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Political Culture of Democracy in Suriname and in the Americas, 2012: Towards Equality of Opportunity

Jack K. Menke, Ph.D.
Anton de Kom University of Suriname,
Leysweg, Paramaribo

J. Marten W. Schalkwijk, Ph.D.
Anton de Kom University of Suriname,
Leysweg, Paramaribo

Jaïr R.V. Schalkwijk, Msc.
Anton de Kom University of Suriname,
Leysweg, Paramaribo

Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D.
Scientific Coordinator and Series Editor
Vanderbilt University



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By:

Prof. Dr. Jack Menke
Anton de Kom University of Suriname

Prof. Dr. Marten Schalkwijk
Anton de Kom University of Suriname

Jaïr Schalkwijk Msc.
Anton de Kom University of Suriname

Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D.
Scientific Coordinator and Series Editor
Vanderbilt University



VANDERBILT  UNIVERSITY



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Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While the surveys' primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, they also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID and the new evaluation policy put in place by USAID in 2011. The *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and international assistance agencies to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

The *AmericasBarometer* builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country by training local researchers and their students. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University, what we call “LAPOP Central,” first develops a core questionnaire after careful consultation with our country team partners, USAID and other donors. It then sends that draft instrument to its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument. An extensive process of pretesting then goes on in many countries until a near final questionnaire is settled upon. At this point it is then distributed to our country partners for addition of modules of country-specific questions that are of special interest to the team and/or USAID and other donors. Final pretesting of each country questionnaire then proceeds, followed by training conducted by the faculty and staff of LAPOP Central as well as our country partners. In countries with important components of the population who do not speak the majoritarian language, translation into those languages is carried out, and different versions of the questionnaire are prepared. Only at that point do the local interview teams conduct house-to-house surveys following the exacting requirements of the sample design common to all countries. Interviewers in many countries enter the replies directly into smartphones in order to make the process less error-prone, avoiding skipped questions or illegible responses. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt's team reviews it for accuracy. Meanwhile, Vanderbilt researchers also devise the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer's* largest supporter, Vanderbilt University's College of Arts and Sciences and the Tinker Foundation provide important ongoing support. In addition, in this round the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the World Bank, the Swedish Embassy of Bolivia, the Brazilian Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq), Duke University, Algonquin College, Florida International University, the University of Miami, and Princeton University supported the surveys as well. Thanks to this unusually broad and generous support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson's and Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister's leadership of *AmericasBarometer*. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Vanessa Reilly
LAC/RSD/Democracy and Human Rights
Bureau for Latin America & the Caribbean
U.S. Agency for International Development



Prologue: Background to the Study

Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D.
Centennial Professor of Political Science, Professor of Sociology
and Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project,
and
Elizabeth Zechmeister, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science
and Associate Director of LAPOP,
Vanderbilt University

We are delighted to present the results of the fifth round of the AmericasBarometer, the flagship survey effort of Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). This round, we tackle a fundamental social, political, and ethical problem in the Americas: the tremendous gaps in opportunities experienced and resources available to the region's citizens. While these disparities are certainly visible in differences in economic development *across* countries, we focus here on inequalities *within* the countries of the Americas. We ask questions such as: to what extent are social and political opportunities and resources distributed equitably across social groups as defined by gender, race, and class? Moreover, to what extent do the citizens of the Americas hold discriminatory attitudes towards the political and economic participation of historically marginalized groups? And, to what extent do they endorse commonly proposed policies to remedy these inequalities? Finally, how do citizens' varying opportunities and resources affect their attachment to and engagement with their political systems?

LAPOP, founded over two decades ago, is hosted (and generously supported) by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The AmericasBarometer is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, 24 countries throughout the Americas were included. Finally, in 2010 the number of countries increased to 26. As in 2010, this round incorporates every independent country in mainland North, Central and South America, and many countries in the Caribbean. The 2012 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer constitute the largest surveys of democratic values ever undertaken in the Americas.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided the principal funding for carrying out these studies, with generous ongoing funding also provided by Vanderbilt University and the Tinker Foundation. Other donors in 2012 are the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the World Bank; the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia; the Brazilian Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq); and Duke University. Florida International University, the University of Miami, Algonquin College and Princeton University supported the research effort in many important ways as well.

Our selection of the theme of equality of opportunity and marginalization draws on many discussions with our partners at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), including Eric Kite and Vanessa Reilly as well as many Democracy and Governance officers in USAID Missions in the Americas. Our concerns with equality of opportunity also derive from our findings based on our last round of surveys. In 2010 we investigated the social and political impacts of the economic crisis that was at that point shaking the region. As described in our *Insights* report Number 76, we found that while in many countries the crisis was only moderate, it disproportionately affected certain groups of citizens, including those with lower household wealth, darker-skinned citizens, and women (see Special Report Box 1). These findings convinced us of the need to explore equality of opportunity and marginalization in greater depth in the current round.

While the data we report here were collected in the first months of 2012, this report represents the culmination of two years of work on the part of thousands of individuals and a large number of institutions and organizations across 26 countries of the Americas. Preparations for the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer began in the last quarter of 2010, as we were finishing analysis and reporting from the 2010 round, and continued full-swing throughout 2011. In the first semester of 2011 we invited a number of leading scholars who study issues related to equality of opportunity in Latin America and the Caribbean to visit and consult with us in Nashville. We asked them to tell us: What are the most important questions needed to be included in the survey? We thank Lisa Baldez of Dartmouth University, Jana Morgan of the University of Tennessee-Knoxville, Leslie Schwindt-Bayer of the University of Missouri, and Michelle Taylor-Robinson of Texas A&M University for very insightful contributions during this period. We also received important input from Edward L. Telles of Princeton University throughout the period of planning for the AmericasBarometer. As we listened to scholars who had dedicated their careers to studying equality of opportunity in the region, we drafted new survey questions, turning their concerns into a format enabling us to gather comparable, reliable, accurate data from citizens across the Americas.

The process of designing the survey involved three phases of development and pretesting, spanning a year. It was a very participatory process, involving thousands of hours of work by countless individuals. Between February and September 2011, our highly skilled fieldwork personnel, María Fernanda Boidi and Patricia Zárate, led the first phase of pretests in Uruguay and Peru, focused on developing new questions. We also received important feedback from Abby Córdova, Daniel Montalvo, and Daniel Moreno, who conducted pretests in El Salvador, Ecuador, and Bolivia. As they reported which questions were well understood, which ones needed minor tweaking, and which ones were entirely unworkable, we began to develop a core group of questions that would examine the many facets of equality of opportunity and marginalization across the Americas. We became excruciatingly detail-oriented, picking apart sentences and axing ambiguous turns of phrases to develop questions that came as close as possible to meaning the same thing to all respondents, everywhere.

At the same time, we selected the set of questions asked in 2010 and prior rounds that we would repeat in 2012. Repeating a core series of questions enables us to maintain a time series spanning a decade or more (e.g., the time series for some Central American countries dates back to the early 1990s), portraying democratic attitudes and personal experiences of citizens across the Americas. We vetted this “reduced core” with our academic partners from across the Americas, as well as with officers and staff from USAID missions throughout the region and our International Advisory Board. Based on this feedback, we reinstated some questions, while ultimately deciding to drop others.

By early October 2011, following a long series of internal meetings debating each proposed survey item, we had developed a first draft of the complete survey. This draft included both new questions and ones used in prior waves. We sent this draft out to USAID missions and our academic partners in each country, soliciting broad feedback. Our 2012 AmericasBarometer Startup Conference, held in Miami, hosted by the University of Miami and Florida International University at the end of October, enabled us to hear directly from this large team of USAID officers and academic partners; following the Startup, we made 1,016 changes to the core questionnaire over the next three months.

The 2012 Startup Meeting provided an important opportunity to bring the large team together to agree on common goals and procedures over the coming year. Dr. Fernanda Boidi, who heads our office in Montevideo, Uruguay and Dr. Amy Erica Smith of LAPOP Central planned the event. To kick off the meeting, for the first time we held a public conference for the Miami policymaking and academic communities. The “Marginalization in the Americas Conference” was made possible by the extensive collaboration we received from the Miami Consortium, a partnership of the University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies and Florida International University’s Latin American and Caribbean Center, and was generously hosted by the U of M. Presentations focused on our 2012 theme, publicizing findings from the 2010 round of surveys that were relevant for the topic of equality of opportunity and marginalization in the Americas. We are especially grateful to Ms. Rubí Arana, who heads up our Miami Office at the University of Miami, who handled all local arrangements for both the Marginalization Conference and the AmericasBarometer Startup Conference.

In November, 2011 a second phase of survey development and pretesting began: creation of the specific questionnaire to be administered in each of the 26 countries. We first adapted questionnaires to local conditions. For instance, we customized the names of national legislative bodies, inserted the names of presidents, and adjusted the terms used in Spanish to refer to bribery. Second, we added in new, country-specific questions developed by the respective USAID missions and academic team members in each country. We then rigorously pretested each country-specific questionnaire, further seeking to ensure that both the core and new questions were understandable in local contexts and idioms.

The third phase of questionnaire development and pretesting involved adapting paper questionnaires for use with smartphones. Surveys are administered in many countries using smartphones, rather than traditional paper-based questionnaires. Our partner Jeisson Hidalgo Céspedes and the Universidad de Costa Rica developed and enhanced the EQCollector program for the Windows Mobile Platform, and formatted it for use in the 2012 round of surveys. In Bolivia, Daniel Moreno worked with a team of computer engineers to design an alternative questionnaire delivery software program using the Android platform. That platform is our most sophisticated to date and the one we plan to use widely for the next round of surveys. In 2012, 16 countries were able to use smartphones. These devices streamline data entry, prevent skipped questions, and thus enabled us to maximize quality and minimize error in survey data.

Another benefit of the smartphones is that we can switch languages, even in mid-question, in countries using multi-lingual questionnaires. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean, the United States, and Canada; as well as a French version in Canada, French Creole in Haiti and Portuguese in Brazil. In Suriname we developed versions in Dutch and SrananTongo. In the end, we

had versions in 13 different languages. All of those questionnaires are posted on the www.americasbarometer.org web site and can be consulted there. They also appear in the appendixes for each country study.

Finally, field work commenced in January of this year, and was concluded in the last countries by early May. We heard from over 41,000 citizens of the Americas, from northern Canada to Chilean Patagonia, from Mexico City to the rural Andean highlands. In 24 of the 26 countries, the questionnaire was administered in face-to-face survey interviews in respondents' homes; only in the US and Canada was the survey administered via a web interface because of the unacceptably high cost of in-person interviews in those two countries. This was the same procedure followed in 2010. These citizens contributed to the project by sharing with us their attitudes towards their political systems and governments, as well as such experiences as victimization by crime and corruption among other things.

A common sample design has been crucial for the success of this comparative effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probability sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals per country. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication. For 2012 we altered the samples somewhat, continuing with our past practice of stratifying each country into regions. Now, however, the municipality is the primary sampling unit, and is selected in probability proportional to size (PPS), with each municipality having a standard size within a given country. The only exceptions are the large cities, which we might have subdivided into sectors, each with its own set of interviews. Capital cities were all self-selected, as were other major cities.

Another important feature of the 2012 surveys is our objective measure of skin color. Following a successful partnership in our 2010 round, Professor Edward Telles, Director of the Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America at Princeton University, again sponsored the use of color palettes in 24 countries of the Americas. These palettes, described in the *AmericasBarometer Insights Report No. 73*, enable the interviewer to rate the skin color of the interviewee on an 11 point scale, where 1 is the lightest skin tone and 11 the darkest. In this report, we use the resulting ratings to examine how skin tone is associated with equality of opportunity and marginalization across the Americas.

LAPOP surveys utilize a common "informed consent" form, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and then took and passed the certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the appendix of each study.

When data collection was completed in each country, we underwent a rigorous process of data entry and verification to minimize error in the data. These procedures, following internationally recognized best practices, give us greater faith in the validity of the analytical insights drawn from the data. First, we utilized a common coding scheme for all questions. Second, we instituted rigorous screening to minimize data entry error in countries using paper questionnaires. All data entry occurred in the respective countries, and was verified (i.e., double entered), except when smartphones were used, in which case the data had already been entered within the respondent's household. When LAPOP received each file, we selected a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers and

requested that the team ship those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing. If a significant number of errors were encountered, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file. Each team also received a data set composed of the 2012 survey as well as all prior AmericasBarometer surveys for their country, so that longitudinal comparisons could be made.

Thus began a new phase of the project. In the third and fourth quarters of 2012, we began to produce a large number of country and other reports. LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layperson, meaning that we make heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agree on the importance of multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader can be assured that the individual variables in the graphs are (or are not) indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also developed a common graphical format, based on programs for STATA 10/12. These programs generate graphs which present confidence intervals taking into account the “design effect” of the sample.¹ Both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study take into account the design effect of the sample. This approach represents a major advancement in the presentation of our survey results, allowing a higher level of certainty regarding whether patterns found are statistically significant.²

Finally, as of December 1, 2012 we have made the raw data files available to the public. We are delighted that for the first time in 2012 and forward, the country-specific data files will be available for download from the LAPOP website for users worldwide, without cost. At the same time, following a recent change in LAPOP policy, we continue to make available to institutional and individual subscribers a merged 26-country database, as well as technical support from the LAPOP team.

What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of a massive team of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 41,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in the Americas.


The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the project.


¹ The design effect results from the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then affect confidence intervals. While the use of stratification tends to decrease standard errors, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys and not assume, as is generally done in public opinion studies, that the data had been collected using simple random samples.

² All AmericasBarometer samples are self-weighted except for Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Bolivia, Chile, Haiti, Trinidad & Tobago, the United States, and Canada. Users of the data file will find a variable called “WT” which weights each country file. In the case of the self-weighted files, each respondent’s weight is equal to 1. The files also contain a variable called “WEIGHT1500” that weights each country file to a sample size of 1,500 so that all countries count as having the same sample size in comparative analysis.

Country	Institutions	
Mexico and Central America		
Costa Rica		 
El Salvador		
Guatemala		
Honduras		
Mexico		 <p>INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO AUTÓNOMO DE MÉXICO</p>
Nicaragua		
Panama		



Caribbean	
Belize	
Dominican Republic	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around; align-items: center;"> <div style="text-align: center;">  <p><i>Galaxy República Dominicana, S.A.</i></p> </div> <div style="text-align: center;">  </div> </div>
Guyana	
Haiti	
Jamaica	 <p>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA</p>
Suriname	 <p>Foundation for Information and Development</p>
Trinidad & Tobago	

Andean/Southern Cone		
Argentina		CIPPEC ^{FP}
Bolivia		 EMBAJADA DE SUECIA
Brazil	 Universidade de Brasilia	
Chile		
Colombia		
Ecuador	 FLACSO ECUADOR	 UNIVERSIDAD SAN FRANCISCO DE QUITO
Paraguay		
Peru	<i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i>	
Uruguay		
Venezuela		



Canada and United States			
Canada	 UNIVERSITÉ LAV AL	 YORK UNIVERSITÉ UNIVERSITY redefine THE POSSIBLE.	 THE ENVIRONICS INSTITUTE
United States	VANDERBILT  UNIVERSITY	 MIAMI CONSORTIUM FOR LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STUDIES	 PERLA Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America Proyecto sobre Etnicidad y Raza en América Latina



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Many academic institutions also contributed to this project. Important support and guidance came from the China Research Center at Duke University; thanks go especially to John Aldrich, Liu Kang, and Alexandra Cooper. We also thank Florida International University and the United States Naval Postgraduate School, for their important contributions to the study, as well Lucio Renno at the University of Brasília, who provided generous support from his Brazilian CNPq grant to expand the Brazil survey. Professor Ed Telles at Princeton continued a partnership formed in 2010, sponsoring the inclusion of palettes for coding skin color again in the 2012 round of surveys. We are very grateful to the Miami Consortium, a partnership of the University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies and Florida International University's Latin American and Caribbean Center, for hosting the October 2011 Miami conference on Marginalization in the Americas. Thanks especially to Professors Ariel Armony from the University of Miami and Cristina Eguizábal from Florida International University for their sponsorship, as well as to Jordan Adams and Israel Alonso at the University of Miami for highly competent logistical support.

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At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration, and hard work of many individuals. The College of Arts & Sciences provided critical support. John Geer, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt, has provided unwavering support and leadership. Professors Jon Hiskey, ZeynepSomer-Topcu, and Efrén Pérez of the Department of Political Science made many helpful suggestions as the research effort proceeded. Tonya Mills, LAPOP Grants Administrator, was the financial backbone of the project, handling the extraordinarily complex financial details involving countless contract and consulting agreements. Patrick D. Green, Executive Assistant Director, Office of Contract and Research Administration,

performed heroically in managing the countless contract details of the project. Attorney Jeffrey K. Newman, Associate Director, Contract Management of the Office of Contract and Research Administration, navigated the complex legal issues involved in contracts spanning the hemisphere. Attorney Dahlia M. French, Director of the Vanderbilt International Services and International Tax handled numerous visa and tax issues for us.

Fernanda Boidi served as director of field work operations, managing and tracking progress across 26 countries simultaneously with an incredibly elaborate system of spreadsheets. She also oversaw pretesting and training, and with great equanimity acted as a liaison between country team members, USAID missions, and LAPOP. Amy Erica Smith took a lead role in many aspects of the 2012 round: developing the questionnaire, planning and coordinating the Startup Conference, working with Fernanda to oversee survey operations, and developing the template for the country and regional reports. Rubí Arana took charge of the complex task of synchronization of the many versions of each country questionnaire and our common core. Without her careful eye, we would have missed many minor but critical errors in the translations and country customization process. And as in previous rounds, Abby Córdova provided important feedback on many issues of questionnaire design; her insights will be much missed at LAPOP. Hugo Salgado provided enthusiastic and highly competent assistance with many technical aspects of the project, and also assisted with pretesting and training in several countries. Georgina Pizzolitto likewise conducted training and pretesting in a number of countries, and provided important feedback and help in some areas of questionnaire development.

Our computer Guru, Professor Adrian Lauf, has provided the overall computer infrastructure in which we work. He built our online data library system by which users worldwide can download our data set, and also constructed the data uploader by which teams exporting enormous data files could do so with ease. He also was our consultant on the new Android platform of smartphones, and fixed up our desktop computers when things went wrong.

Finally, we want to name all of the Ph.D. students at Vanderbilt who did so much to make this round the best ever: Marco Araujo (Brazil), Frederico Batista Pereira (Brazil), Mollie Cohen (USA), Margarita Corral (Spain), Ted Enamorado (Honduras), Arturo Maldonado (Peru), Alejandro Díaz-Domínguez (Mexico), Brian Faughnan (USA), Jordyn Haught (USA), Matt Layton (USA), Whitney Lopez-Hardin (USA), Trevor Lyons (USA), Mason Moseley (USA), Juan Camilo Plata (Colombia), Mariana Rodríguez (Venezuela), Guilherme (Gui) Russo (Brazil), and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga (Mexico). The template for this report is the product of a team of graduate students coordinated by Amy Erica Smith, and with substantial editing by Professors Seligson and Zechmeister as well as Dr. Smith. The graduate student authors and data analysts are Frederico Batista Pereira, Mollie Cohen, Arturo Maldonado, Mason Moseley, Juan Camilo Plata, Mariana Rodríguez, and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga. Mollie Cohen wrote all Special Report Boxes with the exception of Box 1.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and institutional affiliations are listed below.

Country/ Institution	Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted)
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA - LAPOP Central	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science ●Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Associate Director of LAPOP, and Associate Professor of Political Science ●Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson, Professor of Spanish Linguistics, Department of Spanish and Portuguese ●Dr. María Fernanda Boidi, Program Coordinator for Field Operations, LAPOP, Uruguay ●Dr. Amy Erica Smith, formerly Research Coordinator of LAPOP and currently Assistant Professor, Iowa State University
Mexico and Central America Group	
Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Pablo Parás García, President of DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados ●Dr. Vidal Romero, Professor of Political Science, Instituto Tecnológico de México (ITAM)
Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Senior Associate at ASIES in Guatemala and Associate Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University, USA ●Sample design and coordination of field survey: Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES
El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Miguel Cruz, Visiting Assistant Professor, Florida International University, USA ●Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Executive Director of FUNDAUNGO
Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. John Booth, Emeritus Regents Professor of Political Science, University of North Texas, USA
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-Director of the Estado de la Nación Project, Costa Rica ● Ronald Álfaro Redondo, Doctoral Student, University of Pittsburgh, and Researcher, Universidad de Costa Rica, Estado de la Nación Project
Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA
Belize	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Georgina Pizzolitto, Coordinator of Special Studies, LAPOP Central
Caribbean Group	
Dominican Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jana Morgan Kelly, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee, USA ●Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology, Temple University, USA
Guyana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Everette Cleveland Marciano Glasgow, Development Policy and Management Consultants ●Mark Bynoe, Director, Development Policy and Management Consultants
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Amy Erica Smith, Formerly, Research Coordinator of LAPOP and Currently, Assistant Professor, Iowa State University, USA ●Dr. François Gélinau, Associate Professor of Political Science, Université Laval
Jamaica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Balford Alexander Lewis, University of Technology, Jamaica and Centre for Leadership and Governance, Department of Government, Faculty of Social Sciences, UWI, Mona
Suriname	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jack Menke, Professor of Social Sciences, University of Suriname
Trinidad & Tobago	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Marlon Anatol, Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine
Andean/Southern Cone Group	
Colombia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Associate Professor of Political Science, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia ●Dr. Miguel García, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia
Ecuador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Juan Carlos Donoso, Assistant Professor, Universidad de San Francisco de Quito ●Dr. Daniel Montalvo, Assistant Professor, Universidad de San Francisco de Quito
Peru	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Julio Carrión, Associate Professor at the University of Delaware, USA, and Researcher at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima ● Patricia Zárate Ardela, Researcher, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima
Bolivia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Daniel Moreno, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública, Cochabamba ●Vivian Schwarz, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública, Cochabamba and Doctoral Candidate, Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University
Paraguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Manuel Orrego, CIRD ● Álvaro Caballero, CIRD

Country/ Institution	Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted)
Chile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Juan Pablo Luna, Associate Professor of Political Science, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica
Uruguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. María Fernanda Boidi, Program Coordinator for Field Operations, LAPOP ●Dr. María del Rosario Queirolo, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Universidad de Montevideo
Brazil	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Lucio Renno, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Brasília ●Dr. Mathieu Tourgeon, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Brasília
Argentina	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Germán Lodola, Assistant Professor, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
Venezuela	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Damarys Canache, CISOR Venezuela and Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois, USA
North America Group	
United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University ●Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Associate Director of LAPOP and Associate Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University ●Dr. Amy Erica Smith, formerly Research Coordinator of LAPOP and currently Assistant Professor of Political Science, Iowa State University
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Nat Stone, Professor, Marketing and Business Intelligence Research Program, School of Business, Algonquin College ●Dr. Simone Bohn, Associate Professor of Political Science, York University ●Dr. François Gélinau, Associate Professor of Political Science, Université Laval ●Dr. Keith Neuman, The Environics Institute

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 41,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
Summer 2012

Executive Summary

Suriname with a small population of 534,189 in 2012 is ethnically one of the most diverse societies in the Americas and the Caribbean. The country consists of many ethnic groups and tribal people who to a large extent maintained their original linguistic and cultural heritage. It is important to note that the various ethnic and tribal groups are all minorities. The largest groups are East Indian (29%), Creole (19%), Maroon (16%), Javanese (15%), and the Amerindian (4%). There is also a large group of mixed origin (13%) and smaller groups such as the Chinese, Syrian, Lebanese and Whites. The LAPOP survey sample did not match the census data of ethnicity, as there is an overrepresentation of tribal people: Amerindian (10%) and Maroon (20%), which resulted into smaller percentages of the other ethnic groups.

The diversity of Suriname becomes more complex if we add in religion. People of the three major world religions contribute with substantive percentages to the religious diversity: Christian (49%), Hindu (23%) and Islam (16%). Furthermore there are various tribal, Afro-American/ native religions (winti) and other religions such as Javanism. This is quite different from the overall picture in the Americas and the Caribbean: AmericasBarometer 2012 registered only 2.2% Non-Christian Eastern Religions, against a vast majority of 85% Christians, 9.8% with no religion and 1.5% agnostics/atheists. Like the ethnic and tribal groups, the principal religious groups of Christian, Hindu and Islam are all minorities. There is a strong correlation between ethnicity and religious affiliation.

Compared with most countries in the Americas, ethnicity is in Suriname relatively more important than skin color. Ethnicity became important in official social constructions in the post-World War II decolonization process of this country, and replaced the concept of ‘race’ since the 1964 census. In political and social life a tradition evolved to negotiate differences between ethnic, religious and other (cultural) groups, while the related cross-boundary communication contributed to the relative peaceful inter-ethnic relations in Suriname.

The ‘Plural Society’ concept was introduced by Furnivall in the late 1930s to describe South East Asian multi-ethnic societies. This concept was applied to the Dutch colony of Suriname in 1949 by the Surinamese sociologist Rudolf van Lier. In that period the generally accepted view was that cultural segments in plural societies do not share a single set of basic institutions - such as religion, kinship, education and economy – and live side by side with a common governmental system. It should be noticed that since its introduction the validity of the ‘Plural Society’ concept has been questioned by various scholars. It is important to note that class-based approaches have also been applied to analyze the Surinamese society, as well as approaches based on an integrated ‘class and ethnicity’ framework. Despite attempts towards an integrated ‘class and ethnicity’ approach, many studies of multi-ethnic societies are still inclined to perceive class and ethnicity or class and race as a dichotomy.

Since Suriname was described as a ‘Plural Society’ in the late 1940s, it has evolved today into a society with a much greater complexity. In addition to ethnicity, religion and culture, other dimensions – such as class, gender, region, equity and immigration - are important factors that must be considered in order to understand the social, political and economic dynamics. One should realize that most but not all of these factors are included in the current study. Whenever the plural society is mentioned in the current analysis the concept is used more in the statistical meaning to indicate diversity in terms of ethnicity, religion and culture.

Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities

Inequality is a major issue in Suriname that is largely influenced by differences between urban, rural and interior regions, rather than gender and skin color as in other countries in the region. While in many countries of the Americas inequality improved, in Suriname it has become worse. A major predictor of inequality is the place of residence that strongly influences personal income and educational level. In perceived discrimination skin color to some extent does play a role and it has a negative impact on the educational level as well. Being older with a darker skin color has a negative impact on educational status in Suriname, while gender does not play a major role. Like in most countries of the Americas men in Suriname have a more favorable position than women. As the place of residence (urban-rural status) has an even stronger effect than skin color, affirmative action is considered appropriate in this country. Food insecurity is no major issue in Suriname. However, the public assistance received is among the highest in the Americas, which is primarily due to the paternalism in the Surinamese politics.

Equality of Political Participation

While inequality in the Americas has been reduced over the past decades critical aspects of political participation remained unequal. In terms of voting behavior there are no significant gender gaps in Suriname. We also found the attitudes towards women in terms of political participation to be favorable. However this did not affect the dominant positions of men in political leadership positions in Suriname. In terms of people that actively campaign for political parties Suriname ranks in the top of countries in the Americas, which can be partly explained by the paternalistic character of the Surinamese society. Community participation in Suriname is lower, than in most other countries in the Americas. Generally there is not much discrimination, while attitudes towards marginalized and other disadvantaged groups are generally positive.

Political Legitimacy and Engagement

There are interesting differences between Suriname and other countries of the Americas in the way unequal opportunities and discrimination affect political legitimacy and engagement. Internal and external political efficacy in Suriname seems to be very high compared to most other countries in the region. This is primarily due to the fact that people who are highly interested in politics have higher levels of political efficacy. Women seem to have lower levels of political efficacy than men. Discrimination is not a major issue in Suriname, and does not have a large impact on political legitimacy and engagement. Interestingly we found that the older generation supports democracy more than the younger generation. This is partly explained by the views of the older generation that experienced the military regime of the 1980s, which was another form of government, while the younger generation did not. Finally Suriname recently did not have much political protest, and with 3.8% its percentage is very low compared to most countries in the Americas.

Corruption, Crime, and Democracy

In Suriname crime, democracy and perceptions of corruption are among the lowest in the Americas. Despite a significant decrease of perceptions of corruption in the past years, personal experiences of corruption did not reduce. At the policy level, the government of Suriname did not take action in recent years to tackle corruption. Consequently, while perceptions of corruption are relatively

low in Suriname, the levels of corruption did not decrease. There is a decline of perceptions related to insecurity and crime victimization, which corresponds with government policies and crime statistics that show a decline. The overall conclusion is that rural districts are much safer than urban areas, both statistically and according to perceptions of people.

Victims of corruption give less support to the political system than those who have not been victims. The same is true for people who experienced more insecurity, and as a consequence are most dissatisfied with the political system. Education appears to be the strongest determinant for supporting the rule of law. There is evidence that higher educated persons support the rule of law less often than the less educated. The threat hypothesis, stating that those who perceive higher levels of insecurity are more likely to accept transgressions of the rule of law, is also supported by the findings of Suriname.

Political Legitimacy and Tolerance

The support for democracy in Suriname is not only high, but at the same time there are also strong stable democratic attitudes and institutions in the country. As regards support for the political system, this country scores very high if compared with other countries in the Americas. The political tolerance scores for Suriname are slightly higher than the average for all countries in this region. Given the fact that the system support, the political tolerance and trust in institutions are high, Suriname can be considered a stable democracy.

Local Government

Previous research indicated a very low participation in local government in Suriname. However, the AmericasBarometer study shows a quite high participation compared to other countries in the America's. In 2010 demands and requests on local government were higher than in 2012. It seems that citizens who do attend local government meetings are much more likely to make demands and requests towards local government than those who don't. Citizens that go economically through hard times also make more demands/requests towards local government than more citizens who are better off. Satisfaction with local services has a significant positive impact on support for the political system. According to the perceptions of the respondents local services are evaluated less in Suriname than the other countries of America.

Ethnicity, Class and Gender

Since ethnicity rather than skin color is more relevant in the social, political and economic spheres in Suriname, analysis of social cleavages based on skin color is less useful. This is clear, for instance, by comparing the relationship between skin color and education with the relationship between ethnicity and education. There seems to be no significant difference in years of education for Suriname when related to skin color. However, analysis of ethnicity and education shows major differences. It is illustrative that the two most disadvantaged groups, the Amerindian and the Maroon who differ strongly in skin color, have significantly less years of schooling compared to the other ethnic groups. Thus we may conclude that when using the LAPOP color palettes, the dynamics of Suriname that relate more to ethnicity - such as inequality - do not fully become visible.

Ethnicity is still manifest in Surinamese politics, particularly in the complex processes of the emancipation of ethnic groups. Though ethnicity is also still important in terms of party affiliation,

there is a gradual breakdown of this cleavage due to the rise of a few multiethnic parties. To some extent there is a relationship between discrimination and ethnic background, but most of these relationships often vary for the different forms of discrimination. The Maroon group stands out with respect to experienced discrimination, particularly in public offices. Generally women do not feel more discriminated than men. A significant gender difference relates to men who feel more discriminated against in public spaces. Gender differences are evident in education, where more women than men are studying, As regards the labor market more women are unemployed and more are care takers as well. Suriname is one of the 13 countries that registered a significant gender difference in the labor market of the economic active population. Unemployment in Suriname is slightly below the average of other countries in the Americas.

Electoral participation

The assumed relationship between region (place of residence) and electoral participation (voter turnout) did not yield statistical significance. Further analysis was done between electoral participation as a dependent variable and the independent variables ethnicity, identification with a political party, and age. Three of the six analyzed ethnic groups had statistically a significant higher electoral participation, i.e. Javanese, East Indian and Indigenous voters. When controlling for region (urban-rural-interior) the relationship between ethnicity is stronger for urban and rural regions. Political experience measured by age is another important determinant of electoral participation. The youngest voters have a very low voter turnout if compared with the older age groups. This supports the findings by Carreras and Castaneda-Angarita¹ who point at the influence of political experience measured by age of the voter, indicating that older voters are more likely to vote than younger ones. Compared with the urban and interior regions, rural areas have an overall higher electoral participation and also the highest percentage of voters in the 44+ age group. Finally, there is no overall relationship between education and electoral participation. However, in urban Paramaribo voters with a low educational status are less likely to participate in elections than those with a higher educational status.

Changing society

Suriname is in the process of a changing society. Amidst of a continued economic growth and changing demographic and political landscapes, the country seems to become a more trusting society. A comparison of Suriname with other countries in the Americas, shows that it ranks above average for many key institutions. More remarkable, Suriname ranks highest on support for the political system, trust in the justice system, trust in the electoral commission and trust in the Supreme Court.

In Suriname the highest ranking Catholic Church is closely followed by the Protestant Church, with Islamic and Hindu religious institutions following at a large distance, which is explained by the demographic weight of larger numbers and relative weights of Christians in the sample. The Surinamese society is often praised for the mutual religious respect between the different faiths, which is reflected in the relatively high positive rates of the different religious groups for another's religion.

¹Carreras Miguel and Castaneda-Angarita, Nestor. 2012. "Voters Resources and Electoral participation in Latin America". *Em Debate*, Belo Horizonte, Volume 4, no 3, p. 11-24, June 2012.



When focusing on major problems of the Surinamese people ‘Housing’ is perceived as the most serious problem, which contrasts with the ranking of most countries in de America’s. The geographical distribution between urban, district and hinterland indicates that housing is the most important issue for urban people, followed by high prices and crime. These three issues are also the main priorities in rural areas.

Some interesting changes in the Surinamese society become visible with respect to values within households. Traditional values such as discipline and obedience in the upbringing of children are gradually making room for values like creativity and autonomy, which becomes visible when the level of education increases.



Understanding Figures in this Study

AmericasBarometer data are based on a sample of respondents drawn from each country; naturally, all samples produce results that contain a margin of error. It is important for the reader to understand that each *data point* (for example, a country's average confidence in political parties) has a *confidence interval*, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. Most graphs in this study show a 95% confidence interval that takes into account the fact that our samples are “complex” (i.e., *stratified* and *clustered*). In bar charts this confidence interval appears as a grey block, while in figures presenting the results of regression models it appears as a horizontal bracket. The dot in the center of a confidence interval depicts the estimated mean (in bar charts) or coefficient (in regression charts).

