the principles of representative democracy and instead seek to concentrate power. Pushing aside political parties or any institutions which can limit their margin of maneuverability, these self-appointed rulers make use of populist discourse directed at the masses. By these means, they are able to frequently criticize existing political parties as well as the rules which apply to representative democracy.

This chapter seeks to establish which principles support the idea of representative democracy in Guatemala or, in contrast, which principles support populism. The questionnaire of democratic culture in 2010 includes questions that evaluate the following: Support for the belief that people should govern directly rather than through elected representatives; support for the idea that the Executive (in particular the President) should have more power than other branches of government; support for the belief that minorities represent a threat to the country; and support for the belief that democracy can exist without political parties. The attempt is to learn what percentage of Guatemalans support or reject the values of representative democracy, and also to establish who these citizens are and what characteristics distinguish them.

Guatemalans and Political Parties

To begin with, how do Guatemalans identify themselves with political parties? And, in the opinion of Guatemalans, how necessary are political parties to the functioning of a democracy? The exact questions included in the questionnaire are the following:

VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party? (Scale 1 – 10)

DEM23. Democracy can exist without political parties. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement? (Scale 1 – 10)

For better comprehension the questions were converted to a scale of 0-100 (done throughout the study). Figure IX.1 shows the average of sympathy toward political parties in various countries of the Americas. In a strong democracy, these parties are fundamental vehicles of mediation between citizens and states. And, it is common practice for persons to identify with some of these existing parties.

The figure shows Guatemala among the countries with little identification or sympathy toward political parties. Guatemala reaches only 18.3 points on the scale of 0-100. In contrast, this identification reaches beyond the range of 50 points in Uruguay, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic. Even countries with relatively new democracies such as El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua show more identification with political parties than Guatemala. Only Chile and Ecuador score below Guatemala.




Figure IX.1. Identification with Political Parties in the Americas, 2010

A subject related to the weakness of representative democracy is the belief that democracy can exist without political parties. Figure IX.2 shows a comparative perspective which measures the belief that a viable democracy can exist without political parties. It is curious that in regards to this question, Guatemalans are located higher on the scale than other countries more strongly identified with political parties (for example, the United States). Guatemala reports an average of 41.1 points for the question, scoring in the middle range of the scale. Several countries report lower points –Panama, Mexico, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic. And a case of concern is Ecuador, where a lack of identification with political parties is common as well as the belief that democracy can function without political parties.




Figure IX.2. Belief that Democracy Can Exist without Political Parties, 2010

Support for Populism in Guatemala

The extent to which Guatemalans agree with certain actions commonly associated with populism will now be examined. Individual items, as well as types of populism, are analyzed. The original questions asked used a 1-10 point scale—1 indicating disagree and 10 indicating very much agree. For clearer understanding they were converted to graphs with scales of 0-100. The exact questions included in the questionnaire are the following:

- POP101.** It is necessary for the progress of this country that our presidents limit the voice and vote of opposition parties, how much do you agree or disagree with that view?
- POP102.** When the Congress hinders the work of our government, our presidents should govern without the Congress. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?
- POP107.** The people should govern directly rather than through elected representatives. How much do you agree or disagree?
- POP113.** Those who disagree with the majority represent a threat to the country. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?

Figure IX.3 shows the average support for each question related to populism in the Americas. In all cases the averages are below the line of reference (50 points). This indicates that in general terms there is not strong support for these types of actions or ideas. Nevertheless, the averages do reflect that at least one-third of the population is inclined to support the actions and ideas of populism.

The highest average (37.8 points) represents the idea that persons in disagreement with the majority represent a threat to the country. This is a negative result, because an essential component of any democracy is necessarily the right to dissent. This does not refer to ethnic minorities, but rather to persons whose ideas or opinions differ from the majority. Another negative result is the average support for the idea that presidents should limit the voice of political parties (the relatively high percentage of 36.5). And this also runs contrary to the principles of representative democracy. Though the average reported in the last two questions is statistically different from the first questions, it is still relatively high. The average support for the idea that the people should govern directly and not by means of elected representatives is 33.6 points on the scale of 0-100. This question, even more than the others, directly evaluates the degree to which representative democracy is rejected. The idea receiving the least support in the Americas as a whole is that the president should govern without Congress.




Figure IX.3. Support for Populism in the Americas, 2010

Figure IX.4 compares the results in Guatemala using the same questions. As in the case of the countries as a whole, the highest support is given for the idea that those who disagree with the majority represent a threat to the country. The difference is that in Guatemala the support is still higher than in the

rest of the region (almost 41 points vs. 37.8 at the regional level). In Guatemala the idea which is second in terms of support is that people should govern directly and not through elected representatives. And in this case the average is also higher than in the rest of the continent. The average for accepting this idea on the continent is 33.6. In Guatemala it is 38.7 points.

In two of the questions Guatemala reports an average similar to the rest of the continent as a whole. Regarding the idea of the president limiting the voice of political parties, Guatemala reported an average of 36.6. The regional average is 36.5. The question generating the least support on both the regional level and the level of Guatemala asks if the president should govern without Congress. The result for the Americas is 32.5 points. For Guatemala it is 32.6.




Figure IX.4. Support for Populism in Guatemala, 2010

Determinants of Support for Populism

For the purpose of determining which Guatemalans are most supportive of populist ideas, an analysis of multiple regression was done. Figure IX.5 shows the results of this analysis. An index of populism was constructed which included four questions (previously examined). According to the analysis, those more satisfied with presidential performance are more inclined to support populist measures. By contrast, those who perceive corruption among public officials are less inclined to support them. This find appears to be evident and points out that support of populism depends a great deal on the popularity of the chosen chief executive. However, three other socio-demographic factors are associated with populism in a negative sense. The following groups indicate weak support for populism in Guatemala in 2010: Residents of the Metropolitan Zone; Guatemalans of older age; and citizens with higher education.

Again these results may depend on context since the current President, Alvaro Colom, garners little popularity in the Metropolitan Zone and in urban centers in general. A great deal of the criticism lodged against him is generated from these areas. Also it is important to remember that in the elections of 2007, Colom lost the vote in the capital city where the highest levels of educated populace reside. In the

future it will be interesting to see a similar analysis of this. If a ruler more attuned to the realities of the city comes to power, the question becomes—will populism still be rejected by those residents of the Metropolitan Zone and by those with higher education?




Figure IX.5. Determinants of Support for Populism in Guatemala, 2010

The following three figures show in detail the variables resulting from the association with populism in Guatemala, 2010. Figure IX.6 indicates the relationship between perception of corruption and support for populism. Those perceiving widespread corruption among public officials believe more strongly in a system of counter balance. Thus representative government, rather than a system where power is concentrated in the president, generates their support. On the contrary, those who believe corruption is not generalized show greater support for populism.




Figure IX.6. Support for Populism and Perception of Corruption, Guatemala 2010

Figure IX.7 indicates differences of support for populism according to levels of education. The results are evident; greater education generates less support for populist measures. The average support for these measures among Guatemalans without education is 46.4 points. It falls to 29.0 points among those with higher education.




Figure IX.7. Support for Populism and Education, Guatemala 2010

Finally, the subject of age in relation to populism is examined. According to the analysis of regression, age is a determinant. Figure IX.8 indicates that the relationship is not lineal, as in the case of

the other predictors. The results are more inconsistent. Young persons between the ages of 18 and 25, as well as Guatemalans age 66 and over, report a greater level of support for populist measures (39.1 and 39.6 points respectively). Differences are not so marked in the other age groups. Persons indicating the least support for populism are in the age range of 56-65 years. Their average support is 33.1 points.




Figure IX.8. Support for Populism in Guatemala, by Age (2010)

Conclusions

This chapter has examined the measures by which Guatemalans support the principles and practices of representative democracy. First, Guatemalans' perceptions of political parties, key to representative democracy, were studied. The results indicated that Guatemala is one of three countries in the Americas where citizens report weak identification with a political party. While the medium range on the continent is 35.8 points (on a scale of 0-100), Guatemala reaches only 18.3 points.

The following question relating to political parties was asked of the respondents: Can democracy exist without political parties? In Guatemala 41% answered in the affirmative. Guatemala is one of the countries which indicated weak support for parties. And, in various countries on the continent, an even greater percentage than Guatemala answered in the affirmative.

A major theme of this chapter relating to representative democracy was the support for populism. A series of four questions was used to measure this. Results showed the highest support (whether in Guatemala or on the continent) for the idea that those in disagreement with the majority represent a threat to the country. Support for this idea reached almost 41 points in Guatemala and 37.8 points on the regional level.

In Guatemala the idea that the people should govern directly and not through elected representatives received the second highest level of support. Third in level of support, was the idea that the president should limit the voice of political parties. The idea which generated the least support among

Guatemalans was that the president should govern without the Congress. Nevertheless, in all cases support for populist measures received the greatest number—30 points. This implies that at least one-third of the population is disposed to disregard the principles of representative democracy. The multi-varied analysis clarified that residents of the Metropolitan Zone, citizens of older age, and those with higher education were less inclined to support populism.


Chapter X. Democracy in Guatemala: Does a Generation Gap Exist?

Introduction

In this chapter specific subjects (the dependent variables) are not the focus of analysis. Rather, it is an independent variable which is closely examined; the idea that the generation of Guatemalans who grew up under a democratic regime has a different political culture than those Guatemalans who preceded them.

This subject is relevant in 2010, because Guatemala has completed 25 years of a process of democratization. This generation (known as Generation Y) was born at the beginning of 1981 and has grown up with democracy. Knowing if the political values of this generation differ from the rest of the population is important, as it gives a perspective of educational policies at all levels and of programs which promote democracy. It is also this generation which will soon be in charge of governing a nation which must confront extremely critical problems, as previously mentioned.

In recent years “Generation Y”, also referred to as “Millennials” or as “Generation Net” has gained attention because they are the first generation of technology and of the internet, in particular. Though only a small body of literature has been written about them, they are recognized as a subject of growing relevance.⁷⁴ The following diagram (one of the most common forms of classifying generations) shows five consecutive types of generations:



Unlike generations before, Generation Y has grown up with democracy since 1985, and since 1996, in a post-conflict environment. Nevertheless, this generation of Guatemalans has been confronted with increased levels of non-political violence in recent years, as well as the deterioration of democratic institutions, in particular those of the judicial system.

Distribution of the Generations in Guatemala in 2010

To begin with Figure X.1 indicates the population distribution of different generations previously identified. Because this survey is designed only for persons who have adult rights of citizenship, Generation Z and some members of Generation Y (15 -17 years old) are not included.

It is known that Guatemala’s population is young. In fact the figure shows that citizens below the age of 29 (Generation Y) make up 34.6% of those surveyed. It is important to keep in mind that this study

⁷⁴ See, for example, Howe, Neil and William Strauss, *Millennials Rising: The Next Great Generation* (Vintage Books, 2000). Ruy Teixeira, *The Y Generation and American Politics*, The Century Foundation, 2005. Also Tulgan, Bruce and Carolyn A. Martin. *Managing Generation Y: Global citizens born in the late seventies and early eighties* (HRD Press Inc. Amherst: 2001).

includes only Guatemalans 18 years or older, since they are the ones able to exercise their full political rights—such as voting or postulating. Guatemalans between the ages of 30 and 45 (Generation X) comprise 36% of the total. Baby Boomers (Guatemalans between the ages of 46-64) make up 22.4%. Guatemalans 65 years or older who are included in this study make up only 7% of all citizens.




Figure X.1. Distribution of Generations in Guatemala (Adult Population Surveyed), 2010

Before presenting an analysis of the values and democratic attitudes of Generation Y in Guatemala, it is important to have an idea of how these are distributed among different socio-demographic and geographic variables. Figure X.2 indicates that a gender balance exists among the various generations. As many women as men from Generation Y make up approximately 34% of the population. The other generations are also equally distributed in regards to gender.




Figure X.2. Distribution of Respondents by Gender and Generation, Guatemala 2010

Figure X.3 shows that in terms of ethnicity (using methods of ethnic self-identification) a difference does exist among generations. The exception is with Generation Y which reports the same percentage as ladinos and indigenous—34.4%. Among the indigenous population, however, Generation X shows a higher percentage than the ladino population. But the generation of Baby Boomers and Traditionalists report weaker percentages.




Figure X.3. Distribution by Ethnic Self-Identification and Generation of Respondents

Figure X.4 presents the distribution of citizens in terms of areas of residence. Again, a balance exists in Generation Y. In both rural and urban areas, this generation makes up about 35% of the population older than 18 years of age. A higher percentage of Generation X lives in rural areas. But more

Baby Boomers and Traditionalists reside in urban areas. This is explained in part by the higher quality of health services available in an urban environment.




Figure X.4. Distribution by Residence and Generation of Respondents, Guatemala, 2010

The Political Culture of “Generation Y” in Guatemala

This section examines the democratic political culture of Guatemalans belonging to Generation Y which differs from that of the other generations. In order to determine this, political tolerance and support for the system are measured—subjects dealt with extensively in Chapter V of this study. Some questions are included which have been previously used, but this time they are presented from a different perspective. The purpose is to determine if generational differences do exist. In addition, a series of questions not used before are included. They are for the purpose of measuring the perception of freedom among the different generations and their acceptance of certain activities related to politics. The end of the chapter includes the results of two questions asked only to those under 25 years of age.

Regarding political tolerance and support for the system, Figure X.V indicates that Guatemalans belonging to Generation Y have an average tolerance of 50.3 points (on a scale of 0-100). This level is similar to the rest of the generations. Members of the Traditionalists generation report a slightly higher level of tolerance, but it is not statistically significant. Regarding support for the system, Generation Y shows a higher level (51.8 points) than both the generation of Baby Boomers and the Traditionalists, which is a statistically significant difference.




Figure X.5. Political Tolerance and Support for the System in Guatemala by Generation (2010)

A second measurement of democratic culture is done with the following question: (This measurement is used in various academic surveys throughout the world to measure support for democracy.)

ING4. Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

The results presented in Figure X.6 shows that the score of 62.4 obtained by Generation Y is similar to other generations. Again, the generation of Traditionalists shows a slight difference from the others, but this is not statistically significant.




Figure X.6. Support for Democracy by Generation, Guatemala 2010

As previously explained in Chapter V, an individual may have high support for democracy but at times feel dissatisfied with how the country functions in particular. In order to measure the degree of satisfaction with democracy, the following question is used:

PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in country?
 (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (88) DK (98) DA

Figure X.7 shows results according to generation in Guatemala, 2010. Guatemalans of Generation Y show slightly higher levels of satisfaction than older Guatemalans. But the differences with the other groups are not statistically significant.




Figure X.7. Satisfaction with Democracy by Generation, Guatemala

Another question frequently used to measure support for democracy is the following:

DEM2. Which of the following statements do you agree with the most:

- (1) For people like me it doesn't matter whether a government is democratic or non-democratic, **OR**
- (2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government, **OR**
- (3) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one.

In order to make the analysis more comprehensible, a new dummy variable has been created, separating Generation Y as a group from the other generations. Figure X.8 compares the answers given by Generation Y on the right to those of the other generations shown on the left. It indicates that among members of Generation Y less support is given for option 3 (the option of an authoritarian government). 15.1% of Generation Y chose this option in comparison with 19.2% of the other generations. Similarly, Generation Y reports slightly greater support for the option—“democracy is always preferable” (73.3% vs. 70.9% of other generations).




Figure X.8. Preference for Democracy by Generation, Guatemala 2010

Pockets of authoritarianism exist in all countries of the world—sections of the population who indicate a preference for authoritarian political culture instead of democratic actions and beliefs. The problem for democracy occurs when a significant percentage of the population presents an authoritarian political culture. This chapter explores and examines the extent to which these pockets exist among Generation Y in comparison to the rest of the generations. Two questions are used to determine this. The first of them is the following:

DEM11. Do you think that our country needs a government with an iron fist, or that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation?

(1) Iron fist (2) Everyone's participation (88) DK (98) DA

Figure X.9 indicates a positive trend: 65.6% of Guatemalans belonging to Generation Y support participation above iron fist governance while only 58.2% of the other generations show preference for participation. As a consequence support for iron fist governance is higher among citizens thirty years and older. They report 42% vs. only 34% among younger Guatemalans.




Figure X.9. Preference for Participation or Iron Fist Governance in Guatemala, 2010

A conclusive test for determining if citizens have characteristics of an authoritarian political culture is to evaluate their attitude toward the possibility of a *coup d'état*, which in essence represents the antithesis of democracy. Chapter III initially explored this subject, and it is now examined from a different perspective. The index of support for a military coup is found in the following questions:

Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a *coup d'état* (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances?

JC1. When there is high unemployment.

JC10. When there is a lot of crime.

JC13. When there is a lot of corruption.

The options for the answers are: There is justification for the military seizing power through a *coup d'état*. There is no justification for the military seizing power through a *coup d'état*. The answers were converted to a scale of 0-100: 100= military coup is justified, 0=military coup is not justified.

Figure X.10 includes the results of that inquiry. Contrary to the previous question regarding authoritarianism, the results of this one are a matter of concern. Support for a military coup is higher among Guatemalans belonging to Generation Y, who have not suffered the experience of such an event. The last military coup came to power in 1983 when General Oscar Mejía Victores deposed General Efraín Ríos Montt, who also came to power through a coup on March 23, 1982. Since the beginning of democracy in 1985, there have been no successful attempts at military takeover, not even the self-appointed coup executed by President Jorge Serrano Elías.

The figure indicates that Guatemalans belonging to Generation Y with a primary and secondary education are more inclined to support the possibility of a *coup d'état*. However, those Guatemalans of the same generation but with higher education are less inclined to support the measure. The average support for a coup among Generation Y is 49.6 points, nearly reaching the limit of 50. The average for

other generations as a whole is 44.4 points. It should be kept in mind that Guatemala was the only country in 2010 in which support for a military coup increased (see Chapter III).




Figure X.10. Support for a Coup d’etat in Guatemala, 2010, by Generation and Level of Education

Perception of Political Freedom and Support for Political Rights among Members of the Y Generation

Chapter I discussed how Freedom House evaluates countries regarding the degree of respect given to civil liberties and political rights. Part of the information obtained to construct the Freedom House index came from interviews from elites of various countries. These public opinion surveys did not ask citizens to evaluate whether or not their civil liberties were restricted. For several years the Guatemalan questionnaire has included a battery of questions regarding the perception of liberty. An example: Is fear a factor when participating in political activities? The answers are examined to discover if differences exist in 2010 in the perception of liberty between Generation Y and other generations. The exact questions used are the following:

The exact questions used are the following:

Si usted decidiera participar en algunas de las actividades que le voy a mencionar ¿lo haría usted sin temor, con un poco de temor, o con mucho temor? [VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA SI ES NECESARIO]						
	SIN TEMOR	UN POCO DE TEMOR	CON MUCHO TEMOR	NS	NR	
DER1. ¿Participar para resolver problemas de su comunidad?	1	2	3	88	98	
DER2. ¿Votar en una elección nacional?	1	2	3	88	98	
DER3. ¿Participar en una manifestación pacífica?	1	2	3	88	98	
DER4. ¿Postularse para un cargo de elección popular?	1	2	3	88	98	

Figure X.11 shows the answers obtained for each of these questions, separating Generation Y from other generations. Except for the perception of freedom to run for public office, no statistically significant differences exist among the groups. The right to vote receives the highest average, followed by the right to participate in community gatherings. Guatemalans from all generations feel free to demonstrate and still less free to run for public office. In the last case, the difference between Generation Y and the others is statistically significant. The probable cause is the monopoly of power exercised by leaders within the political parties.