The numbers next to each bar in the bar charts represent the values of the dots. When two estimated points have confidence intervals that overlap, the difference between the two values is not statistically significant and the reader should ignore it.

Graphs that show regressions also include a vertical line at “0.” When a variable's estimated coefficient falls to the left of this line, it indicates that the variable has a negative impact on the dependent variable (i.e., the attitude, behavior, or trait we seek to explain); when the coefficient falls to the right, it has a positive impact. We can be 95% confident that the impact is *statistically significant* when the confidence interval does not overlap the vertical line.

Please note that data presented and analyzed in this report are based on a pre-release version of the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey

**Part I:
Equality of Opportunity and
Democracy in the Americas**

Chapter One: Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas

With Mariana Rodríguez, Frederico Batista Pereira, and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

Equality of opportunity is at the very core of virtually all definitions of democracy. The notion of a level playing field resonates with advocates of democracy nearly everywhere in the world. The life-chances that individuals have are strongly affected by the opportunities they have to attend good schools, receive quality health care, have access to credit, and so on. Indeed, children's life-chances are strongly affected by their parents' own position in society and the economy, such that future achievement is often conditioned and either limited or advanced by the conditions of one's youth. Moreover, the life circumstances that affect success are also affected by societal levels of prejudice and norms related to groups' roles in society, since these attitudes can constrain economic opportunity and political participation.

How successful have the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean been in turning the ideal of equality of opportunity into reality? A look at economic opportunities provides important initial insight. Narrowing our view for a moment to the sub-region of Latin America, this set of countries has long been known as the region of the world with the greatest inequality in the distribution of income and wealth. In recent years, however, income inequality, although not wealth inequality, has gradually declined in some Latin American countries with historically very high levels of inequality.¹ More impressive has been the notable declines in poverty that a number of countries have experienced.²

These encouraging signs of lower levels of income inequality and poverty do not mean, however, that the pervasive problem of inequality of opportunity in the Americas has been overcome. Quite the contrary, the recent small declines in income inequality seem to have only highlighted the overall picture of persistent economic inequality. Research has increasingly shown that high levels of income inequality slow economic growth and hinder continued poverty reduction.³ Socially, inequality tends to be accompanied by an increase in violent crime.⁴

Inequality is not just a social or economic problem, but it is also a fundamentally *political* one, for several reasons. First, particularly among the region's "have-nots," inequality often foments unrest and dissatisfaction, affecting voting behavior and the stability of governments. Research shows

¹Income and wealth are related, but still conceptually distinct terms. For example, the AmericasBarometer surveys contain questions that ask about income (the sum of funds coming into the household each month due to work and remittances) and that ask about wealth in terms of ownership of household items.

²López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Claudia Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and United Nations Development Programme.

³De Ferranti, David, Guillermo E. Perry, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, and Michael Walton. 2004. *Inequality in Latin America: Breaking with History?* Washington DC: The World Bank.

⁴Fajnzylber, Pablo, Daniel Lederman, and Loayza, Norman. 2002. "Inequality and Violent Crime." *Journal of Law and Economics* 45: 1-39.

that inequality creates public discontent,⁵ fosters political instability and violence,⁶ and decreases trust in democracy.⁷ LAPOP research has shown that inequality seriously erodes interpersonal trust, the basic “glue” that holds together democratic societies.⁸ Second, inequality is a problem governments seek to address through public policies, and candidates to office compete on the basis of how they propose to address this problem. Third, to the extent that political systems pay more attention to the voices of some citizens (those with the resources to make demands) than others, this constitutes a core challenge to democratic consolidation, and indeed to the notion of democracy itself.

Of course, even conditions of “perfect” equality of opportunity would not prevent all inequalities, since individuals are naturally endowed with different strengths that lead to differences in outcomes over the course of a lifetime.⁹ However, the extreme gaps between the wealthy and the poor in Latin America and the Caribbean are *prima facie* evidence that opportunities have not been equally distributed; even more importantly, inequality is self-reinforcing. Unequally distributed resources, even though they may in part be the outcomes of past efforts and abilities, affect future opportunities for economic achievement. For instance, a recent study by the World Bank shows that, in the seven Latin American countries analyzed, about ten percent of income inequality can be attributed to differences in mothers’ educational attainment alone.¹⁰ Equality of opportunity, moreover, extends far beyond economic issues, and includes political participation and access. Inequalities in these areas exacerbate vicious circles in which those born with greater opportunity create the rules of the game that help retain them and their children in positions of wealth and power.

To what extent do gender, race, ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation translate into barriers to equality of opportunity, and therefore sources of long-term marginalization, in the Americas? And how do such inequalities affect public opinion toward the political system? In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we measure economic, social, and political marginalization, developing objective measures based on experienced inequalities as well as subjective indicators, including measures of prejudice and of group-related norms. Throughout the study, we pay attention to multiple sources of marginalization. We then assess if and how marginalization may be undermining key values that are crucial for a democratic political culture.

In this chapter we examine the extent of economic and social inequality in the Americas. First, in Section II of this chapter we take stock of previous research on economic and social inequalities in Suriname and in the Americas, reviewing data and findings from international institutions and academic researchers. In Section III, we take a look at the 2012 AmericasBarometer, examining what these data tell us about equality of economic and social opportunities in the region. After assessing

⁵ De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid.*

⁶ Alesina, Alberto, and Roberto Perotti, 1996. “Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment,” *European Economic Review* 40: 1203-1228; Muller, Edward N., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1987. “Inequality and Insurgency.” *American Political Science Review* 81(2): 425-52.

⁷ Uslaner, Eric M. and Mitchell Brown. 2005. “Inequality, Trust, and Civic Engagement.” *American Politics Research* 33: 868-894.

⁸ Córdova, Abby B. 2008. “Divided We Failed: Economic Inequality, Social Mistrust, and Political Instability in Latin American Democracies.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University.

⁹ Przeworski, Adam. 2010. *Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government*, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁰ Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, and Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. *Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

objective disparities in economic and social outcomes, we turn to public opinion. We ask, who *perceives* that they have been discriminated against? Moreover, we examine what citizens think about social and economic inequalities in the region. Finally, we discuss possible policy solutions, examining questions such as who supports racial quotas for education.

II. Background: Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas

This section explores previous research on inequality in Suriname and in the Americas, based in part on a number of objective measures of inequality. World Bank researchers have compared the levels of global inequality in North, Central, and South America and the Caribbean, relative to other world regions. Figure 1 takes a look at inequality both *within* countries and *between* countries within a region.¹¹ The horizontal (X) axis presents average levels of inequality within each country in the region, while the vertical (Y) axis presents differences between countries within a region in levels of income. Latin America and the Caribbean stand out on both dimensions. On the one hand, average levels of inequality within the countries of the region are remarkably high, by far the highest in the world. On the other hand, the region is relatively homogeneous when levels of income between one country and another are considered.




Figure 1. Gini Indices World Regions

Figure 2 shows the distribution of wealth across the region by comparing Gini coefficients in South, Central, and North America, as well as the Caribbean.¹² As we can see, levels of inequality are,

¹¹See Milanovic, Branko and Shlomo Yitzhaki. 2001. "Decomposing World Income Distribution: Does the World Have a Middle Class?" World Bank: *Policy Research Working Paper* 2562.

¹² The Gini Index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini Index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. The average Gini Index is estimated in each

on average, much higher in South and Central America than in North America and the Caribbean. The World Bank provided a Gini Index for Suriname in 1999. The Gini Index at that point was calculated to be 52.88 for Suriname. This is higher than the average of all the regions shown in Figure 2 (North, Central, and South America and the Caribbean). According to data from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC) the Gini Index was even higher in 1999 namely 61.6, which was the highest compared to all other countries in the region from which data was available¹³. Neri and Menke¹⁴ calculated an income based Gini index of 50.7 in 2000, which is 10 points lower than the Gini of 60.7 for 1993. This decrease of the economic inequality from 1993-2000 is explained primarily by the macro shock resulting from the implementation of structural adjustment policy measures in 1993 and 1994. These measures resulted into a hyperinflation that contributed to a drastic deterioration of the macroeconomic situation and a decline in the purchasing power of the poor in particular.¹⁵

The General Bureau of Statistics in Suriname (ABS) used data from the census in 2004 and measured a Gini Index of 54.67¹⁶. So it seems that inequality is a major problem in Suriname especially compared to the countries of the region and the literature (according to Todaro countries with a Gini Index that ranges between 50 and 70, such as Suriname, can be considered very unequal)¹⁷.




Figure 2. Inequality in the Americas

region based on the World Bank's most recent entry for each country since 2000. Several countries (Guyana, Suriname, Belize, Haiti, Trinidad & Tobago, and the United States) were dropped because they had no reported Gini Index since 2000.

¹³Kramer, Charles, Cubeddu Luis, Eyzaguirre Nicolás, and Valdés Rodrigo. 2011. *Regional Economic Outlook: Western Hemisphere Shifting Winds, New Policy Challenges*. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.


¹⁴Neri, Marcelo and Menke Jack. 2001. *Sustainable Combat against Poverty in Suriname*. Main Report, Final Version. UNDP: Paramaribo.

¹⁵A serious implication of the economic restructuring was an increase of inflation from 44% in 1992 to 144% in 1993.

¹⁶General Bureau of Statistics. 2007. *Inkomensverdeling en inkomensongelijkheid in Suriname*. Paramaribo: General Bureau of Statistics. We should point out that underreporting of income by many in the substantial informal sector may in fact have an impact on the calculation of the Gini Index.

¹⁷Dagum, Camilo (ed.). 2003. *Special Issue on Income Distribution, Lorenz Curve, Inequality and Poverty*. Estadística, vol. 55 (164 & 165).

Another way to view income inequality is to examine the relative positions of the citizens of different countries in the global income distribution. In Figure 3 researchers have assessed the living standards of citizens in four countries of the world by ventile within each country (a ventile includes 5% of the income distribution).¹⁸ The figure compares Brazil, in many ways a prototypically unequal country of the region, with three others: France, Sri Lanka, and rural Indonesia, and dramatically suggests the highly unequal living conditions in South and Central America. The poorest 5% of Brazilian citizens are worse off than the poorest 5% in Sri Lanka or Indonesia, and rank very close to the bottom percentile of the world income distribution. However, the richest 5% of Brazilians do as well as the richest 5% of French citizens, far better than the richest ventile of Sri Lankans or rural Indonesians, and at the top percentile of the global income distribution.



Source: Milanovic (2006)

Figure 3. The Positions of Citizens of Four Countries in the Global Income Distribution

However, levels of inequality are evolving in the region. At the same time that we see differences across the Americas, we also find some evidence that levels of inequality are converging. A recent report by the Brookings Institution argues that since 2000, inequality has been improving in some of the most notoriously unequal countries of the region.¹⁹ In Figure 4 we present time series data for the Gini Index for four countries between 2005 and 2009. While inequality has been dropping to some extent in two historically highly unequal countries, Brazil and Honduras, in the two countries with lower historical levels of inequality it has been rising (Costa Rica) or unchanging (Uruguay).

¹⁸Milanovic, Branko. 2006. "Global Income Inequality: What It Is and Why It Matters." *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 3865.

¹⁹López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Claudia Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and United Nations Development Programme.

When we compare the data from the census held in 1980 and 2004 in Suriname we see some changes taking place regarding inequality. For instance the Gini index in 1980 was 40.91, while as mentioned earlier, it was 54.67 in 2004. Therefore the General Bureau of Statistics in Suriname concluded in their report that between 1980 and 2004: ‘inequality has increased!’²⁰. In fact Schalkwijk noted the increasing inequality as a trend that was cause for “much concern”. He pointed out that in 1969, the lowest 40% of society still earned 24% of all income, while by 2004 this had been cut in half. In contrast the richest 20% of society had earned 35% of all income in 1969, which had increased to 54% in 2004²¹. So while inequality has been improving in some of the most notoriously unequal countries of the region this is definitely not the case in Suriname.




Figure 4. Changes in Inequality in Four Countries of the Americas

How will inequality continue to evolve over the next decade in the Americas? This is a difficult question to answer, since the changes in inequality are arguably attributable to national economic growth, to the international economic environment, and to domestic public policies. Thus, the future course of inequality in any one country depends in part on the broader national, regional, and world economies, including the economies of China, the United States, and Europe.²² Inequality in Suriname was very marked in the 19th century, but became less so in the 20th century. Society was quite open in the 1950s to 1980s and social mobility was an important aspect of society. Periods of high inflation in the 1980s and 1990s, coupled with a poorly designed structural adjustment program in the late 1990s, eroded the income and savings of most average citizens, which shrank the middle class substantially and led to more inequality. With high economic growth in the past decade, however, one would expect

²⁰General Bureau of Statistics. 2007. *Inkomensverdeling en inkomensongelijkheid in Suriname*. Paramaribo: General Bureau of Statistics. Page 19 emphasis theirs.

²¹Schalkwijk, J. Marten W. 2010. *Ontwikkeling als blijvende uitdaging*. Paramaribo: Anton de Kom University of Suriname.

²² Powell, Andrew. 2012. *The World of Forking Paths: Latin America and the Caribbean Facing Global Economic Risks*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

to see less inequality in recent years. In 2012 a census was held, but the results are expected in mid-2013.

Economic inequality goes hand in hand with pronounced social inequalities in the Americas. Latin America and the Caribbean have typically been found to have middle to high levels of human development, as gauged by the Human Development Index (HDI).²³ Since 2010, however, the United Nations has also produced the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), which “discounts” each dimension of the HDI based on a country’s level of inequality. Figure 5 demonstrates the differences between the HDI and the IHDI in various regions of the world. We find that in absolute and relative terms, the gap in Latin America and the Caribbean between the average HDI and the average IHDI is the largest in the world. In 1991 the HDI of Suriname was 0.792, but by 2011 this had dropped to 0.680. All this time, however, the country was placed in the medium human development category. Suriname scores lower than the average countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (see Figure 5). As expected the IHDI is much lower than the HDI in Suriname, for 2011 the IHDI was 0.518²⁴.




Figure 5. Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index in Six World Regions

²³ The United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index running from 0 to 1, and measuring a country’s average achievement in three dimensions of human development: life expectancy, education and income (standard of living). Calculations are based on data from UNDESA (2011), Barro and Lee (2010), UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2011), World Bank (2011a) and IMF (2011).

²⁴ Zimmermann, Robert, Lawes Carol, and Svenson Nanette (eds.). 2012. *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012: Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security*. New York: United Nations Development Programme.

Figure 6 presents the overall loss in human development due to inequality in the region, calculated as the percentage difference between HDI and IHDI. According to this metric, the region loses 26% of its potential for human development because of persistent inequality. The loss in human development due to inequality for Suriname is 23.8%. The loss in Suriname is a bit lower than the overall loss among the countries of Latin American and the Caribbean, but is not far behind the average of these countries.




Figure 6. Overall Loss in Human Potential Due to Inequality

Measures of the HDI and the IHDI obscure major differences in levels of human development across the country, however. For Suriname there is no Municipal Human Development Index. But it is a well-known fact that there are major differences between urban, rural and interior (so-called Rural Interior) regions in Suriname. For instance the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) of 2006, which is one of the most detailed nation-wide surveys in Suriname, concluded ‘*The results of this MICS often reveal striking differences between the Rural Interior region (mainly populated by Maroon and Indigenous people), and the Urban and Rural Coastal Region. For most if not all of the indicators the Urban Region yields the most favorable scores*’²⁵.

Figure 7 allows one to discern differences in the probability of completing sixth grade on time for children with disadvantaged (dark green bar) and advantaged (light green bar) family backgrounds in a number of countries in the Americas.²⁶ For example, the graph shows that a student from a disadvantaged background in Jamaica has odds of completing sixth grade on time that register at just over 80%, while his/her peer with an advantaged background is only slightly more likely (the odds are close to 90%) to complete sixth grade on time. By these measures, Brazil, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Peru are the countries where children from disadvantaged backgrounds have lowest probabilities of

²⁵General Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation and Ministry of Social Affairs and Housing. 2009. *Suriname Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2006, Final Report*. Paramaribo, Suriname: Government of Suriname & United Nations Children’s Fund. Page XI.

²⁶Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, and Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. *Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

achievement. At the same time, most countries of Central and South America stand out as highly unequal.

When we look at Suriname the major differences between advantaged and disadvantaged groups are between regions, especially the more tribal societies (interior) are lagging behind on almost all indicators with the rest of the country. The residents of the interior are on average poorly educated, with higher unemployment rates, lower incomes and simpler housing compared to the rest of the country. For instance when we look at pre-school education only 7.3% of the children in the rural interior areas attend a pre-school, compared to 29.5% in the rural coastal areas and 49.4% in the urban areas. When we look at primary school almost 1 out of 3 children aged 6 are not in school in the interior (69.3% attend primary school, compared to almost 90% in the rest of Suriname). At the secondary level the regional differences are even more alarming, since only 7.6% in the rural interior attend secondary school, while nationwide this is 61.4%. Also when looking at adult literacy rates there are major disparities between the urban and rural coastal areas (96.2% and 94.2% respectively) and the rural interior (45.0%). The MICS study found a *'positive correlation with mother's education and socioeconomic status'* and whether or not a child attends primary school²⁷. This correlation suggests that the odds of attending primary school (and finish it) are much lower in the interior, since mothers have less education and the socioeconomic status of households is lower in comparison to the rest of the country. Education is strongly correlated with income in Suriname, so strongly that the General Statistics Bureau even concludes one study by the simple statement: *'the higher the educational level, the higher the income'*²⁸. Therefore we expect that since children in the interior do not attend school as often as other children in the country, they will have a lower socioeconomic status, on average, compared with the rest of society. Regional inequality has an effect on the overall inequality levels in the country.

²⁷General Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation and Ministry of Social Affairs and Housing. 2009. *Suriname Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2006, Final Report*. Paramaribo, Suriname: Government of Suriname & United Nations Children's Fund. Page 56.

²⁸General Bureau of Statistics. 2007. *Inkomensverdeling en inkomensongelijkheid in Suriname*. Paramaribo: General Bureau of Statistics. Page 24.




Figure 7. Family Background and Educational Achievement in the Americas

III. Equalities in Economic and Social Opportunities in Suriname: A View from the AmericasBarometer

The previous section provided a bird’s eye view of the state of economic and social inequality in the Americas. But who is most affected by inequalities? And what do the citizens of the Americas think about equality and inequality of opportunity in the region? Questions included in the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer allow us to assess the extent to which key measures of opportunity such as income and education differ across measures such as one’s race, gender, and family background. We also take a detailed look at public opinion: who thinks they have been discriminated against, to what extent citizens perceive inequalities as natural or desirable, and what public policies citizens might endorse to redress inequalities.

Studies of discrimination across the Americas seek to document the extent to which people with the same skills and education, but who are members of different social groups, are paid differently

or have different employment opportunities.²⁹ Such discrimination may occur either because of actual negative attitudes towards the group discriminated against, or because of “statistical discrimination,” meaning that employers infer lower levels of desired skills or human capital from membership in certain marginalized groups. Such studies of discrimination generally indicate that women remain underpaid relative to men with similar characteristics, and that women from marginalized ethnic and racial groups are especially so.³⁰

Nonetheless, a recent series of experimental and observational studies suggests that some forms of overt labor market discrimination may be lower than often thought in many countries of Latin America.³¹

The first major social divide we examine is that between men and women. According to scholars of gender inequality in the Americas, although large gaps still exist, inequality in labor force participation among men and women has become more equal.³² Moreover, the region has experienced growing equality in terms of class composition between genders.³³ Furthermore, a gender gap in educational levels has also shrunk significantly.³⁴ So, the trend in gender discrimination is certainly positive according to most studies.

Second, we examine divides by racial and ethnic groups. According to recent academic studies, racial, ethnic, and linguistic minorities experience continued unequal economic and social situations, especially in terms of wage differences and employment types/occupations.³⁵ Such discrimination tends to be higher in regions exhibiting low levels of socioeconomic development.³⁶ Additionally, discrimination by race/ethnicity is more prevalent than gender discrimination in the

²⁹For an overview of this literature, see Ñopo, Hugo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro, eds. 2009. *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank.

³⁰Lovell, Peggy A. 2000a. “Race, Gender and Regional Labor Market Inequalities in Brazil.” *Review of Social Economy* 58 (3): 277 – 293; Lovell, Peggy A. 2000b. “Gender, Race, and the Struggle for Social Justice in Brazil.” *Latin American Perspectives* 27 (6) (November 1): 85-102. Ñopo, Hugo. 2004. “The Gender Wage Gap in Peru 1986-2000. Evidence from a Matching Comparisons Approach.” *Económica* L (1-2).

³¹ Bravo, David, Claudia Sanhueza, and Sergio Urzúa. 2009a. “Ability, Schooling Choices, and Gender Labor Market Discrimination: Evidence for Chile.” In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*, ed. Hugo Ñopo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank; Bravo, Sanhueza, and Urzúa. 2009b. “An Experimental Study of Labor Market Discrimination: Gender, Social Class, and Neighborhood in Chile.” In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*; Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo, Natalia Candelo, Alejandro Gaviria, Sandra Polanía, and Rajiv Sethi. 2009. “Discrimination in the Provision of Social Services to the Poor: A Field Experimental Study.” In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*; Petrie, Ragan and Máximo Torero. 2009. “Ethnic and Social Barriers to Cooperation: Experiments Studying the Extent and Nature of Discrimination in Urban Peru.” In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*.

³²Abramo, Laís, and María Elena Valenzuela. 2005. “Women’s Labour Force Participation Rates in Latin America.” *International Labour Review* 144 (December): 369-399; De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid*.

³³Hite, Amy Bellone, and Jocelyn S. Viterna. 2005. “Gendering Class in Latin America: How Women Effect and Experience Change in the Class Structure.” *Latin American Research Review* 40 (2): 50–82.

³⁴Duryea, Suzanne, Sebastian Galiani, Hugo Ñopo, and Claudia C. Piras. 2007. “The Educational Gender Gap in Latin America and the Caribbean.” SSRN eLibrary (April).

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1820870.

³⁵De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid*; Patrinos, Harry Anthony. 2000. The Cost of Discrimination in Latin America. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 35, no. 2 (June): 3-17.

³⁶Branton, Regina P., and Bradford S. Jones. 2005. Reexamining Racial Attitudes: The Conditional Relationship between Diversity and Socioeconomic Environment. *American Journal of Political Science* 49, 2: 359-72.

Americas.³⁷ Nevertheless, accuracy in the measurement of discrimination by race/ethnicity is difficult to achieve given the lack of sufficient and reliable data.³⁸

Finally, we examine how family background and social class affect economic and social opportunities in the Americas. Differences in social class have long been considered the driving forces behind inequality in Latin America, if not also in some other parts of the Americas, trumping the effects of race or gender. Recent studies, including many cited in the previous paragraphs, have increasingly shown the importance of these other factors in affecting life choices. Nonetheless, statistical analyses continue to show that family background remains perhaps the most robustly important social characteristic affecting opportunities in the Americas.³⁹

We begin our analysis using the AmericasBarometer 2012 by examining what citizens of Suriname of different ethnic, gender, and class-based groups, as well as ones living in rural versus urban areas, told us about their economic and social resources. The AmericasBarometer's 2010 and 2012 questionnaires included many measures of the social groups to which respondents belonged. We assessed respondents' racial and ethnic groups in several ways.⁴⁰ Question **ETID** simply asks respondents whether they identify as Hindustani (East Indian), Creole, Mixed, Javanese, Maroon, Amerindian, Chinese, White, Jew or Other. In addition, beginning with the AmericasBarometer 2010, with the sponsorship of Professor Ed Telles from Princeton University, we pioneered the use of a color palette.⁴¹ At the end of each interview, interviewers are asked to rate the facial skin color of the respondent on a scale from 1 (lightest) to 11 (darkest) (see Figure 8). The 2010 data from the resulting variable, **COLORR**, proved extremely useful for understanding differences in the experiences of citizens from varying groups across the region (see, for instance, Special Report Boxes 1 and 2). Thanks to Professor Telles' ongoing sponsorship, we again included the color palette in 2012.⁴²

In contrast to many other countries, however, in Suriname ethnicity is more important than skin color.⁴³ It is noteworthy to point that culture and ethnicity became a central importance of official social constructions in the post-World War II decolonization of Suriname. In the 1964 census, the concept of 'race,' the principal social classification of the population until then, was replaced by 'ethnicity,' which refers strongly to cultural and historical characteristics of the respective ethnic groups. The tradition of negotiating social life between ethnic, religious and art groups and cross-boundary communication - by means of language, cultural symbols and events, music, poetry, visual

³⁷De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid*.

³⁸Telles, Edward Eric. 2004. *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

³⁹See, e.g., Barros et al., 2009, *Ibid*; Telles, Edward, and Liza Steele. 2012. "Pigmentocracy in the Americas: How is Educational Attainment Related to Skin Color?" *AmericasBarometer Insights*73. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

⁴⁰ The full text of all questions is provided in the questionnaire in Appendix C.

⁴¹Telles, Edward, and Liza Steele. 2012. *Ibid*.

⁴² In 2012, the skin color palette was used in 24 countries, except the US and Canada. In 2010, the palette was used in 23 countries, also excluding Haiti.

⁴³ However, Skin color remains important, though differently per ethnic group. See: Menke Jack, From Fair and Lovely to Banho de Lua: Skin Whitening and its Implications in the Multiethnic and Multicolored Surinamese. Society, in: Hall, R.(ed.). 2013. *The Melanin Millennium. Skin Color as 21st Century International Discourse*. Springer. Dordrecht.



arts, and the like - contributed to the present inter-ethnic relations and the nation⁴⁴. (See Chapter 7 for further explanation).



Figure 8. Skin Color Palette Used in the AmericasBarometer

We also included a number of questions on social and economic resources in the 2012 questionnaire. As in previous years, we included questions on education, family income, and household assets, ranging from indoor plumbing to ownership of flat-screen television sets and vehicles. The latter group of questions, found in the **R series**, is used to create a five-point index of quintiles of household wealth, which is standardized across urban and rural areas in each country.⁴⁵

We also incorporated a number of new questions on social and economic resources in 2012. For the first time, we also asked those respondents who reported working at the time of the interview about their personal incomes (**Q10G**). For respondents who were married or living with a partner, we sought to tap intra-household inequalities in income earned with question **GEN10**.

⁴⁴Menke, Jack. 2011. *Ethnicity Between Nation-building and Nation-creation*. In: M.G. Smith, Caribbean Reasonings: “Social Theory and Anthropology in the Caribbean and Beyond”, Ian Randle Publishers. Kingston.

⁴⁵This variable is called **QUINTALL** in the merged 2012 database. For more information on the variable, see Córdova, Abby. 2009. “Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth Using Household Asset Indicators”. *AmericasBarometer Insights* 6. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

GEN10. Thinking only about yourself and your spouse and the salaries that you earn, which of the following phrases best describe your salaries **[Read alternatives]**

- (1) You don't earn anything and your spouse earns it all;
- (2) You earn less than your spouse;
- (3) You earn more or less the same as your spouse;
- (4) You earn more than your spouse;
- (5) You earn all of the income and your spouse earns nothing.
- (6) **[DON'T READ]** No salary income
- (88) DK (98) DA

The 2012 AmericasBarometer integrated a few questions on family background or class, in addition to the measures of household wealth. Question **ED2** examines family background by asking respondents to report their mother's level of education. In addition, self-identified social class is measured in question **MOV1**, which asks respondents whether they consider themselves to be upper class, upper middle class, middle class, lower middle class, or lower class.⁴⁶

Finally, we included two new questions on food security developed by our team in Mexico in cooperation with Yale University, but now used in all countries: **FS2** and **FS8**.⁴⁷ Taken together, these measures provide an important opportunity to examine how social and economic resources are distributed in the countries of the region.

Now I am going to read you some questions about food.					
	No	Yes	DK	DA	N/A
FS2. In the past three months, because of a lack of money or other resources, did your household ever run out of food?	0	1	88	98	99
FS8. In the past three months, because of lack of money or other resources, did you or some other adult in the household ever eat only once a day or go without eating all day?	0	1	88	98	99

We first assess how gender, race, age, and urban-rural status affect educational status in Suriname, using linear regression analysis.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Álvarez-Rivadulla, María José and Rosario Queirolo. 2013. Inequality Matters: The Role of Education in Defining Social Class in Colombia vs. Uruguay. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 86. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

⁴⁷ These questions were administered to a split sample of respondents in each country, meaning that only half of respondents received the questions.

⁴⁸ In an effort to facilitate interpretation, all LAPOP reports present the results of multivariate analyses graphically. Each independent variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical axis. The dot represents the impact of the variable, and the bar represents the confidence interval. When the bar does not intersect the vertical "0" line, that variable is statistically significant, meaning, that we can be 95% confident that the independent variable has the displayed relationship with the dependent variable. For more information on reading and interpreting LAPOP graphs and figures, please refer to page xxxiii.




Figure 9. Determinants of Educational Level in Suriname

Figure 9 indicates that urban-rural status is the most powerful predictor for educational status in Suriname. The people living in a rural area seem to be disadvantaged compared to those living in an urban area.⁴⁹ This was also one of the main findings in the MICS survey in 2006 conducted by the government of Suriname and UNICEF. Some of their findings were already mentioned earlier. We also find that being older and having a darker skin color have a negative impact on educational status in Suriname, while gender on the other hand does not play a major role. It should be noted that when we use the ‘*objective measure of skin color*’, by using color palettes, as is done in the study of LAPOP, the plurality of Suriname and all the dynamics that relate to ethnicity (such as inequality) do not fully become visible. For instance the two most marginalized groups, the Amerindian and the Maroon people (who differ strongly in skin color), score significantly lower in years of schooling compared to other ethnic groups. The Surinamese society has a complex plurality, and therefore we will discuss this topic in greater depth in chapter seven.

Finally, we assess the extent to which family background affects educational level in Suriname. We did not include our measure of family background, **ED2**, in the multivariate regression model because the question was only asked of half the sample.⁵⁰ Limiting analysis to half the sample would reduce inferential power regarding the effects of the other variables. Nonetheless, Figure 10, which shows the respondent’s years of schooling (y-axis) according to the level of education his/her mother

⁴⁹General Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation and Ministry of Social Affairs and Housing. 2009. *Suriname Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2006, Final Report*. Paramaribo, Suriname: Government of Suriname & United Nations Children’s Fund. Page 56.

⁵⁰In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, many new questions were asked of split samples of respondents in order to maximize questionnaire space.

obtained (x-axis), indicates that the education of the mother is significantly related to the years of schooling of the respondents. The figure shows quite clearly that the higher the educational level of the mother, the more years of schooling the respondent has on average. This finding gives an even clearer picture, than the finding in the MICS study, mentioned earlier, which found a ‘*positive correlation with mother’s education*’ and whether or not a child attends primary school⁵¹. The LAPOP finding indicates that mother’s education has an effect on the whole educational achievement of the child, not only on the question whether or not he or she attends primary school.




Figure 10. Mother’s Educational Level as a Determinant of Respondent Educational Level in Suriname

Are the same factors associated with education also associated with income? How do personal incomes vary by age, race, gender, urban-rural residence, and family background in Suriname? In Figure 11, we use linear regression analysis to assess the determinants of personal income among respondents who told us that they had a job at the time of the interview.⁵² Looking at the determinants of personal income we find that respondents that are of younger age and living in urban areas are more likely to have a higher personal income than older people and people living in rural areas. It is also interesting that while gender did not play a major role in educational level, it is a strong predictor of income, whereby women have a significantly lower personal income than men in Suriname.

⁵¹General Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation and Ministry of Social Affairs and Housing. 2009. *Suriname Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2006, Final Report*. Paramaribo, Suriname: Government of Suriname & United Nations Children’s Fund. Page 56.

⁵²Income (both Q10NEW, family income, and Q10G, personal income) is coded on a scale from 0 to 16, with response categories corresponding to increasing ranges in the income distribution. See the questionnaire in Appendix C for more information.




Figure 11. Determinants of Personal Income in Suriname, Among Respondents who Work

The previous figure suggests that on average women have lower personal incomes than men in Suriname. As discussed above, in question **GEN10** we asked respondents who were married or who had an unmarried partner about their income versus their spouse's incomes. In Figure 12, we examine differences between men and women in responses to **GEN10**, only among those who also said that they were employed. Figure 12 indicates that in more than half of all the couples where both partners work, the male has higher earnings than the female. Almost 60% of all male respondents said they earn more than their spouse, while around 56% of the female respondents said they earn less than their spouse. In only about one third of all cases, there is income equality between the partners. So in Suriname there is still a major gap when it comes to gender based income equality. Differences in educational levels between partners could possibly be an explanatory factor, but we do not have data about educational levels of the partner to compare this with that of the respondent.




Figure 12. Respondent's Versus Spouse's Income in Suriname, Among Respondents who Work

In Figure 13, we see that living in a rural area has an impact on personal income, whereby working people living in rural areas in Suriname earn less on average than working people living in urban areas.




Figure 13. Place of Residence and Personal Income in Suriname, Among Respondents who Work

Finally, we assess the extent to which family background affects personal income in Suriname. In Figure 14, we find evidence that the educational level of the mother has an impact on the personal income of the respondent; the higher the educational level of the mother, the higher the average personal income of the respondent. Family background does seem to affect personal income in Suriname.⁵³




Figure 14. Mother's Educational Level as a Determinant of Own Income in Suriname, Among Respondents who Work

Arguably the most critical basic resource which citizens need access to is food. We have seen that personal income is not distributed in a perfectly egalitarian fashion across Suriname. Does access to food follow similar patterns? In Figure 15, we use linear regression analysis to assess the determinants of food insecurity, based on the two questions described above. Questions **FS2** and **FS8** are summed to create an index of food insecurity that runs from 0 to 2, where respondents who report higher values have higher levels of food insecurity.⁵⁴ Only skin color seems to be significantly related to food insecurity, whereby skin color has a positive impact on food insecurity. So people with a darker skin color experienced food insecurity more often than people with lighter skin color. However, we have to point out that only 10% of all respondents that gave a response to the question on food insecurity experienced periods of food insecurity in the past three months. So food insecurity does not seem to be a serious problem in Suriname.

⁵³The mothers who have a college education are not represented in Figure 14, since all of these mothers in the sample still have children that are in school, so they do not have working children.

⁵⁴ Recall that these questions were asked of a split sample (that is, of only half of respondents).




Figure 15. Determinants of Food Insecurity in Suriname⁵⁵

When considering skin color, we see in Figure 16 that people with a darker skin color experience more food insecurity than people with a lighter skin color. Looking at the specific ethnic groups in Suriname, we found that indeed the groups with darker skin color - Maroon and Afro-Surinamese⁵⁶ - experience food insecurity most in Suriname (Figure 17).

⁵⁵It was not possible to relate the answers to mother's education, since this question was asked only to a part of the respondents, notably those who were not asked the question about mother's education.

⁵⁶ The mean skin color of the different ethnic groups are (from lighter to darker skin color): white (1.50), Chinese (2.33), Javanese (4.40), Amerindian (4.62), Mixed (5.12), Hindustani (East Indians) (5.23), Other (6.33), Afro-Surinamese (7.07) and Maroons (8.06).




Figure 16. Skin color and Food Insecurity in Suriname




Figure 17. Ethnicity and Food Insecurity in Suriname

Who Reports Discrimination?

Another way of viewing social and economic discrimination is from the point of view of the purported victim. In 17 countries of the Americas, we included questions tapping whether respondents perceived themselves to have been victims of discrimination. The questions were a slightly modified battery that had first been used in 2008, and were optional in each country:

Now, changing the subject, and thinking about your experiences in the past year , have you ever felt discriminated against, that is, treated worse than other people, in the following places?				
	Yes	No	DK	DA
DIS2. In government offices [courts, agencies, municipal government]	1	2	88	98
DIS3. At work or school or when you have looked for work	1	2	88	98
DIS5. In public places, such as on the street, in public squares, in shops or in the market place?	1	2	88	98

In Figure 18 we report the percentage of citizens in each country where question **DIS3** was asked who said they had been the victim of employment discrimination. We find that on average 12.1% of the respondents experienced discrimination at the workplace or school. Suriname scores slightly above average, since 12.8% of the respondents indicated that they had been a victim within the workplace or school.




Figure 18. Self-Reported Discrimination at Work or School in the Countries of the Americas

Who reports that they have been the victim of discrimination at work or school? In Figure 19, we use logistic regression analysis to examine determinants of self-reported victimization by discrimination in Suriname. We see that skin color and respondents between 26-35 years of age showed a positive correlation with perceived discrimination. So respondents of younger age or with darker skin color say more often that they are discriminated in the workplace than respondents of older age or with lighter skin color. Interestingly we find that women are less likely to say that they have experienced workplace discrimination (but this was not statistically significant). Discrimination in the workplace or at school also had a significant and positive correlation with ethnic group in Suriname. It

is important to note that this question is about perceptions of discrimination and not necessarily related to objectively measured discrimination.⁵⁷




Figure 19. Determinants of Victimization by Self-Reported Employment Discrimination in Suriname

⁵⁷Nopo, et al. 2009.*Ibid.*

Public Opinion on Racial and Gender Inequality

The previous sections have shown that economic and social resources are not distributed equally among citizens of Suriname in different groups defined by gender, race, urban/rural status, and family background. They have not told us a great deal about why these inequalities persist, however. In particular, we have not yet assessed the extent to which differences in socioeconomic outcomes might be due in part to discriminatory norms or attitudes. The AmericasBarometer 2012 included several questions that provide a look at how social and economic inequalities are related to general attitudes regarding the economic roles of men and women, and the economic achievements of different racial groups.

First, we examine norms regarding men's versus women's work. Many studies have suggested that citizens throughout the Americas continue to hold attitudes that imply different roles for men and women in the labor force.⁵⁸ In 2012, we asked respondents to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following question, on a 7-point scale:

GEN1. Changing the subject again, some say that when there is not enough work, men should have a greater right to jobs than women. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

Figure 20 presents average levels of agreement with this statement across the Americas. In the figure, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, for ease of comparison with other variables. In Figure 20 we see that Suriname scores below average compared to the other countries when it comes to favoring men in the labor market. Of course, we expect that men more often favor their own gender in the labor market and for Suriname this was indeed the case, even more strongly than in the other countries on average⁵⁹.

⁵⁸Morgan, Jana and Melissa Buice. 2011. "Gendering Democratic Values: A Multilevel Analysis of Latin American Attitudes toward Women in Politics." Presented at the *Marginalization in the Americas* Conference, Miami, FL; Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2003. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality & Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁵⁹ Mean for men favoring men in the labor market was 3.60, while for women favoring men it was 2.81 on a 7-point scale (for all countries it was for men 3.42 and for women 2.92).




Figure 20. Agreement that Men Have Labor Market Priority in the Countries of the Americas

The average levels of agreement with this statement obscure substantial variation among the citizens of Suriname in their responses. In Figure 21, we examine their responses in further detail, returning to the original 1-7 scale of the question. We see that a large portion (37.9%) of the respondents strongly disagree with the statement that men should be favored in the labor market⁶⁰. But there is still a group that strongly agrees (10.3%) with this statement. To shed some light on this topic, we analyzed the data in greater depth and found that there is a significant relationship between

⁶⁰If we would split it up by gender, than from all the women 45% says that they strongly disagree, while of all the men 30% strongly disagrees with this statement.



education and favoring men in the labor force. In general people with a lower education favor men more often than higher educated people.




Figure 21. Agreement and Disagreement that Men Have Labor Market Priority in Suriname

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also asked citizens across the Americas about their perceptions of the reasons for racial and ethnic inequalities. This round, we included the following question in every country of the Americas.⁶¹

RAC1CA. According to various studies, people with dark skin are poorer than the rest of the population. What do you think is the main reason for this?
 [Read alternatives, just one answer]
 (1) Because of their culture, or (2) Because they have been treated unjustly
 (3) **[Do not read]** Another response (88) DK (98) DA

In Figure 22, we present the percentage of respondents who agreed that inequality was due to the “culture” of people with dark skin. Overall 22% of all respondents in different countries were of the opinion that people with dark skin were poorer than others because of their culture. On the other hand the majority (66%) agreed with the statement that they were poorer because they had been treated unjustly, while 12% gave another or no response. In Suriname, 20% held the cultural explanation, while 44% choose the unjust treatment, but 36% had another or no opinion.

⁶¹ This question was asked of a split sample of respondents.




Figure 22. Percentage Agreeing that Poverty is Due to “Culture” in the Countries of the Americas

IV. Public Opinion towards Common Policy Proposals

What, if anything, should the governments of the Americas do about the major social and economic inequalities faced by their citizens? Answering this question fully is beyond the range of this report and answering this question with precise solutions would require, in part, taking positions on important normative and ideological debates that are the purview of citizens and politicians, rather than the authors of this study. Nonetheless, we outline here some common policy proposals, and present public opinion related to those proposals.

In 2010 and 2012, the AmericasBarometer asked citizens across the region what they thought the role of the state is in reducing inequality. In question **ROS4**, respondents were asked to agree or disagree, on a 7-point scale, with the following statement:

ROS4. The Surinamese government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Responses to this question provide a first glimpse into the extent to which citizens agree, in the abstract, that inequality constitutes a public policy problem that governments should actively address. In Figure 23 we present the average agreement with this statement in each country in the region. As always, we have recoded responses to run from 0 (“Strongly disagree”) to 100 (“Strongly agree.”). In Suriname there tends to be a strong focus on the government also with respect to the role of the state in reducing inequality. Suriname scored 85.1 on the question if the government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor (on a 0-100 scale). This is above the average for all countries in the Americas and amongst the highest in the region. We mentioned earlier that inequality is indeed a major problem in Suriname especially compared to the countries of the region.




Figure 23. Agreement that the State Should Reduce Inequality in the Countries of the Americas

Conditional Cash Transfer and Public Assistance Programs

In the past two decades, many of the region’s governments have transformed their social assistance programs, providing means-tested, conditional assistance to their most disadvantaged citizens in exchange for those citizens participating in public health programs and keeping their children in school.⁶² The most well-known and largest of these programs include *Oportunidades* in

⁶² Barrientos, Armando, and Claudio Santibáñez. 2009. “New Forms of Social Assistance and the Evolution of Social Protection in Latin America.” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 41(1): 1-26; Bruhn, Kathleen. 1996. “Social Spending and Political Support: The ‘Lessons’ of the National Solidarity Program in Mexico.” *Comparative Politics* 28(2): 151-177; Fiszbein, Ariel, and Norbert Schady. 2009. *Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty*.

Mexico, *Bolsa Familia* in Brazil, *Familias en Acción* in Colombia, and the *Asignación Universal por Hijo* in Argentina. At the same time, many governments throughout the region have also widely expanded non-conditional social assistance programs. In general, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs in Latin America are seen as being effective strategies toward assisting the poorest citizens throughout the region. In addition to having positive effects on school enrollment and attendance, “CCTs have increased access to preventive medical care and vaccination, raised the number of visits to health centers and reduced the rate of illness while raising overall consumption and food consumption, with positive results on the groups and weight of children, especially among the smallest.”⁶³ However, recent studies have also found that the effectiveness of these and similar programs depend, in large part, on how such programs are designed and implemented in specific countries, making clear the need for policy-makers to develop well-planned and effective programs.⁶⁴ These social assistance and CCT programs are widely attributed to help reduce inequality and poverty in some of the region’s most historically unequal contexts.

In 2012, we measured levels of receipt of public assistance and CCT programs across the region, using question CCT1NEW.

CCT1NEW. Do you or someone in your household receive monthly assistance in the form of money or products from the government?
 (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

Levels of receipt of social assistance and CCTs vary greatly across the region. In Figure 24, we present the percentage of respondents in each country of the region who said that some member of their household received public assistance. Suriname ranks in the top 3 countries in the region where citizens receive public assistance from the government with 22% of the population reporting some form of assistance. The census in 2004 indicated that on average 13.6% of people’s income could be traced to public assistance⁶⁵. This amount will probably increase since the current government is planning to do so. The census also looked at regional differences, which showed that in the rural interior (districts Para, Brokopondo and Sipaliwini) people’s average income from public assistance was much higher (i.e. 26.9%). In fact a household survey which was done in nine villages in the interior of Suriname, found that about 56% of the households received some social benefit or allowance (senior citizens benefits, child support, handicapped allowance, poverty allowance) from the government. But 80% of these allowances were less than 500 SRD (at that point US \$178) per month. For many of the elderly, their senior citizen benefits (AOV) were the only income they had. The distribution of government allowances varied substantially among the villages; in some communities only 20% of the people received an allowance and in others up to 90%.⁶⁶

Washington, D.C.: The World Bank; Layton, Matthew L., and Amy Erica Smith. 2011. “Social Assistance and the Presidential Vote in Latin America.” *AmericasBarometer Insights* 66. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

⁶³Valencia Lomeli, Enrique. 2008. “Conditional Cash Transfers as Social Policy in Latin America: An Assessment of their Contributions and Limitations.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 34: 475-499. p. 490.

⁶⁴Lindert, Kathy, Emmanuel Skoufias and Joseph Shapiro. 2006. “Redistributing Income to the Poor and Rich: Public Transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean.” *Social Protection Working Paper* #0605. The World Bank.

⁶⁵General Bureau of Statistics. 2007. *Inkomensverdeling en inkomensongelijkheid in Suriname*. Paramaribo: General Bureau of Statistics.

⁶⁶Schalkwijk, Marten. 2010. *Traditional and non-traditional aspects of livelihoods in Maroon and Indigenous communities in the Interior of Suriname*. Paper presented to the 2nd International Congress on Biodiversity of the Guianas Shield, August 1-4, 2010, Macapa, Brazil.




Figure 24. Receipt of Public Assistance in the Countries of the Americas

Suriname has a reasonably developed social security system compared to many other countries in the region. There are four general forms of cash transfers to citizens. All senior citizens who have reached the age of 60 years get a government allowance of SRD 525 per month (US \$157 in 2012). This is in addition to a pension that they may receive from an employer. All persons with a handicap are eligible for an allowance of SRD 325 per month (US \$97), but they need a document from a medical doctor. Families with children can apply for child support of SRD 30 per month (US \$9) for up to 4 children; they should not receive any other child support. Very poor people, between 21 years and 60 years, with an income of less than 40 SRD (US \$12) per month can get an additional 40 SRD for their family as financial support.

A very important benefit for poor people is the Free Health Provision card, which provides holders of such a card with free health care (from basic health care to specialist treatment and

hospitalization). The Ministry of Social Affairs in fact pays the bills for the holders of the card to the health care providers and in that sense; it is not a direct cash transfer, but an indirect one. Very poor people (earning less than 40 SRD i.e. less than US \$12 per month) get a special card; while less poor people (those earning between 40 SRD and 80 SRD per month) get another type of card. In the interior, the Medical Mission provides free basic health care for all inhabitants, while transport and specialist treatment (including hospital costs) are also paid for if needed. The Medical Mission receives a subsidy from the Ministry of Health and thus this is not a direct cash transfer. Special homes for children, the elderly and the handicapped also receive subsidies for their work, but again this is not a direct cash transfer to individuals of these target groups. There are several special programs and subsidies, but the ones we have listed so far are the most important ones.

The 2012 AmericasBarometer provides an opportunity to assess what citizens of the region think about CCT and other public assistance programs. While the survey did not ask directly about *support* for such programs, question **CCT3** did ask about attitudes towards recipients.⁶⁷

CCT3. Changing the topic...Some people say that people who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy. How much do you agree or disagree?

Responses were coded on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 represents “Strongly disagree” and 7 represents “Strongly agree.” Figure 25 presents levels of agreement with this statement across the countries of the Americas; responses have been recoded on a 0 to 100 scale for ease of comparison with other public opinion items.

⁶⁷ This question was asked of a split sample of respondents.




Figure 25. Belief that Public Assistance Recipients are Lazy in the Countries of the Americas

In comparison to the other countries in the region respondents in Suriname agree less with the statement that people who receive public assistance are lazy. As we would expect people who receive public assistance more often disagreed with this statement (in fact by agreeing they would call themselves lazy) than people who do not receive public assistance⁶⁸.

⁶⁸The mean for people in Suriname who receive public assistance was 2.98, while the mean for people who do not receive public assistance was 3.49. (On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 was strongly disagree and 7 was strongly agree).

Affirmative Action

Another possible policy solution that has very recently attracted attention in some places within Latin America is affirmative action. While in the United States affirmative action has a history of several decades, in Latin America it is a very recent phenomenon, and has only been seriously considered in a handful of countries with the largest populations of Afro-descendants.⁶⁹

In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we asked about support for affirmative action in every country of the region. Question **RAC2A** was administered to a split sample of respondents, who were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following statement, on a scale from 1 to 7.

RAC2A. Universities ought to set aside openings for students with darker skin, even if that means excluding other students. How much do you agree or disagree?

In Figure 26, we examine support for affirmative action across the Americas. Here, responses have been recoded on a 0 to 100 scale for ease of comparison with other public opinion items. In Suriname, with an average of 35.9, there is not much support for affirmative action (in universities) at least in comparison to most other countries of the region. We should mention that there is only one university in Suriname and the tuition fees are very low in comparison to other countries. The university basically allows all students with high school degrees who apply, except for a few disciplines where there is a *numerous fixus*. For students who do not have a high school degree, there are special classes to obtain a similar degree. There are study loans available to all students. So officially there is no discrimination within the educational system in Suriname based on skin color or ethnicity. The problem is that there are hardly any secondary schools, and no high schools, in the regions where tribal people live. Most primary schools in the rural interior have under qualified teachers or not enough teachers. This is a major problem, which leads to huge gaps within educational levels within the country⁷⁰. With such basic problems, affirmative action will not help because there are simply no candidates to enter the university from these regions. Good students from tribal areas often have to go to boarding schools to continue in secondary and high school. We already found (Figure 9) that place of residence has the biggest impact on education level in Suriname. So probably this question was not well suited for the Suriname situation, but should have rather been framed in a way that asks about affirmative action based on geography and not skin color.

⁶⁹ For further information on support for affirmative action in Brazil, see Smith, Amy Erica. “Who Supports Affirmative Action in Brazil?” *AmericasBarometer Insights* 49. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

⁷⁰ Apapoe I. 2004. *Het achterland van Suriname, een vergeten gebied*. Paramaribo: master thesis Anton de Kom University Suriname.

General Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation and Ministry of Social Affairs and Housing. 2009. *Suriname Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2006, Final Report*. Paramaribo, Suriname: Government of Suriname & United Nations Children’s Fund.




Figure 26. Support for Affirmative Action in the Countries of the Americas

V. Conclusion

The great differences in the life circumstances and opportunities facing citizens of the Americas constitute one of the most important political, social, and economic problems facing the governments of the Americas. While inequality has recently been improving in many countries of the Americas that have historically had the highest levels of inequality, we have seen that important differences remain in the opportunities and resources available to citizens depending on their personal characteristics and where these then place them within their country’s social milieu.

In Suriname inequality has not been improving recently, but actually has become worse. One of the major predictors of inequality is the place of residence. This has a strong effect on personal income and educational level. In perceived discrimination, skin color does play a significant role and it also has a negative effect on educational level. Compared with most countries in the Americas, in Suriname ethnicity is relatively more important than skin color. Ethnicity became of importance in official social constructions in the post-World War II decolonization process of Suriname, and replaced the concept of 'race'. We also see that as in most other countries in the region men still have a favored position in comparison to women. Because of the strong effect of place of residence (urban-rural status), even stronger than skin color, affirmative action seems more appropriate when based on geography at least in the Surinamese context. We have also noted that food insecurity is not a major issue in Suriname, while on the other hand receiving public assistance is among the highest in the region. This has mostly to do with the paternalistic characteristics of Surinamese politics and will be elaborated on in Chapter 8. We can conclude this chapter by saying that inequality is still a major issue in Suriname, but mostly based on differences between urban, rural and interior regions, rather than on gender and skin color as it is in other parts of the Americas.

Special Report Box 1: Educational Achievement and Skin Color


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 73, by Edward L. Telles and Liza Steele. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

To explore relationships between race and social outcomes, in the 2010 AmericasBarometer interviewers discreetly recorded respondents' skin tones.¹ This measure of skin tone provides an arguably more objective measure of skin color than a question asking for individuals' racial identification.

The figure indicates that, across the Americas, there are significant differences in years of education between the lightest and darkest skinned residents of almost every country, with the exceptions of Panama, Suriname, Belize, and Guyana.

Multivariate regression analysis is used to control for differences in social class and other relevant sociodemographic variables. This analysis indicates that skin color still has an independent predictive effect on educational outcomes. The impact of skin color on education is notable in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. The effect of skin tone on education is even stronger, however, in Bolivia and Guatemala, both countries with large indigenous populations. These results suggest that, contrary to scholarly wisdom, skin color does matter in Latin America. Furthermore, the results from Bolivia and Guatemala are consistent with research suggesting that indigenous groups are particularly marginalized in a number of Latin American countries.

Differences in Educational Achievement by Skin Tone in the Americas



95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effect Based)

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

¹ The variable used to measure a respondent's skin tone is **COLORR**. Education is measured using the variable **ED**, self-reported years of education.


Special Report Box 2: Economic Crisis, Skin Color, and Household Wealth

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 76, by Mitchell A. Seligson, Amy Erica Smith, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

To measure the impact of the economic crisis, the 2010 AmericasBarometer asked 43,990 citizens across the Americas whether they perceived an economic crisis, and if they did so, whether they thought it was serious.¹ While most citizens in the Americas perceived an economic crisis, in many countries of the region, the crisis' impact was surprisingly muted. However, the impact of the crisis was not evenly distributed across important sub-groups within the population, with reports of economic distress varying by race and social status.

As this figure shows, respondents with darker facial skin tones were much more likely to perceive a severe economic crisis. Among those with the lightest skin tones, the percentage of individuals who reported perceiving a grave economic crisis was around 40-45%, on average across the Latin American and Caribbean regions; at the other end of the scale, for those with the darkest skin tones, over 50% of individuals expressed the belief that their country was experiencing a severe economic crisis.

Similarly, the figure demonstrates that respondents from wealthier households were much less likely to perceive a severe economic crisis. Finally, we also uncover some limited evidence that women were more likely to be affected by the crisis. While 44.8% of men in the Americas perceived a severe economic crisis, 48.1% of women did so, a difference that is statistically significant, but not especially large. This leads us to conclude that the crisis especially hurt the region's most vulnerable populations: those who were worse off prior to the crisis felt its negative effects most strongly.



¹The variable measuring economic crisis perceptions is **CRISIS1**.

Special Report Box 3: Support for Interethnic Marriage


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 77, by Mollie Cohen. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

In order to gauge levels of support for interethnic marriage in countries with high indigenous populations, in the 2010 AmericasBarometer respondents in four countries, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru and Guatemala, were asked to what extent they would support their child's hypothetical marriage to an indigenous person.¹ The first figure indicates that a plurality of respondents indicated high levels of support for such a marriage. Nonetheless, there is still important variation in response to the question.


The second figure illustrates the results from a multivariate regression analysis of the sociodemographic predictors of interethnic marriage. A respondent's ethnicity has a statistically significant impact on support for marriage to indigenous persons, with all ethnic groups reporting significantly lower levels of support than self-identified indigenous respondents. Members of privileged groups—particularly self-identified whites and mixed individuals—indicate the least support for a child's hypothetical interethnic marriage.

Sociodemographic factors are largely irrelevant in predicting support for interethnic marriage, with a respondent's gender (not shown here to preserve space), wealth, education level, and the size of a respondent's place of residence all yielding statistically insignificant coefficients. Interestingly, self-reported political tolerance and the personality trait of openness to experience both positively predict support for interethnic marriage, all else equal.

Levels of Support for Interethnic Marriage in Four Countries, and Predicted by Sociodemographics and Values



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

¹ The variable measuring support for marriage to indigenous persons is **RAC3B**.

Chapter Two: Equality of Political Participation in the Americas

With Mason Moseley and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

In this chapter, we turn our attention to politics, examining how gender, race, and poverty affect political involvement and opportunities across the region. Chapter Two is thus divided into four parts. First, we review the literature on unequal participation, making the case for why this topic merits significant attention given its pertinence to democratization and economic development. Second, we focus on current levels of participation in electoral politics and civil society as measured by the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey. In doing so, we attempt to gauge the extent to which participatory inequalities are present in the Americas. We then turn to public opinion related to disadvantaged groups' participation in politics and public office. Finally, we review potential remedies for some of the participatory inequalities that might exist in the region.

Why does unequal participation matter? Perhaps beginning with Almond and Verba's seminal work on the "civic culture," political scientists and sociologists alike have sought to determine *who* participates in democratic politics, and how to explain variation in participation across groups and contexts.¹ An inevitable consequence of this literature has been that scholars have discovered that certain groups participate more in politics than others, and that there is a great deal of variation in levels of participation across democratic societies. The consequences of this variation are often manifested in political representation and policy outputs, as those who participate are also more likely to have their interests represented in government.

In his address to the American Political Science Association in 1997, Arend Lijphart suggested that unequal political participation was the next great challenge for democracies across the world.² Focusing on voter turnout in Europe and the Americas, Lijphart puts forth four principal concerns regarding unequal political participation in modern democracies. First, unequal turnout is biased against less well-to-do citizens, as the middle and upper classes are more likely to vote than lower class citizens. Second, this low turnout among poor citizens leads to unequal political influence, as policies naturally reflect the preferences of voters more than those of non-voters. Third, participation in midterm, regional, local, and supranational elections tends to be especially low, even though these elections have a crucial impact on a wide range of policy areas. Fourth, turnout has been declining in countries across the world, and shows no signs of rebounding. Many of Lijphart's arguments have been substantiated by strong empirical evidence, as the ills of uneven participation are especially deleterious in countries like Switzerland and the United States, where overall turnout is particularly low.³

¹Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications.

²Lijphart, Arend. 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemmas." *American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 1-14.

³Jackman, Robert W. 1987. "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies." *The American Political Science Review* 81(2): 405-424. Powell, G. Bingham. 1986. "American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective."

Uneven voter turnout certainly has some concerning implications for the representation of traditionally disadvantaged groups in democracies. Unfortunately, biased turnout also seems to be the rule rather than the exception. But what about other forms of political participation? Is political engagement outside the voting booth also unevenly distributed across various groups within society?

According to Verba et al. (1995), not only is turnout biased, but other forms of participation besides voting are actually *more* biased against certain groups.⁴ For example, while we continue to observe a significant gap between turnout among rich and poor citizens, the gap widens even further when we consider letter-writing, donating to campaigns, and volunteering for political parties or in local organizations.⁵ Particularly in a day and age when money has become a hugely important factor in political campaigns in countries across the world, it seems clear that a select few wield an inordinate amount of political power almost universally.

Inequalities in participation exist not only along lines of class or wealth, but also along gender and ethnicity. While turnout has largely equalized between men and women, such that in most countries women vote at approximately the same rate as men, women remain underrepresented in many other forms of participation.⁶ Substantial gaps in participation persist in areas such as communicating with representatives or volunteering for campaigns.⁷ Research suggests that many inequalities are due in part to inequalities within households in the gendered division of labor.⁸ Perhaps the greatest gender inequalities are seen for the most difficult types of participation, such as running for and holding public office. Inequalities in women's rates of holding office may aggravate inequalities in participation at other levels, since studies show that women are strongly influenced to participate by visible female leaders.⁹

Some scholarship suggests that participation has historically been uneven across ethnic and racial groups, though here national context seems to play a more important role. Even in the US, which has historically been characterized by very stark inequalities in the political resources and

American Political Science Review 80 (1): 17-43; Timpone, Richard J. 1998. "Structure, Behavior, and Voter Turnout in the United States." *American Political Science Review* 92 (1): 145-158.

⁴In the US, see Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Leighley, Jan E. and Arnold Vedlitz. 1999. "Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation: Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations." *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 61, No. 4, pp. 1092-1114. In Latin America, see Klesner, Joseph L. 2007. "Social Capital and Political Participation in Latin America: Evidence from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru." *Latin American Research Review* 42 (2): 1-32.

⁵Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

⁶Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Harvard University Press.; Desposato, Scott, and Barbara Norrander. 2009. "The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation." *British Journal of Political Science* 39 (1): 141-162; Kam, Cindy, Elizabeth Zechmeister, and Jennifer Wilking. 2008. "From the Gap to Chasm: Gender and Participation Among Non-Hispanic Whites and Mexican Americans." *Political Research Quarterly* 61 (2): 205-218.

⁷Burns et al. 2001. Aviel, JoAnn Fagot. 1981. Political Participation of Women in Latin America. *The Western Political Quarterly*. Vol. 34, No. 1. pp. 156-173.

⁸Iverson, Torben, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2010. *Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Welch, Susan. 1977. Women as Political Animals? A Test of Some Explanations for Male-Female Political Participation Differences. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 711-730

⁹Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Harvard University Press.

opportunities available to different ethnic groups, some evidence suggests that apparent differences across ethnic groups may be explained by differences in economic (or other) resources and social status.¹⁰ In Latin America, while the indigenous have historically been economically and culturally marginalized, democratization brought important indigenous social movements in many countries of the region.¹¹ Nonetheless, there is some evidence that indigenous *women*, in particular, may experience particularly strong barriers to participation.¹²

Unequal participation has very real consequences for democratic representation. When certain groups are overrepresented on Election Day, it stands to reason that they will also be overrepresented in terms of the policies that elected officials enact. In Mueller and Stratmann's cross-national study of participation and equality, they find that the most participatory societies are also home to the most equal distributions of income.¹³ In other words, while widespread political participation might not generate wealth, it can affect how wealth is distributed, and the policy issues that governments prioritize (e.g. education and welfare programs). Put simply, high levels of democratic participation also beget high levels of representativeness in terms of public policy and thus, more even processes of development.¹⁴

Another potential consequence of low levels of participation among traditionally disadvantaged groups is that those groups are underrepresented in legislative bodies. When women, ethnic minorities, and poor people vote at high rates, they often elect representatives that share similar backgrounds. Numerous studies have demonstrated that female representatives prioritize different issues than males, as do representatives from certain racial minority groups.¹⁵ Moreover, having minority representatives in the national legislature might also mobilize minority participation, generating a cyclical effect by which participation and representation go hand in hand.¹⁶ Thus, the effects of unequal participation on social and economic development are multifarious and significant, making any discrepancies we discover in terms of rates of participation across groups cause for concern, while any lack of discrepancy might be considered cause for optimism.

¹⁰Leighley and Vedlitz 2000, *Ibid.* Lien, Pei-Te. 1994. "Ethnicity and Political Participation: A Comparison Between Asian and Mexican American." *Political Behavior*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 237-264; Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady, Norman H. Nie. 1993. Race, Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United States. *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 453-497.

¹¹Cleary, Matthew R. 2000. "Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (9) (November 1): 1123 -1153; Nagengast, Carole, and Michael Kearney. 1990. "Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness, and Political Activism." *Latin American Research Review* 25 (2) (January 1): 61-91; Yashar, Deborah J. 2005. *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹²Pape, I.S.R. 2008. "This is Not a Meeting for Women": The Socio-Cultural Dynamics of Rural Women's Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes. *Latin American Perspectives*, 35(6): 41-62.

¹³Mueller, Dennis C., and Thomas Stratmann. 2003. "The Economic Effects of Democratic Participation." *Journal of Public Economics* 87: 2129-2155

¹⁴ See also Bartels, Larry M. 2008. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton University Press.

¹⁵Kenworthy, Lane, and Melissa Malami. 1999. "Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis." *Social Forces* 78(1): 235-268; Lublin, David. 1999. "Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation: A Critique of 'Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?'" *American Political Science Review* 93(1): 183-186; Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. 2006. "Still Supermadies? Gender and the Policy Priorities of Latin American Legislators." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 570-85.

¹⁶Barreto, Matt A., Gary M. Segura and Nathan D. Woods. 2004. "The Mobilizing Effect of Majority-Minority Districts on Latino Turnout." *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 65-75.

II. Participation in the Americas in 2012

In this section, we attempt to gauge how unequal political participation actually is in the Americas, using data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer surveys. While data from past studies indicate that significant disparities exist in terms of rates of participation across various social groups, we embark on this analysis with an open mind vis-à-vis participatory inequality in the Americas. Particularly given the lack of empirical evidence on this topic in Latin America and the Caribbean to date, the possibility remains that rates of participation are relatively equal across socioeconomic and racial groups, and between men and women.

Turnout

First, we examine inequalities in turnout in Suriname and across the Americas. In the AmericasBarometer surveys, electoral participation is measured using question **VB2**. In parliamentary countries, the question is revised to ask about the most recent general elections.

VB2. Did you vote in the last **presidential elections** of 2010? **[IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS, ASK ABOUT THE FIRST.]**
 (1) Voted **[Continue]** (2) Did not vote **[Go to VB10]**
 (88) DK **[Go to VB10]** (98) DA **[Go to VB10]**

In Figure 27 we present turnout by gender across the Americas. Two points are clear from this figure. First, there are great inequalities *across* the countries of the Americas in turnout, such that turnout in Honduras is 50.6%, while turnout in Peru is 90.6%. It is important to note that voting is compulsory in a number of countries in the region, while it is voluntary in others; these institutional differences certainly contribute to part of the cross-national variation in turnout. In Suriname voting is not compulsory. Although voting is not compulsory, we see that voter turnout in Suriname (78% in the sample) is slightly above the average of all countries studied (76%).¹⁷ Second, compiling data from all twenty-six countries included in the AmericasBarometer surveys, it appears that men and women participate in elections at similar rates—in fact women across the region actually boast *higher* turnout rates than men. This finding reflects what survey data from the developed world has indicated in recent years: when it comes to electoral participation, women have largely closed the gap with men. In Suriname, we also see that men and women participate in elections at the similar rate: 78% of all men voted in the elections of 2010 and also 78% of all women voted in the election of 2010. So there is no gender gap in terms of electoral participation in Suriname.¹⁸

¹⁷The actual voter turnout in 2010 was 75%, although it varied by district (from 52% to 89%). Ramadhin, Hardeo R. 2011. *De dynamiek in de politiek: een analyse van de algemene, vrije en geheime verkiezingen van 1996, 2000, 2005 en 2010 in de Republiek Suriname*. Paramaribo.

¹⁸Note that the one anomalous case in Figure 28 is the United States, where men self-report higher turnout (86.8%) than women (77.6%). There are two anomalies here. First, more women voted in the last U.S. election than men (66% to 62%), and second, there is substantial over-reporting of voting in the survey by about 18%. This over-report percentage is not unusual for recent U.S. presidential elections. See United States Census Bureau, “Voter Turnout Increases by 5 Million in 2008 Presidential Election, U.S. Census Bureau Reports,” July, 20, 2009, <http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/voting/cb09-110.html>, accessed July 21, 2012, and Allyson L. Holbrook and Jon A. Krosnick, “Social Desirability Bias in Voter Turnout Reports: Tests Using the Item Count Technique,” February 2009, <http://comm.stanford.edu/faculty/krosnick/Turnout%20Overreporting%20-%20ICT%20Only%20-%20Final.pdf>, accessed July 21, 2012




Figure 27. Gender and Turnout in the Countries of the Americas

We now turn to explore inequalities in turnout in Suriname in greater detail (see Figure 28). When we look at Suriname, we see that the more well-to-do citizens vote more often than the lower

classes. This is in line with the research conducted by Lijphart, which was mentioned earlier. He says that the middle and upper classes are more likely to vote than lower class citizens. This is also the case in Suriname, especially the poorest 20% of citizens vote less often (72%) than the rest. We already mentioned that there is no gender gap in terms of electoral participation in Suriname. When looking at educational background of the respondents we see that respondents with no education vote slightly less, on average, than respondents that are educated; although the confidence interval is large for people with no education so we have to be cautious with interpreting these data. Also looking at mother's educational level, the confidence intervals are very large for the higher educated mothers, so we cannot conclude anything from this result.

Further analysis shows that there seems to be a significant difference between the levels of education and if people identify with a political party; whereby the higher educated are less likely to identify themselves with a political party, but on the other hand have a greater interest in politics than the less educated. This could possibly be explained by the fact that in Suriname, identifying with political parties is often done for one's own interest¹⁹, so we expect the lower social class to identify more with political parties in order to gain benefits




Figure 28. Sociodemographics and Turnout in Suriname

¹⁹ Verschuuren, S. 1991. *Suriname: Geschiedenis in hoofdlijnen*. 's Gravenhage: SDU uitgeverij. Derveld, R. 1999. Veranderingen in de Surinaamse politiek 1975-1998. *OSO tijdschrift voor Surinaamse Taalkunde, Letterkunde, Cultuur en Geschiedenis*, 18 (1), 5-21. Martin, D. et al. 2001. *The Governance of Suriname*. Washington D.C: Inter-American Development Bank. Apapoe, I. 2004. *Het achterland van Suriname, een vergeten gebied*. Paramaribo: Anton de Kom University of Suriname.