Figure X.11. Perception of Freedom in Guatemala, by Generation (2010)

It is important to evaluate whether or not Guatemalans feel free to exercise their political rights. It is equally important to recognize the degree to which they regard others rights to the same. The LAPOP

questionnaire includes a battery of questions that measures this level of acceptance by dividing the questions into two groups—acceptance of actions considered necessary and legal in any democracy, and acceptance of actions generally regarded as illegal in any country. The exact questions follow:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DN	DA
Strongly disapprove					Strongly approve					88	98
E5. Of people participating in legal demonstrations. How much do you approve or disapprove?											
E8. Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community problems. How much do you approve or disapprove?											
E11. Of people working for campaigns for a political party or candidate. How much do you approve or disapprove?											
E15. Of people participating in the blocking of roads to protest. Using the same scale, how much do you approve or disapprove?											
E14. Of people seizing private property or land in order to protest. How much do you approve or disapprove?											
E3. Of people participating in a group working to violently overthrow an elected government. How much do you approve or disapprove?											
E16. Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals. How much do you approve or disapprove?											

Figure X.12 shows the level of support for the group of democratic and legal actions. It is evident that citizens of Generation Y give greater support to all actions than citizens from other generations. However, the difference with other age groups is not statistically significant. In general terms, this can be seen as a positive find. This new generation of Guatemalans shows increased openness and respect for political rights.




Figure X.12. Support for Participation in Political Activities, by Generation (2010)

Figure X.13 shows the degree of acceptance toward the three other actions, all considered outside the law in Guatemala. Members of Generation Y show more inclination to accept these types of activities than the other generations. This is not a positive find, particularly regarding the acceptance of taking justice into their own hands. Even though the degree of acceptance by Generation Y (44.5 points) is statistically similar to the other generations (42.5 points), this is a matter of concern. All generations report a high degree of approval toward taking justice into their own hands. This level of approval far surpasses the degree of acceptance toward other illegal actions (the invasion of private property and blockading streets). The only variable with a statistically significant difference among the generations is the blockading of streets. Generation Y reports a much higher degree of acceptance toward this activity.




Figure X.13. Support for Participation in Illegal Activities, by Generation (Guatemala, 2010)

Political Ideology According to Generation

Finally, the subject of ideology is briefly examined. Guatemala has been a polarized society for decades. This is due in part to the 36-year armed conflict which ended in 1996. The new generation has grown up in a democracy where political parties of various ideologies exist. It seems probable that the polarization has diminished in this generation. To test this hypothesis a question is used which is frequently included in public opinion surveys throughout the world.

Young Guatemalans and their Perception of the Future

The questionnaire of 2010 includes questions prepared only for Guatemalans 25 years old or less (18 being the lowest limit, because this study only interviewed citizens 18 or older). One question relates to present day concerns of young Guatemalans. Figure X.15 indicates that the main concern of the majority of youth is the economy (relating to income and jobs). It reaches 57.6%. The second concern relates to violence and gangs and reaches 17.1%. This is an extremely high percentage. The remaining concerns of young people are education, the environment, interpersonal relations and the situation of the country in general. 4.3% of young people reported having no particular concerns.




Figure X.15. Subjects of Concern to Youth, Guatemala 2010

Finally, young people were asked about the direction in which Guatemala is moving. It is a matter of concern that only 37.8% of young people consider their country to be headed in the right direction (Figure X.16).




Figure X.16. Evaluation of the Direction in which Guatemala is Moving, by Generation (2010)

Conclusions

In the final chapter of the Report on Democratic Culture of the year 2010, the specific subject of political culture of Generation Y has been examined. Young Guatemalans between the ages of 18 and 29 and who grew up in an atmosphere of democracy are compared with generations who came before them. A generation gap in terms of attitudes and opinions about democracy does not seem to exist. Nevertheless, important contrasts were found.

Regarding similarities, no statistically significant differences among Generation Y and other generations were found in terms of the following: Level of support for democracy as an idea; satisfaction with the way government functions in Guatemala; or preference for a democratic government over an authoritarian one. Although levels of political tolerance are somewhat lower among Generation Y, the difference is not statistically significant. In a similar way, members of Generation Y indicate greater support for the political system, but this also is not statistically significant. These young people, also known as Generation Net, do not show great differences in their perception of freedom to exercise political rights. They do, however, feel less free to run for public office than Guatemalans of other generations.

The distribution of the young people of Generation Y on the ideological scale (left-right) is also similar to the rest of the population. The majority of Guatemalans, young or old, tend to be located in the center of this type of scale.

On some subjects, generational differences were found. Support for iron fist governance reached only 34.4% among Guatemalans between 18 and 29 years of age. But 41.8% of generations 30 years and older supported this type of governance. Yet members of Generation Y showed support for an eventual coup d'état in a far greater proportion than the other generations. The average support for a military

takeover was 49.6 points among Generation Y. It reached 44.4 points among the rest of the generations. This is a matter of concern.

Finally, Generation Y shows somewhat more openness for support of political rights of other Guatemalans. Examples include the right to vote, to participate in campaigns and in community groups. But, at the same time, Generation Y is inclined to accept some illegal forms of citizen participation—street blockading, building takeovers, and of even greater concern, taking justice into their own hands.

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Appendixes

Appendix I: Technical Description of the Sample Design for Guatemala⁷⁵

This sample, originally prepared for ASIES, forms part of a collection of similar studies carried out in almost all the countries of the region. Although the design remains constant, slight differences due to various rejection rates cause differences to exist from year to year. This appendix discusses these variations and estimates error.

Universe

The universe of a sample refers to the population centers or the geographical units by which conclusions can be drawn from the initial survey data. For this study, the universe includes all citizens (18 years or older) living in urban and rural areas in 331 municipalities existing at the time of the 2002 census in the Republic of Guatemala. The populations of the recently created municipality of Union Cantinil, Huehuetenango and of Raxruhá, Alta Verapaz have the possibility of appearing, since all their populations already existed and were found in the neighboring municipalities. Nevertheless, having been selected as the county seat, this may have been counted as rural area, not urban area, for purposes of classification.

Regions and Other Domains of Study

A domain of study is a region or specific group for which estimations are desired. For this study, five regions are defined which can be used as domains of study:

Metropolitan: Includes all municipalities of the province of Guatemala.

Southwest: Includes all municipalities of Escuintla, Suchitepéquez and Retalhuleu as well as some selected municipalities in San Marcos and Quetzaltenango.⁷⁶⁷⁷

Northwest: Includes all municipalities of Sacatepéquez, Chimaltenango, Quiché, Sololá, Totonicapán, Huehuetenango, as well as the rest of the municipalities of San Marcos and Quetzaltenango.

Northeast: Includes all municipalities of Petén, Alta Verapaz, Baja Verapaz, El Progreso, Izabel and Zacapa.

Southeast: Includes the municipalities of Santa Rosa, Jalapa, Jutiapa, and Chiquimula.


The regions are presented on the following map:

⁷⁵ This section was written by Juan Pablo Pira.

⁷⁶ The municipalities of Quetzaltenango included in this region are: Colomba, El Palmar, Coatepeque, Flores Costa Cuca, and Génova. The municipalities of the department of San Marcos included in this region are: El Quetzal, El Rodeo, El Tumbador, La Reforma, San Pablo, Malacatán, Catarina, Nuevo Progreso, Pajapita, Ayutla, and Ocos.

Map I

Regionalización para el proyecto CAM



Map 1: ASIES, 2003

Units of Measurement

Measurement units are persons or objects to which the information refers. For this study, the units of measure are the population which resides in dwelling units reported on the maps of the 2002 National Census. Persons living in hospitals, barracks, boarding schools, monasteries, care homes or other similar institutions are excluded from the units of measure.

Units of Observation, Respondents and Final Sampling Units

This study reports variables that refer to the respondent, the head of household and the housing unit. For this reason, it is convenient to use the housing unit as the final sampling unit, due to its somewhat permanent nature.

Sampling Method

As part of the contractual requirements, a complex sample was designed. The complex sample includes characteristics of both stratified as well as clustered (conglomerated) samples. The following requirements were observed in the construction of the sample:

- 100% of Guatemalan citizens must be represented. The only exceptions are those residing in housing units unreported in the 2002 census maps.

- A minimum of five and a maximum of eight strata of analysis are defined. In this study, the five strata previously mentioned were used.
- Each stratum can be used as a domain of study.
- Both urban as well as rural areas should be used as domains of study.
- The sample should be self-weighted at a national level as well as a stratum level. This requirement exists in order to avoid the use of weights in the analysis of the information.

Based on these requirements, the following objectives were proposed:

- To obtain a representative sample that will allow analysis of information for the following domains of study:
 1. Guatemala as a country
 2. Strata of the first stage (domains of study)
 - a. Metropolitan
 - b. Northeast
 - c. Northwest
 - d. Southwest
 - e. Southeast
 3. Other domains of study
 - a. urban
 - b. rural
- To obtain a sampling of errors for indicators at all levels.
- To distribute interviews in a manner consistent with the proposal, the required sample size and a margin of error adequate for the results of the study.
- To use the most recent sample frame available for each populated place.

Under these conditions and objectives, began the process of constructing a complex sample. Random choice was used in all stages except in the final one in which quotas by age and gender were established. In 2004 the quotas were calculated for each census sector so as to correspond to the quotas in the census information. During the 2006 application, the same quota was used in all sectors. In the 2008 application, the same method was used from 2006.

Obtaining a sufficient representation of Guatemala requires diverse considerations. In addition to the usual consideration of the urban and rural quotas, special attention was given to the characteristics of each municipality. This represented some complications for meeting the requirement of the sample being self-weighted at the regional level. Thus, even though it might have been more logistically convenient to study urban and rural areas of the same municipality, in various cases only rural areas, or only rural areas from some municipalities, are presented.

The municipal division of Guatemala presents wide variations in area and population. Also, the definition of urban area and rural area used up to the 2002 Census did not present economic activities, population concentration or available services, but rather a classification of a populated place. This definition was kept in order to guarantee comparability with the sample studies from 1993 to 2001. For this reason, it was considered convenient to divide each stratum into their urban and rural areas and then select from this group the municipalities with probability proportional to the population of each type. In this way, a given municipality had different possibilities of selection for their urban and rural area.