Beyond Turnout

Turnout does not tell the whole story. Certainly there are myriad ways that citizens can engage their democratic system besides just voting, and participation in these activities across groups may or may not conform to the patterns observed in turnout. Fortunately, the AmericasBarometer surveys include an extensive battery of questions on other political participation besides voting. Among numerous other topics, these questions inquire about whether and how often citizens contact their representatives, and if they take part in certain community organizations. By looking at how groups might differ in terms of their involvement in these types of political activities, we obtain a more holistic view of whether or not certain sub-sections of society have unequal influence in the political process.

The AmericasBarometer by LAPOP has long included a series of questions to gauge whether and how frequently citizens participate in a variety of community groups. In 2012, we also included questions to measure whether a person who says that he or she participates takes a leadership role. The text of the CP battery is as follows:

I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never.
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...
(1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) NR
CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them...
(1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) NR
CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them...
(1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) NR

After each question, respondents who said that they participated at least once or twice a year received a follow-up question (**CP6L**, **CP7L**, and **CP8L**):

CP6L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role? [If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]
CP7L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? [If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]
CP8L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? [If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]

To what extent do citizens across the Americas participate in community groups? In Figure 29, we examine this question. The left side of the figure presents levels of community participation in each country of the Americas. Community participation is calculated as the average response to CP6, CP7, and CP8, and has been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents never participating in any group, and 100 represents participating very frequently in all groups. The right side of the figure presents the percentage of respondents in each country who said they had a leadership role in any community group. We see that on average community participation in Suriname is lower, than in most other countries in the Americas. Martin and colleagues also noticed this in earlier research, and they mention several factors for this: *'civic participation in Suriname has traditionally been low partly because of the long history of dependence on the Netherlands, and partly because of economic and political factors. On the economic side, citizen involvement is more difficult for persons with lower incomes due to the costs of membership in certain organizations and the costs of transportation necessary to participate in certain activities. In tight economic times, volunteer work becomes more*

*difficult*²⁰. The first reason seems to contradict itself, because the Netherlands has a very active tradition of civic participation, and we would therefore expect a higher degree of civic participation in Suriname. The second reason seems more valid, but since 2000 the economy has improved substantially; thus one would expect to see a higher civic participation in more recent years. Although we see that community participation is low on average in Suriname, we see that the percentage of respondents that said that they had a leadership role in a community group is quite high (12.9%), at least compared to other countries in the Americas.




Figure 29. Community Participation in the Countries of the Americas

In Figure 30 and Figure 31, we explore the results further within Suriname, presenting the average levels of participation among Surinamese by demographic group. When we look at community participation in Suriname, it is noteworthy that women participate more in community groups than men. It also seems that the higher educated participate slightly more in community groups than persons with a lower educational background. Wealth on the other hand does not seem to have a big influence on community participation; so this is in contrast with the finding of Martin and colleagues²¹. What we do see on the other hand, is that wealth does play a factor when looking at persons taking a leadership role in community groups and education plays an even larger role; whereby the higher educated are more often leaders in community groups than the lower educated. In terms of leadership in community

²⁰Martin, D. et al. 2001. *The Governance of Suriname*. Washington D.C: Inter-American Development Bank: 174.

²¹Martin, D. et al. 2001. *The Governance of Suriname*. Washington D.C: Inter-American Development Bank.



groups, there is no gender gap in Suriname looking at Figure 31; although actually there is, since women participate more in community groups (Figure 30). Thus we would expect them to more often have a leadership position; so there is some inequality in terms of leadership, whereby women seem to be disadvantaged.




Figure 30. Sociodemographics and Community Participation in Suriname




Figure 31. Sociodemographics and Percent Taking a Leadership Role in a Community Group in Suriname

Many citizens also participate in campaign related activities beyond simply voting. To gauge involvement in elections, we asked respondents questions **PP1** and **PP2**.

- PP1.** During election times, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate? **[Read the options]**
 (1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) DA
- PP2.** There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential [prime minister] elections of 2010?
 (1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) DK (98) DA

In Figure 32, we examine participation in campaign activities across the Americas. The left side of the figure presents the percentage of citizens who say they have “tried to persuade others” either “frequently” or “occasionally.” The right side presents the percentage who said they had worked for a campaign. When we look at Suriname and compare it with the other countries of America, we see that in terms of persuasion of others to vote for a party or candidate during election times, Suriname is among the countries that score high in terms of persuasion (although lagging behind the United States, which ranks much higher than all other countries). Suriname ranks the highest (along with Haiti) of all countries in the Americas in terms of people who actively have worked for political parties during the elections. Eighteen percent of all respondents said that they actively campaigned for a political party during the elections of 2010. One factor that can help explain this is that Suriname can be seen as a very paternalistic society in which the ruling government helps the people from their own political

party through patron-client networks²². This can be seen for instance in the fact that a staggering 43,589 (June 2012) persons are working for the government²³; most often they are employed because of loyalty to a political party. This is approximately 33% of the total workforce (some estimate this number to be even higher). When we compare the occupation of the respondents from all the LAPOP surveys, Suriname is the country with relatively most civil servants in the work force; 37% finds employment with the government, while on average, 16% in the Americas (see also Chapter 8). Therefore it seems rational for people to actively campaign for a political party, since they themselves might benefit if the party becomes the ruling party (through employment, receiving land, etc.). In Chapter 8 we will discuss this topic in more detail.




Figure 32. Campaign Participation in the Countries of the Americas

Next, we explore results for Suriname in further depth. In Figure 33, we recode all those who report that they tried to persuade others either frequently or occasionally as having attempted to persuade others. Interestingly we see that the very rich and the very poor citizens try to persuade others

²²Verschuuren, S. 1991. *Suriname: Geschiedenis in hoofdlijnen*. 's Gravenhage: SDU uitgeverij. Derveld, R. 1999. Veranderingen in de Surinaamse politiek 1975-1998. *OSO tijdschrift voor Surinaamse Taalkunde, Letterkunde, Cultuur en Geschiedenis*, 18 (1), 5-21. Martin, D. et al. 2001. *The Governance of Suriname*. Washington D.C: Inter-American Development Bank. Apapoe, I. 2004. *Het achterland van Suriname, een vergeten gebied*. Paramaribo: Anton de Kom University of Suriname.

²³General Bureau of Statistics. 2012. *Suriname Basis Indicatoren I Juli 2012*. Paramaribo: General Bureau of Statistics.

more often than the middle class, to vote for a certain political party or candidate during election time. We also see that men try to convince others more often than women, and the higher educated also try this slightly more often than others. Although these findings are interesting, only educational level of the respondents is statistically significantly correlated with attempts to persuade others in Suriname.




Figure 33. Sociodemographics and Attempts to Persuade Others in Suriname

In Figure 34, we present the percentage of respondents in different groups who said they worked for a candidate or party in the most recent elections. When looking at the different subgroups who said that they actively campaigned for a political party or candidate during the elections of 2010, we see that there are no differences in terms of economic status of the respondents, nor are there gender differences. It does seem that the higher educated respondents campaigned more often, although the spread around the means are large (with 95% confidence interval) so we have to be cautious with interpretation of this finding. It seems that we can conclude by saying that in Suriname people from all different levels of society are active during election time. This high active involvement in politics can partly be explained by the paternalistic nature of the Surinamese society. A finding that supports this argument is when we look at all the people who did campaign work during the elections in 2010 and about half of them were employed by the government.




Figure 34. Sociodemographics and Campaign Work in Suriname

In the preceding analysis, we have found evidence for some participatory inequalities by gender. However, it is quite likely that rates of participation vary by women's positions in the labor market and family.²⁴ Figure 35 presents rates or levels of participation by gender and, for women, by family and labor market status. When we look at Figure 35, we see that in terms of voting behavior there is no participatory inequality by gender. We already mentioned earlier that men persuade others more often than women to vote for a political party or candidate. Interestingly we see that married women with no income participate more often in community groups than other women and men. This could be explained by the fact that these women have more spare time to participate in community groups, although we do not know this for certain. In Figure 31, we saw that there was no difference in terms of gender for leadership positions in community groups, but we now get a more nuanced view; since in Figure 35, we see that it is especially the married women with no income that are less often community leaders, while other type of women are even more often community leaders than men.²⁵ Although we have to take into account that women also participate more in community groups than men; so all things being equal, we would expect more women to be leaders in community groups. It would be tempting to conclude that inequalities in terms of gender are not that large, but this would not be a good representation of the Surinamese society. For instance if we look at the parliament we see that only 12% of the members are female, but this includes both the female Speaker and female Deputy Speaker. Only three of the seventeen ministers are female; furthermore no political party in Suriname

²⁴ See, for instance, Iverson, Torben, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2010. *Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

²⁵ Again we must be cautious with the interpretation, because the spread around the means overlap (in terms of confidence intervals).

has a woman leading the party. So in terms of women’s leadership in high positions there is still a large gender gap in Suriname.




Figure 35. Gender Roles and Participation in Suriname

These results have not told us much about the association between race and participation in Suriname. In Figure 36, we present the rates or levels of each form of participation across the spectrum of skin color. When we look at skin color and participation, we see that in terms of voter turnout, people with very light and very dark skin color vote less often than others. In terms of persuasion, community participation and community leadership there seems to be noteworthy differences between people with different skin colors²⁶. We do see some fluctuations in terms of campaign work for political parties during the elections of 2010. This can be explained by the fact that several political parties in Suriname are strongly associated with ethnic groups. So ethnicity is more important than skin

²⁶We have to note that only 5 respondents were coded as very light (skin color number 1), so results of skin color 1 should be taken with caution.

color in the political arena in Suriname²⁷. In Chapter Seven, we will discuss the role of ethnicity in greater detail.




Figure 36. Skin Color and Participation in Suriname

III. Public Opinion on Opportunities and Discriminatory Attitudes

How much do members of the majority or society as a whole support equal opportunities for minority groups? Public support for equality of opportunity has obvious and important consequences. Citizens who think that the women's place is in the home, or that members of certain ethnic groups do not make good political leaders, are less likely to tolerate those groups' participation in public life, or to vote for such candidates. In this section, we review the results for a number of questions that seek to quantify the extent to which certain populations are discriminated against.

²⁷See for instance: Derveld, R. 1999. Veranderingen in de Surinaamse politiek 1975-1998. *OSO tijdschrift voor Surinaamse Taalkunde, Letterkunde, Cultuur en Geschiedenis*, 18 (1), 5-21. Sedney, J. 1997. *De toekomst van ons verleden: democratie, etniciteit en politieke machtsvorming in Suriname*. Paramaribo: Vaco N.V. Ramsoedh, H. 1999. *Oude schoenen in de Surinaamse politiek*. *OSO tijdschrift voor Surinaamse Taalkunde, Letterkunde, Cultuur en Geschiedenis*, 18 (1), 22-35. Blanksma, A. 2006. Etniciteit en nationalisme tijdens de Surinaamse verkiezingscampagne in mei 2005. *OSO tijdschrift voor Surinaamse Taalkunde, Letterkunde, Cultuur en Geschiedenis*, 25 (1), 149-165. Schalkwijk, M. 1996. De Etnische stem in de Surinaamse politiek, *SWI-Forum*, 13 (1).

Note that responses to these questions are likely subject to what public opinion scholars call “social desirability bias,” meaning that citizens will be less likely to report discriminatory attitudes because they recognize that prejudicial attitudes are socially taboo.²⁸ This means that even respondents who privately harbor discriminatory attitudes may give the “socially desirable,” non-discriminatory response in the survey context to avoid displeasing the interviewer. As a result, the levels of discriminatory attitudes we report based on these survey questions will likely be lower than their actual levels in the population.

Public Opinion towards Women’s Leadership

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included three questions tapping attitudes towards women in positions of political leadership, **VB50**, **VB51**, and **VB52**.²⁹ The text of these questions is as follows:

VB50. Some say that in general, men are better political leaders than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?			
(1) Strongly agree	(2) Agree	(3) Disagree	(4) Strongly disagree
(88) DK	(98) DA		
VB51. Who do you think would be more corrupt as a politician, a man or a woman, or are both the same?			
(1) A man	(2) A woman	(3) Both the same	
(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A	
VB52. If a politician is responsible for running the national economy, who would do a better job, a man, or a woman or does it not matter?			
(1) A man	(2) A woman	(3) It does not matter	
(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A	

In general about 3 out of 4 citizens of all countries disagree with the statement that “in general men are better political leaders than women” (**VB50**).³⁰ Still that means that at least 1 out of 4 citizens do think that women are less fit for political leadership. When we look at the general attitudes towards women in positions of political leadership, Figure 37 shows that there is a significant number of respondents who think that men are better political leaders than women. There are several Caribbean countries among the top ten countries that score highest in Figure 37; and Guyana, Suriname’s neighbor, ranks highest of all countries. This is somewhat unexpected since several of these countries have had women presidents or prime-ministers in the past. Compared to other countries in the Americas especially the Caribbean, we see that in Suriname there is a much more positive attitude towards women in leadership. But as mentioned before, in Suriname there are still large gaps between men and women’s positions in political leadership, so the positive attitudes do not seem to reflect the political landscape, where men still dominate daily political life.

²⁸Some recent scholarship in Latin America addresses the problem of social desirability in public opinion surveys when it comes to the issue of vote buying by designing experiments (see, for instance, Gonzalez-Ocantos, Ezequiel, de Jonge, Chad K., Meléndez, Carlos, Osorio, Javier and Nickerson, David W. 2012 Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56: 202–217.)

²⁹ VB51 and VB52 were administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.

³⁰We have added the answers “disagree” and “strongly disagree” up to make one large category “disagree”.




Figure 37. Belief that Men Make Better Leaders in the Countries of the Americas

Public Opinion towards the Leadership of Marginalized Racial/Ethnic Groups

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also included one question on attitudes towards people of darker skin in positions of political leadership, **VB53**.³¹

Now we are going to talk about race or skin color of politicians.

VB53. Some say that in general, people with dark skin are not good political leaders. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree? [Interviewer: “dark skin” refers to blacks, indigenous/native-(country)/First Peoples, “non-whites” in general]

(1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree
 (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

³¹ This question was administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.

In Figure 38 we see that some respondents still believe that people with dark skin are not good political leaders. Suriname scores below average compared to the other countries in the Americas. Negative attitudes towards people of darker skin in positions of political leadership therefore do not seem to be a real problematic issue in Suriname. In fact since the 1960s, there have always been persons with darker skin color in high political positions in Suriname. Again this does not mean that ethnicity is not an issue in politics, but as pointed out earlier, ethnicity is not equivalent to skin color in Suriname.




Figure 38. Belief that Dark Skinned Politicians are Not Good Leaders in the Countries of the Americas

Public Opinion towards the Participation of Homosexuals

As in 2010, the 2012 AmericasBarometer included question D5 on attitudes towards gays running for public office.

D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to **run for public office**?

Respondents could give a score between 1 and 10 on this question, with 1 being high disapproval and 10 meaning high approval; these scores have been transformed to fit on a 0-100 scale. Figure 39 shows that Suriname scores 43.3 on a 0-100 scale and scores slightly above the average for all countries. Suriname was the only Caribbean country who scored above average. So it seems that discrimination among homosexuals is not a very important issue in Suriname, especially compared to other Caribbean countries.




Figure 39. Support for Homosexuals Running for Office in the Countries of the Americas

Public Opinion towards the Participation of the Disabled

Finally, the 2012 AmericasBarometer included a new question on attitudes towards those who are physically disabled being allowed to run for public office.³²

D7. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of people who are physically handicapped being permitted to run for public office?

When we look at the attitudes towards those who are physically disabled being allowed to run for public office, we see that Suriname scores around the average (68.5 on a 0-100 scale) of the countries of the Americas. So while the respondents are in general positive towards those who are physically handicapped, they are not that positive compared to several other countries in the Americas, who score much higher.




Figure 40. Support for the Disabled Running for Office in the Countries of the Americas

³² This question was administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.

IV. Public Opinion towards Common Policy Proposals

Unfortunately, for at least some indicators of political engagement, there seem to exist nontrivial discrepancies in rates of participation between men and women, different racial groups, and social classes. While these results are certainly troubling, there are reasons to be optimistic about closing this gap, as American democracies have already come a long way in terms of political equality. Moreover, these differences are not present everywhere, which means that there might be lessons we can learn from the countries where unequal participation is not as pronounced. Below, we review public opinion towards several commonly proposed potential remedies for unequal participation, based on results from the 2012 AmericasBarometer surveys.

Gender Quotas

One potential policy solution to the problem of unequal participation and representation among women is gender quotas, which have been hailed as an effective way to more fully incorporate women into politics.³³ The general idea is that when more members of marginalized groups see people like them on the ballot and in office, they are thus more motivated to participate in politics than they are where political role models are scarce. In Latin America, several countries have adopted gender quotas, whereby the law mandates that women occupy a certain percentage of the seats in the national legislature. Unfortunately, however, as described in Special Report Box 5, the evidence on whether gender quotas reduce inequalities in participation is mixed.

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included one question, **GEN6**, enabling us to tap support for gender quotas across the Americas.³⁴

GEN6. The state ought to require that political parties reserve some space on their lists of candidates for women, even if they have to exclude some men. How much do you agree or disagree?

In Figure 41, we find support for gender quotas in the countries of the Americas. In Suriname, there are no laws mandating gender quotas for women. When comparing Suriname to the other countries of the Americas, we see that support for such gender quotas is somewhat lower (63 on a 0-100 scale) than the average of the other countries. So compared to other countries, there is less support in Suriname for the introduction of gender quotas; although looking at Suriname on its own terms, the majority is in favor of a quota. We should also note that in Suriname there is an increasingly louder call (by NGO's, but also organizations like the UNDP) to introduce stimulating measures such as gender quotas to include more women in Surinamese politics³⁵.

³³Desposato, Scott W., and Barbara Norrander. 2009. "The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation." *British Journal of Political Science*; Campbell, David E., and Christina Wolbrecht. 2006. "See Jane Run: Women Politicians as Role Models for Adolescents." *Journal of Politics* 68 (2): 233-47; Krook, Mona Lena. 2009. *Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide*. New York: Oxford University Press; Waring, Marilyn. 2010. "Women's Political Participation." <http://idbnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/43896/1/130393.pdf>.

³⁴ This question was administered to a split (half) sample of respondents.

³⁵See for instance: http://undpsuriname.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=207:increasing-participation-of-women-in-politics&catid=1:news&Itemid=12 and <http://nwonieuwsbrief.wordpress.com/tag/vrouwen-in-politiek/> (accessed on 29-11-2012).




Figure 41. Support for Gender Quotas in the Countries of the Americas

Compulsory Voting

Another potential remedy for unequal participation that has received much attention in the literature is compulsory voting.³⁶ While about half of countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region have some type of compulsory voting law, the extent to which these laws are enforced varies a great deal between countries. For example, Costa Rica has a compulsory voting law that is only weakly enforced, while not voting in Peru can actually prevent citizens from having access to certain public

³⁶Lijphart, 1997, *Ibid.*; Jackman 1987, *Ibid.*

services.³⁷ One would expect that in a country where turnout is high, participation in election is less unequal. Unfortunately, some new research, described in Special Report Box 6, would suggest that compulsory voting also does not have the expected effect in terms of reducing participatory inequalities.

Suriname does not have a law on compulsory voting. The electoral board produces a list of voters –which in fact is done by the Government Department of Registration of Births and Deaths. Everyone on the list is eligible to vote. Voters can check if they are on the list and make corrections if necessary. The process is easy and the lists are very accessible in urban areas. In the interior, it is however less easy to verify the voter list, because of the geographic spread of villages, high transport costs and lack of government offices.

Reduction in Economic and Social Inequality

Finally, and perhaps most obviously, reductions in inequality and poverty would seem to go a long way in closing the participation gap between citizens. One of the most important determinants of participation across the hemisphere is socioeconomic class. While female participation in the workforce itself can have a powerful positive effect on participation, socioeconomic status and education might render irrelevant any effects for gender or race on rates of participation.³⁸

At the aggregate level, scholars have found that political engagement is lower where economic inequality is at its highest, which has particular relevance to Latin America, the most unequal region in the world.³⁹ While the relationship among socioeconomic status certainly differs across political contexts,⁴⁰ material wealth and education exert a positive impact on political participation in virtually every democracy. Indeed, it seems that economic development can go a long way in reducing not only economic inequalities, but participatory ones as well.

V. Conclusion

Despite reductions in inequality over the past decades, this chapter has revealed that important aspects of political participation remain unequal in the Americas. When looking at Suriname, we have seen that in terms of voting behavior there are no significant gender gaps. But this is in strong contrast to political leadership positions in Suriname, which are mostly dominated by men. In general the attitudes towards women in terms of political participation are favorable, but this does not seem to have an effect on the general political landscape in Suriname. We also noted that compared to other countries in the Americas, Suriname ranks in the top in terms of people that actively campaign for political parties. This can partly be explained by the paternalistic character of the Surinamese society, which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8. Furthermore we saw that on average community participation in Suriname is lower, than in most other countries in the Americas. In general we can

³⁷Fornos, Carolina, Timothy Power, and Jason Garand. 2004. “Explaining Voter Turnout in Latin America, 1980 to 2000.” *Comparative Political Studies* 37(8): 909-940.

³⁸Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010, *Ibid*; Morgan and Buice 2011, *Ibid.*; Verba et al., 1993, *Ibid*.

³⁹Uslaner and Brown, 2005, *Ibid*; Seawright, Jason. 2008. “Explaining Participatory Inequality in the Americas.” Working paper.

⁴⁰Verba, Sidney, Norman Nie, and Jae-On Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

conclude that attitudes towards marginalized groups and other most often disadvantaged groups are positive, in the sense that Suriname people think favorably of these groups. Only support for homosexuals running for office was below the midpoint of 50. But besides this finding, there is not much discrimination in general. In different areas, however, the manifestation of these attitudes in present day Surinamese society is still somewhat lacking.


Special Report Box 4: Political Participation and Gender

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 78, by Frederico Batista Pereira. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

Across the Latin American and Caribbean regions, differential levels of community participation were reported by men and women in response to two questions posed to 40,990 respondents by the AmericasBarometer in 2010.¹ In almost every country in the region, men reported significantly higher levels of community participation than women. What accounts for these differences?

The top figure indicates that a number of variables from a mainstream model of political participation are significant in determining community participation. Thus, as expected, higher levels of education, wealth, external efficacy and political interest are associated with higher levels of community participation. However, these variables do not account for the gendered difference in participation—gender is still significant when other sociodemographic and motivational variables are accounted for.

We observe in the bottom figure that adherence to different gender roles has large impacts on predicted levels of community participation. While men and women without children participate at fairly similar rates, there is a substantial difference in predicted participation between men and women with two children, with men being substantially more likely to participate in local community affairs. Similarly, we see that those whose primary employment is as a caregiver or housewife report substantially lower levels of community participation than non-housewives. This suggests that women in Latin America and the Caribbean who have children and/or take on the role of homemaker face important barriers to participation in community affairs.



¹ To measure levels of community participation, questions CP5 and CP8 were used.


Special Report Box 5: Gender Quotas and Women’s Political Participation

This box reviews findings from the recipient of the 2011 AmericasBarometer Best Paper Award, by Leslie Schwindt-Bayer. The full paper may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/papers-ab-smallgrants.php>.

Gender quotas have been introduced in a number of Latin American countries since 1991. What, if any, effects have these gender quotas had on female participation not only at the elite level in politics, but in mass-level political engagement?

Data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey are used to explore whether differences in male and female political participation differ across countries with and without gender quotas for females at the elite level. As the figure shows, in three areas of political participation—political interest, having attended a party meeting, and having signed a petition—the gaps between male and female participation were smaller in countries with gender quotas in place than in countries where no such quota law has been implemented. However, these differences are small, and do not extend to the other kinds of political participation tested, including voting, persuading others to vote, working for a political campaign, protesting, attending a local government meeting, and attending women’s group meetings.¹

Analysis of a single case—Uruguay—was performed using data from the 2008 and 2010 rounds, before and after the implementation of gender quotas for the election of the party officials in that country in 2009. There is little change found between pre- and post-quota implementation.²The only gender gap that is statistically distinguishable from zero is that for petitioning government officials;



in both 2008 and 2010, women were statistically more likely to report having petitioned an official than men. Across all other measures of participation, the gap between men and women did not achieve statistical significance, and, except for the difference in political knowledge, in which women are more knowledgeable in 2010, the gap favors Uruguayan men.

¹ The questions used for these analyses are as follows: political interest, POL1; political knowledge (Uruguay only) G11, G13, G14; persuading others, PP1; working on a campaign, PP2; protest, PROT3; working on a campaign, CP2, CP4A, CP4; attending government meeting, NP1; attending party meeting, CP13; attending women’s group meetings, CP20.

² In 2014, there will be gender quotas to elect legislators.

Special Report Box 6: Compulsory Voting and Inequalities in Political Participation


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 63, by Arturo L. Maldonado. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

It has been postulated that compulsory voting changes the profile of voters, decreasing socioeconomic differences between voters and non-voters; in a statistical analysis, the implication is that indicators such as education and wealth would not be significant predictors of turnout in compulsory voting systems. This proposition was tested in the Latin American and Caribbean regions using data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, and in particular, a question (VB2) asking respondents from 24 countries whether they had voted in their country's last presidential or general elections.


Classic predictors of turnout are found to be significant in countries across the Americas, with older, wealthier, and more educated people more likely to report having voted. Similarly, those working for political parties and those reporting greater support for democracy were more likely to report having turned out to vote in their country's most recent elections.

Importantly, the figures illustrate that these differences in the profiles of voters versus non-voters hold across compulsory and non-compulsory voting systems. This suggests that, contrary to what a substantial body of political science literature has argued, changes in a country's voting rules might not affect the profile of voters (and thus, potentially, the profile of politicians who are elected). Although levels of turnout are higher in compulsory voting systems, changing from voluntary to compulsory voting might not, in fact, affect the profile of the average voting citizen. Rather, the findings reported here suggest that differences between voters and non-voters would likely persist in spite of such a change to the rules.

The Impact of Socio-Demographic and Political Variables on Turnout



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010
 Country fixed effects and intercept included but not shown here



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010
 Country fixed effects and intercept included but not shown here

Chapter Three: The Effect of Unequal Opportunities and Discrimination on Political Legitimacy and Engagement

With Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

As we have seen, economic, social, and political opportunities and resources are distributed unevenly in the Americas. Moreover, sizable minorities of citizens across the Americas are willing to report social and political attitudes that disfavor the participation of some groups. Such attitudes may reinforce unequal opportunities and resources. In this chapter we ask, what are the consequences for democracy in the Americas? How do political and social inequalities affect citizens' perceptions of their own capabilities? Furthermore, how do they affect their perceptions of their political systems and the democratic regime? Are there further consequences for the stability of the region's political systems?

There are many ways that discrimination may affect citizens' political attitudes. First, being a member of a socially and politically marginalized group may affect what is often called "internal political efficacy": one's perception of one's own political capabilities. There are two ways this could happen. On the one hand, marginalized groups might interpret their disadvantages as a signal of their social worth, and downgrade their estimates of their own capabilities.¹ Indeed, a recent *Insights* report by LAPOP indicates that across the Americas, women have lower internal efficacy, while the more educated and those with higher wealth have higher efficacy.² On the other hand, perhaps citizens who recognize discrimination as unjust react by becoming mobilized and engaged in politics. If so, under some circumstances being the victim of discrimination could boost political efficacy. Thus, the relationship between marginalization and internal efficacy may vary depending on the marginalized group's level of politicization.

Discrimination might also affect what is often called "external political efficacy": perceptions of leaders' receptiveness to citizen input. There are a couple of ways advantages and disadvantages accruing to one's group could affect external political efficacy. Some citizens have had previous contact with politicians, or their close friends and family members may have done so. These citizens may base their judgments of the receptiveness of politicians in general on actual experiences, whether favorable or unfavorable, with specific politicians.³ If politicians actually treat some groups better than others, citizens who have contact with politicians will draw conclusions from their own experiences,

¹Lassen, David Dreyer, and Søren Serritzlew. 2011. "Jurisdiction Size and Local Democracy: Evidence on Internal Political Efficacy from Large-scale Municipal Reform." *American Political Science Review* 105 (02): 238-258. See also Miller, Robert L., Rick Wilford, and Freda Donoghue. 1999. "Personal Dynamics as Political Participation." *Political Research Quarterly* 52 (2): 269-292.

²Borowski, Heather, Rebecca Reed, Lucas Scholl, and David Webb. 2011. "Political Efficacy in the Americas." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 65. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

³Kahne, Joseph, and Joel Westheimer. 2006. "The Limits of Political Efficacy: Educating Citizens for a Democratic Society." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 39 (2): 289-296.

leading to an association between group membership and external efficacy.⁴ In addition, citizens with a sense of collective identity – those who perceive that their fate is linked to that of the group– may well base their judgments of political leaders’ receptiveness on the experiences of others with whom they share the same characteristics, more generally.⁵

If discrimination diminishes external efficacy, this could, in turn, have downstream consequences for the legitimacy of the entire political system, meaning the perception that the political system is right and proper and deserves to be obeyed.⁶ Citizens who perceive that politicians care about and represent their views and interests may well reciprocate by supporting the political system. But discrimination might affect political legitimacy in other ways, as well. Citizens who perceive that they have been treated unfairly, whether by their fellow citizens or by political leaders, may see this unjust treatment as an indication of a society-wide failure, and of leaders’ ineffectiveness. This could lower evaluations of incumbents’ performance and what is often called “specific political support”: support for the particular people in office.⁷ When specific support for elected leaders declines, this may have downstream consequences, spilling over and depressing “diffuse support,” or trust in the broader political system. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that diffuse support for the system is a relatively stable attachment; analysis of the AmericasBarometer 2010 found that it was resistant to the effects of economic crisis.⁸

Prior evidence on the relationship between discrimination and legitimacy is mixed. In an extensive examination of 2006 AmericasBarometer data from Guatemala, Azpuru showed that there is not an ethnic divide in political legitimacy between Ladinos and Mayas in that country.⁹ However, in an analysis of 2010 AmericasBarometer data, Moreno Morales found that self-reported victimization by discrimination depresses system support.¹⁰

⁴For evidence on police officers differentially targeting citizens based on perceived social class, see Fried, Brian J., Paul Lagunes, and Atheendar Venkataramani. 2010. “Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America.” *Latin American Research Review* 45 (1): 76-97.

⁵Ashmore, Richard D., Kay Deaux, and Tracy McLaughlin-Volpe. 2004. “An Organizing Framework for Collective Identity: Articulation and Significance of Multidimensionality.” *Psychological Bulletin* 130 (1): 80-114.

⁶Gilley, Bruce. 2009. *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy*. Columbia University Press; Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy.” *American Political Science Review* 53 (1): 69-105; Weber, Max. 1919. “Politics as a Vocation.” In *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, 77-128. New York: Oxford University Press.

⁷Easton, David. 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: John Wiley; Easton, David. 1975. “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support.” *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (October): 435-7.

⁸Seligson, Mitchell A., and Amy Erica Smith. 2010. *Political Culture of Democracy, 2010: Democratic Consolidation in the Americas During Hard Times: Report on the Americas*. Nashville, TN: Latin American Public Opinion Project, Vanderbilt University.

⁹Azpuru, Dinorah. 2009. “Perceptions of Democracy in Guatemala: an Ethnic Divide?” *Canadian Journal of Latin America and Caribbean Studies* 34 (67): 105-130.

¹⁰Moreno Morales, Daniel. 2011. “The Social Determinants and Political Consequences of Discrimination in Latin America.” Presented at the Marginalization in the Americas Conference, University of Miami, Miami, FL, October 28. Also, in the US context, Schildkraut found that among non-acculturated US Latinos, discrimination increased participation but decreased legitimacy of the political system. See Schildkraut, Deborah J. 2005. “The Rise and Fall of Political Engagement among Latinos: The Role of Identity and Perceptions of Discrimination,” *Political Behavior*, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp.285-312.

Finally, discrimination and membership in marginalized groups could affect participation in social movements, with consequences for the shape of democracy and political systems in the Americas. If groups that are discriminated against respond by withdrawing from political activity, we might find lower levels of social movement participation among such groups as well.¹¹ However, discrimination certainly also at some moments constitutes a grievance that catalyzes protest among groups that are discriminated against, with famous examples such as the US civil rights movement or the recent Andean movements for indigenous rights.¹²

Again, however, evidence on the relationship between discrimination and protest participation is mixed. Cleary (2000), on the one hand, finds little link between discrimination and ethnic rebellion; Moreno Morales, on the other, finds in the AmericasBarometer that perceiving that one has been the victim of discrimination increases the likelihood of participating in protests.¹³ And scholars argue that inequalities along gender, racial, and socioeconomic lines can serve as “important rallying cries” during democratization,¹⁴ and raise “the probability that at least some dissident groups will be able to organize for aggressive collective action.”¹⁵ It appears, however, that group identity may need to be politicized, and group consciousness to form, to translate deprivation along racial, gender, or socioeconomic lines into activism.¹⁶

In this chapter, we assess how experiences of marginalization affect attitudes towards and engagement with the political system. First we examine measures of engagement, including internal and external efficacy. We then turn to more general attitudes towards the current political system, with attention to how perceptions of representation affect such more general attitudes. Finally, we examine whether and how membership in marginalized or discriminated groups affects protest participation.

¹¹Iverson and Rosenbluth *Ibid.*

¹²Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

¹³Cleary, Matthew. 2000. “Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America.” *Comparative Political Studies*. 33 (9). pp. 1123-53. Moreno Morales, *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Lovell, Peggy. 2000. Gender, Race and the Struggle for Social Justice in Brazil. *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 27, No. 6. pp. 85-102; Safa, Helen Icken. 1990. Women’s Social Movements in Latin America. *Gender and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 354-369.

¹⁵Muller, Edward N. and Mitchell Seligson. 1987. “Inequality and Insurgency.” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 81, No. 2, pp. 425-452.

¹⁶Nagengast, Carole and Michael Kearney. 1990. Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness and Political Activism. *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 25, No. 2 pp. 61-91; Uhlaner, Carole, Bruce E. Cain, and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1989. Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s. *Political Behavior*. Vol. 11 No. 3. pp. 195-231; Yashar, Deborah. 1998. Contesting Citizenship: Indigenous Movements and Democracy in Latin America. *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 23-42.

II. Inequality, Efficacy, and Perceptions of Representation

In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we included a number of questions to tap internal and external efficacy, as well as perceptions of representation. Two questions are part of the AmericasBarometer's long-standing core questionnaire (the first measuring external efficacy, the latter measuring internal efficacy):

EFF1. Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

EFF2. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

These questions were both coded on a 7 point scale running from 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly Agree”). In addition, the 2012 AmericasBarometer asked citizens to respond to the following question, **EPP3**, on a 7 point scale running from 1 (“Not at all”) to 7 (“A lot”). All three questions are recoded for the analysis in this chapter to run from 0 to 100.¹⁷

EPP3. To what extent do political parties listen to people like you?

Questions measuring group characteristics and equality of opportunities have been described in detail in Chapters 1 and 2. These questions include measures of gender, skin color, class, household wealth, and intra-household inequalities by gender, and self-reported victimization by discrimination in government offices, public places, and employment situations.

We begin by considering the distribution of internal efficacy, **EFF2**, across the countries of the Americas. When we look at internal efficacy in Suriname, we see that compared to the countries of the Americas, Suriname scores above average (average of all countries is 48.8, for Suriname it is 52.7). In general, Surinamese people believe that they understand political issues in Suriname quite well, more so than in most other countries of the Americas. It is interesting to focus on factors that can explain this internal efficacy in Suriname, and this will be done by looking at determinants for internal efficacy in Suriname (see Figure 42).

¹⁷This question was administered to a split sample, meaning to half of all respondents in each country.




Figure 42. Internal Efficacy in the Countries of the Americas

How do social inequalities and experiences of discrimination affect internal efficacy? In Figure 43, we use linear regression analysis to examine the association between internal efficacy and personal characteristics and experiences. When looking at the association between internal political efficacy and personal characteristics and experiences, it becomes apparent that the most important factor contributing to internal efficacy is the respondents' political interest. This has a statistically significant positive impact on internal efficacy. Education also has a positive impact on internal efficacy (measured with the question 'Do you feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country?'). It seems plausible that the higher educated have a better understanding of politics, at least believe that they do. Women also have a lower internal efficacy. These findings are in line with the recent *Insights* report mentioned earlier, indicating that across the Americas, women have lower

internal efficacy, while the more educated and those with more wealth have higher efficacy.¹⁸ Although for Suriname wealth does not have a significant impact on internal efficacy. On the other hand, we see that for Suriname political interest plays the most important role in internal efficacy. This can partly be explained by the fact that in Suriname, the higher educated have a greater interest in politics than the less educated (so education and political interest are highly correlated). Interestingly, on the other hand, the higher educated are less likely to identify themselves with a political party in Suriname.




Figure 43. Determinants of Internal Efficacy in Suriname

In Figure 44, we explore in greater depth how personal characteristics and discrimination are related to citizens' belief in their ability to understand the political system in Suriname. The results highlight the findings from Figure 43, whereby education, gender and especially interest in politics are factors associated with internal efficacy. There are evident differences among men and women, whereby women have lower internal political efficacy. However, the differences among women (female homemaker and female non-homemaker) are negligible.

¹⁸Borowski, Heather, Rebecca Reed, Lucas Scholl, and David Webb. 2011. "Political Efficacy in the Americas." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 65. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).




Figure 44. Factors Associated with Internal Efficacy in Suriname

Now we turn to examine two variables that reflect citizens' perceptions that the political system represents and listens to them. Variables **EFF1** and **EPP3** are described at the beginning of this section. In figure 45 we present the distribution of these two variables across the countries of the Americas. It was already observed that in terms of external efficacy Suriname ranks amongst the highest compared to the countries of the Americas. This is also the case in terms of citizens' perceptions that the political system represents them (average for all countries is 38.6, for Suriname it is 48.2, the second highest behind Venezuela) and listens to them (average of all countries is 34.5, for Suriname it is 40.0). Thus in general Surinamese people have a strong belief that the political system represents and listens to them, at least if compared to most other countries of the Americas.




Figure 45. External Efficacy and Perceptions of Party Representation in the Countries of the Americas

Who within Suriname thinks that “those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think?” And who agrees with the notion that “political parties represent people like you?” In Figure 46 and Figure 47, we use linear regression analysis to examine the personal characteristics and experiences that lead citizens to report high external efficacy and strong perceptions of representation. Interestingly we see that unlike internal efficacy in Suriname, there is no significant relationship between education and both external political efficacy and perceptions of representation. This can be explained by the fact that internal efficacy has more to do with ‘understanding’ by the respondent itself, which means that the level of one’s own education is important. In contrast external efficacy and perceptions of representation are more related to ‘others’ (if political parties listen and if political leaders are interested in the respondent), so one’s own educational level is not as important. On the other hand we do see that in line with the finding of internal efficacy in Suriname, the respondents’ interest in politics has a strong positive impact on external efficacy and perceptions of representation. As regards external efficacy in Suriname, we see that women also have lower external efficacy while wealth¹⁹ has a negative impact on external efficacy.

¹⁹ In previous research Borowski and others also found a negative significant relationship between wealth and external efficacy, see Borowski, Heather, Rebecca Reed, Lucas Scholl, and David Webb. 2011. “Political Efficacy in the Americas.” *AmericasBarometer Insights* 65. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).




Figure 46. Determinants of External Efficacy in Suriname




Figure 47. Determinants of Belief in Party Representation in Suriname

To further understand what factors are associated with these two attitudes, in Figure 48 and Figure 49, we examine how several of the most important variables from the regression analysis are related to external efficacy and perceptions of party representation. Both Figure 48 and Figure 49 indicate that interest in politics is strongly related with external efficacy and whether political parties listen to individuals. The higher one's interests in politics the higher one's external efficacy and the more likely that they believe political parties listen to people like themselves. So in general we see that interest in politics in Suriname is important for all factors related to political efficacy. Figure 48 also shows that poorer people in general tend to have a higher external efficacy compared to the very rich. Thus they believe that those who govern the country are more often interested in (poorer) people like them than the rich do. Lastly we see that in Figure 48 men have slightly higher levels of external efficacy than women. So men believe more often that politicians governing the country are more interested in them than women.




Figure 48. Factors Associated with External Efficacy in Suriname




Figure 49. Factors Associated with Belief in Party Representation in Suriname

III. System Support and Engagement with Democracy

Experiences of marginalization and discrimination may also affect more abstract political attitudes. As discussed above, discrimination could be seen as a failure of the political system, and could lower support for the general political system. In the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we tap a number of more general political attitudes; the most important of these are support for the political system and support for democracy in the abstract. In Chapter Five we describe in detail how these are measured, as well as the levels of these attitudes across the region and over time within Suriname. In the present section, we consider how personal characteristics and experiences of discrimination shape these attitudes that are so critical for democratic stability.

In Figure 50 we use linear regression analysis to assess what individual traits and reported experiences predict levels of political support in Suriname. It is once more evident that interest in politics has a very positive impact on supporting the political system in Suriname. Experiencing discrimination by government, wealth and education are also significantly related to supporting the political system. Figure 51 examines these relationships in greater detail.




Figure 50. Determinants of Support for the Political System in Suriname

To assess in greater depth the most important factors determining support for the political system, in Figure 51 we examine the separate relationships between a number of personal traits and experiences and system support. Figure 51 indicates that lower educated people support the current political system more often than the higher educated people. This is also the case for poorer people, who favor the current system more, compared to the wealthier persons. The greater one's interest in politics, the more in favor one is of the current political system. Also if respondents do not experience discrimination by the Suriname's government they are more in favor of the political system. This is in line with what we would expect, as it seems logical that people who do not feel discriminated by the government will be more in favor of the government compared with those experiencing discrimination.




Figure 51. Factors Associated with System Support in Suriname

Experiences of marginalization and discrimination might also have spillover effects on support for democracy in the abstract. In Figure 52, we use linear regression analysis to assess how the set of personal traits we reported above are associated with the belief that “democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.” The linear regression analysis shows that Maroons and older persons favor democracy more than any other form of government; although these determinants are not as robust as previous findings.




Figure 52. Determinants of Support for Democracy in Suriname

In Figure 53, we continue to examine the variables identified as important in the regression analysis above. Figure 53 shows that Maroons support democracy slightly more than other ethnic groups, but the differences are not very noteworthy. What we do see is that age has a significant relationship with supporting democracy; whereby older people favor democracy much more than the younger aged. An explanation could be that the older generation in Suriname has experienced the military regime from 1980 - 1987, so they have a better understanding (real-life experience) of other forms of government than democracy.




Figure 53. Factors Associated with Support for Democracy in Suriname

IV. Protest Participation

Last, as we discussed at the beginning of the chapter, marginalization and discrimination may lead some groups – at least those that are highly politicized – to join social movements and participate in protest politics. Previous LAPOP studies have presented evidence that in at least some countries throughout the Americas, the act of protesting may be becoming a more “normalized” method of political participation: “individuals who protest are generally more interested in politics and likely to engage in community-level activities, seemingly supplementing traditional forms of participation with protest.”²⁰ In the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we asked a number of questions related to protest, including most importantly **PROT3**.

PROT3. In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?
 (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to PROT6]
 (88) DK [Go to PROT6] (98)DA [Go to PROT6]

In Figure 54, we examine the levels of political protest throughout the Americas. Suriname did not experience much political protest in recent years. Figure 54 shows that only 3.8% of the respondents have participated in a demonstration or protest march in the last 12 months. Compared to the other countries of the Americas this is very low.

²⁰Moseley, Mason and Daniel Moreno. 2010. “The Normalization of Protest in Latin America.” *AmericasBarometer Insights* 42. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).




Figure 54. Participation in Protests in the Countries of the Americas

Who protests in Suriname? In Figure 55, we now use logistic regression analysis to consider whether and how experiences of marginalization and discrimination affect whether citizens of Suriname participate in protest politics. We have to be cautious with interpreting the following data, since only 3.8% of all the respondents participated in political protest in the past 12 months. Therefore the confidence intervals are large (see for instance Figure 56). Regression analysis to explore determinants of protest participation in Suriname shows that experiencing discrimination in public places, Amerindians compared to other ethnic groups, political interest, gender and size of place of residence, have a significant impact on protest behavior. But when analyzing these variables in greater detail, one should be very cautious, since Figure 56 shows that the confidence intervals are too large.




Figure 55. Determinants of Protest Participation in Suriname

In Figure 56, we explore further how protest participation is related to several important variables discovered in the analysis presented in Figure 55. It is important to note that all variables, that were significantly related with protest participation in the regression analysis, have too large of confidence intervals to make valid conclusions. This is due to the fact that only 3.8% of all the respondents participated recently (last 12 months) in a demonstration or protest march in Suriname.




Figure 56. Factors Associated with Protest Participation in Suriname

V. Conclusion

This chapter has revealed that internal and external political efficacy in Suriname is very high compared to most other countries in the Americas. The major explanation is that those with a high level of interest in politics have higher levels of political efficacy. In line with previous research, there is evidence that women have lower levels of political efficacy than men. Discrimination is not a major issue in Suriname, and does not have a large impact on political legitimacy and engagement. Interestingly we found that the older generation supports democracy more than the younger generation. This is explained by historical factors, namely that the older generation experienced a military coup in 1980; so they know what it means to live under another form of government, while the younger generation does not. Finally we found that recently there has not been much political protest in Suriname. In fact only 3.8% of all respondents participated in a demonstration or protest march in the past twelve months, which is very low in comparison to most other countries in the Americas.


Special Report Box 7: Political Knowledge and the Urban-Rural Divide

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 68, by Frederico Batista Pereira. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

Across Latin America and the Caribbean there are important differences between urban and rural areas in levels of political knowledge, as measured by a series of factual questions about the country's political system by the AmericasBarometer in 2010. What accounts for these differences?¹

The second figure illustrates that both individuals' **opportunity** to become involved in politics—measured here using socioeconomic factors and educational variables—and individuals' **motivation** to learn about politics—measured here using questions about an individual's personal interest in politics and exposure to media—are important to predicting an individual's level of political knowledge. However, measures of opportunity are of greater importance in explaining the knowledge gap between urban and rural areas.

Two variables in particular stand out: access to media at home, and an individual's level of education. When these opportunity variables are controlled for in the analysis, the difference in predicted levels of political knowledge across urban and rural areas shrinks substantially. This indicates that most of the gap in political knowledge observed across the urban/rural divide is, in fact, due to differential opportunities in urban versus rural areas, particularly in access to education and in access to media at home.



¹ For this report, political knowledge questions related to national level politics—G11, G13, and G14—are used.

Special Report Box 8: Discrimination and System Support



This box reviews findings from the paper “The Social Determinants and Political Consequences of Discrimination in Latin America,” by Daniel Moreno Morales. This paper was presented at the AmericasBarometer Conference on Marginalization and Discrimination in the Americas, at the University of Miami, October 28, 2011.

Who is most likely to be a victim of discrimination in Latin America and the Caribbean? Using data from 8 countries from the 2006 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer, the author finds that economic, ethnic, and gender-based discrimination are all prevalent in the countries under study.¹ The figures at the right indicate that discrimination is prevalent across these eight countries, and that individuals are more likely to report witnessing than experiencing discrimination.

Further analysis indicates that those who identify as black or indigenous, as well as those who have darker skin tones, are more likely to report having experienced discrimination. However, wealthier respondents report less experience with discrimination.

Last, experiencing discrimination either as a victim or as a witness lowers support for democracy and interpersonal trust, and increases protest behavior.² Thus, discrimination can have pernicious democratic effects.

Experiences with Discrimination in Eight Countries



Source: Americas Barometer by LAPOP, 2010

¹ The countries included in these analyses are: Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Mexico and Bolivia. The questions used to measure various types of discrimination, both victimization and observation, are: DIS11, DIS12, DIS13, RAC1A, RAC1D, RAC1E from the 2010 questionnaire.

² The questions used to measure these dependent variables are: system support, B1, B2, B4, and B6; protest, PROT3; interpersonal trust, IT1.

Special Report Box 9: Support for Democracy and Electoral Information


This box reviews findings from the 2012 report “Follow-up and Baseline Surveys of the DemocraciaActiva-Peru Program: Descriptive and Comparative Results,” by Arturo Maldonado and Mitchell A. Seligson.

The DemocraciaActiva-Peru (DAP) program, sponsored by USAID/Peru and FHI 360, was designed to promote positive attitudes toward democratic processes and to encourage a more informed vote among Peruvian citizens in seven targeted regions. This report analyzes a 2010 baseline and a 2012 follow-up survey, comparing results to those of AmericasBarometer.


The most salient point of the program results was the impact on support for democracy, a question asked in DAP and the AmericasBarometer surveys.¹ As the green bars in the first figure show, an increase of 15 points on a 1-100 scale was found between the baseline and follow-up surveys. This change is attributable to the DAP program because a similar increase was not found in support for democracy in the AmericasBarometer survey (BA) for the same time period, as the grey bars display.

The impact of the program among women is especially significant. As the second figure indicates, before the program intervention in 2010, it was observed that men more often reported having information about electoral candidates than women did. However, after the program intervention, women reported similar levels to the men in having access to election information; this percentage rose to almost 50% for both groups in 2012. Importantly, this study shows that well-targeted interventions can help to reduce gender gaps in political engagement.

Average support for democracy, by year and survey



Percentage who have received information about candidates, by gender and year



Source: Baseline and Follow-Up Surveys by LAPOP, 2010-2012

¹ This question asks to what extent respondents agree or disagree with the statement: “Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.”

**Part II:
Governance, Political Engagement, and
Civil Society in the Americas**

Chapter Four: Corruption, Crime, and Democracy

With Mollie Cohen and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

High crime rates and persistent public sector corruption are two of the largest challenges facing many countries in the Americas today. Since the 1990's, following the end of the Cold War and the global shift towards democracy, the study of corruption and implementation of initiatives to combat corrupt practices have been on the rise.¹ Corruption, often defined as the use of public resources for private gain, obviously was commonplace under previous authoritarian regimes in various countries throughout the Americas; however, given widespread media censorship and the great personal risk for those who chose to report on corruption, it was impossible to determine just how much corruption existed and in what public spheres was it more common.

Studies from the field of economics have noted corruption's adverse impact on growth and wealth distribution. Because corruption takes funds from the public sector and places them in private hands, it often results in the inefficient expenditure of resources and in lower quality of public services. There is, then, growing understanding in academia of the corrosive effects that corruption has on economies as well as of the challenges corruption creates for democratic governance, particularly the egalitarian administration of justice.²

At the level of public opinion, there is a substantial body of evidence indicating that those who are victims of corruption are less likely to trust the political institutions and political actors of their country, and these effects hold across the region.³ However, others show that such opinions do not spill over onto attitudes towards democracy more generally.⁴ Some scholars even suggest that corruption can at times simply lead to citizen withdrawal from politics, or even *help* specific governments

¹ See, for example, Schedler, Andreas, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner. 1999. *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

² Pharr, Susan J. 2000. Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies. In *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?*, edited by Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Meon, Pierre-Guillaume and Khalid Sekkat. 2005. "Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth?" *Public Choice* (122): 69-97; Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* (28) 2: 388-409; Fried, Brian J., Paul Lagunes, and Atheender Venkataramani. 2010. "Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* (45) 1: 76-97.

³ Seligson, Mitchell A. 2002. "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries." *Journal of Politics* (64) 2: 408-33; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2006. "The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America." *World Development* (34) 2: 381-404; Booth and Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2008. "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 285-308.

⁴ Canache, Damarys, and Michael E Allison. 2005. "Perceptions of Political Corruption in Latin American Democracies." *Latin American Politics and Society* 47 (3): 91-111.

maintain public support.⁵ Some have also suggested that corruption victimization could erode social capital, making those who experience corruption less trusting of their fellow citizens.

Recently, increased scholarly attention has been paid to the importance of perceptions of corruption. Two recent studies, both using AmericasBarometer data, have indicated that perceiving higher rates of corruption is linked to lower levels of trust in key state institutions, independently of individuals' experiences with corruption.⁶ However, having experienced corruption is not particularly strongly linked to high perceptions of corruption, and for that reason LAPOP normally prefers to both data on actual corruption victimization as well as data on corruption perceptions.

Crime is another serious and growing problem in many countries of the Americas. Homicide rates in Latin America and the Caribbean were estimated at 15.5 per 100,000 citizens by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2011, more than double the global homicide rate of 6.9 per 100,000, and nearly five times the homicide rate in Europe (3.5 per 100,000).⁷ While South America has been following the worldwide trend downward in homicide, rates in Central America and the Caribbean have been on the upswing.

Given this context of extremely high crime, it is imperative that political scientists and policymakers understand the effects that crime victimization and the fear associated with crime have on democratic governance and stability. It is easy to comprehend how crime victimization might affect citizen support for the political system and perhaps even democracy, since it is that system that can be blamed for not delivering citizen security.⁸ Moreover, citizens might become less trusting, and potentially less tolerant, of their fellow citizens if they fear or have experienced crime, thus eroding social capital and leading to lower support for civil liberties and liberal institutions. Crime victimization could even lead citizens to seek to immigrate to other countries.⁹ Fear of or experience with crime might also lead to decreased support for and faith in certain key political institutions, particularly the police, but also the judiciary.¹⁰

As with corruption, it is unclear whether an individual's perception of crime or actual crime victimization is more important in shaping her attitudes towards the democratic system. Even in places

⁵Davis, Charles L, Roderic Ai Camp, and Kenneth M Coleman. 2004. "The Influence of Party Systems on Citizens' Perceptions of Corruption and Electoral Response in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (6): 677-703; Manzetti, Luigi, and Carole Wilson. 2007. "Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Support?" *Comparative Political Studies*; McCann, James A, and Jorge I Domínguez. 1998. "Mexicans React to Electoral Fraud and Political Corruption: An Assessment of Public Opinion and Voting Behavior." *Electoral Studies* 17 (4): 483-503.

⁶ Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico." *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, (28) 2: 388-409; Salinas, Eduardo and John A. Booth. 2011. "Micro-social and Contextual Sources of Democratic Attitudes in Latin America." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* (3) 1: 29-64.

⁷Global Study on Homicide. 2011. <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/global-study-on-homicide-2011.html>

⁸ Bateson, Regina. 2010. "The Criminal Threat to Democratic Consolidation in Latin America." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, D.C; Carreras, Miguel. Forthcoming. "The Impact of Criminal Violence on System Support in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review*.

⁹Arnold, Alex, Paul Hamilton, and Jimmy Moore. 2011. "Who Seeks to Exit? Security, Connections, and Happiness as Predictors of Migration Intentions in the Americas." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 64. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

¹⁰ Malone, Mary Fran T. 2010. "The Verdict Is In: The Impact of Crime on Public Trust in Central American Justice Systems." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 2 (3).

where crime rates are high compared to global figures, the probability that an individual will be murdered or become the victim of a serious crime, fortunately, remains quite low in most countries, even though in some Central American countries the rate is disturbingly high. However, individuals might read about violent crimes in the newspaper, see images on the television, or know people who have become the victims of such crimes. The fear of becoming a victim, which is possible for anyone regardless of past experience with crime, might have a greater impact on attitudes than actually having been a crime victim.

This chapter seeks to understand the extent of corruption and crime in the Americas and to clarify how corruption and crime affect democratic attitudes and feelings about the rule of law across the region.

II. Corruption

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of questions that measure corruption victimization, which are deployed in the AmericasBarometer surveys. Following initial tests in Nicaragua in 1996¹¹, these items have been refined and improved. Because definitions of corruption can vary across different country contexts, we avoid ambiguity by asking such questions as: “Within the past year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?” We ask similar questions about demands for bribes at the level of local government, from police agents, from military officials, in public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and other settings (see below for the exact questions).¹² This series has two particular strengths. First, it allows us to determine in which social settings corruption occurs most frequently. Second, we are able to construct a corruption scale, distinguishing between those who have experienced corruption in only one setting and those who have been victimized in more than one setting. We assume that with corruption, as with crime, multiple victimizations are likely to make a difference.

¹¹Seligson, Mitchell A. 1997. *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Study of Public Opinion*. Washington, D.C., Casals and Associates, and Seligson, Mitchell A. 1999. *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Follow-up Study*. Washington, D.C., Casals and Associates

¹² Question **EXC20**, on bribery by military officials, was introduced for the first time in 2012.

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE “FUERZA PÚBLICA”] EXC20. In the last twelve months, did any soldier or military officer ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

Another item that taps perceptions of rather than experiences with corruption is also included in the questionnaire. The question reads as follows:

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among **public officials** is **[Read]** (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA



We rescale this variable from 0-100, where 0 represents a perception that corruption is very uncommon, and 100 a perception that corruption is very common.

Perception of Corruption

Figure 57 shows that citizens tend to perceive high levels of corruption in the Americas. The highest countries are Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago, both with average reported levels of corruption above 80 on the 100-point scale; by far the lowest country is Suriname, where the average perception of corruption is only 38.8 on the scale. In Suriname, perceptions of corruption are the lowest if compared with other countries in the Americas. This is noteworthy, since there are often corruption scandals in Suriname. In the Corruption Perception Index 2012 of Transparency International, Suriname ranked 88 of 174 countries. The Corruption Perception Index measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption within a country (the higher the number, the more corrupt)¹³. One IDB report said: ‘*Suriname appears vulnerable to corruption because its economic and institutional systems have many of the characteristics that provide a favorable environment for corruption. The economy is highly regulated and the officials who administer many of the economic regulations often have substantial monopoly power and a large amount of discretion. Furthermore, accountability in the public sector is weak...*’¹⁴ Although corruption in Suriname is widespread, perceptions are low. One possible explanation is that, because it is so widespread many people do not consider ‘*small things*’ (such as being given a job or a small piece of land through patron-client networks¹⁵) as ‘*corruption*’.

¹³Transparency International (2012). *Corruption Perceptions Index 2012*. Berlin, Germany: Transparency International.

¹⁴Martin, D. *et al.* (2001). *The Governance of Suriname*. Washington D.C: Inter-American Development Bank.

¹⁵ Suriname can be seen as a paternalistic society in which the ruling government helps the people from their own political party through patron-client networks (see for instance Verschuuren 1991; Derveld 1999; Martin *et al.* 2001, cf. Apapoe 2004). Therefore it is not astonishing to see that in Suriname, a staggering 43.589 (June 2012) persons are working for the government (ABS 2012). This is approximately 33% of the total workforce (some estimate this number to be even larger).




Figure 57. Perceptions of Corruption in the Countries of the Americas

As with the other indicators throughout this report, we present the changes in perceptions of corruption over time. Figure 58 reports trends in perception of corruption in Suriname for the years in which these data were collected. Perceptions of corruption have dropped from 2010 to 2012. We do not know why this is the case, since in terms of corruption scandals there are no major differences nor has there been any campaign against corruption in the past years, although this was mentioned by the current president shortly after his inauguration in 2010. However, since then still nothing has been done to combat corruption. A possible explanation is that large corruption scandals seem to play a role during surveys, so if the survey of 2010 was shortly after a large corruption scandal this could have contributed to a higher percentage of the perception of corruption. Conversely, if during the survey of 2012, there was no large corruption scandal right before the survey this could influence the response, in terms of a lower rate.




Figure 58. Perceptions of Corruption over Time in Suriname

It is important to note that high levels of perceived corruption might not always correspond to high, or even rising, levels of corruption. Thus, although perceptions of corruption might be high, actual victimization might be low. We turn to actual experiences with corruption victimization in the next section.

Corruption Victimization

This section addresses the extent to which citizens in the Americas have been victimized by corruption. To this end, we present the percentage of respondents who report that they have been asked for a bribe in at least one location in the last year.




Figure 59. Percentage Victimized by Corruption in the Countries of the Americas

Figure 59 shows wide variation in rates of corruption in different countries across the region. When looking at actual numbers of corruption in the past year, Suriname scores on the lower end compared to other countries in the Americas, with 11.9% of respondents saying that they were victimized by corruption in the past year, so roughly one in ten respondents.

Some citizens received requests for a bribe in many instances, while others received requests in one or none. Next, we assess the number of instances in which citizens reported being victimized by corruption in Suriname in 2012. This information is presented graphically in Figure 60. We find that 88.1% reports no experience with corruption in the past 12 months, 7.7% being victimized in one instance, while 2.8% report two instances, and less than 2% have been victimized three or more times in the past year.




Figure 60. Number of Instances Victimized by Corruption in Suriname

How have levels of corruption victimization varied in Suriname over time? In Figure 61, we show the percentage of citizens who report any corruption victimization, by year. We see that in contrast to perceptions of corruption which drastically decreased between 2010 and 2012, respondents who were actually victimized by corruption remained the same (11.8% in 2010 and 11.9% in 2012). So while there is an improvement in perceptions, this is not the case in real time corruption.




Figure 61. Percentage Victimized by Corruption over Time in Suriname

Who is Likely to be a Victim of Corruption?

In order to paint a clearer picture of corruption victimization, we computed a logistic regression model to identify those socioeconomic and demographic characteristics that were positively and negatively associated with corruption victimization. Figure 62 displays the results of this regression. The results of the logistic regression show that only gender, being a woman, and age have a negative impact on corruption victimization. Other socioeconomic and demographic characteristics were no significant predictors of corruption victimization.




Figure 62. Determinants of Corruption Victimization in Suriname

To better grasp the impact of a given independent variable on the likelihood that an individual has been victimized by corruption, we present bivariate results in Figure 63. Figure 63 indicates large confidence intervals so we have to be cautious with interpreting this data. The confidence intervals are large, since only 11.9% of the respondents in the sample experienced corruption in the past year. Although the confidence intervals are large, it seems as if the middle class (those with an average education and those considered middle class in terms of wealth) experiences more corruption than the higher educated and more well-to-do citizens and more corruption than the less educated and poorer citizens. An explanation for this finding is that this last group probably has less to offer corrupt officials. As we already noticed in Figure 62, women are less often than men victims of corruption in Suriname as are people of older age (although there are large confidence intervals for age).




Figure 63. Demographics and Corruption Victimization in Suriname

III. Perceptions of Insecurity and Crime Victimization

The Americas Barometer measures citizens’ perception of their safety by asking question AOJ11:

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?
 (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe
 (4) Very unsafe (88) DK (98) DA

Following LAPOP standard practices, responses were recalibrated on a 0-100 scale, where higher values mean greater perceived insecurity. Given that the majority of criminal acts occur in urban areas, and especially in national capitals, we opted to present crime victimization data for the 24 national capitals included in the sample (for sampling reasons, the United States and Canada are excluded). Figure 64 shows the results for all the capitals in the survey. When we look at perceptions of insecurity, we see that Suriname’s capital Paramaribo ranks slightly lower in comparison to the average of citizens in other countries in the Americas. Paramaribo scores 37.5, whereas most other capital city’s score higher. So perceptions of insecurity are lower in Suriname than the majority of the other countries in the Americas.




Figure 64. Perceptions of Insecurity in the Capitals of the Americas

Figure 65 shows how perceived levels of insecurity have changed over time in Suriname, using data from past waves of LAPOP surveys in which respondents were asked the same question. Comparing perceptions of insecurity over time, we see that perceptions have been decreasing in Suriname between the years 2010 (39.1) and 2012 (34.1), and the difference is statistically significant. An explanation for this finding is that actual numbers of crime victimization have been steadily dropping in Suriname according to police statistics¹⁶. This is supported by the data on crime victimization over time in Suriname in this current study (Figure 70). We expect that this decrease in crime victimization gives people a greater sense of security. This is in line with a finding by the UNDP¹⁷ (study done in 2010), which found that compared to several other countries in the Caribbean, Suriname ranked among the highest in terms of its citizens feeling of security.

¹⁶ See for instance *Suriname 2012 Crime and Safety Report*.

<https://www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=12328> (accessed 10-01-2013).

¹⁷ Zimmermann, Robert, Lawes Carol, and Svenson Nanette (eds.). 2012. *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012: Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security*. New York: United Nations Development Programme.




Figure 65. Perceptions of Insecurity over Time in Suriname

In what regions of the country are perceptions of insecurity most severe? In Figure 66, we examine this issue. In regards to the different regions in Suriname, perceptions of insecurity is lowest in the rural-interior (where many tribal communities live) and the highest in Paramaribo, the capital. This is also what one would expect, since the rural areas in Suriname are much safer than the capital city (see also Figure 69 for actual numbers on crime victimization by region).




Figure 66. Perceptions of Insecurity in the Regions of Suriname

Once again, in the same way as we previously discussed for the issue of corruption, it is important to note that high levels of perceived insecurity might not always correspond to high, or even rising, levels of crime. Thus, although perceptions of insecurity might be high, actual victimization might be low. We turn to a discussion of crime victimization in the next section.

IV. Crime Victimization

How do perceptions of insecurity compare to individuals' experiences with crime? Since 2010, the Americas Barometer has used an updated series of items to measure crime victimization, which reads as follows:

<p>VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Skip toVIC1HOGAR] (88) DK [Skip toVIC1HOGAR] (98) DA [Skip toVIC1HOGAR]</p>
<p>VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred?[Read options] (1) In your home (2) In this neighborhood (3) In this municipality/canton (4) In another municipality/canton (5) In another country (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A</p>
<p>VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)</p>

Figure 67 combines responses from **VIC1EXT** and **VIC1HOGAR**. Compared to other countries in the Americas, when looking at levels of crime victimization, it is apparent that the capital city of Suriname is safer than most other capital cities in the Americas. With respect to levels of personal crime victimization Paramaribo (the capital of Suriname) scores lower than the average for all countries that were studied in the Americas (Suriname 20.2%, average all countries 23.8%). But also at levels of household crime victimization, Suriname scores lower than the average of the countries in the Americas (Suriname 13.2%, average all countries 25.7%). When we compare Suriname to other Caribbean countries, its neighboring country Guyana and Jamaica have a more favorable score than Suriname, while a Caribbean country like Trinidad & Tobago scores worse¹⁸.

It is important to remember, however, that our survey is only administered to adults of voting age or older, making it possible for youth crime victimization that family members do not know about to go underreported. It is also important to remember that responses are individuals' self-reported crime victimizations. In some contexts, certain crimes (particularly those that are perpetrated almost exclusively against particular marginalized groups) might be normalized and thus reported with less frequency than that with which they occur.

¹⁸ These findings are in line with the study done by the UNDP, see Zimmermann, Robert, Lawes Carol, and Svenson Nanette (eds.). 2012. *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012: Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security*. New York: United Nations Development Programme.




Figure 67. Personal and Household Crime Victimization in the Countries of the Americas

Figure 68 illustrates where most crime in Suriname occurred, according to respondents. Figure 68 shows that most crimes (71%) took place in the respondents own home (one can especially think of burglaries and break-ins), while 11% took place in the neighborhood in which the respondent lives. Lastly, 15.7% says that the last crime occurred in another resort.




Figure 68. Location of Most Recent Crime Victimization in Suriname

In which regions of Suriname does most crime take place? Figure 69 illustrates regional patterns in crime. Figure 69 clearly shows that most crimes take place in the capital city of Paramaribo (urban), while the rural areas of Suriname score much lower in terms of crime victimization. This corresponds with the finding on perceptions of insecurity mentioned earlier; here we also noticed that perceptions of insecurity were the highest in the capital city.




Figure 69. Crime Victimization by Region in Suriname

Finally, it might be of interest to know how experiences with crime have changed over time. Figure 70 illustrates trends in self-reported crime victimization in Suriname between 2010 and 2012. In terms of crime victimization, there is a drastic decrease between 2010 and 2012. Suriname seems to have become much safer in the past years, at least according to the respondents. Police statistics¹⁹ also show this downward trend; although the crimes that have taken place in recent times seem to be more violent than previously experienced in Suriname, according to the police. So while there is a downward trend, the brutality of the fewer crimes committed seems to become harsher.

¹⁹ See for instance *Suriname 2012 Crime and Safety Report*.
<https://www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=12328> (accessed 10-01-2013).