Originally, it was suggested that municipalities might be selected in the first stage and once chosen, communities or other census units might be selected within those first stage municipalities.

However, this method could present problematic results if a municipality without a rural area had been selected. Examples include Sacatepéquez, Sololá and Guatemala City. Also, a municipality with a small urban area in comparison to its rural population (which occurs in some municipalities of Quiché and San Marcos) would have presented problematic results. Eliminating the selection of the municipality reduced the number of stages of selection. This made it easier to comply with the requirements of self-weighting.

For various reasons, mainly historical, some municipalities demonstrate characteristics quite different from their neighbors. Two typical cases are Zaragoza in Chimaltenango and Pachalum in Quiché which have mainly ladino populations and are surrounded by municipalities with mainly indigenous populations. The opposite case occurs in Chiquimula in the municipalities of Camotán, Jocotán and Olopa. They present an indigenous population surrounded by neighbors of an almost exclusively ladino population. If it is advisable to select municipalities and then select populations, it is possible that if chance favors one of these municipalities, the ladino/indigenous proportions could be seen as affected.


In order to avoid these problems, a regionalization of Guatemala was constructed based more on similar characteristics than on geographic proximity. This type of division was carried out by the method of analysis of clusters (conglomerates)⁷⁸ to which was included an elevated number of variables at the municipal level. These variables were particular to the theme of the study—they related to education, participation in elections, poverty, gender and rural life.⁷⁹

The divisions were tested from one to ten groups. One to six groups were preferable because, at this point, too many groups were obtained from only one municipality. Three municipalities could not be classified since they presented an elevated number of lost values for the variables that were used: Santa Lucía Milpas Altas in Sacatepéquez, San Bartolo in Totonicapón and Quesada in Jutiapa. The first two municipalities were assigned to the group Special 1 and Quesada was assigned to the group Special 2. The division is presented in the following map:

⁷⁸ The variables were standardized and we did use an Euclidean norm to measure the distance between clusters.

⁷⁹ The variables used are the following: total population 2002, housing 2002, indigenous self-identification percentage, percentage of rural population, percentage of male population, male and female 15 and older literacy, educational efficiency indicators, municipalities regular income, percentage of population in poverty, vulnerability index, chronic malnutrition prevailing, Human Development Index, and percentage of citizens registered to vote.

Map 2



Produced by: ASIES, 2003

If all the possible divisions of the six homogenous groups and the two special ones are considered, the five domains of study and the two areas present a total of eighty possible divisions. However, only thirty-four are occupied. The number of interviews in each division was obtained by assigning in a manner proportional to the population. The selection was then carried out in two stages: in the first stage, communities of the divisions were selected with the probability proportional to the number of census sectors. By having a similar number of housing units in each census sector, the selection previously mentioned is similar to selection with probability proportional to the population. In the next stage, census sectors were selected within each community. By having a similar number of housing units for all sectors, this second stage is similar to a selection with equal probability. According to the size of the sample, in the majority of cases a sector or two were selected by municipality. The exception was in the case of Guatemala City.

Twelve interviews were assigned to each rural census sector, and eight interviews were assigned to each urban census sector. The sample from these results was revised in order to determine if all requirements had been fulfilled.

In summary: The sample result is a sample in three stages with thirty-four strata of selection. The first stage consisted of selecting communities with probability proportional to the number of census sectors. The probability of selecting community C_i is then proportional to the number of census sectors N_{ci} which might be found in the community as shown in the following equation:

Equation 1: Probability of selecting a community:

$$P(C_i) = \frac{N_{C_i}}{\sum_j N_{C_j}}$$

In the second stage, the census sector was selected with a probability proportional to the population in the sector. In this case, the population refers to the number of housing units. Usually this value is similar for all the sectors.

Equation 2: Probability of selecting sector k in community i:

$$P(S_{ki}) = \frac{Pob_{S_{ki}}}{\sum_j Pob_{S_{ji}}} = \frac{Pob_{S_{ki}}}{Pob_{C_i}}$$

Within each sector, the housing units were selected with equal probability. For example, for a rural sector, the probability of selecting a housing unit would be:

Equation 3: Probability of selecting a housing unit in sector S_{ki}

$$P(Viv_{ikl}) = \frac{12}{Pob_{S_{ki}}}$$

The probability of selection of a housing unit in a stratum selection (each one of the thirty-four divisions previously mentioned) would be the product of the three possibilities mentioned. By all assignments being proportional and having census sectors of similar size, the probabilities of selection for each housing unit are similar on a national level.

In housing units where more than one adult might meet the quota, a fourth stage of selection was available and was carried out with the help of a table of random numbers. These tables are known as the Kish Tables.

Sample Frame

The sample frame used was the listing of communities, census sectors and maps produced by the INE (National Institute of Statistics) for the 2002 Census.

Sample Size

In order to meet the contractual requirements, a sample size was established of 1500 effective interviews. The estimations of margin of error in each domain of study are presented in section 1.9.

Design Effects and Sampling Error

The sampling error and the design effect are estimated using the size of the sample and the design effects obtained in similar studies. The design effects are defined as the quotient of variance obtained between the variance of the complex sample and the variance obtained with the random sample of equal size. The following equation indicates this:

Equation 4: Definition of design effects:

$$Deff = \frac{V_{comp}(\theta)}{V_{sa}(\theta)}$$

The $V_{sa}(\theta)$ is the variance of the indicator θ obtained using a random sample and $V_{comp}(\theta)$ is the variance for the same indicator using a complex sample. It should be emphasized that these effects are different for each variable.

In order to estimate the values of the design effects, in 2004 and 2006 a repetitive method was used—*Jackknife 1*—which is available in the software WesVar Version 2. For the 2008 and 2010 applications, the program—Stata®—was used in an attempt to maintain uniformity with the other countries. This program estimates the design effects by means of the Taylor series.

The following table presents the design effects for different variables, preferably those which are measured on scales from 1-10 and from 1-7. Both methods produce similar values.

Table 1. Design Effects for Selected Variables in the 2010 Study

Variable	Efecto de diseño en el cálculo de la muestra (DEFF)	Variable	Efecto de diseño en el cálculo de la muestra (DEFF)	Variable	Efecto de diseño en el cálculo de la muestra (DEFF)
e2	n/d	B1	1,246	D1	1,166
e3	1,095	B2	1,148	D2	1,125
E5	1,097	B3	1,264	D3	1,249
E8	1,072	B4	1,194	D4	1,200
ED	1,733	B6	1,151	D5	1,186

For the 2004 CAMS study, a design effect average of (DEFT) 1.348 was estimated for these variables using the approximation by the Taylor series which provides the Epi Info program at the beginning of version 6. For the 2006 application a design effect average was obtained for these variables using the *Jackknife 1* technique and the WesVar program, version 3.2, estimable in 1.359 which differs little from values obtained in 2004. For the 2008 application, the smallest design effect of the series is obtained, 1.296. In 2010, again, the same statistical package was used. With this design of 1.209 the errors for each stratum will be calculated.

At this time, the admission of facts was transferred directly to a PDA⁸⁰ by which the failed attempts were cited and noted down with great precision. It is important to realize that an oversample was considered for each region based upon the rate of rejection observed in the 2004 application. Since the rates were substantially lower from the applications of 2004 to 2006, some sampling points were eliminated with the help of a table of random numbers. For the 2008 and 2010 applications, the same sample of 2006 was used.

⁸⁰ Personal Data Assistant: It was used the ASUS 262 A Model operated by Windows Mobile platform version 5.2.

Table 2. Interviews and Rates of Rejection by Region

Región	Entrevistas requeridas	Tasa de rechazo estimada	Número de boletas logradas	Número de intentos (incluido las que se lograron)	Rechazos activos (No quiere participar y decide no participar una vez iniciada la encuesta)	Tasa de rechazo (real)
Guatemala	332	12%	332	973	469	59%
Noroccidente	504	25%	487	5567	511	51%
Nororiente	360	12%	350	5743	59	14%
Suroriente	112	14%	112	1714	50	31%
Suroccidente	232	14%	223	1494	58	25%
TOTAL	1540	14%	1504	15491	1147	43%

Within each stratum, the rejection differs radically in regards to causes and behavior. In the previous table, only those situations which resulted in an eligible respondent rejecting the interview or in an incomplete interview were considered as rejection. Therefore, it was requested that at this time each cause of rejection might be detailed. The information was recorded in the following table:

**Table 3. Causes of Rejection by Stratum
(Does not include unsuccessful attempts caused by route problems)**

Razones de intento de entrevista sin éxito	Metro	SO	NO	SE	NE
1. Entrevista rechazada	461	55	508	49	50
2. Entrevista incompleta	5	4	3	1	8
3. Persona elegible ausente	270	5	214	40	21
3. Vivienda desocupada	87	7	195	11	12
4. Vivienda en construcción	38	3	137	1	7
5. Casa de descanso/ extranjeros/ No habla el idioma de la encuesta	49	0	9	0	0
6. Nadie en casa	279	53	338	40	19
7. informantes no aptos (Mudo, enfermos mentales, borrachos, personas agresivas etc.)	40	0	36	0	6 *
8. No hay elegible (no corresponde a la cuota buscada)	148	90	334	30	20
9. No hay adultos en el hogar	79	13	114	44	17
10. otros	119**	0	0	0	0

Sampling Errors by Domain of Study:

Table 4. Expected Sizes of Sample and Sample Errors

	Boletas	Margen de error (95% confianza)	
		Muestra aleatoria irrestricta	Margen de error en muestra compleja.*
Metropolitana	332	5.5%	6.6%
Noroccidente	487	4.5%	5.5%
Nororiente	350	5.3%	6.5%
Suroriente	112	9.4%	11.4%
Suroccidente	223	6.7%	8.1%
Urbana	711	3.8%	4.5%
Rural	793	3.6%	4.3%
TOTAL	1504	2.6%	3.1%

Comparison between the Sample and the Population:

A precise adjustment to the census proportions is perceived in these comparisons:

By Region

	Población Censo 2002	Porcentaje	Entrevistas	Porcentaje
Metropolitana	2 541 581	22.6%	332	22.1%
Noroccidente	3 742 407	33.3%	503	32.4%
Nororiente	2 012 859	17.9%	359	14.8%
Suroriente	1 235 866	11.0%	112	7.4%
Suroccidente	1 704 486	15.2%	232	23.3%
TOTAL	11 237 199		1 538	

By Urban and Rural Areas

	Población Urbana	Población Rural	Porcentaje de población urbana	Entrevistas urbanas	Entrevistas rurales	Porcentaje de entrevistas urbanas (en la muestra)
Metropolitana	2186669	354912	86.0%	308	24	92.8%
Noroccidente	1424190	2318217	38.1%	182	305	37.4%
Nororiente	590006	1422853	29.3%	96	254	27.4%
Suroriente	366029	869837	29.6%	40	72	35.7%
Suroccidente	667120	1037366	39.1%	85	138	38.1%
TOTAL			46.1%	711	793	47.3%

Appendix II: Informed Consent Letter



ASOCIACIÓN DE INVESTIGACIÓN
Y ESTUDIOS SOCIALES

Guatemala Enero, 2010

Estimado señor o señora:

Usted ha sido elegido/a al azar para participar en un estudio de opinión pública. Vengo por encargo la Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales (ASIES) y de la Universidad de Vanderbilt. El proyecto está financiado desde los Estados Unidos. La entrevista durará de 30 a 40 minutos.

El objetivo principal del estudio es conocer la opinión de las personas acerca de diferentes aspectos de la situación de Guatemala. Su participación en el estudio es voluntaria. Usted puede dejar preguntas sin responder o terminar la entrevista en cualquier momento. Las respuestas que usted proporcione serán completamente confidenciales y anónimas. Usted no recibirá pago alguno por su participación, pero ésta tampoco le ocasionará gastos.

Si tiene preguntas respecto al estudio, puede comunicarse a ASIES, al teléfono 2332-2002 con Juan Pablo Pira.

¿Desea Participar?

10a. Calle 7-48 Zona 9 - Apartado Postal: 1005A - Guatemala, C.A.
Teléfonos: 23322002 - 23347178 - 23347179 Fax: 23602259
email: asies@asies.org.gt
<http://www.asies.org.gt>

Appendix III: The Questionnaire



El Barómetro de las Américas: Guatemala, 2010
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PAIS.					2
01. México	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua	
06. Costa Rica	07. Panamá	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia	
11. Perú	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brasil	
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Rep. Dom.	22. Haití	23. Jamaica	
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad y Tobago	26. Belice	40. Estados Unidos	41. Canadá	
27. Surinam					
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____					
ESTRATOPRI: (201). Zona metropolitana (202). Suroccidente (203) Noroccidente (204) Suroriente (205) Nororiente					2 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
UPM. (Unidad Primaria de Muestreo) _____					<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
PROV. Departamento: _____					2 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
MUNICIPIO. Municipio: _____					2 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
GUADISTRITO. Lugar poblado: _____					<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
GUASEGMENTO. SEGMENTO CENSAL _____					<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
GUASEC. Sector _____					<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
CLUSTER. (Unidad Final de Muestreo o Punto Muestral) [Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales]					<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
UR (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]					<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
TAMANO. Tamaño del lugar: (1) Capital nacional (área metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande (3) Ciudad mediana (4) Ciudad pequeña (5) Área rural					<input type="checkbox"/>
IDIOMAQ. Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español (2) Mam (3) K'iche' (4) Kaqchikel (5) Q'eqchi' (6) Achí (7) Ixil					<input type="checkbox"/>
Hora de inicio: _____ : _____					<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
FECHA. Fecha de la entrevista día: _____ mes: _____ año: 2010					<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA					

Q1. [Anotar, no preguntar] Género: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	
--	--

LS3. Para comenzar, ¿en general, qué tan satisfecho está con su vida? ¿Usted diría que se encuentra:
[Leer alternativas]
 (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Algo satisfecho(a) (3) Algo **insatisfecho(a)** (4) Muy **insatisfecho(a)** (88) NS
 (98) NR

A4. En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema **más grave** que está enfrentando el país? **[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]**

Agua, falta de	19	Impunidad	61
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Inflación, altos precios	02
Conflicto armado	30	Los políticos	59
Corrupción	13	Mal gobierno	15
Crédito, falta de	09	Medio ambiente	10
Delincuencia, crimen,	05	Migración	16
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Narcotráfico	12
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pandillas	14
Desigualdad	58	Pobreza	04
Desnutrición	23	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Deuda Externa	26	Secuestro	31
Discriminación	25	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Drogadicción	11	Terrorismo	33
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Electricidad, falta de	24	Violencia	57
Explosión demográfica	20	Vivienda	55
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	Otro	70
NS	88	NR	98

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica **del país**?
 ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?
 (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala
 (5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR

SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual **del país** es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses?
 (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR

SOCT3. ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses la situación económica **del país** será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora?
 (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR

IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría **en general su** situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?
 (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala
 (5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR

IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que **su** situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses?
 (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR

IDIO3. ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses **su** situación económica será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora?
 (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.				
¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ... [Lea cada opción y anote la respuesta]	Sí	No	NS	NR
CP2. ¿A algún diputado del Congreso?	1	2	88	98
CP4A. ¿A alguna autoridad local como el alcalde, municipalidad/corporación municipal concejal, alcalde auxiliar?	1	2	88	98
CP4. ¿A algún ministerio/secretario, institución pública, u oficina del estado?	1	2	88	98

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...	
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) No Sabe (98) No Responde	
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a SGL1] (88) NS [Pase a SGL1] (98) No responde [Pase a SGL1]	
MUNI10. ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición? (1) Sí (0) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP.	
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (88) NS (98) NR	
LGL2. En su opinión, ¿se le debe dar más responsabilidades y mayores recursos a la municipalidad, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales? (1) Más al municipio (2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios (3) No cambiar nada [NO LEER] (4) Más al municipio si da mejores servicios [NO LEER] (88) NS (98) NR	

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR
CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿en los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio o colonia? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca en los últimos 12 meses.	1	2	3	4	88	98

Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. **[Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/u organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98
CP20. [Solo mujeres] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	NS 88	NR 98

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “A”]

LS6. En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con gradas numeradas del cero al diez. El cero es la grada más baja y representa la peor vida posible para usted. El diez es la grada más alta y representa la mejor vida posible para usted.

¿En qué grada de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos? **Por favor escoja la grada que mejor represente su opinión.**

[Señale en la tarjeta el número que representa la “peor vida posible” y el que representa “la mejor vida posible”. Indíquelo a la persona entrevistada que puede seleccionar un número intermedio en la escala].

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	98
La peor vida posible							La mejor vida posible				NS	NR

LS6A. ¿En qué grada diría usted que se encontraba hace dos años, es decir, en el 2008?

[RECOGER TARJETA "A"]

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: **[Leer alternativas]**
 (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (88) NS (98) NR

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "B"]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la cual el número 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	(NS=88)	
										(NR=98)	
Izquierda							Derecha				

[RECOGER TARJETA "B"]

PROT3. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública?
 (1) Sí ha participado **[Siga]** (2) No ha participado **[Pase a JC1]** (88) NS **[Pase a JC1]**
 (98) NR **[Pase a JC1]**

PROT4. ¿Cuántas veces ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública en los últimos 12 meses? _____ (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

Y4. ¿Cuál era el motivo de la manifestación o protesta? **[NO LEER. MARCAR SOLO UNA. Si participó en más de una, preguntar por la más reciente. Si había más de un motivo, preguntar por el más importante]**

- (1) Asuntos económicos (trabajo, precios, inflación, falta de oportunidades)
- (2) Educación (falta de oportunidades, matrículas altas, mala calidad, política educativa)
- (3) Asuntos políticos (protesta contra leyes, partidos o candidatos políticos, exclusión, corrupción)
- (4) Problemas de seguridad (crimen, milicias, pandillas)
- (5) Derechos humanos
- (6) Temas ambientales
- (7) Falta de Servicios públicos
- (8) Otros
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) Inap (No ha participado en protesta pública)

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión, ¿se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias...? **[Lea las alternativas después de cada pregunta]:**

JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	

JC15A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles, se justifica que el presidente del país cierre el Congreso y gobierne sin Congreso?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	
JC16A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles se justifica que el presidente del país disuelva la Corte Suprema de Justicia y gobierne sin la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	

VIC1EXT. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delictual en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR] (88) NS [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR] (98) NR [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]	
VIC1EXTA. ¿Cuántas veces ha sido usted víctima de un acto delictual en los últimos 12 meses? [Marcar el número] (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
VIC2. Pensando en el último acto delictual del cual usted fue víctima, de la lista que le voy a leer, ¿qué tipo de acto delictual sufrió? [Leer alternativas] (01) Robo sin arma sin agresión o amenaza física (02) Robo sin arma con agresión o amenaza física (03) Robo con arma (04) Agresión física sin robo (05) Violación o asalto sexual (06) Secuestro (07) Daño a la propiedad (08) Robo de la casa (10) Extorsión (11) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no fue víctima)	

<p>VIC2AA. ¿Podría decirme en qué lugar ocurrió el último acto delincencial del cual usted fue víctima? [Leer alternativas] (1) En su hogar (2) En este barrio o comunidad (3) En este municipio (4) En otro municipio (5) En otro país (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>VIC1HOGAR. ¿Alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delincencial en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

<p>AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio/la colonia donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy inseguro(a)? (1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

<p>AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría... (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas o maras? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “C”]

En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con gradas numeradas del uno al siete, en la cual el 1 es la grada más baja y significa NADA y el 7 es la grada más alta y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta ver mucha televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Nada						Mucho	NS	NR

<p style="text-align: center;">Anotar el número 1-7 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR</p> <p>Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número.</p> <p>B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Guatemala garantizan un juicio justo? (Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)</p> <p>B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Guatemala?</p>	
---	--

B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político guatemalteco?	
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso(a) de vivir bajo el sistema político guatemalteco?	
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político guatemalteco?	
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto usted tiene confianza en el Tribunal Supremo Electoral?	
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Ejército?	
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Congreso?	
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Gobierno Nacional?	
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Policía Nacional?	
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Iglesia Católica?	
B20A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Iglesia Evangélica?	
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los partidos políticos?	
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el presidente?	
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipalidad?	
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser guatemalteco(a)?	
B17 [B45]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Procuraduría de Derechos Humanos?	
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?	
B47. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?	
B48. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudan a mejorar la economía?	
B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Ministerio Público	
B24 ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los tribunales de justicia?	
B50. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte de Constitucionalidad?	
B60. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la CICIG (Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala)?	
B61. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba que misiones internacionales como la CICIG se involucren en mejorar el sistema político guatemalteco?	
B62. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que es positivo para el país el resultado de la investigación del asesinato de Rodrigo Rosenberg?	
B63. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que es positivo para el país el haber capturado al expresidente Portillo, quien está acusado de corrupción?	