Figure 70. Crime Victimization over Time in Suriname

Overall crime levels in Suriname have decreased over time. This downward trend is statistically significant and has almost certainly to do with an increase in police patrols in the past years. We conclude this part by quoting from the UNDP study on crime in the Caribbean: *‘Barbados and Suriname record low levels of officially reported violent crime, and high percentages of the respondents there indicated they felt secure from crime’*²⁰.

Who is Likely to be a Victim of Crime?

Figure 71 depicts the results of a logistic regression model assessing who is likely to be a victim of crime in Suriname. In this and all other regression charts, we standardize all variables. As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable’s effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p < 0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect.

²⁰ Zimmermann, Robert, Lawes Carol, and Svenson Nanette (eds.). 2012. *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012: Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security*. New York: United Nations Development Programme. Page 36.




Figure 71. Determinants of Personal Crime Victimization in Suriname

In Figure 71, we see that the only statistically significant determinant for being a crime victim is the size of the place in which one lives (in the case of Suriname, urban, which is meant the capital city, or rural).

To better understand the effect of each independent variable on crime victimization in Suriname, Figure 72 shows the bivariate relationships between each of the significant independent variables from the original logistic regression and crime victimization in Suriname. When we look at Figure 72, we must first of all note the large confidence intervals because the majority of the respondents have not been a victim of crime in the past year. So we have to be cautious with interpreting these data. Although caution is required, there are some interesting findings, for instance female homemakers have been less victimized by crime than other females and males. The most statistically significant finding is of course that living in an urban area (the capital city Paramaribo) increases chances of being a crime victim compared to living in rural areas.




Figure 72. Demographics and Household Crime Victimization in Suriname

V. The Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Support for the Political System

What are the effects of high rates of crime and corruption victimization, as well as the perceptions of corruption and insecurity, on political legitimacy in Suriname? We now turn to a multivariate linear regression which estimates the impacts victimization and insecurity have on support for the political system. Figure 73 depicts the impacts of perceptions of and experiences with crime and insecurity on system support.²¹ Figure 73 shows that there are several variables that have a statistically significant impact (all negative) on system support in Suriname. We see that corruption victimization, perceptions of insecurity, gender (females support the system less often than males) and educational level have a negative effect on system support. In Figure 74, we will examine more in depth the effects these variables have on system support.

²¹ System support is calculated as the respondent's mean of responses to five questions: B1 (perception that the courts guarantee a fair trial), B2 (respect for the political institutions of the country), B3 (belief that citizens' basic rights are well-protected in the country), B4 (pride in living under the country's political system), and B6 (belief that one should support the political system of the country). The resulting variable is rescaled to run from 0 to 100. For more information, see Chapter 5.




Figure 73. Determinants of System Support in Suriname

Figure 74 delves further into the effects of the independent variables on system support, presenting the bivariate relationships between system support and corruption and crime perceptions and experiences. Corruption victimization and perceptions of insecurity have a statistically significant influence on system support in Suriname. When looking at corruption victimization, it is apparent that those who are more often victims of corruption support the political system less often than those who are not victims of corruption. This is also what we would expect, since we assume that those being victims of corruption to be dissatisfied with the current political system in which corruption has a foothold. In regards to perceptions of insecurity, those experiencing more insecurity are most dissatisfied with the current political system. This is also in line with our expectations, since these respondents consider the current political system inadequate to give them a sense of security. Besides these two variables, we also noticed in Figure 73 that gender (females support the system less often than males) and educational level have a negative effect on system support.




Figure 74. Crime, Corruption, and System Support in Suriname

VI. Support for the Rule of Law and the Impact of Crime and Insecurity

This section addresses support for the rule of law in the Americas. The rule of law is often conceptualized as the universal application of the laws of the state, or the supposition that no group has legal impunity.²² Previous studies by LAPOP found a wide variation of the willingness of citizens in the Americas to accept violations of the rule of law by the police in order to fight criminals. Consistent with the threat hypothesis, those that perceive higher levels of crime and those who are victimized by crime are more likely to accept transgressions of the rule of law.²³ To measure support for the rule of law in the Americas, we use a single item which taps the extent to which the authorities should be bound by the law while pursuing justice.

AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?
 (1) Should always abide by the law
 (2) Occasionally can cross the line (88) DK (98) DA

Figure 75 shows the percentage of citizens in 2012 in each country of the Americas who express support for the rule of law, versus those who believe that, at times, the police and other

²² See, O'Donnell, Guillermo A. 2004. Why the Rule of Law Matters. *Journal of Democracy* 15 (4): 32-46.

²³ Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime? AmericasBarometer Insights Series, 19. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

authorities may act with impunity. The highest support for the rule of law is found in Jamaica (74.9%), while the lowest support is found in Bolivia (53.3%). In Suriname, 65.8% of the citizens express support for the rule of law. This is slightly higher than the average for all countries of the Americas that are represented in Figure 75 with a mean of 65.0% for all countries. The differences between the countries are not as substantial, as with other variables that we have described in previous chapters.




Figure 75. Percentage Supporting the Rule of Law in the Countries of the Americas



In Figure 76 we show levels of support for the rule of law over time in Suriname. Figure 76 shows that there is no significant difference between support for the rule of law in 2010 (66.1%) and 2012 (65.8%) in Suriname. So, support for the rule of law in Suriname has not changed in recent years.




Figure 76. Percentage Supporting the Rule of Law over Time in Suriname

Finally, we conclude this section by attempting to clarify the determinants of support for the rule of law in Suriname. Figure 77 represents the results of a logistic regression used to identify those factors. Figure 77 shows that educational level, corruption victimization, perceptions of insecurity and wealth are statistically significant determinants for supporting the rule of law in Suriname. Figure 78 indicates the precise impact these variables have on supporting the rule of law.




Figure 77. Determinants of Support for the Rule of Law in Suriname

Figure 78 delves more deeply into some of the more important independent variables in this analysis. It shows quite clearly that the higher educated persons support the rule of law less often than the lower educated. This is the strongest determinant for supporting the rule of law that we could identify. Figure 78 also shows that people who are poorer support the rule of law more often than people with more wealth. Interestingly Figure 78 shows that victims of corruption support the rule of law slightly more often than those that were not victims of corruption in the past year (although the differences are not that substantial). Possibly these respondents are less likely to accept violations of the rule of law by the police or others, since the corruption that they themselves experienced was also a violation of the rule of law (although in another sense than asked in the question: ‘*In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?*’). In line with the threat hypothesis,²⁴ we find that those who perceive higher levels of insecurity are more likely to accept transgressions of the rule of law (so support the rule of law less often). The threat hypothesis, also states that those who are victimized by crime are more likely to accept transgressions of the rule of law. But the variable, being victimized by crime, was not a significant determinant in support of the rule of law when adding this variable in the regression model.

²⁴Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime? *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)




Figure 78. Factors Related to Support for the Rule of Law in Suriname

VII. Conclusion

This chapter has addressed the magnitude and the relationships between crime victimization, corruption victimization, perceptions of insecurity, crime, and corruption, and support for the political system and the rule of law in Suriname. We found that perceptions of corruption in Suriname are the lowest of all countries in the region. Perceptions of corruption also decreased significantly in the past years. Although perceptions decreased, actual cases of corruption that respondents have experienced themselves did not reduce. While perception has dropped, the government of Suriname did not take policy measures in recent years to tackle corruption. So while perceptions have dropped, levels of corruption did not decline in Suriname. When looking at perceptions of insecurity and crime victimization, there are declines of both in recent years; this is in line with government policy on these issues and with police statistics on crime levels (crime levels have truly declined). We also found a strong relationship between the region in which one lives and levels of crime and perceptions of insecurity. The overall finding is that the rural areas in Suriname are much safer than the capital city, both in reality and in perceptions of individuals.

We also found that those who are more often victims of corruption support the political system less often than those who are not victims of corruption. People who experience more insecurity are most dissatisfied with the current political system. Furthermore, we found that the higher educated individuals support the rule of law less often than the lower educated. Thus this is the strongest determinant for supporting the rule of law; so education plays a very important role. Last but not least we find support for the threat hypothesis, that those who perceive higher levels of insecurity are more likely to accept transgressions of the rule of law.

Chapter Five: Political Legitimacy and Tolerance

With Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

At least since the times of Plato, philosophers and political scientists have asked what makes democracy tick. The concept of legitimacy has been central. While some political scientists have defined democracy in terms of procedures,¹ others have shown that citizen attitudes and values play a key role, highlighting legitimacy as key for democratic consolidation.² Political legitimacy is an indicator of the relationship between citizens and state institutions, central to the study of political culture and key for democratic stability.³

In LAPOP studies using AmericasBarometer data, we define political legitimacy in terms of citizen support for the political system and tolerance for the political rights and participation of others. Further, “system support” has two central dimensions: diffuse and specific support.⁴ While specific support can be measured by questions addressing the incumbent authorities, diffuse system support refers to a generalized attachment to the more abstract object represented by the political system and the political offices themselves. Though many existing measures of system support confound these two dimensions, LAPOP’s measure of system support (operationalized through the AmericasBarometer survey data) captures the diffuse dimension of support that is central for democratic survival.⁵ This chapter examines political legitimacy and tolerance across the Americas, seeking to understand what factors explain variation in these attitudes at the individual level.

While some argue that certain cultures naturally have higher political legitimacy, others have proposed that economic development or politicians’ proximity to citizens’ policy preferences have an important effect on citizens’ attitudes about the political system.⁶ Institutional variables have also been

¹Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 3rd ed. New York: Harper Perennial; Przeworski Adam. 1999. “Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense,” in Robert A. Dahl, Ian Shapiro, y Jose Antonio Cheibub. eds. *The Democracy Sourcebook*. Cambridge: The MIT Press; Huntington, Samuel P.1991.*The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.

²Diamond, Larry. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*.Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University Press; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2000. “Toward a Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America”. *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2: 5-29; Booth, John A. and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations*, 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

³See also Almond, Gabriel Abraham y Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*.Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

⁴Easton, David. 1975. “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support,” *British Journal of Political Science* 5, no. 4: 435-457; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2000. “Toward a Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America.” *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2: 5-29.

⁵Booth and Seligson. 2009 *Ibid*.

⁶Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*; Inglehart Ronald, 1988. “The Renaissance of Political Culture,” *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 4 (December 1): 1203-1230.PrzeworskiAdam et al., 2000.*Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*, 1st ed. Cambridge University Press; Acemoglu, Daron et al., 2008. “Income and Democracy,” *American Economic Review* 98, no. 3 (May): 808-842; Peter Kotzian.2011. “Public support for liberal democracy,” *International Political Science Review* 32, no. 1 (January 1): 23 -41.Geoffrey Evans and

shown to be important determinants of system support. Some studies have found, for instance, that systems that incorporate features that make electoral defeat more acceptable, i.e. that reduce disproportionality, have positive impacts on support for the system, especially among the losers in the democratic game.⁷

Previous research by LAPOP has shown that system support is associated with measures such as citizens' trust and participation in political parties and their perception that they are represented by those parties.⁸ In addition, the research has shown political system support to be related to participation in local and national politics and support for the rule of law.⁹

Political tolerance is a second key component of political culture and a central pillar of democratic survival. In line with previous LAPOP research, we define political tolerance as "the respect by citizens for the political rights of others, especially those with whom they may disagree."¹⁰ Gibson and other authors have pointed out the nefarious effects of intolerance on the quality of democracy. Intolerance, among both the mass public and elites, is associated with support for policies that seek to constrain individual freedoms and with perception of lack of freedom among those who are targets of intolerance.¹¹ Gibson has found that racism within a community is associated with a lessened sense of freedom of expression. Additionally, he has found racial intolerance to have a negative impact on political freedom for both blacks and whites.

Why do people become intolerant? Scholars have found many factors affecting tolerance, including perceptions of high levels of threat,¹² authoritarian personality,¹³ and religion.¹⁴ At the

Stephen Whitefield.1995. "The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies," *British Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 4: 485-514.

⁷Anderson, Christopher. 2007. *Losers' consent: elections and democratic legitimacy*, [Reprinted]. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Anderson, Christopher J. and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems," *The American Political Science Review* 91, no. 1: 66-81.

⁸Corral, Margarita. 2009. Participation in Meetings of Political Parties.*AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 20. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Corral, Margarita. 2008. Mis (trust) in Political Parties in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 2. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Corral, Margarita. 2010. Political Parties and Representation in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 36. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

⁹Montalvo, Daniel. 2008. Citizen Participation in Municipal Meetings.*AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 4: Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime? *AmericasBarometer Insights*, 19. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Maldonado, Arturo. 2011. Compulsory Voting and the Decision to Vote, *AmericasBarometer Insights*, 63. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)

¹⁰Seligson, "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America," 5.

¹¹ Gibson, James L.. 1988. "Political Intolerance and Political Repression During the McCarthy Red Scare," *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2: 511-529; Gibson, James L.2008. , "Intolerance and Political Repression in the United States: A Half Century after McCarthyism," *American Journal of Political Science* 52 : 96-108; Gibson, James L.1998. "A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading Russians to Tolerate," *American Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 3 : 819-850; Gibson, James L.1995. , "The political freedom of African-Americans: a contextual analysis of racial attitudes, political tolerance, and individual liberty," *Political Geography* 14, no. 6-7 : 571-599.

¹²Marcus George E., W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen. 2000. *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*, 1st ed. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press; Merolla, Jennifer L. y Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2009. *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public*, 1st ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Huddy, Leonie et al.2005."Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies," *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3: 593-608; Brader, Ted,

macro-level, social identity and social dominance theorists have proposed looking at intolerance as a function of in-group and out-group dynamics and positions in the social hierarchy.¹⁵ Finally, external threats and security crisis as well as levels of democratization are related to tolerance.¹⁶ LAPOP-affiliated researchers using AmericasBarometer data have found that support (or lack thereof) for the right to same sex marriage is linked not only to the religious denomination but also the centrality of religion in individuals' lives. Additionally, more developed countries present higher levels of support for this right.¹⁷

Research by Golebiouwska has found that an individual's sex has a direct effect on tolerance, such that women are less tolerant than men.¹⁸ It also has strong indirect effects, because women are more religious, perceive more threats, are less likely to tolerate uncertainty, are more inclined towards moral traditionalism, have less political expertise, and are less supportive of democratic norms than men.

System support and political tolerance have important effects on democratic consolidation. Stable democracies need legitimate institutions and citizens who are tolerant and respectful of the rights of others. The ways in which tolerance and political legitimacy are expected to affect stable democracy, according to LAPOP previous studies, are summarized in Table 1. If the majority shows high system support as well as high tolerance, it is expected that the democracy will be stable and consolidated. On the contrary, if the majority is intolerant and distrustful of their institutions, the democratic regime may be at risk. A third possibility is high instability if the majority shows high tolerance toward other citizens but accords political institutions low legitimacy. Finally, if the society has high system support but low tolerance, the conditions do not bode well for democracy and, at the extreme, are ripe for the regime to drift toward a more authoritarian model.

Table 1. The Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

	High Tolerance	Low Tolerance
High System Support	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low System Support	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

Nicholas A. Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay. 2008. "What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat," *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 4 : 959-978

¹³ Altemeyer Bob. 2007. *The Authoritarians*.

¹⁴ Postic, Robert K. 2007. *Political tolerance: The effects of religion and religiosity*; Stouffer, Samuel A. 1955, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties*. John Wiley & Sons Inc.

¹⁵ Sidanius, Jim and Felicia Pratto. 1999. *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression*, 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁶ Peffley, Mark and Robert Rohrschneider. 2003 "Democratization and Political Tolerance in Seventeen Countries: A Multi-level Model of Democratic Learning," *Political Research Quarterly* 56, no. 3 : 243 -257.

¹⁷ Lodola, Germán, and Margarita Corral. 2010. Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights* 44. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

¹⁸ Golebiouwska, Ewa. 1999. "Gender Gap in Political Tolerance", *Political Behavior*, 21 (3): 443-464; Golebiouwska, Ewa. 2006. "Gender and Tolerance" in Gerson Moreno-Riano Ed. *Tolerance in the 21st Century*. Lanham, MD; Lexington Books.

It is worth noting that this conceptualization has found empirical support. Using 2008 AmericasBarometer data, Booth and Seligson found serious warning signs of political instability in Honduras just before the military forces unconstitutionally exiled the then president Zelaya to Costa Rica.¹⁹

II. Support for the Political System

LAPOP's "system support" index is estimated as the mean of responses to the following questions from the AmericasBarometer survey:

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.

B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial?(**Read:** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)

B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?

B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?

B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?

B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

Following the LAPOP standard, we rescale the resulting variable to run from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low support for the political system, and 100 represents very high support.

How does support for the political system vary across the Americas? In Figure 79, we present the levels of political support in our study in 2012. In Suriname, we see a very high support for the political system compared to other countries in the Americas. Suriname ranks second right behind Belize. One factor that can possibly shed some light on this very high political support is that the political system in Suriname helped to create a peaceful multi-ethnic society, to some extent due to its consociational democracy, whereby each political group or party is too small to hold a majority position. Parties therefore have to reach out to others to form a majority coalition. And as most political parties are organized along ethnic lines, coalitions are generally of an inter-ethnic nature. The philosophy of *broederschap* (brotherhood), which is well respected in Suriname, mostly directs government formation. This philosophy is based on an ideology that values the inclusion of many ethnic groups in leadership in order to negotiate about differing interests and to resolve eventual conflicts in a peaceful manner.²⁰ Taylor and Berns²¹ describe the pride in the political system in the

¹⁹Booth, John A. and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press; see also Perez, Orlando J., John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2010. The Honduran Catharsis. *AmericasBarometer Insights* 48. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

²⁰Gowricharn, R. 2006. "Ethnicity and Political Stability in Plural Societies", In Gowricharn, R. (ed.). *Caribbean Transnationalism: Migration, Pluralization, and Social Cohesion*. Oxford: Lexington Books. Cf. Blanksma A. 2006. *Etniciteit en nationalism tijdens de Surinaamse verkiezingscampagne in mei 2005. OSO tijdschrift voor Surinaamse Taalkunde, Letterkunde, Cultuur en Geschiedenis*, 25 (1), 149-165.

²¹ Taylor, S. & Berns, J. 2010. *Country Studies Series: Suriname*. Waltham, Massachusetts: Coexistence International at Brandeis University.

following way: ‘There is a pride felt by the Surinamese government and many of its citizens for how the multi-ethnic society has avoided overt tensions and violent conflict for much of its history. There is also a growing recognition on the part of the government that Suriname’s diversity is an asset to the country’s development, and one that should be nurtured’. Tensions and violent conflict have especially been avoided due to the political system (consociational democracy) in Suriname. In the last couple of years we see more support among citizens for multiethnic political parties.²² This may have implications for continuing consociational democracy in the future. Consociationalism is only a possible explanation for the strong support for the political system in Suriname. In Figure 80, we will look in more detail at the different dimensions of which political support is made up in this LAPOP study.




Figure 79. Support for the Political System in the Countries of the Americas

²² See for instance already Ramsoedh, H. 1999. *Oude schoenen in de Surinaamse politiek. OSO tijdschrift voor Surinaamse Taalkunde, Letterkunde, Cultuur en Geschiedenis*, 18 (1), 22-35

Support for the political system is typically higher on some of the individual dimensions of the index than on others. In Figure 80, we present the levels of agreement in Suriname with each of the five components of system support. Figure 80 shows that the basic rights component scores the lowest in Suriname of all five components that define support for the political system. Several studies in the past have discussed basic rights in Suriname and said that more should be done in this area.²³ Interestingly a lot of Surinamese citizens say that they think one should support the political system.




Figure 80. Components of Support for the Political System in Suriname

Figure 81 shows that support for the political system has increased slightly between 2010 and 2012 in Suriname, and that this difference is statistically significant.

²³ For instance: Taylor, S. & Berns, J. 2010. *Country Studies Series: Suriname*. Waltham, Massachusetts: Coexistence International at Brandeis University. Padilla, D.J. (n.d.). *The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: The Dominican Republic and Suriname*. Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas. Anaya, J. 2011. *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples: Measures needed to secure indigenous and tribal peoples' land and related rights in Suriname*. United Nations General Assembly.




Figure 81. Support for the Political System over Time in Suriname

III. Political Tolerance

The second component that the Americas Barometer uses to measure legitimacy is political tolerance. This index is composed of the following four items in our questionnaire:

D1. There are people who only say bad things about the Surinamese form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale [1-10 scale]: **[Probe: To what degree?]**

D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.

D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Surinamese form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?

D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?

As with all LAPOP indexes, we calculate each person's mean (average) reported response to these four questions. We then rescale the resulting variable to run from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low tolerance, and 100 represents very high tolerance.

When comparing Suriname with the other countries of the Americas, this country scores around the average in terms of political tolerance (the mean in Suriname is 55.4 and mean of all the countries in the Americas which were studied was 54.6). Thus Surinamese people are, in general, not intolerant, but also not too tolerant towards others, especially those with whom one disagrees, when it comes to politics.




Figure 82. Political Tolerance in the Countries of the Americas

In Figure 83, we present the levels of agreement with each of the four components of tolerance in Suriname. In Suriname, we see that most respondents are very tolerant about peaceful demonstrations, but less tolerant for people running for public office who think negative about the Surinamese form of government, thus people with whom one disagrees.




Figure 83. Components of Political Tolerance in Suriname

How political tolerance evolved over time in Suriname? In Figure 84, we display the average levels of political tolerance in Suriname in each round of the AmericasBarometer since 2010. In contrast to the support of the political system in Suriname in which we have seen an increase in recent years, there is a decline in terms of political tolerance between 2010 and 2012. Figure 85 shows the determinants of political tolerance in Suriname.




Figure 84. Political Tolerance over Time in Suriname

What affects levels of tolerance in Suriname? In Figure 85, we develop a linear regression model to answer this question. Figure 85 shows that support for democracy has a significant positive impact on political tolerance. Interestingly church attendance has a negative impact on political tolerance. As noticed before, research²⁴ indicates that perceptions of high levels of threat has a negative impact on tolerance. This is confirmed in the current study, since perceptions of insecurity seem to have a negative impact on political tolerance. Furthermore perceptions of one’s personal economic situation also have a negative impact on political tolerance.




Figure 85. Determinants of Political Tolerance in Suriname

In Figure 86, we continue to explore the results from Figure 85, showing the variables of greatest theoretical interest and the ones that were most significant in the analysis. Figure 86 shows that in general those that feel more secure are more tolerant towards others in matters concerning politics. We also find that in general people who attend church more often are more intolerant towards others, while those who strongly favor democracy are more tolerant towards others.

²⁴George E. Marcus, W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen. 2000. *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*, 1st ed. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press; Jennifer L. Merolla and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2009. *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public*, 1st ed. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press; Leonie Huddy et al., 2005. “Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies,” *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 (July): 593-608; Ted Brader, Nicholas A. Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay. 2008. “What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat,” *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 4 (October 1): 959-978.




Figure 86. Factors Associated with Political Tolerance in Suriname

IV. Democratic Stability

As we discussed in the introduction of this chapter, both system support and political tolerance are critical for democratic stability. In Figure 87, we examine the extent to which citizens across the Americas hold this combination of attitudes. We may conclude that in general Suriname has a stable democracy, at least if compared with most other countries of the Americas. As was observed before, Suriname scores very high on support for the political system and slightly above average on political tolerance. These scores combined show that Suriname scores in the upper region when it comes to high system support and high political tolerance. To be more precise Suriname scores (39.0) far above the average of all countries combined (28.7). So we can conclude that Suriname is currently very stable in terms of democracy.




Figure 87. Stable Democratic Attitudes in the Countries of the Americas

How has the percentage of citizens of Suriname with the combination of attitudes that is most compatible with stable democracy evolved over time? In Figure 88, we present the percent of citizens with high levels of both system support and tolerance since 2010. Although Suriname scores high in terms of stable democratic attitudes compared to the countries of the Americas, Figure 88 shows that the stable democratic attitudes in Suriname have declined over time.




Figure 88. Stable Democratic Attitudes over Time in Suriname

What affects the extent to which citizens in Suriname hold attitudes that produce stable democracy? In Figure 89, we examine this question using logistic regression analysis. Figure 89 shows clearly that political interest has a strong positive impact on stable democratic attitudes. Furthermore, job approval of the president also has a positive impact on stable democratic attitudes. On the negative side, we see that not surprisingly corruption (although not statistically significant) and crime victimization hurt stable democratic attitudes.




Figure 89. Determinants of Stable Democratic Attitudes in Suriname

To further explore the determinants of support for the political system, in Figure 90, we examine the bivariate relationships between system support and the most important variables from the regression analysis.



Figure 90 shows quite clearly that being victimized by crime or corruption has a severe negative impact on stable democratic attitudes from forming (although corruption not statistically significant). Figure 90 also indicates that being in favor of the President, has a positive impact on stable democratic attitudes. Finally we see that those that are more interested in politics have stronger stable democratic attitudes.




Figure 90. Factors Associated with Stable Democratic Attitudes in Suriname

V. Legitimacy of Other Democratic Institutions

To what extent do citizens in Suriname support major political and social institutions? In the AmericasBarometer’s 2012 round, we asked about attitudes towards many specific institutions, in addition to the more general questions about support for the political system. Using a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represented “not at all,” and 7 represented “a lot,” we asked citizens to respond to the following questions:

B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?
B11. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Electoral Tribunal?
B12. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces?
B13. To what extent do you trust the National Congress?
B18. To what extent do you trust the National Police?
B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?
B20A. To what extent do you trust the Protestant Church?
B20B. To what extent do you trust the Hindu religious institutions?
B20C. To what extent do you trust the Islamic religious institutions?
B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?
B21A. To what extent do you trust the President?
B31. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court?
B32. To what extent do you trust the District council?
B43. To what extent are you proud of being a citizen of Suriname?
B37. To what extent do you trust the mass media?
B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country?

In Figure 91, we examine support for each of these items. As it is usual in the AmericasBarometer report, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100. Suriname seems to be a very trusting society, at least in regards to institutions. When we compare Suriname with the other countries in which the LAPOP survey was held, this country scores above average for all institutions that were questioned. Figure 91 indicates that trust in the Catholic Church is the highest when compared with other institutions. Trust is the lowest in several political institutions such as the parliament, the district council and interestingly the lowest in political parties. Previous research²⁵ in Suriname showed that trust in several political institutions, such as political parties and the parliament was very low. So it is no surprise that these institutions also score low in this current research, at least compared to all the other institutions that were questioned.

²⁵ IDOS 2004 in Ramssoedh, H. 2012. *Commentaar op inleiding Hugo Fernandes Mendes ‘Kenmerken politieke cultuur en leiderschap in Suriname’*. Van Lier Lezing 2012. <http://caraibischeletteren.blogspot.com/p/van-lier-lezing.html> (accessed 20-01-2013).




Figure 91. Trust in Institutions in Suriname

How do these results compare with those from prior years in Suriname? In Figure 92, we present results since 2010. We see that interestingly trust has significantly increased for the president, parliament, Supreme Court and justice system in the past two years. Trust in the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has decreased slightly, though not significantly between 2010 and 2012. From all institutions, trust in the president and the parliament have increased most over the past two years.



Figure 92. Trust in Institutions by Year in Suriname

VI. Support for Democracy

Support for democracy in the abstract is also considered a requirement for democratic consolidation. In the AmericasBarometer, we measure support for democracy by asking citizens to respond to a statement that is a modification of a quote from Churchill,²⁶ and a question inspired by the work of Rose and Miller.²⁷ The “Churchillian” question again uses a 7 point response scale, this time running from 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly agree”):

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

In Figure 93, we examine the average levels of agreement with this statement across the countries of the Americas. When looking at the mean score (71.7) for all the countries of the Americas that were surveyed, Suriname scores (mean 74.6) above the average in terms of supporting democracy over other forms of government. We can conclude that in Suriname there is a strong support for democracy.

²⁶ Churchill actually referred to democracy as “the worst form of government except for all the others.”

²⁷Rose, Richard and William Mishler. 1996. Testing the Churchill Hypothesis: Popular Support for Democracy and Its Alternatives. *Journal of Public Policy* 16 (1): 29-58.




Figure 93. Support for Democracy in the Countries of the Americas

How has support for democracy evolved in recent years in Suriname? In Figure 94, we examine changes in support for democracy since 2010. There is a slight decline between 2010 and 2012 in terms of support for democracy, which is statistically significant. In 2010, the support for democracy was slightly higher. A possible explanation is that the 2010 elections played a role, in the sense that democracy and elections were fully in the spotlight in that year in the media. A limitation of this explanation is that we only have data of two time periods for Suriname.




Figure 94. Support for Democracy over Time in Suriname

VII. Conclusion

We can conclude that there is a strong support for democracy in Suriname. Not only is the support for democracy strong, but there are also strong stable democratic attitudes in Suriname. These attitudes were measured by looking at support for the political system, whereby Suriname scores very high compared to other countries in the Americas. In regards to political tolerance, Suriname scores slightly above the average of the countries that were surveyed. Since the majority indicates a high system support as well as a high tolerance, Suriname can be considered a stable democracy. If crime and corruption victimization would decrease the stable democratic attitudes are expected to become even stronger. We also found that trust in institutions in Suriname is generally high and increased in recent years. Thus Suriname has become a more trusting society, at least in terms of trusting institutions.

Chapter Six: Local Government

With Frederico Batista Pereira and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

In this chapter we explore the relationship between citizens' experiences and views about local government and their orientations towards democracy. To what extent do citizens interact with local authorities in Latin America and Caribbean? How well do they evaluate those interactions? Does local level politics affect system support at the national level?

The power of local governments varies across countries and works in different ways in different political systems. In some places citizens only have contact with local authorities and do not have access to levels above that. Some local authorities have little administrative and fiscal autonomy, while others have more. Moreover, local governance takes place in more democratic ways in some places than in others. Thus, the extent to which local government is efficient and democratic may shape citizens' attitudes towards democracy as a whole.

Decentralization has been taking place to varying degrees among developing countries, and is especially pronounced in Latin America and the Caribbean.¹ This process happened simultaneously as the "third wave" of democratization took place in the hemisphere.² Citizens all over Latin America and the Caribbean not only experienced the strengthening of local governments, but also saw the widespread adoption of democratic procedures for representation at the local level.

Research on local politics provides both enthusiastic and skeptical views. Some authors argue that local politics has generally positive outcomes for governance and democracy. Faguet's study on Bolivia's 1994 decentralization process shows that it changed the local and national investment patterns in ways that benefited the municipalities that most needed projects in education, sanitation, and agriculture.³ Akai and Sakata's findings also show that fiscal decentralization across different states in the United States has a positive impact on economic growth.⁴ Moreover, Fisman and Gatti's cross-country research finds that, contrary to some conclusions of previous studies, fiscal decentralization in government expenditures leads to lower corruption, as measured by different indicators.⁵

¹Rondinelli, Dennis, Nellis, John, and Cheema, Shabbir.1983. *Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience*. World Bank Staff Working Paper 581, Management and Development Series (8): 1-99; p. 9.

² Huntington, Samuel.1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

³Faguet, Jean-Paul. 2004. Does Decentralization Increase Responsiveness to Local Needs? Evidence from Bolivia [online]. London: LSE Research Online.

⁴Akain, Nobuo & Sakata, Masayo.2002. "Fiscal Decentralization Contributes to Economic Growth: Evidence From State-Level Cross-Section data for the United States." *Journal of Urban Development* 52: 93-108.

⁵Fisman, Raymond &Gatti, Roberta. 2002. "Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence across Countries." *Journal of Public Economics* 83: 325-345.

However, others argue that local politics does not always produce efficient and democratic results, and can be problematic when local governments and communities are ill-prepared. Bardhan warns that local governments in developing countries are often controlled by elites willing to take advantage of institutions and to frustrate service delivery and development more broadly.⁶ Willis et al. show that in Mexico decentralizing administrative power and expanding sub-national taxing capacity led to the deterioration of services and to increasing inequality in poorer states.⁷ Galiani et al. find that while decentralization improved Argentine secondary student performance overall, performance declined in schools from poor areas and in provinces with weak technical capabilities.⁸

How does local government performance affect citizens' attitudes towards the political system more generally? Since some citizens only interact with government at the local level, they can only form impressions about democracy from those experiences. Thus, a significant proportion of citizens may rely on experiences with local government when evaluating democracy and democratic institutions. In a study of Bolivia, Hiskey and Seligson show that decentralization can improve system support; however, relying on local government performance as a basis of evaluation of the system in general can become a problem when local institutions do not perform well.⁹ Weitz-Shapiro also finds that Argentine citizens rely on evaluations of local government to evaluate democracy as a whole.¹⁰ Citizens distinguish between different dimensions of local government performance; while perception of local corruption affects satisfaction with democracy, perception of bureaucratic efficiency does not. And using 2010 AmericasBarometer data, West finds that citizens who have more contact with and who are more satisfied with local government are more likely to hold democratic values. Moreover, this relationship holds especially for minorities.¹¹ Hence, local politics can be crucial for democratization.

The relationship between local politics and minority inclusion is also an important topic. The big question is whether decentralization can improve representation of groups that are historically marginalized, such as women and racial minorities. Scholarship on this topic usually sees local institutions as channels through which minorities can express their interests.¹² Moreover, local public officials may be better than national-level officials at getting information about minority preferences and effectively enhancing minority representation.¹³ So, if decentralization may contribute to minority representation, it may also lead to increased levels of systems support and satisfaction with democracy, especially among minority groups.¹⁴

⁶Bardhan, Pranab.2002. "Decentralization of Governance and Development." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 16 (4): 185–205.

⁷Willis, Eliza, Garman, Christopher, and Haggard, Stephen.1999. "The Politics of Decentralization in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* 34 (1): 7-56.

⁸Galiani, Sebastian, Gertler, Paul, and Schargrotsky, Ernesto. 2005. "School Decentralization: Helping the Good Get Better, but Leaving the Poor Behind", *Working Paper*. Buenos Aires: Universidad de San Andres.

⁹Hiskey, Jonathan, Seligson, Mitchell.2003. "Pitfalls of Power to the People: Decentralization, Local Government Performance, and System Support in Bolivia". *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37 (4): 64-88.

¹⁰Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2008. "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina". *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 285-308.

¹¹ West, Karleen. 2011. *The Effects of Decentralization on Minority Inclusion and Democratic Values in Latin America. Papers from the AmericasBarometer*. Vanderbilt University.

¹²Hirschmann, Albert.1970. *Exit Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

¹³ Hayek, Friedrich.1945. "The Use of Knowledge in Society". *American Economic Review* 35(4): 519-530.

¹⁴West, *ibid*; p. 4.

Nonetheless, existing research has produced mixed results.¹⁵ Patterson finds that the decentralization of electoral laws in Senegal in 1996 led to an increase in the proportion of women participating in local politics, but not to more women-friendly policies.¹⁶ West uses the 2010 round of the Americas Barometer survey data to show that recent decentralization in Latin America does not increase minority inclusion and access to local government.¹⁷ In this chapter we seek to develop more systematic evidence, in the context of the entire region

In the next section of this chapter we will examine to what extent citizens in the Americas participate in local politics, and how they evaluate local political institutions. We focus on indicators of two types of participation: *attending town meetings* and *presenting requests to local offices*. We compare to what extent citizens from different countries participate in local politics through such institutional channels and we compare the cross-national results from 2012 with the one from 2010. We also seek to understand the main determinants of those two types of participation, focusing especially on the relationship between racial and gender inequality and citizens' participation in local politics. Last, we assess the extent to which citizens across the Americas are satisfied with their local governments, and we focus on the relationship between satisfaction with local government and system support.

Previous works using the AmericasBarometer surveys already examined in detail some of these phenomena. For instance, Montalvo has shown that the determinants of citizens' demand-making on municipal governments include not only individual level factors such as education and age, but also decentralization of public spending.¹⁸ Thus, fiscal decentralization strengthens the connection between governments and citizens' demands.¹⁹ In a different study, Montalvo found that crime and corruption victimization are negatively associated with citizens' satisfaction with municipal services, showing that perceptions of poor performance at this level are probably due to such problems.²⁰ Finally, Montalvo also showed that satisfaction with municipal services, participation in community services, and interpersonal trust are among the best predictors of trust in municipal governments.²¹

¹⁵West, *ibid*; Pape, I.R.S. 2008. "‘This is Not a Meeting for Women’: The Sociocultural Dynamics of Rural Women’s Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes". *Latin American Perspectives* 35 (6): 41-62. Pape, I.R.S. 2009. "Indigenous Movements and the Andean Dynamics of Ethnicity and Class: Organization, Representation, and Political Practice in the Bolivian Highlands". *Latin American Perspectives* 36 (4): 101-125.

¹⁶ Patterson, Amy.2002. "The Impact of Senegal’s Decentralization on Women in Local Governance". *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 36 (3): 490-529.

¹⁷West, *ibid*.

¹⁸Montalvo, Daniel.2009a. "Demand-Making on Local Governments." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 10.Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

¹⁹Montalvo, *ibid*; p. 4.

²⁰Montalvo, Daniel.2009b. "Citizen Satisfaction with Municipal Services." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 14.Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

²¹Montalvo, Daniel (2010). "Understanding Trust in Municipal Governments." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 35.Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).


II. Local Level Participation

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included a series of questions to measure citizens' engagement with the local political system:

Now let's talk about your local municipality...
NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to SGL1] (88) Doesn't know [Go to SGL1] (98) Doesn't answer [Go to SGL1]
MUNI10. Did they resolve your issue or request? (1) Yes (0) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

Local Meeting Attendance

In Figure 95, we examine the percentage of citizens in each country of the Americas who say they have attended a local meeting in the past year. In Suriname, 13.9% of the respondents said that they attended a local government meeting in the past year. On average 11.1% of all respondents in all countries of the Americas attended a local government meeting in the past year. So we see that local meeting attendance is on average slightly higher in Suriname compared to other countries in the Americas.



**Figure 95. Municipal Meeting Participation
in the Countries of the Americas**

How has participation in municipal meetings evolved in recent years? In Figure 96, we examine levels of local participation since 2010. Participation in local meetings has increased slightly during the past two years in Suriname. In 2010, 11.8% of all respondents attended a local government meeting, while in 2012 13.9% participated in a local government meeting; although this difference is not statistically significant.





Figure 96. Municipal Meeting Participation over Time in Suriname

Demand-Making on Local Government

The 2012 AmericasBarometer allows us to examine not only who attends meetings, but also who makes requests or demands of their local government. In Figure 97, we analyze question NP2 to present the percentage of citizens in the Americas who have made a request or demand of some person or agency in local government in the past year. In terms of making demands or requests to their local government, Surinamese citizens score lower than the average of all countries in the Americas. In Suriname, 10.5% of the respondents made demands or request to local government; while the average was 12.5% in all countries of the Americas.



**Figure 97. Demand Making on Local Government
in the Countries of the Americas**

How has local demand making evolved over time? In Figure 98, we examine the percentage of citizens making demands since 2010. We see a sharp decline in percentage of citizens that made demands between 2010 (17.1%) and 2012 (10.5%). One possible explanation for this sharp decline is that in 2010 there were elections in Suriname, and during elections citizens tend to make more demands towards political parties. Since their votes are needed, voters have more bargaining power during elections.




Figure 98. Demand Making on Local Government over Time in Suriname

Finally, the AmericasBarometer also asked whether citizens’ demands and requests were satisfied. Note that this question was only asked of those citizens who first said that they had made a demand or request. These responses can provide an important window on the quality of services municipalities provide, at least from citizens’ perspectives. In Figure 99, we examine responses to question **MUNI10** in Suriname. In 35.5% of the cases that demands were made (152 cases) towards local government, the issue was resolved; thus action was taken by the local government. In 64.5% of the cases, the issue was not resolved; thus no action whatsoever was taken by the local government in response to the demands, according to the citizens.




Figure 99. Resolution of Demands Made on Local Government in Suriname (n=152)

Who chooses to make demands of local government? In Figure 100, we develop a logistic regression model to examine a number of factors that may affect local demand-making in Suriname. There are two significant determinants on making demands on the local government. First of all we see that perception of family's economic situation has a negative impact on demand making. Second we see that attending a local government meeting has a very strong positive impact on demand making. So in other words those active in local government (participating), make more demands.




Figure 100. Determinants of Demand Making on Local Government in Suriname

In Figure 101, we examine in further detail the bivariate relationships between demand-making on local government and a number of important factors assessed in the logistic regression analysis. Figure 101 shows very clearly that there is a very strong relationship between demand making on local government and attending meetings. Those who attend local meetings make many more demands than those who do not attend local government meetings. We also see that those who perceive that their family is enduring hard times make significantly more demands than family's that do well economically. Perhaps in a cry of desperation they seek help from the local government.




Figure 101. Factors Associated with Demand Making on Local Government in Suriname



III. Satisfaction with and Trust in Local Government

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also included a number of questions to assess the extent to which citizens are satisfied with and trust their local governments. The first question has appeared in a number of previous surveys.

SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are...? **[Read options]** (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

In addition, the 2012 round featured three new questions that tapped satisfaction with particular services typically delivered by local governments.

SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
(4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? **[Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]**

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
(4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? **[Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]**

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
(4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

Finally, the last question, which measures trust, is also one that has appeared in many previous waves. It asks citizens to respond to the following question using a 7-point scale, where 1 means “not at all” and 7 means “a lot.”

B32. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?

Satisfaction with Local Services

In Figure 102, we examine citizens' average levels of satisfaction with local government services across the Americas, using question **SGL1**. Following the AmericasBarometer standard, responses been recoded to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low satisfaction and 100 represents very high satisfaction. Suriname scores very low when it comes to being satisfied with local services. In fact Suriname is among the three countries with the lowest scores. The satisfaction level for Suriname is 44.5 on a scale from 0 to 100. This figure shows us that compared to the countries of America, Suriname does not do well when it comes to local services at least in the perceptions of the respondents.




Figure 102. Satisfaction with Local Government Services in the Countries of the Americas

In Figure 103, we further explore the extent to which citizens are satisfied or dissatisfied with local government in Suriname. This pie chart shows us that 36.6% evaluates the local government services as bad or very bad, 23.5% as good or very good; while a large group (40%) is neutral in their evaluation and says neither good nor bad.




Figure 103. Evaluation of Local Government Services in Suriname

How has satisfaction with local government services evolved in recent years? In Figure 104, we examine trends in satisfaction since 2010. We have already noticed that compared to the other countries in the Americas, Suriname scores very low when it comes to local services by the government. Although Suriname ranks very low, this was even worse in 2010. So there has been some improvement in recent years, since the satisfaction level has gone up from 37.2 in 2010 to 44.5 in 2012.




Figure 104. Evaluation of Local Services over Time in Suriname

Citizens may evaluate some aspects of local service delivery more highly than others. In the next three figures, we examine levels of satisfaction with the state of the roads and schools and the provision of health care across the Americas.²² To begin, in Figure 105, we examine satisfaction with roads and highways, based on question SD2NEW2. As always, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low satisfaction and 100 represents very high satisfaction. When it comes to roads, Suriname scores slightly above the average for all countries (Suriname 49.7, all countries 49.1). It must be noted that in recent years there have been large investments in the road network of Suriname.





Figure 105. Satisfaction with Roads in the Countries of the Americas

²² We recognize that responsibility for this type of service provision may come from varying levels of government across the countries in the Americas.



In Figure 106, we turn to satisfaction with public schools, based on question **SD3NEW2**. Suriname also scores slightly higher on satisfaction with schools compared to the average of all countries in the Americas (Suriname 55.9, all countries 53.8). In the education sector in Suriname, the government has made large investments especially in 2012.



**Figure 106. Satisfaction with Public Schools
in the Countries of the Americas**

Finally, in Figure 107 we assess satisfaction with public health services, based on question SD6NEW2. From a scale of 0-100, Suriname scores 53.0 on satisfaction with public health services. While the countries in the Americas represented in Figure 107, score on satisfaction with public health an average of 47.8. Thus Suriname has a favorable score compared to most other countries in terms of public health services.




Figure 107. Satisfaction with Public Health Services in the Countries of the Americas

Trust in Local Government

In the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we asked citizens not only whether they were satisfied with local government, but also whether they trusted that government. This question may tap more long-standing, abstract attitudes towards local government. In Figure 108, we present average levels of trust in local government across the Americas. Suriname ranks fifth in terms of trust in local government. We already observed in Chapter 5 that trust in Suriname is generally high compared to other countries in the Americas. Figure 108 confirms that this is also the case with trust in local government.




Figure 108. Trust in Local Government in the Countries of the Americas

IV. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on System Support

As we argued in the introduction of this chapter, many citizens have little contact with any level of government except for local government. As a result, perceptions of local government may have an important impact on attitudes towards the political system more generally. In Figure 109, we develop a linear regression model to examine whether satisfaction with local services is associated with support for the political system in Suriname, while controlling for many other factors that may affect system support. The results of this linear regression model indicate that even when controlling for many other factors, satisfaction with local services has a significant positive impact on support for the political system. Figure 110 shows the relationship between these variables in more detail.




Figure 109. Satisfaction with Local Services as a Determinant of System Support in Suriname

In Figure 110, we present the bivariate relationship between satisfaction with local services and support for the political system. Figure 110 shows that in general those who are more satisfied with local services support the political system more often; although there is a tipping point whereby those who evaluate the local services as ‘very good,’ support the system slightly less than those who evaluate the local services as ‘good’.




Figure 110. Satisfaction with Local Services and System Support in Suriname

V. Conclusion

While previous research in Suriname has indicated that participation in local government in Suriname is very low²³, this study shows that compared to other countries in the America's, participation is actually quite high. We have seen that in the year of the 2010 elections, demands and requests on local government were higher compared to 2012. An interesting finding was that citizens who do attend local government meetings are much more likely to make demands and requests towards local government than those that do not attend. Citizens that are enduring hard times economically also make more demands/requests towards local government than more well-to-do citizens. In slightly more than one third of the cases in which demands/requests were made, the issue was resolved. We found that compared to the countries of America, Suriname does not do well when it comes to the evaluation of local services at least in the perceptions of the respondents. Finally, we can conclude that satisfaction with local services is important, since a linear regression analysis has shown that satisfaction with local services has a significant positive impact on support for the political system.

²³ See for instance Schalkwijk, Marten. 2006. Democratie in Suriname: inclusief of exclusief? Een verklaringmodel voor de politieke ontwikkeling. *OSO tijdschrift voor Surinaamse Taalkunde, Letterkunde, Cultuur en Geschiedenis*, 25 (1), 20-44.

**Part III:
Beyond Equality of Opportunity**

Chapter Seven: Ethnicity, Class and Gender in Suriname

I. Introduction

Ethnicity seemed to have become less important in Surinamese society after independence, but ethnic politics and wide spread patronage have prevented a significant decline. In this chapter we will provide an overview of ethnic demographics and look at its relationship with skin color, social class, education, political affiliation, religion and discrimination. At the end, we will look at the gender aspects of discrimination as well.

II. Plural Society

Suriname has a small, but very diverse, population. According to the 2012 census, the population was 534.189 in 2012 (ABS 2013).¹ There are several ethnic groups², but all are minorities. The East Indian group is the largest (29%), followed by the Creole (19%), the Maroon (16%), the Javanese (15%), and the Amerindian (4%). There is also a large group of mixed origin (13%) and some smaller groups such as the Chinese, Syrian, Lebanese and Whites (“Others” 4%)³. The survey sample did not match the census data of ethnicity, especially because there was an overrepresentation of the tribal groups: Amerindian (10%) and Maroon (20%), which led to smaller percentages of the other ethnic groups.⁴

Suriname is ethnically one of the most diverse societies in Latin America and the Caribbean with many ethnic groups and tribal people⁵, who have maintained, to a large extent, their linguistic and cultural heritage. The most interesting fact, however, is that all the ethnic groups and tribal people are minorities by themselves.

¹ Some preliminary general results of the most recent census (August 2012) were published in January 2013. General Bureau of Statistics. 2013. *Voorlopige resultaten uit de 8e Volks- en Woningtelling in Suriname*. Paramaribo: ABS. More specific data will become available around mid-2013, which means that we have to use older sources of demographic information for this chapter.

² In Suriname, people from African-descent who came to Suriname mainly as slaves are referred to as Creoles. The Maroons freed themselves from slavery by escaping from the plantations and formed African tribes in the hinterland. East Indians or Hindostani people are those of Indian descent. Javanese refers to people of Indonesian descent. Indigenous were previously called Amerindians, some still tribal.

³ These percentages were a recalculation of the census data of 2004 to get rid of the category “unknown”, without losing most of the people in this category. This was done by using information on other characteristics notably religion, geographic location and the distribution in the census of 1964 (Schalkwijk, Marten. 2007. *Ontwikkeling van de godsdiensten in Suriname tussen 1964 en 2004*. Inleiding workshop “Suriname Decade of Advance 2007-2017”). The census results of 2004 by the Statistical Office were: Hindustani (27.4%), Creole (17.7%), Maroon (14.7%), Javanese (14.6%), Mixed origin (12.5%), Indigenous (3.7%), Chinese (1.8%), White (0.6%), Other (0.5%), Unknown (6.6%) (General Bureau of Statistics. 2005. *Zevende algemene volks- en woningtelling in Suriname landelijke resultaten volume 1*. Paramaribo: ABS).

⁴ The exact distribution of the survey sample (N=1492) was: Hindustani (23.6%), Creole (18.3%), Maroon (19.8%), Javanese (13.7%), Mixed origin (12.3%), Indigenous (10.3%), Chinese (0.2%), White (0.1%), Other (0.6%), Unknown (1.1%). It is extremely difficult to get an exact match of the ethnic distribution in a sample in Suriname due to very localized ethnic patterns. The overrepresentation of the Indigenous population, however, was intentional in the sample, since this group would be too small otherwise.

⁵ The tribal populations of the maroon group are: Samaaka, Ndjuka, Matawai, Paramaka, Kwinti. The populations of the Amerindian group (often referred to as Indigenous in Suriname) are: Arowak, Carib, Wayana, Trio.

The picture gets more complex if we add in religion. The three major religions in the world are present in substantive percentages: Christian (49%), Hindu (23%) and Islam (16%). Furthermore 4% adhered to tribal religions, 3% to other religions and 5% had no religion.⁶ This reality differs from the overall picture in Latin America and the Caribbean: The AmericasBarometer survey for 2012 registered only 2.2% Non-Christian Eastern Religions, against an overwhelming 83.5% Christians (and 85.0%, if we include Jehovah Witnesses and Mormons), 9.8% with no religion (but believed in a Supreme Entity), and 1.5% agnostics/atheists.⁷ We will get back to the issue of religion later.

In the late 1940's Suriname was characterized as a Plural Society by sociologist Rudolf van Lier in his seminal work.⁸ According to the conceptualization of the famous anthropologist M.G. Smith the cultural segments in plural societies do not share a single set of basic institutions - such as religion, kinship, education and economy – and live side by side with a common governmental system.⁹ The 'Plural Society' concept was introduced by Furnivall (1944) to describe South East Asian multi-ethnic societies, and applied to the Dutch colony of Suriname by Rudolf van Lier and to the Anglophone Caribbean by M.G. Smith¹⁰. The validity of this concept has been questioned by several others, however.¹¹ In any case Suriname is at least a "Plural Society" in terms of ethnicity, religion and culture. So we use the concept here more in this statistical sense to indicate diversity.

The class and ethnicity approaches often give rise to opposing views in the debate on the basic characteristic in the multiethnic Surinamese society, and issues with regard to political power and political behavior. Both adherents of the Plural Society and the Consociational Democracy model stress the role of cultural institutions and ethnicity.¹² On the other end, there are approaches based on the primacy of class.¹³ There is also a third approach based on an integrated 'class and ethnicity' framework.¹⁴ Despite various attempts towards an integrated 'class and ethnicity' approach, many contemporary studies of multi-ethnic societies are still inclined to perceive class and ethnicity or class and race as a dichotomy.¹⁵

Since the introduction of Plural Society in 1949, Suriname has evolved into a society with a much greater complexity. In addition to ethnicity, religion and culture, other dimensions –like class,

⁶ These percentages were also a recalculation of the census data of 2004 (Schalkwijk 2007). In the survey sample these percentages were also not replicated (see footnote 4) and the exact distribution was: Christian (60.0%), Hindu (19.2%), Muslim (13.9%), Tribal (0.4%), Other (2.5%) and no belief (4.1%).

⁷ Furthermore only 0.7% were reported as adhering to Traditional or Native religions, 1.0% Jewish, and 0.3% belonged to some other religion. N=37406.

⁸ Van Lier, Rudolf. 1971. *Frontier Society: A Social Analysis of the History of Suriname*. The Hague: MartinusNijhoff. This book is the translation of his Ph.D Thesis (1949): *Samenleving in een Grensgebied. Een sociaal historische studie van Suriname*. Deventer, van Loghum Slaterus.

⁹ Smith, M.G. 1965. *The Plural Society on the British West Indies*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

¹⁰ In the 1950s the Jamaican born Smith had written several articles on the 'Plural society in the Caribbean' that were published in his 1965 book.

¹¹ Wertheim, W.F. 1966. *Pluraliteit en eenheid van waarden. in: De Plurale Samenleving. Begrip zonder toekomst?* Meppel: Boom. Sankatsing, Glenn. 1989. *Caribbean Social Sciences. An Assessment*. Caracas: UNESCO.

¹² Dew, Edward. 1978. *The difficult flowering of Suriname*. The Hague, MartinusNijhoff.

¹³ Hira, Sandew. 1982. *Van Priari tot en met De Kom. De Geschiedenis van het verzet in Suriname 1630–1940*. Futile, Rotterdam.

¹⁴ Rodney, Walter. 1981. *A History of the Guyanese Working People, 1881-1905*. Johns Hopkins Studies in Atlantic History and Culture. Baltimore. Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Thomas, Clive Y. 1984. *The Rise of the Authoritarian State in Peripheral Societies*. New York and London: Monthly Review Press.

¹⁵ See 'Deadlock. Ethnicity and Electoral Competition in Trinidad and Tobago 1995-2002' by Selwyn Ryan (2003).

gender, region, development, equity- are assumed to be important for explaining the social dynamics in the society. Immigration is another influencing factor more recently. In the 1970s, many Guyanese moved to Suriname, and during the 1980s many Haitians did as well. In the 1990s and 2000s, various new immigrant groups came legally and illegally to Suriname, especially from Brazil and China.¹⁶ Changes in demographics often lead to changes in other areas as well.

III. Ethnicity and Skin Color

The Amerindian and the Maroon (who are considered the tribal people of Suriname), experience a much lower level of socio-economic development than the other ethnic groups, but are the groups with the highest growth rates in Suriname.¹⁷ In fact these tribal groups have nearly doubled their demographic share in society i.e. from 11% in 1964 to 20% in 2004. The skin color of Maroons is much darker than that of the Amerindians, while their socio-economic status is about the same.




Figure 111. Average number of years of education and skin color

When we use the ‘*objective measure of skin color*’, i.e. using color palettes, as is done in the study of LAPOP, Suriname’s plural society and all the dynamics that relate to ethnicity (such as inequality) do not fully become visible. For instance in the recent study done by Telles & Steele, there seems to be a significant difference in years of education for Suriname when looking at skin color (see Figure 111; Special Box 1 p.39).¹⁸ But when we focus on ethnicity, there are still major differences in education; whereby the two most marginalized groups, the Amerindian and the Maroon (who have a totally different skin color), score significantly lower in years of schooling in comparison to the other groups (Table 2). In fact when we split the surveyed population into two groups i.e. a tribal group (Amerindian and Maroon) and a non-tribal group (all other ethnic groups) the average years of education are respectively, 7.4 years (tribal) and 10.2 years (non-tribal).

¹⁶ Ten Theije, M. 2007. *De Brazilianen stelen al ons goud: Braziliaanse Migranten in Stad en Binnenland*. OSO tijdschrift voor Surinaamse Taalkunde, Letterkunde, Cultuur en Geschiedenis, 26 (1), 81-99. Tjon Sie Fat, P. 2007. *Immigratie van Chinezen schijnt de laatste jaren toe te nemen: het anti-Chinese Discours in Suriname*. OSO tijdschrift voor Surinaamse Taalkunde, Letterkunde, Cultuur en Geschiedenis, 26 (1), 61-80.

¹⁷ UNICEF. 2006. *Suriname Multiple Indicator Survey 2006 final report*. Paramaribo.

IDB. 2007. IDB Country Strategy with Suriname (2007-2010). <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1377642> (accessed 19-9-2012). Schalkwijk, Marten. 2010. *De Sociaal-Maatschappelijke Positie van de Marrons*. Seminar: ‘Vrede, Vrijheid en Onafhankelijkheid: Marrons in Ontwikkelingsperspectief’. Paramaribo, 8 oktober 2010.

¹⁸ Telles, E. & Steele, L. 2012. *Pigmentocracy in the Americas: How is Educational Attainment Related to Skin Color?* AmericasBarometerInsight Report number 73. Vanderbilt University.

Table 2. Ethnic background and skin color and years of schooling

Ethnic background	Frequency	Percentage	Skin color (average)	Average years of schooling
White	2	0.1%	1.5	14.0
Chinese	3	0.2%	2.3	13.7
Javanese	204	13.8%	4.4	9.6
Amerindian/ Indigenous	153	10.4%	4.6	7.7
Mixed	181	12.5%	5.1	11.0
East Indian/ Hindustani	352	23.8%	5.2	9.4
Other	9	0.6%	6.3	12.6
Creole/ Afro-Surinamese	272	18.5%	7.1	10.6
Maroons	295	20.1%	8.1	7.3

The numbers on skin color in Table 2 correspond to the skin color palette used in the LAPOP survey (see figure 8 in Chapter 1). We found that Amerindians score an average of 4.6 on the skin color palette, while the Maroons score 8.1. The socio-economic situation of these two main ethnic groups, however, is still quite similar, especially for those living in tribal villages in the interior region. Therefore we will elaborate in much greater detail on ethnicity (that includes tribal people) and its relation with other dimensions in this chapter. This is especially important since almost everything in Suriname has a relationship with ethnicity, for instance social class, voting behavior and educational achievement.¹⁹ It is also interesting to note that the respective ethnic groups perceive skin color differently; while their perceptions influence skin whitening practices - that are related to improving opportunities for marriage, education and labor market – in a different way. Of all ethnicities, East Indian women have by far the highest proportion users of skin whitening cosmetics.²⁰

When we focus on social class, the LAPOP survey shows that indeed the Amerindian and the Maroon people are the most disadvantaged groups in Suriname (see Figure 112). These are the only groups with more than 50% of the group belonging to the lower class (self-reported).

¹⁹See for instance: Sedney, J. 1997. *De toekomst van ons verleden: democratie, etniciteit en politieke machtsvorming in Suriname*. Paramaribo: Vaco N.V. Derveld, R. 1999. Veranderingen in de Surinaamse politiek 1975-1998. *OSO tijdschrift voor Surinaamse Taalkunde, Letterkunde, Cultuur en Geschiedenis*, 18 (1), 5-21. Ramsodh, H. 1999. *Oude schoenen in de Surinaamse politiek*. *OSO tijdschrift voor Surinaamse Taalkunde, Letterkunde, Cultuur en Geschiedenis*, 18 (1), 22-35. Martin, D. et al. 2001. *The Governance of Suriname*. Washington D.C: Inter-American Development Bank. MINOV. 2004. *Sectorplan Onderwijs 2004-2008*. Paramaribo. General Bureau of Statistics. 2005a. *Zevende algemene volks- en woningtelling in Suriname landelijke resultaten volume I*. Paramaribo: ABS. General Bureau of Statistics. 2005b. *Zevende algemene volks- en woningtelling in Suriname landelijke resultaten volume II*. Paramaribo: ABS.

²⁰ See: Menke Jack, From Fair and Lovely to Banho de Lua: Skin Whitening and its Implications in the Multiethnic and Multicolored Surinamese Society, in: Hall, R.(ed.). 2013. *The Melanin Millennium. Skin Color as 21st Century International Discourse*. Springer. Dordrecht.




Figure 112. Ethnicity and Social Class

IV. Ethnicity and Politics

Since the first general elections until today, ethnic groups have used ethnic politics in Suriname to climb up the social ladder.²¹ Several major political parties in Suriname are strongly associated with one ethnic group. So ethnicity plays a major factor in the political arena in Suriname.²² However, in the last twenty five years some parties are evolving towards multiethnic organizations.

One of the questions in the survey of LAPOP was ‘*which political party do you identify with?*’ Through Table 3 this question the strong association between ethnicity and political parties becomes evident (see).²³ It should be pointed out that a majority of the respondents did not identify with any political party at the time of the survey. Thus Table 3 is based on the respondents who identified with a party. But since not all of them answered the question about which party they identified with, the actual table is based upon 509 valid responses or 34% of the sample.

²¹ See for instance the earlier mentioned Ramsøedh (1999).

²² See in addition to Sedney (1997), Derveld (1999), and Ramsøedh (1999), also: Schalkwijk, Marten. 1996. *De etnische stem in de Surinaamse politiek*. In “Politiek in Suriname”. SWI, Paramaribo. Blanksma, A. (2006). *Etniciteit en nationalisme tijdens de Surinaamse verkiezingscampagne in mei 2005*. OSO tijdschrift voor Surinaamse Taalkunde, Letterkunde, Cultuur en Geschiedenis, 25 (1), 149-165.

²³ See Ramsøedh 1999:32 for a classification based on ethnicity of political parties in Suriname.

In 2010, approximately 20 parties contested the elections, some combined into larger electoral blocs, providing the voters 9 choices on the ballot. The current coalition government was formed in 2010 by 8 parties, the largest coalition ever in Surinamese history.²⁴ Alliances are often shifting in Suriname's politics and sometimes it is hard to follow where people and parties actually stand.²⁵ The core of the coalition, however, is formed by the National Democratic Party (NDP) of former military strongman Desi Bouterse, who was elected president by the coalition parties in parliament. His party is multi-ethnic; although in practice this does not automatically mean that ethnic politics are absent. Ethnic affiliation is often more localized. Illustrative examples are campaigns in Amerindian villages where the NDP portrays its leader primarily as an Amerindian (Bouterse is of mixed ethnic background with some Amerindian blood), but this image shifts in other geographic areas. The NDP currently is the largest party (58% in the survey), and in Table 3 it is clear that it attracts a sizable group of voters from different ethnic groups. A comparison of the ethnic groups shows that the NDP attracts relatively more Amerindians and Creoles, who are overrepresented (Table 3).

The National Party Suriname (NPS) of former three time president Ronald Venetiaan suffered an enormous blow during the last elections, and it is not the main party of the Creoles anymore (only 12% of the Creoles had the NPS as their party of preference, while 29% of all NPS adherents in the survey were Creole). In the NPS, the most noticeable image of Venetiaan was as a Creole (Afro) leader with a distinct Creole tradition.²⁶ The NPS also has a multi-ethnic group of adherents, which probably is more distinct than before due to the loss of a large group of Creole voters in 2010. On the other hand, it is clear that *Pertjajah Luhur* is mainly made up of Javanese (70% of those who answered the survey question were Javanese), the BEP and ABOP mainly of Maroons (84% and 95%, respectively), and the VHP mainly of Hindustani (98%). In any case, we still see lots of ethnic political parties and even some ethnic politics within multi-ethnic parties.

²⁴ The coalition consisted of the Mega-Combination (MC), which got 23 seats in parliament. MC was made up of NDP, PALU (a small left wing party), New Suriname (a new mainly liberal Hindustani party), and KTPI (a traditional Javanese party). This electoral bloc formed a coalition with the A-Combination (consisting of three Maroon parties: ABOP of former jungle Commando leader Ronnie Brunswijk, BEP, and SEEKA), which got 7 seats. Another coalition member was the People's Alliance (*Volksalliantie*, VA): consisting of the Javanese *PertjajahLuhur* (which had absorbed three small Javanese parties just before the elections), *Middenblok* (itself consisting of the mainly Hindustani UPS and the Catholic PSV), and *Trefpunt2000* (a breakaway faction of the NPS); when the VA announced that it would join a coalition with Bouterse, the *Middenblok* and *Trefpunt2000* left the VA and thus only *PertjajahLuhur* (with 6 seats) is effectively a coalition member.

²⁵ The New Suriname party (2 seats within the Mega-Combination) suffered from internal strife which resulted in two factions; the two members of parliament have effectively pulled out of the coalition. Also the A-Combination split and BEP (4 seats) is now officially in the opposition, although two of its members of parliament still consider themselves as part of the coalition. The KTPI (2 seats within the Mega-Combination) also suffered from internal strife, but both factions remain within the coalition.

²⁶ Ronald Venetiaan has been replaced in 2012 by Gregory Rusland as chairman of the NPS; Venetiaan is still a member of the National Assembly.

Table 3. Ethnic groups and their identification with political parties

Parties Ethnic Groups	NDP	PL	BEP ²⁷	ABOP ²⁸	VHP ²⁹	NPS	Other (9 parties)	Total
Amerindians	90%	3%	0%	0%	0%	3%	4%	100% N=68
Creoles	72%	1%	1%	0%	1%	12%	14%	100% N=107
Hindustani	43%	3%	0%	0%	40%	7%	7%	100% N=116
Javanese	42%	36%	0%	0%	0%	11%	11%	100% N=53
Maroons	36%	0%	24%	19%	0%	11%	10%	100% N=107
Others	81%	3%	7%	2%	0%	7%	0%	100% N=58
Total	N=295 (58%)	N=27 (5%)	N=31 (6%)	N=21 (4%)	N=48 (9%)	N=45 (9%)	N=42 (8%)	N=509 (100%)
Official results election 2010	40% (MC)	13% (VA)	5% (A Combination)		32% (Nieuw Front)		(11%)	

Is ethnic politics good or bad? The answer to this question is not an easy one at all. Schalkwijk (1996)³⁰ addressed this issue substantively and pointed towards a worst case scenario of former Yugoslavia, where neglect of the ethnic issues by the socialist regime of Marshal Tito in the end resulted in ethnic wars and the fragmentation of this nation. These wars have shown the dangers of ethnic political mobilization by shrewd ethnic politicians. In the political history of Suriname, ethnicity has been used regularly as a mobilization instrument without disastrous results, since the mobilization was meant to emancipate ethnic groups, who were socio-economically in a disadvantaged position, and not primarily as a political instrument to acquire power. In the Surinamese society such ethnic mobilization was tolerated by other groups as long as the ethnic group was indeed at a disadvantage. Thus open ethnic mobilization by Maroons and Amerindians is tolerated due to their disadvantaged position in society, but ethnic mobilization by Whites or Mulattoes is not; since they are considered groups that have achieved a more advantaged status in society. Schalkwijk therefore sees nation building in Suriname as a difficult and delicate process of emancipation and integration of the different ethnic groups. This, however, requires special leadership qualities at both the national level and the ethnic group level.³¹ The fact that in Suriname all ethnic groups are minorities by themselves actually helps to prevent “Yugoslavia scenarios”.

²⁷ *Broederschap en Eenheid in de Politiek* (BEP) i.e. Brotherhood and Unity in Politics.

²⁸ *Algemene Bevrijdings en Ontwikkelings Partij* (ABOP) i.e. General Liberation and Development Party.

²⁹ *Progressieve HervormingsPartij* (VHP) i.e. Progressive Reform Party.

³⁰ Schalkwijk, Marten. 1996. *De etnische stem in de Surinaamse politiek*. In “Politiek in Suriname”. SWI, Paramaribo.

³¹ See interview with Marten Schalkwijk in Lotens, W. 2000. *Gesprekken aan de Waterkant, Suriname in 2000*. Libertas, Mol/Firgos, Paramaribo.

V. Ethnicity and Religion

As indicated at the beginning of this chapter Suriname is an odd duck in the overwhelming Christian (including Catholics) landscape of Latin America and the Caribbean. In Suriname Eastern religions –notably Hinduism and Islam- are substantial elements on the religious map. Guyana and Trinidad & Tobago are the only other countries with large groups of Hindus and Muslims. This has to do with the specific policies of importing Asian contract labor after slavery was abolished.




Figure 113. Ethnic groups of Suriname by religion³²

Ethnicity and religion, however, have a close relation in Suriname as can be seen in Figure 113. Most Hindustani are Hindus, with a substantial group being Muslim and a smaller group Christian. Most Javanese are Muslim, but a sizable minority is Christian. Most Creoles, Indigenous, Maroons and people of mixed origin are Christian. Within each group there are small pockets that adhere to another faith or have no faith. As stated before in the sample the Indigenous and Maroon population is overrepresented, and therefore also are the Christians. Nevertheless the survey results are clear about the relationship between ethnicity and religion. This relationship is statistically significant (Chi Square = .000). Since in general the correlation between a certain ethnic group and a specific religion is quite high; it is often very difficult to separate the influence of ethnicity from religion. Most often, however, ethnicity is used in analysis because ethnicity is more than just race and detects other aspects such as religion and culture.