Ahora, usando la misma escalera [<i>continúe con la tarjeta C: escala 1-7</i>] NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO	Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR
N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la pobreza?	
N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?	
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?	
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?	
N12. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate el desempleo?	
N15. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual está manejando bien la economía?	

[RECOGER TARJETA "C"]

GUAN20. ¿Se ha beneficiado usted de alguno de los siguientes programas: Bolsa Solidaria, Mi Familia Progresá, fertilizante barato, comedores solidarios u otros programas similares? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
--	--

WT1. ¿Qué tan preocupado está usted de que haya un ataque violento por terroristas en Guatemala en los próximos 12 meses? ¿Está usted muy, algo, poco, o nada preocupado, o diría usted que no ha pensado mucho en esto? (1) Muy preocupado (2) Algo preocupado (3) Poco preocupado (4) Nada preocupado (5) No ha pensado mucho en esto (88) NS (98) NR	
--	--

<p>WT2. ¿Qué tan preocupado está de que usted o alguien de su familia sea víctima de un ataque violento por terroristas? ¿Está usted muy, algo, poco, o nada preocupado, o diría usted que no ha pensado mucho en esto?</p> <p>(1) Muy preocupado (2) Algo preocupado (3) Poco preocupado (4) Nada preocupado (5) No ha pensado mucho en esto (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
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<p>GUAJUS1. ¿Se enteró usted del proceso de elección de magistrados de la Corte Suprema de Justicia que se realizó en septiembre del año pasado? (2009) [si responde sí, pasar a las preguntas GUAJUS2, GUAJUS3 Y GUAJUS4]</p> <p>(1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a GUAJUS5] (88) NS [Pase a GUAJUS5] (98) NR [Pase a GUAJUS5]</p>	
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<p>GUAJUS2. ¿Considera usted que el proceso de elección de magistrados fue transparente?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) Regular (3) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
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<p>GUAJUS3. ¿Cree usted que las acciones de la CICIG fueron positivas para la elección de magistrados a la Corte Suprema de Justicia? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
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<p>GUAJUS4. ¿Cree usted que las acciones de los grupos sociales fueron positivas para la elección de magistrados a la Corte Suprema de Justicia?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
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<p>GUAJUS5. ¿Ha oído usted algo acerca de la nueva ley de acceso a la información?[sí responde sí, pasar a la pregunta GUAJUS6]</p> <p>(1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a M1] (88) NS [Pase a M1] (98) NR [Pase a M1]</p>	
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<p>GUAJUS6. ¿Cree usted que la ley de acceso a la información va a contribuir a que el gobierno sea más transparente?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
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<p>M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Colom es...?: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
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<p>M2. Hablando del Congreso y pensando en todos los diputados en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen; ¿usted cree que los diputados del Congreso guatemalteco están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal?</p> <p>(1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy Mal (88) NS (98)NR</p>	
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[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "D"]									
Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera similar, pero el número 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el número 7 representa "muy de acuerdo". Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. Anotar Número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	NS	NS	
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo			
							88	98	
							Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR		

Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, usando esa tarjeta quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones	
POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP102. Cuando el Congreso estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP103. Cuando la Corte Suprema de Justicia estorba el trabajo del gobierno, la Corte Suprema de Justicia debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP113. Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	

Continuamos usando la misma escalera. Por favor, dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes frases.

EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
EFF2. Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
DEM23. La democracia puede existir sin partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. Seguimos usando la misma escalera de 1 a 7.

NS = 88, NR = 98

ROS1. El Estado guatemalteco, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS2. El Estado guatemalteco, más que los individuos, debería ser el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS3. El Estado guatemalteco, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS4. El Estado guatemalteco debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS5. El Estado guatemalteco, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer las pensiones de jubilación. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS6. El Estado guatemalteco, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer los servicios de salud. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Ahora le voy a leer unas afirmaciones y quisiera que me contestara hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas, usando esta escala de 7 puntos, donde 1 significa muy en desacuerdo y 7 significa muy de acuerdo.

	Anotar 1-7 88=NS, 98=NR
RAC3A. La mezcla de razas es buena para Guatemala. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	
RAC3B. Estaría de acuerdo que una hija o hijo suyo se casara con una persona indígena. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	
RAC3C. A Ud. le gustaría que su piel fuera más clara. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	

[RECOGER TARJETA "D"]

PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Guatemala? (1) Muy satisfecho (a) (2) Satisfecho (a) (3) Insatisfecho (a) (4) Muy insatisfecho (a) (88) NS (98) NR	
PN5. En su opinión, ¿Guatemala es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático (88) NS (98) NR	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "E"]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indica que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NR
Desaprueba firmemente										88	98
Aprueba firmemente										1-10, 88, 98	
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras como forma de protesta. Usando la misma escala, ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados como forma de protesta. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno electo. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia cuenta cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											

[No recoja tarjeta “E”]

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Guatemala. Por favor continúe usando la escalera de 10 puntos.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NR
Desaprueba firmemente								Aprueba firmemente		88	98

	1-10, 88, 98
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Guatemala, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]	
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Guatemala. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?	
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	
D6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las parejas del mismo sexo puedan tener el derecho a casarse?	

[Recoger tarjeta “E”]

DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático, O (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, O (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (88) NS (98) NR	
DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (88) NS (98) NR	
AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser electo a través del voto popular. Otros dicen, que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral o sea, el voto popular es siempre lo mejor. ¿Usted qué piensa? [Leer alternativas] (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (88) NS (98) NR	
PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? [Leer alternativas] (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR	
PP2. Hay personas que trabajan para algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2007? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (88) NS (98) NR	

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS	NR
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria...					
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida en los últimos 12 meses?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en la municipalidad en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el municipio/delegación, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida en los últimos 12 meses?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida en los juzgados en este último año?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida en la escuela o colegio?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una mordida?		0	1	88	98
EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos en el país está: [LEER] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (88) NS (98) NR					

[Entregar otra vez la Tarjeta “D”] Ahora, voy a leerle una serie de rasgos de personalidad que podrían aplicarse o no aplicarse a usted. Por favor use la misma escalera del 1 al 7 para indicar en qué medida está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo en que estas frases se aplican a su persona. Debe calificar en qué medida se aplican a usted estos rasgos de personalidad, aun cuando alguna característica se aplique en mayor medida que otra.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98	
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo		NS	NR

Usted se considera una persona que es:

PER1. Sociable y activa

PER2. Una persona crítica y peleonera

PER3. Una persona confiable y disciplinada

PER4. Una persona ansiosa y fácil de molestar

PER5. Una persona abierta a nuevas experiencias e intelectual

PER6. Una persona callada y tímida

PER7. Una persona generosa y cariñosa

PER8. Una persona desorganizada y descuidada

PER9. Una persona calmada y emocionalmente estable

PER10. Una persona poco creativa y con poca imaginación

[Recoger Tarjeta “D”]

CRISIS1. Algunos dicen que nuestro país está sufriendo una crisis económica muy grave, otros dicen que estamos sufriendo una crisis económica pero que no es muy grave, mientras otros dicen que no hay crisis económica. ¿Qué piensa usted? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Estamos sufriendo una crisis económica muy grave

(2) Estamos sufriendo una crisis económica pero no es muy grave, o

(3) No hay crisis económica **[Pase a DER1]**

(88) NS **[Pase a DER1]**

(98) NR **[Pase a DER1]**

CRISIS2. ¿Quién de los siguientes es el principal culpable de la crisis económica actual en nuestro país? **[LEER LISTA, MARCAR SOLO UNA RESPUESTA]**

(01) El gobierno anterior

(02) El gobierno actual

(03) Nosotros, los guatemaltecos

(04) Los ricos de nuestro país

(05) Los problemas de la democracia

(06) Los países ricos [Acepte también: Estados Unidos, Inglaterra, Francia, Alemania y Japón]

(07) El sistema económico del país, o

(08) Nunca ha pensado en esto

(77) **[NO LEER]** Otro (88) **[NO LEER]** NS (98) **[NO LEER]** NR (99) INAP

Si usted decidiera participar en algunas de las actividades que le voy a mencionar ¿lo haría usted **sin temor, con un poco de temor, o con mucho temor?** **[VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA SI ES NECESARIO]**

	SIN TEMOR	UN POCO DE TEMOR	CON MUCHO TEMOR	NS	NR
DER1. ¿Participar para resolver problemas de su comunidad?	1	2	3	88	98

DER2. ¿Votar en una elección nacional?	1	2	3	88	98
DER3. ¿Participar en una manifestación pacífica?	1	2	3	88	98
DER4. ¿Postularse para un cargo de elección popular?	1	2	3	88	98

VB1. ¿Está empadronado para votar? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (88) NS (98) NR	
GUAVB15. Como ciudadano, ¿cree usted que el nuevo documento único de identidad podría hacer el proceso electoral más confiable? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NR (98) NR	
VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2007? (1) Sí votó [Siga] (2) No votó [Pasar a VB10] (88) NS [Pasar a VB10] (98) NR [Pasar a VB10]	
VB3. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2007? [NO LEER LISTA] (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco o anuló su voto) (201) Álvaro Colom, Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE) (202) Otto Pérez, Partido Patriota (PP) (203) Alejandro Giammattei, Gran Alianza Nacional (GANAN) (204) Eduardo Suger, Centro de Acción Social (CASA) (205) Luis Rabbé, Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG) (206) Rigoberta Menchú, Encuentro por Guatemala (EG) (207) Mario Estrada, Unión del Cambio Nacionalista (UCN) (210) Fritz García-Gallont, Partido Unionista (PU) (211) Oscar Castañeda, Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN) (212) Miguel Angel Sandoval, Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) (213) Manuel Conde, Unión Democrática (UD) (214) Pablo Monsanto, Alianza Nueva Nación (ANN) (215) Héctor Rosales, DIA (216) Vinicio Cerezo Blandón, Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (DCG) (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (No votó)	
VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a POL1] (88) NS [Pase a POL1] (98) NR [Pase a POL1]	

<p>VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO LEER LISTA]</p> <p>(201) Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE) (202) Partido Patriota (PP) (203) Gran Alianza Nacional (GANAN) (204) Centro de Acción Social (CASA) (205) Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG) (206) Encuentro por Guatemala (EG) (207) Unión del Cambio Nacional (UCN) (210) Partido Unionista (PU) (211) Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN) (212) Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) (213) Unión Democrática (UD) (217) NINGUNO (218) Frente por la Democracia (El Frente) (219) Movimiento Integral de Oportunidades (MIO) (220) Movimiento Reformador (MR) (221) Frente de Convergencia Nacional (FCN) (222) Bienestar Nacional (BIEN) (223) Visión de Valores (VIVA) (224) Partido Libertador Progresista (PLP) (225) Victoria (226) CREO (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
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<p>POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada?</p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
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<p>VB20. ¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, qué haría usted? [Leer opciones]</p> <p>(1) No votaría (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido diferente del actual gobierno (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría la boleta en blanco o la anularía (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
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<p>GUAVB25. ¿Hay alguna persona que a usted le gustaría como candidato o candidata para las próximas elecciones? [NO LEER las opciones]</p> <p>(1) Sandra Torres (de Colom) (2) Otto Pérez Molina (3) Harold Caballeros (4) Eduardo Suger (5) Nineth Montenegro (6) Alejandro Giammattei (7) Otro (88) NS (98)NR</p>	
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<p>CLIEN1. En los últimos años y pensando en las campañas electorales, ¿algún candidato o alguien de un partido político le ofreció algo, como un favor, comida o alguna otra cosa o beneficio a cambio de que usted votara o apoyara a ese candidato o partido? ¿Esto pasó frecuentemente, rara vez, o nunca?</p> <p>(1) Frecuentemente [SIGA con CLIEN2] (2) Rara vez [SIGA con CLIEN2] (3) Nunca [Pase a RAC1C] (88) NS [Pase a RAC1C] (98) NR [Pase a RAC1C]</p>	
<p>CLIEN2 Y pensando en la última vez que esto pasó, ¿lo que le ofrecieron le hizo estar más inclinado o menos inclinado a votar por el candidato o partido que le ofreció ese bien?</p> <p>(1) Más inclinado (2) Menos inclinado (3) Ni más ni menos inclinado (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	

<p>RAC1C. Según los datos del Censo de Población las personas indígenas son más pobres, en general, que el resto de la población. ¿Cuál cree usted que es la principal razón de esto? [Leer opciones] [Permitir sólo una respuesta]</p> <p>(1) Porque las personas indígenas no trabajan lo suficiente (2) Porque las personas indígenas son menos inteligentes (3) Porque las personas indígenas son tratadas de manera injusta (4) Porque las personas indígenas tienen bajo nivel educativo (5) Porque las personas indígenas no quieren cambiar su cultura (88) NS (98)NR</p>	
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<p>RAC4. ¿Ud. cree que las personas indígenas son tratadas mucho mejor, mejor, igual, peor o mucho peor que las personas blancas?</p> <p>(1) Mucho mejor (2) Mejor (3) Igual (4) Peor (5) Mucho peor (88) NS (98)NR</p>	
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Y ahora, cambiando de tema...

<p>y pensando en los últimos cinco años, ¿alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o ha sido tratado mal o de manera injusta: [Repetir después de cada pregunta: muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca]</p>						
	Muchas veces	Algunas veces	Pocas veces	Nunca	NS	NR
DIS11. Por su color de piel? ¿Usted diría que eso ha sucedido muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca?	1	2	3	4	88	98
DIS17. Se ha sentido discriminado por su forma de hablar o acento?	1	2	3	4	88	98
DIS13. Por su condición económica	1	2	3	4	88	98
DIS12. Por su género o sexo	1	2	3	4	88	98

Ahora pensando en lo que le pudo haber sucedido a otra persona, ¿ha usted vivido o presenciado situaciones en las que otra persona ha sido discriminada, tratada mal o injustamente: **[Repetir después de cada pregunta: muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca]**

	Muchas veces	Algunas veces	Pocas veces	Nunca	NS	NR
RAC1A. Por su color de piel? muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca?	1	2	3	4	88	98
RAC1B. Ha visto que otra persona ha sido discriminada por su forma de hablar o acento?	1	2	3	4	88	98
RAC1D. Por su condición económica?	1	2	3	4	88	98
RAC1E. Por su género o sexo?	1	2	3	4	88	98

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?
 _____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria)
 = _____ años total **[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]**

	1 ^o	2 ^o	3 ^o	4 ^o	5 ^o	6 ^o
Ninguno	0					
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6
Secundaria (Básicos: primero básico, segundo básico, tercero básico)	7	8	9			
Bachillerato, Magisterio o Secretariado	10	11	12			
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18
Maestría o Doctorado	19	20	21	22		
NS	88					
NR	98					

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años (888 = NS 988 = NR)

[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos] [Si la persona entrevistada es mayor de 25 años pasar a Q3C]

Y1. Dentro de cinco años, ¿se ve usted desempeñando algún papel en la política del país, como por ejemplo... **[Leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA]**

- (1) Participando en una asociación civil (ONG), comunitaria o un partido político
- (2) Postulándose a algún cargo público en las elecciones
- (3) Participando en un movimiento revolucionario
- (4) Ninguna de estas
- (5) **[NO LEER]** Otra
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) INAP

<p>[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos] Y2. ¿Qué temas o problemas le preocupan con frecuencia? [NO leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA] [Si dice “el futuro” preguntar ¿y qué cosas del futuro le preocupan?]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Trabajo, empleo, salarios, ingreso, estabilidad económica o laboral (2) Pasarla bien, fiestas, deportes, club, citas, pareja, formar familia, chicas o chicos (3) Posesiones materiales (ropa y calzado, celulares, ipods, computadoras) (4) Obtener o terminar educación, pagar educación (5) Seguridad, crimen, pandillas (6) Relacionamiento interpersonal (relación con padres, familia, amigos y otros) (7) Salud (8) Medio ambiente (9) Situación del país (10) Nada, no le preocupa nada (11) Otra respuesta (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP 	
<p>[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos] Y3. En su opinión, en términos generales, ¿el país se está encaminando en la dirección correcta o en la dirección equivocada?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Correcta (2) Equivocada (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP 	
<p>[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos] HAICR1. Podría decirme, ¿cómo se informa usted principalmente sobre la situación del país? [NO leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (01) TV (02) Diario (03) Radio (04) Iglesia (05) Centro comunitario (06) Escuela (07) Familiares (08) Compañeros de trabajo o estudio (09) Amigos (10) Vecinos (11) Portales de internet (excluye diarios) (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP 	

<p>Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? [No leer opciones] [Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11] (01) Católico (02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava). (03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha’i). (04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión) (05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra). (06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones). (07) Religiones Tradicionales (Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lonza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esotérica). (10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado) (11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios) (12) Testigos de Jehová. (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? [Leer alternativas] (1) Más de una vez por semana (2) Una vez por semana (3) Una vez al mes (4) Una o dos veces al año (5) Nunca o casi nunca (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q5B. Por favor, ¿podría decirme, qué tan importante es la religión en su vida? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy importante (2) Algo importante (3) Poco importante (4) Nada importante (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “F”] Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? [Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?] (00) Ningún ingreso (01) de 0 a 1000 quetzales (02) de 1001 a 1500 quetzales (03) de 1501 a 2000 quetzales (04) de 2001 a 2500 quetzales (05) de 2501 a 3300 quetzales (06) de 3301 a 4000 quetzales (07) de 4001 a 5000 quetzales (08) de 5001 a 6600 quetzales (09) de 6601 a 9500 quetzales (10) más de 9500 quetzales (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>[RECOGER TARJETA “F”] Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica del exterior? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a Q10C] (88) NS [Pase a Q10C] (98) NR [Pase a Q10C]</p>	
<p>Q10B. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	

<p>Q10A3. [Sólo si recibe remesas] En los últimos doce meses, ¿la cantidad de dinero que recibe del exterior ha disminuido, aumentado, permanecido igual, o no recibió dinero del exterior en los últimos doce meses?</p> <p>(1) Ha aumentado (2) Se ha mantenido igual (3) Ha disminuido (4) No recibió dinero del exterior en los últimos doce meses (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>Q10C. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? [Si dijo “Sí”, preguntar ¿en dónde?] [No leer alternativas] (1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente [Siga] (2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países [Siga] (3) Sí, en otros países (no en estados Unidos) [Siga] (4) No [Pase a Q14] (88) NS [Pase a Q14] (98) NR [Pase a Q14]</p>	
<p>Q16. [Sólo para los que contestaron Sí en Q10C] ¿Con qué frecuencia se comunica con ellos? [Leer alternativas] (1) Todos los días (2) Una o dos veces por semana (3) Una o dos veces por mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>Q14. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: [Leer alternativas] (1) Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades (3) No les alcanza y tienen dificultades (4) No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades (88) [No leer] NS (98) [No leer] NR</p>	
<p>Q10E. En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: [Leer opciones] (1) ¿Aumentó? [Pase a Q11] (2) ¿Permaneció igual? [Pase a Q11] (3) ¿Disminuyó? [Pase a Q10F] (88) NS [Pase a Q11] (98) NR [Pase a Q11]</p>	
<p>Q10F. ¿Cuál fue la principal razón por la que el ingreso de su hogar disminuyó en los últimos dos años? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS] (1) Disminuyó la cantidad de horas de trabajo o salario (2) Un miembro de la familia perdió su trabajo (3) Bajaron las ventas/El negocio no anduvo bien (4) El negocio familiar se quebró (5) Las remesas (dinero del exterior) disminuyeron o dejaron de recibirse (6) Un miembro de la familia que recibía ingreso se enfermó, murió o se fue del hogar (7) Desastre natural/ pérdida de cultivo (9) Todo está más caro, el ingreso alcanza menos (8) Otra razón (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (“Aumentó”, “Permaneció igual” o NS/NR en Q10E)</p>	

<p>Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [No leer alternativas] (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? _____ (00= ninguno → Pase a ETID) (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q12A. [Si tiene hijos] ¿Cuántos hijos viven en su hogar en este momento? _____ 00 = ninguno, (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no tiene hijos)</p>	
<p>ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona ladina, indígena, u otra? (2) Ladina (3) Indígena (7) Otra (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>GUAETID2. [Preguntar a todos] ¿A qué grupo étnico (pueblo) pertenece? [No leer alternativas] (01) Achí (02) Akateko (03) Awakateko (04) Ch'orti' (05) Chuj (06) Itza' (07) Ixil (08) Jakalteko (Popti') (09) Kaqchikel (10) K'iche' (11) Mam (12) Mopan (13) Poqomam (14) Poqomchi' (15) Q'anjob'al (16) Q'eqchi' (18) Sipakapense (19) Tektiteko (20) Tz'utujil (21) Uspanteko (22) Garífuna (26) Ninguno (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>GUAETIDA. ¿Considera que su madre es o era una persona ladina, indígena o garífuna? (2) Ladina (3) Indígena (4) Garífuna (7) Otra (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que habló de pequeño en su casa? [acepte una alternativa, no más] [No leer alternativas] (201) Español (202) Mam (203) K'iche' (206) Kaqchiquel (207) Q'eqchi' (204) Otro (nativo) (205) Otro extranjero (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>LENG4. Hablando del idioma que sus padres conocían, ¿sus padres hablan o hablaban [Leer alternativas]: <i>(Encuestador: si uno de los padres hablaba sólo un idioma y el otro más de uno, anotar 2.)</i> (1) Sólo castellano o español (2) Castellano-español e idioma nativo (3) Sólo idioma nativo (4) Castellano-español e idioma extranjero (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>IND1. ¿Cree usted que los grupos indígenas están ayudando a que nuestro país sea más democrático, menos democrático o ellos no están teniendo ningún impacto en nuestra democracia? (1) Más democrático (2) Menos democrático (3) No tienen impacto (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

<p>IND2. ¿Cuánta influencia cree usted que los grupos indígenas han tenido en la promulgación o aprobación de nuevas leyes en este país? [Leer Alternativas] (1) Mucha (2) Algo (3) Poca [Pasar a IND4] (4) Ninguna [Pasar a IND4] (88) NS [Pasar a IND4] (98) NR [Pasar a IND4]</p>	
<p>[Preguntar solo a los que respondieron “Mucho” o “Algo” a IND2] IND3. En su opinión, ¿por qué algunos grupos indígenas han sido efectivos en tener influencia sobre los debates políticos en este país? [Leer alternativas] (1) Porque tienen más dinero/recursos (2) Porque pueden trabajar bien con grupos no-indígenas (3) Porque ellos representan a la población indígena (4) Porque tienen buenas ideas (5) Porque tienen buenos líderes (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap</p>	
<p>[Preguntar a Todos] IND4. ¿Qué tan efectivos son los grupos indígenas para convencer a la gente de que los temas indígenas son importantes? (1) Muy efectivos (2) Algo efectivos (3) Poco efectivos (4) Nada efectivos (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

<p>WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente usa usted el Internet? [Leer alternativas] (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS [No leer] (98) NR [No leer]</p>	
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<p>Por propósitos estadísticos, ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre la política y el país tiene la gente...</p>	
<p>G10. ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos, o el Internet? [Leer opciones]: (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>G11. ¿Cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? [NO LEER: Barack Obama, aceptar Obama] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No responde</p>	
<p>G13. ¿Cuántos departamentos tiene Guatemala? [NO LEER: 22] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No Responde</p>	
<p>G14. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Guatemala? [NO LEER: 4 años] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No Responde</p>	

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

R1. Televisor	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R3. Refrigeradora	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R4. Teléfono convencional /fijo (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R5. Vehículo. ¿Cuántos?	(0) No (1) Uno (2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R7. Microondas	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	

R15. Computadora	(0) No	(1) Sí
R16. Televisor de pantalla plana	(0) No	(1) Sí
R18. Servicio de internet	(0) No	(1) Sí

OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Trabajando? **[Siga]**

(2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? **[Siga]**

(3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**

(4) Es estudiante? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**

(5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**

(6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**

(7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**

(88) NS **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**

(98) NR **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**

OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Asalariado del gobierno o empresa estatal?

(2) Asalariado en el sector privado?

(3) Patrono o socio de empresa?

(4) Trabajador por cuenta propia?

(5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago?

(88) NS

(98) NR

(99) INAP

OCUP1. ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realiza? **(Probar: ¿En qué consiste su trabajo?) [No leer alternativas]**

(1) Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.)

(2) Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor)

(3) Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.)

(4) Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.)

(5) Funcionario del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública)

(6) Oficinista (secretaria, operador de máquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.)

(7) Comerciante (vendedor ambulante, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.)

(8) Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados

(9) Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxistas, etc.)

(10) Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra)

(11) Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros)

(12) Artesano

(13) Servicio doméstico

(14) Obrero

(15) Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.)

(88) NS

(98) NR

(99) INAP

<p>OCUP1B1. ¿Ha perdido usted su trabajo en los últimos dos años? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Sí, usted perdió su trabajo pero ha encontrado uno nuevo. (2) Sí, usted perdió su trabajo y no ha encontrado uno nuevo. (3) No, no perdió su trabajo (4) Por decisión propia o incapacidad no ha tenido trabajo (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>OCUP1B2. ¿Además de usted, alguien que vive en este hogar ha perdido su trabajo en los últimos dos años?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98)NR</p>	

<p>OCUP1ANC. ¿Cuál era la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realizaba el jefe de su hogar cuando usted tenía 15 años? [No leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.) (2) Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor) (3) Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.) (4) Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.) (5) Funcionario del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública) (6) Oficinista (secretaria, operador de máquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.) (7) Comerciante (vendedor ambulante, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.) (8) Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados (9) Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxistas, etc.) (10) Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra) (11) Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros) (12) Artesano (13) Servicio doméstico (14) Obrero (15) Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.) (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
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<p>PEN1. ¿Se encuentra usted afiliado a un sistema de pensiones [o jubilación]?</p> <p>(1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a SAL1] (88) NS [Pase a SAL1] (98) NR [Pase a SAL1]</p>	
<p>PEN3. ¿A qué sistema de pensiones o jubilación está usted afiliado? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Jubilación por una institución o empresa privada (2) Jubilación como trabajador del Estado (3) Jubilación del seguro social (7) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	

<p>PEN4. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, usted contribuyó a su fondo de jubilación/pensión? [Leer alternativas]:</p> <p>(1) Todos los meses (2) Por lo menos una o dos veces al año, o (3) No contribuyó (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
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[Preguntar a todos]

<p>SAL1. Tiene usted seguro médico? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Finalizar] (88) NS [Finalizar] (98) NR [Finalizar]</p>	
<p>SAL2. Es su seguro médico... [Leer opciones] (1) Del gobierno, parte del seguro social (IGSS) (2) De otro plan del Estado (3) Es un plan privado [No leer]: (4) Tiene ambos, del gobierno y un plan privado (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no tiene seguro médico)</p>	
<p>SAL4. ¿En su plan de seguro médico médico(a), es usted titular o beneficiario? (1) Titular (2) Beneficiario (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap</p>	


Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

<p>COLORR. [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al color de piel de la cara del entrevistado] _____ (97) No se pudo clasificar [Marcar (97) únicamente, si por alguna razón, no se pudo ver la cara de la persona entrevistada]</p>	<input type="text" value=""/>
<p>Hora en la cual terminó la entrevista _____ : _____</p>	<input type="text" value=""/>
<p>TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____</p>	
<p>INTID. Número de identificación del entrevistador: _____</p>	<input type="text" value=""/>
<p>SEXI. Anotar el sexo suyo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer</p>	
<p>COLORI. Usando la Paleta de Colores, anote el color de piel suyo _____</p>	<input type="text" value=""/>

<p>Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada. Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ / ____</p> <p>Firma del supervisor de campo _____</p> <p>Comentarios: _____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>[No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____</p> <p>[No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____</p>

TARJETA "A"


¿En qué escalón [grada] de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos?




TARJETA "B"

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Izquierda					Derecha				


TARJETA "C"



TARJETA "D"



TARJETA "E"



TARJETA “F”

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) de 0 a 1000 quetzales
- (02) de 1001 a 1500 quetzales
- (03) de 1501 a 2000 quetzales
- (04) de 2001 a 2500 quetzales
- (05) de 2501 a 3300 quetzales
- (06) de 3301 a 4000 quetzales
- (07) de 4001 a 5000 quetzales
- (08) de 5001 a 6600 quetzales
- (09) de 6601 a 9500 quetzales
- (10) más de 9500 quetzales