³² Pearson Chi-Square³²: Value=1729.237, df=24, asymp. significance 2 sided= .000




Figure 114. Christianity in Suriname

An interesting development, which is noticeable in all of Latin America and the Caribbean, is the growth of the Evangelical and Charismatic churches. Unfortunately the census of 2004 did not provide much differentiation between denominations. The survey gives us more insight into the distribution of Christian groups (Figure 114). The Catholic Church is the largest denomination (38.9% of the Christian respondents in the survey), but overall the Protestants form a majority of the Christian believers. The Evangelical and Charismatic churches (35.1%) are often fairly small in and of themselves, but together form the largest group within the Protestant section of Christianity in Suriname. The “mainstream” (for lack of a better term) Protestant denominations -such as the Lutheran, Reformed, Moravian, Adventist, and Anglican - make up 23.1% of all Christians. In addition we have the Jehovah Witnesses which can be considered a Christian sect.³³ We hope that the census of 2012 will provide more accurate information about the real distribution in society.³⁴

VI. Discrimination by Gender and Ethnicity

In Chapter One, a general overview of gender effects was sketched. We found that the trend in gender discrimination in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) was positive according to most studies. There were three questions about discrimination in the survey: did the respondent experience discrimination in the past year by public offices (court, government departments, etc.), at school/work, in public spaces (street, shops, etc.). The overall experienced discrimination level hovered between 10% and 13% for all three types in LAC. There was only a significant gender difference reported in discrimination by public offices, where actually males reported a higher level of discrimination than

³³ Christian sects do not believe in the Trinity, which is seen as the essential part of Christianity.

³⁴ The census of 2004 did not differentiate within the broad categories of Christianity, Hinduism and Islam.

females. In Table 4, we provide a more detailed picture of the answers and see that there actually is substantial variation in the reported experienced discrimination. In most of the statistically significant cases –except for Argentina- the males reported a higher level of discrimination. In Suriname, only the discrimination in public spaces showed a significant gender difference.

Table 4. Experienced discrimination in Latin America and Caribbean

Type of Discrimination (N=total number of respondents)	Percentage of respondents who experienced discrimination			
	Lowest	Highest	Average	Suriname
In public offices (N=24106)	6.4% (Venezuela)	23.8% (Trinidad)	12.9% Only significant* in Dominican Republic Trinidad & Tobago Honduras	Av. 17.7% Males 17.2% Female 18.3% No significant difference
In school or at work (N=23912)	4.2% (Venezuela)	24.8% (Trinidad)	12.1% Only significant* in Honduras	Av. 12.8% Males 13.9% Female 11.6% No significant difference
In public spaces (N=24547)	3.6% (Venezuela)	23.5% (Trinidad)	10.4% Only significant* in Argentina Suriname	Av. 10.7% Males 12.3% Female 9.2% Significant difference p = .05
These questions were asked in 17 of the 26 LAC countries			Significant(*) if chance of particular Chi square $\leq .05$	

In Suriname, we tested the gender difference by ethnic group, since it may have been the case that particular men or women were discriminated against. This, however, did not reveal any major trends. Only one case proved significance: i.e. indigenous men reported a relatively high level of discrimination at school/work (10.3% against only 1.5% reported by indigenous women). Thus in general there were no significant gender differences in experienced discrimination in Suriname. This does not mean, however, that there were no discrimination cases in other respects. In fact if we analyze the discrimination patterns by ethnic groups (Table 5) there are significant differences.

Table 5. Experienced discrimination in Suriname by Ethnicity³⁵

Ethnic group	Type of discrimination (% reported discrimination)			
	In public offices	In school or at work	In public spaces	Victim of crime in past year
Hindustani	19%	12%	11%	17%
Javanese	11%	8%	6%	10%
Creole	20%	19%	17%	18%
Mixed	12%	10%	8%	19%
Indigenous	13%	6%	3%	5%
Maroon	26%	17%	14%	16%
Other	25%	27%	29%	21%
Average	18% (N=258)	13% (N=173)	11% (N=158)	15% (N=219)

We turn now to what the respondents were doing for a living and which differences there are between men and women. Interesting enough 11% of the women said they were students, against only 8% of the men. This underlines the fact that women are much more active in education, especially at the higher levels and professional levels. On the other hand, there were more male retirees (pensioners or not able to work) than women (i.e. resp. 11% male and 9% female), which has to do with the fact that more males had been economic active in the past than females. The full-time caretakers, however, were mostly female because 34% of the women said they were taking care of the home, but only 2% of the men did so. Then there was a small group of people who were not working, but also not looking for a job (3% of the males and 2% of the females). Twenty-four percent of men were retired, students, homemakers or not looking for a job, while 55% of the women were spread over these categories. All others we can consider the economic active population. Figure 115 shows what the status was of these people. Most of these were working, but 9% were unemployed i.e. they were looking for a job. More women were looking for jobs (14%) than men (6%). There was also a small group that said that they had a job, but did not consider themselves as working (Volunteers? Very rich? Civil servants who did not have to show up or were ousted by the new regime?).

³⁵ All relationships in the table were statistically significant.




Figure 115. Overview of economic active population in Suriname

If we compare the situation in Suriname with the other countries in the AmericasBarometer we find a general unemployment rate of 11% (13% for women and 10% for men). Thus Suriname's unemployment is slightly below the LAC average. There is a wide variation between the different countries, however, because Bolivia registered the lowest unemployment rate of just 4%; while Haiti had the highest unemployment rate with a staggering 39% of the population. In 11 out of 24 LAC countries in the survey, there was no statistical significant gender difference in the labor market of the economic active population; while the other 13 countries (including Suriname) registered a significant gender difference.³⁶

VII. Conclusion

One of the remarkable characteristics of Suriname's society is that it consists only of ethnic minorities. The same is true for religions of which Christianity, Hinduism and Islam have a substantial representation. There is a clear correlation between ethnicity and religious affiliation, which primarily has to do with the country of origins of each ethnic group and historical processes. Because of this ethnic and religious composition, Suriname has often been described as a Plural Society, a concept used here in a statistical sense to indicate diversity. Analysis of social cleavages in relation to skin color is less useful in Suriname, since ethnicity is more relevant than skin color. This is clear for

³⁶ Statistically significance was measured by looking at the Chi Square of the crosstabs between gender and occupational status. For 9 countries the p value for that Chi Square was $\leq .05$ and for 4 countries it was still significant if the p value was raised to $p \leq .1$ (which for such data is still very significant).

instance in the analysis of the relationship between skin color and education compared to ethnicity and education; which according to Telles and Steele showed a statistically significant difference (Figure 111). In politics, the role of ethnicity is still very manifest, both in terms of party affiliation and in more complex emancipation processes of the ethnic groups. There was a certain relationship between discrimination and ethnic background, but for different forms of discrimination these relationships often varied. Women did not feel more discriminated against than men in Suriname, and in fact the only gender difference that was found had to do with men who felt more discriminated against in public spaces. There were significant gender differences in the labor market, where more women than men were studying, looking for jobs and care takers. On the other hand, there were more retired men than women. Unemployment in Suriname was slightly below the average of other countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region.

Chapter Eight: Electoral Participation in Suriname

I. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the way social and demographic factors in Suriname influence electoral participation. Studies that examined socioeconomic explanations of electoral participation (measured by voter turnout) show that socioeconomic status is positively related with voter turnout. Voters with a lower socioeconomic status (measured by education and income) are less likely to participate in elections than those with a higher status¹. Other studies point at the importance of political experience measured by age of the person, showing that younger voters are less likely to vote than older ones².

In regards to regional differences (urban-rural-interior), it is assumed that voters in the interior are less likely to vote than those in urban regions. This is based on the assumption that socioeconomic inequality influences voter turnout, the dependent variable. Consequently, lower education in the interior is assumed to be positively related with lower voter turnout; while higher educational levels in urban or rural areas is positively related with a higher voter turnout. The independent variables are clustered in three categories: sociostructural factors, voters' motivation and voters' networks.

The sociostructural factors include region of residence (urban-rural-interior), gender, ethnicity, education, and age.

The control variables are related to the motivation and networks of voters. Motivational factors refer to voters' trust in democracy and election, and include questions such as interest in politics, identification with political parties, and trust in political institutions/ elections. Voters' networks refer to the position in various mobilizing activities or organizations, measured by mobilization work for a party and employment status.

Bivariate analyses and logistic regression are used to explain the dichotomous variable 'Voted'. The analysis is based on 1492 cases of the Suriname survey from the 2012 AmericasBarometer.

Suriname

Suriname acquired political independence in 1975 and is both part of the South American continent and the Caribbean region. It is located on the northern coast of South America, and bordered in the north by the Atlantic Ocean, in the south by Brazil, in the east by French Guyana, and in the west by Guyana. According to the 2004 census, the population was 492,829.³ On a land area of 163,820 square kilometers, the population density of 2.5/km² is among the lowest in South America, with significant differences across the country. Topographically, there is a subdivision of the country into the coastal lowlands, the savanna and the highlands in the south with its tropical rain forest. Suriname is divided into 10 districts, the main administrative division. Approximately 66% of the population lives in the capital

¹ Leighley, Nagler, 1992. Individual and Systemic Influences on Turnout: Who Votes? *Journal of Politics*, 54 (3), 718-740.

² Carreras Miguel and Castaneda-Angarita, Nestor. 2012. Voters Resources and Electoral participation in Latin America. *Em Debate*, Belo Horizonte, Volume 4, no 3, p. 11-24, (June).

³ Preliminary results of the 2012 census indicate a population of 534189. General Bureau of Statistics. 2013. *Voorlopige resultaten uit de 8e Volks- en Woningtelling in Suriname*. Paramaribo: ABS.

city of Paramaribo and the semi-urban district Wanica⁴ in the coastal lowlands, which occupies only 0.4% of the total land area. The Sipaliwini district, located in the southern interior, occupies 80% of the land area with a population density of only 0.2 inhabitants per square kilometer. Suriname's multi-ethnic population comprises approximately 20 ethno-linguistic groups. The major groups in the urban and rural areas are Hindustani, Creoles, and Javanese. The interior is mainly populated by Maroon and Indigenous people (Amerindians).

Economic and Political Background

Suriname's small open mineral-based economy experienced several adjustment shocks in the 1980s and 1990s due to external and internal developments: the decline in the bauxite mining and processing sector (the pillar of the economy) in the 1980s; the suspension of Dutch development aid in the 1980s; and the implementation of structural adjustment policies in the 1990s. After a volatile growth from 1980-1999, the economy is being characterized, since 2000, by monetary stabilization and a relatively high growth. This is mainly due to the favorable world market prices of crude oil and gold that are - in addition to bauxite - Suriname's principal mineral export products. Various sources report inequalities in basic needs such as health, education, and housing. The Gini-coefficient, estimated in 1993 at 0.608, decreased to 0.46 in 2000, which indicates that the economic inequality of Suriname is still high⁵. From 2000-2010 the HDI country ranking decreased from 74 to 94, which places Suriname in the lower category of medium human development. The inequalities by region, particularly the urban - interior division are high. Results of the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey sponsored by UNICEF⁶ indicate that income poverty is lowest in the urban district with approximately 52% of the households living below the poverty line. For the coastal rural districts this is 61% and for the interior districts the proportion below the poverty line is 91%. The latest Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey also shows significant differences between the urban and interior districts with respect to household wealth and the educational level of the household head⁷.

After the first elections in 1949, a political tradition of a multi-party system evolved, while a consociational democracy⁸ became dominant, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s. This was based on the cooperation between elites of the major ethnic groups and their respective political parties - East Indians (VHP), Javanese (KTPI) and Creoles (NPS) - via an informal brokerage system. The political independence of Suriname in 1975 was short-lived, as in 1980, non-commissioned army officers seized state power. A military regime ruled until 1987 and again during a short period in 1990/1991. The New Front, a coalition of mainly traditional party coalitions, held government from 1987-1990 and 1991-1996. The 1996 elections marked a turning point in the history of elections, when a nontraditional coalition was formed, led by the multi-ethnic National Democratic Party (NDP) of Desire Bouterse, former leader of the military regime (1980-1987). The New Front held government again from 2000 - 2010 periods and was defeated in the 2010 elections by the Mega-combination, led by the National Democratic Party (NDP).

⁴General Bureau of Statistics. 2013. *Voorlopige resultaten uit de 8e Volks- en Woningtelling in Suriname*. Paramaribo: ABS.

⁵Neri, Marcelo and Menke Jack. 2001. *Sustainable Combat against Poverty in Suriname*. Main Report, Final Version. UNDP: Paramaribo.

⁶Government of Suriname. 2001. *Suriname Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2000*. Paramaribo.

⁷Government of Suriname. 2008. *Monitoring the Situation of Children and Women: Suriname. Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2006*. Paramaribo.

⁸Lijphart, Arend. 1977. *Democracy in plural societies: a comparative exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.



II. Survey Results

Demographic and Socio-economic Background

The definition of urban, rural and interior areas is based on qualitative and quantitative criteria. These include any combination of the following criteria: ‘size of population, population density, distance between built-up areas, predominant type of economic activity, conformity to legal or administrative status and urban characteristics such as specific services and facilities’.⁹

According to the criteria population size (50,000 or more), population density (386 persons per square kilometer), and predominant economic activity of at least 80% in non-primary sector – Paramaribo is the only district that meets these criteria. Therefore the urban area in the analysis comprises of the Paramaribo district. The interior includes districts where at least 70% of the population is living in tribal enclaves or semi-enclaves. The districts Marowijne, Brokopondo and Sipaliwini, with a predominant Maroon and Amerindian population, meet this criterion (Table 6).

Table 6. Survey Population by District and Ethnicity

District	Ethnicity						Total	
	Amerindian	Afro-Surinamese	Mixed, Other	East Indians	Javanese	Maroon	Relative	Absolute
Paramaribo	2.4%	32.2%	19.2%	21.8%	10.4%	14.1%	100.0%	510
Wanica	2.6%	11.5%	17.3%	45.5%	11.5%	11.5%	100.0%	191
Nickerie	1.7%	6.7%	14.2%	59.2%	16.7%	1.7%	100.0%	120
Coronie		72.9%	4.2%	2.1%	8.3%	12.5%	100.0%	48
Saramacca	1.4%	5.6%	9.9%	47.9%	32.4%	2.8%	100.0%	71
Commewijne		2.6%	10.3%	35.0%	52.1%		100.0%	117
Marowijne	32.6%	3.2%	3.2%		6.3%	54.7%	100.0%	95
Para	42.5%	21.2%	8.8%	3.5%	11.5%	12.4%	100.0%	113
Brokopondo		6.4%	2.1%	1.1%		90.4%	100.0%	94
Sipaliwini	46.2%	3.4%	12.0%	1.7%	1.7%	35.0%	100.0%	117
Total	10.4%	18.5%	13.4%	23.8%	13.8%	20.1%	100.0%	1476

⁹ United Nations. 2007. Demographic Yearbook.
<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dyb2007.htm> (Accessed 20-01-2013).

Table 7. Absolute and relative Population by District 2012

District	Population	
	Absolute	Relative
Paramaribo	236065	44.2%
Wanica	117584	22.0%
Nickerie	34241	6.4%
Coronie	3153	0.6%
Saramacca	17251	3.2%
Commewijne	31087	5.8%
Marowijne	18114	3.4%
Para	23874	4.5%
Brokopondo	14662	2.7%
Sipaliwini	38158	7.1%
Total	534189	100%

According to 2012 AmericasBarometer data, Indigenous and Maroon populate most of the interior of Suriname, 60.1% of all Maroons live there and 55.6% of all Indigenous people. The majority of East Indians (67.6%) and Javanese (70.1%) live in the rural region, and the majority of Afro-Surinamese (60.1%) and other ethnic groups (57.1%) live in the urban region (Figure 116).




Figure 116. Survey Population by Region and Ethnicity

Electoral Participation

According to the electoral system of Suriname, members of the National Assembly are elected by proportional representation at the district level. The president is not elected directly by the voters but by a two thirds majority of the members of the National Assembly. In case the parliament fails to elect a president after two electoral sessions, the election is continued within the ‘*Verenigde Volksvergadering*’¹⁰ (United Peoples Conference) by way of a simple majority vote.

The overall voter turnout based on the 2012 AmericasBarometer is 77.9% (the official election turnout was 73.2%). The proportion of voters is lowest in the interior and highest in the rural areas (Figure 117). This is based on the assumption that socioeconomic inequality influences voter turnout.




Figure 117. Did you vote in the 2010 elections?¹¹

¹⁰ The ‘*Verenigde Volksvergadering*’ is a combined meeting that includes all elected members of the National Assembly, the districts councils and the local councils.

¹¹ Pearson Chi-Square 17.017, DF =2, $p < 0.001$




Figure 118. Determinants of Voter Turnout Suriname, Logistic regression




Figure 119. Predictors of Voter Turnout with significant score statistics and category percentages

Predictors based on the most significant score statistics (with a p of 0.05 or less) are:

- Trust national assembly
- Trust elections
- Identify political party
- Worked for party
- Ethnicity: Indigenous
- Ethnicity: East Indian
- Ethnicity: Javanese
- Age (18-24)

Figure 118 shows that the coefficient for age is statistically significant.

Some of the predictors of Voter Turnout with significant score statistics and category percentages are presented in Figure 119.

There is a positive relationship for three of the six ethnic categories, which are statistically significant (Figure 120). Javanese (87.1%), East Indian (84.9%) and Indigenous (82.4%) are more likely to vote in elections of the National assembly (Figure 120).




Figure 120. Ethnicity by Voting in the last 2010 elections¹²

¹² Pearson Chi-Square 49.507, DF =6, p < 0.001

When controlling for region, the relationship between some ethnic groups and Voting remains (Figure 121).




Figure 121. Ethnicity by Voting, controlling for Region, 2010 elections

Voting behavior of the age group, 18-25, is statistically significant (Figure 119). Of voters in the 18-25 age group, 57.4% voted in elections of the National assembly in Suriname. This is a large contrast with the older age groups; where we see that the gradual increase in the voter turnout is positively related to age with a peak of 89.8% for the 56-65 age group (Figure 119).



When controlling for region, the positive association ($p < 0.001$) between age and voting behavior remains. The rural region has an overall higher voter turnout, and also the highest percentage (96%) for the 46-55 age group that voted (Figure 122).




Figure 122. Age by Voting, controlling for Region, 2010 elections

A positive association ($p < 0.000$) between voters who identify with a political party and voting behavior is evident. Of those who do not identify with a political party, the percentage of non-voters is significantly higher than the non-voting percentage of those who identify with a political party (Figure 119).

There is no statistically significant relationship between education and voting behavior in the 2010 elections (Figure 118 and Figure 123). When controlling for region, the differences in voter turnout is evident in the urban area: Voters with no education show a significantly lower voter turnout than those with primary education or higher (Figure 124).




Figure 123. Education by voting behavior in the last 2010 elections




Figure 124. Education by voting behavior and Region

III. Conclusion

There is no statistically significant relation between region (place of residence) and electoral participation (voter turnout) in Suriname. Factors with a statistically significant influence on electoral participation in Suriname are *sociostructural* (ethnicity and age), *voters' motivation* (identification with political parties, trust in elections, and trust in national assembly) and *voters' networks* (worked for a party). Three of the six analyzed ethnic categories (Javanese, East Indian and Indigenous) have a statistically significant relationship with electoral participation, rather than the three other groups (Afro-Surinamese, Maroon and Mixed/other). When controlling for region, the relationship between ethnicity and electoral participation remains, though with a higher statistical significance for urban and rural regions. Other variables that influence electoral participation are 'Current Identification with a political party' and age. With regards to age, there are stark differences between voters in the 16-25 age group- who have a very low turnout - and the older age groups. This confirms the findings by other studies,¹³ which point at the influence of political experience measured by age of the voter, indicating that older voters are more likely to vote than younger ones. Compared with the urban and interior region, the rural areas stand out by an overall higher electoral participation and also the highest voter percentage for the 46-55 age group.

Finally, there is no overall relationship between socioeconomic status (measured by education) and electoral participation. However, in urban Paramaribo voters with a low socioeconomic status (who have no education) are less likely to participate in elections than those with a higher educational status.

¹³Carreras Miguel and Castaneda-Angarita, Nestor. 2012. Voters Resources and Electoral participation in Latin America. *Em Debate*, Belo Horizonte , Volume 4, no 3, p. 11-24, (June).

Chapter Nine: Suriname as a Changing Society

I. Introduction

This chapter gives a more focused analysis of key sectors, opinions and issues in the Surinamese society. We examine some interesting findings in the LAPOP data as well as other data to identify important changes in the society. Despite the availability at Suriname's political independence in 1975 of 3.5 billion Guilders of Dutch development aid for the period 1975-1985/1990), the economic growth remained volatile until 2000. Amidst a weak political culture and stagnation in the national development, non-commissioned officers of the Surinamese army seized power in 1980. More precisely the background that created room for the coupe included a stagnating economy, the poor and far from effective decision-making, a weak parliamentary democracy, and a variety of serious social problems. The military leadership was eager to play an important role in the national development and rejected the ethnic basis of politics and a political system rooted in political parties that represented by and large the respective ethnic groups. It is important to note that neither the military regime (1980-1987) nor the civilian governments succeeded to transform Suriname into a society of sustainable growth and more equity in the 1975-2000 period.

After the military regime withdrew in election year 1987 the political landscape changed. The traditional parties based on the support of the major ethnic groups (Creoles, East Indians and Javanese) showed a significant decline in the 1987-2005 period. Despite the fact that these parties - united in the *Nieuw Front voor Democratie en Ontwikkeling* - won three of the four elections in this period, their electoral support declined significantly. This decline went to the advantage of the new parties, in particular the National Democratic Party (*Nationale Democratische Partij*), founded by the military leaders of the 1980s. This party together with a few old and new political parties formed a coalition government after its victory in the 2010 elections. In addition to the changing political landscape, the economic and social landscapes are changing due to the continued economic growth and the influx of immigrants from Brazil, China and Holland. This chapter examines what has changed in society against the background of high economic growth and the new demographic and political configurations. We deal with voters trust in institutions and political leaders, the opinion of their own financial and the economic situation, and changing values and issues.

II. Economic Growth

The economy of Suriname has experienced a continued GDP growth rate in the past decade of about 5% annually and the IMF expects a similar continued economic growth in the next five years as well. Per capita income grew from US \$5,758 in 2007 to US \$8,452 in 2011.¹ The economy depends heavily on income from its mineral resources, notably gold and oil, which have replaced the importance of the bauxite sector. While from 2004 – 2011 the production of oil and gold increased in particular, the bauxite production decreased (Table 8). Thus the macro-economic situation has been

¹ International Monetary Fund: Suriname 2012 Article IV Consultation. IMF Country Report No.12/281. October 2012. This document also reports that a new series of GDP figures are used since 2007: "Newly-released national accounts data, rebased to 2007, show that the level of nominal GDP in 2010 was about 20 percent higher than previously assessed" (p.4).

quite positive in the past decade and Suriname has withered the storms of the economic crises that have plagued the more developed Western economies fairly good.²

Table 8. Index of Gold, Oil, & Bauxite Production, 2004-2011

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Tonnage of Gold Ore	21.0	21.7	21.8	23.2	27.1	29.8	31.5	31.6
Bauxite Production in mln dmt	4.1	4.8	4.9	5.3	5.3	3.4	3.1	3.2
Crude Oil Production in 1000 Barrels	2500	2700	2500	2650	2540	2740	2720	2630

(Source: The National Planning Office of Suriname [*Stichting Planbureau Suriname*])

We can safely say that the past decade has been a good economic decade for the country and for substantial portions of the population. This has not been the case in many other years. Suriname started out well at independence in 1975, and even during the first years of the military coup (1980-1982). One American dollar was valued at a stable rate of 1.8 Suriname guilders. After the Netherlands suspended its massive aid package in December 1982 –after the military junta killed 15 opposition leaders- plus the decline of the revenues from the bauxite industry, the economy began to suffer. Foreign exchange became scarce and import goods were difficult to get, while inflation and poverty began to increase. After the military allowed elections in 1987 and the Dutch restored their aid relationship, the economic situation improved slightly. Still the 1990s were economically volatile with a period of hyperinflation and a Structural Adjustment Program, which wiped out most savings of the population and increased poverty levels and inequality. By 1996 inflation was under control, but the new government built two large bridges without securing enough foreign funding and without enough own savings, which reactivated inflation. In 2003, the debt of bridges were paid off and inflation decreased to normal levels.³

In the LAPOP survey the respondents were asked how they rated the economic situation of Suriname: 18% stated that the economy was good, 56% found it neither good nor bad (fair), while 26% rated it bad. Compared to a year before, however one third of the respondents found the economy in better shape, while another third rated it the same and the last third said it was worse.

²The economic situation since independence in 1975 shows many ups and downs and interested readers are referred to for instance Pitou van Dijck (ed.). 2001. *The Suriname Economy, Prospects for Sustainable Development*. Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers. Caram, A.R. 2007. *Ontsporingen op weg naar monetaire soliditeit, de drie fasen in het bestaan van de Centrale Bank van Suriname 1957-2007*. Paramaribo: Centrale Bank van Suriname.

³Inflation in the period 1998-2003 was on average 42% per year, with a high peak of 99% in 1999. The average inflation for the period 2004-2011 was 9%.

Table 9. The personal financial situation of respondents 1996-2012

How is financial situation compared to a year ago?	Better	About the same	Worse	Total	Remarks
LAPOP April 2012	29%	42%	29%	100% (N=1441)	National survey
LAPOP April 2012	28%	41%	31%	100% (N=494)	Paramaribo
LAPOP April 2010	27%	49%	24%	100% (N=2901)	National survey
LAPOP April 2010	28%	48%	24%	100% (N=993)	Paramaribo
IDOS January 2007	5%	35%	59%	99% (N=487)	Paramaribo
IDOS August 2002	6%	28%	66%	100% (N=500)	Paramaribo
IDOS April 1999	3%	16%	81%	100% (N=589)	Paramaribo
IDOS November 1997	12%	27%	61%	100% (N=330)	Paramaribo
IDOS June 1996	26%	35%	39%	100% (N=412)	Paramaribo

With respect to their own financial situation, we see a slightly different picture because 29% of the respondents in Paramaribo noted an improvement in their personal finances; although the same percentage reported that it got worse, while for 42% it remained the same. The pattern is similar as the one for 2010 and indicates a much better situation than in previous years i.e. compared to similar questions in surveys of 2007, 2002, 1999 and 1996 (see Table 9). We have reported the LAPOP data both for the whole country and for the capital Paramaribo in order to allow for a better comparison. The year 1996 was the year when inflation was -1%, having come down from 236% in 1995 and 368% in 1994; thus it is not surprising that 26% reported a personal improvement in their finances.⁴ Still one would expect this percentage to be much higher after the hyperinflation nightmare for household budgets.

We present the data for 1996 because it seems to indicate that people are very conservative in reporting improvements of their personal financial situation. In 2008 Standard & Poor praised the Surinamese economy as one of the best performing ones in Latin America and the Caribbean. This credit rating company upgraded Suriname's rating from B+ to BB- and complimented the nation with six years of consecutive growth. Despite this macroeconomic growth, only 5% of the population in the capital reported an improvement of their personal financial situation in 2007, while 59% lamented that it got worse. At the same time, however, the number of private cars increased by 40% between 2000 and 2007⁵, while the number of mobile phones jumped from 41,048 in 2000 to 380.000 in 2007 (an increase of 826%). These data which indicate an increase in personal income of a broader group of the

⁴ Inflation data source: General Bureau of Statistics.

⁵ General Bureau of Statistics. 2011. *Traffic and Transport Statistics 2000-2010*. Paramaribo: General Bureau of Statistics.

population do not match very well with the reports in the opinion poll. Therefore, one has to be cautious with reports of income in Suriname, since there is a tendency for underreporting.

Table 10. Household income and living standards in 2012

The salary that you receive and total household income is.....	Percentage	N
is good enough for you and you can save from it	14%	179
is just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems	41%	523
is not enough for you and you are stretched	24%	309
is not enough for you and you are having a hard time	21%	277
Total	100%	1288

Source: LAPOP 2012

Despite the question of underreporting of income, there is a group of the population that is poor and does not profit from macro-economic growth i.e. they do not reap the benefits at the micro-economic level. According to the LAPOP survey 55% of the respondents could live from their salary, while 45% reported that they had problems getting through the month. In fact 21% of the people said that they were very poor because they had a hard time getting through the month. If we correlate this with the reported income we find that 22% of the respondents said that they had a household income of SRD 600 (US \$180) per month or less. These should be considered very poor households indeed within the Suriname context. Another 26% earned between SRD 601 (US \$180) and SRD 1200 (US \$360), which was not much either, but was above the extreme poverty line. Only 3% of the households reported to earn more than SRD 6000 (about US \$ 1800) per month.

III. More Trust

In 1999, the voters had little trust in the main institutions of the country. Actually 37% of the population at the time said that they had no confidence in any of the following institutions. Only 2% of the voters expressed confidence in the National Assembly, just 4% in the Justice system and 7% in the Government. There was also little trust in the Labor Unions (6%) and the Private Sector (7%). With a percentage of 32%, the religious institutions (Church, Temple and Mosque) scored highest in trust, while all other institutions received only 5% of the priority vote. Actually the voters had to choose between institutions so that the secondary trust level may have been much higher.⁶ It must be pointed out that at that time there was a growing political crisis in the country, with major strikes in May and June against the government under President Jules Wijdenbosch – soon after early elections were announced.⁷ The economy was also in bad shape with an inflation of 99% and an exchange rate for the US dollar that had more than doubled since the year before. Per capita income stood at US \$1,952.

⁶IDOS did an opinion poll in mid April 1999. Nearly all respondents answered the question on trust (N=589). The report was sent on 19 April 1999 to the press. *IDOS-opinie peiling geeft aan: Electoraat ziet geen betere toekomst vóór 2000* (De West, 22 April 1999).

⁷Among others the president had appointed a new Chief Justice against the advice of the sitting judges and lawyers and they did not recognize the new Chief Justice, but supported the old acting Chief Justice, and thus in fact there were two Chief Justices at the same time.

This situation was probably not the best period to measure trust in basic institutions, but it is the only documented case we could find.

Compared to the situation in 1999, it seems that Suriname has become a model of trust in 2012, at least with respect to institutions. This is remarkable, because the leading partner in the current coalition government is the same NDP that was leading a coalition in 1999. Thus it may well be that the improved socio-economic and political context has much to do with the change of mind of the voters. When we compare Suriname with other countries in which the LAPOP survey was held, Suriname scores above average for all institutions that were questioned (see Table 11). In fact, Suriname ranks first from all the countries considering support for the current political system in the country, trust in the justice system, trust in the electoral commission and trust in the Supreme Court.

Table 11. Trust in different political and social institutions (1 not at all, 7 a lot)

Institutions	Average 26 countries	Average Suriname (rank)
Courts guarantee a fair trial	3.97	4.66 (2)
Respect the political institutions	4.49	4.70
Basic rights are protected by the political system	3.88	4.28
Proud of living under the political system	4.16	4.42
Support the political system	4.46	5.29 (1)
Trust the justice system	3.87	4.85 (1)
Trust the Electoral Commission ⁸	4.06	5.16 (1)
Trust the Parliament	3.74	4.47 (3)
Trust the Police	3.90	4.77 (3)
Trust the Catholic Church ⁹	4.79	5.33 (3)
Trust the Evangelical/Protestant Church ¹⁰	4.11	5.14 (2)
Trust the political parties	3.21	3.79 (3)
Trust the President	4.17	4.89 (2)
Trust the Supreme Court	3.98	5.07 (1)
Trust the local or municipal government	4.01	4.35
Trust the mass media ¹¹	4.54	5.11 (3)
Trust elections ¹²	4.16	5.06 (2)

Source: LAPOP 2012

Suriname ranks second in regard to the opinion that courts guarantee a fair trial (behind Guyana), trust in Evangelical/Protestant Church (behind Panama), trust in the president (behind Haiti), and trust in elections (behind Uruguay).

⁸United States and Canada were missing.

⁹United States and Canada were missing.

¹⁰United States and Canada were missing.

¹¹United States and Canada were missing.

¹²United States and Canada were missing.

Suriname ranks third in regard to trusting the parliament (behind Belize and Guyana), the police (behind Canada and Chile), the Catholic Church (behind Panama and Paraguay), the political parties (behind Guyana and Belize), and mass media (behind Dominican Republic and Nicaragua).

Overall we see that the citizens of Suriname have a high level of trust in institutions compared to the other countries of North, Central and South America and the Caribbean. But it is of interest to analyze the trust levels further.¹³ Interestingly enough the Catholic Church holds the highest trust in the country, closely followed by the Protestant Church (Nr. 3), while the Islamic (Nr. 8) and Hindu (Nr. 9) religious institutions followed at a distance. This begs the question why this is so? Most can be explained easily by demographic weight i.e. there are more Christians than Hindus and Muslims; thus their relative weight moves them up. Thus Hindus trust their own institutions most (mean=6.28) and the same is true for Muslims (6.15).¹⁴ The Christians have somewhat less trust in their own institutions, but Catholics score higher (5.86), than Evangelicals/Pentecostals (5.39) and mainstream Protestants (5.08).¹⁵ Since we have these data we can also check how different religious groups rate each other. If the relationship is very antagonistic we would expect a low mean score. What we find actually is that it is not antagonistic at all, but rather a quite high level of mutual respect for another's religion, which is what Suriname is known for. In fact Hindus trusted Islamic institutions very much (5.73) and also Catholics (5.61) and Protestants (5.52). The Muslims also respected the Hindus (5.20), Catholics (5.27) and Protestants (4.89). The Christians (taken as a whole) also gave respect to the other groups: i.e. Muslims (4.50) and Hindus (4.48).¹⁶ A further inspection of the data reveals that even the non-believers did not have an antagonistic attitude towards the faithful; although their trust levels in the four religious institutions was much lower (av. mean of 4.00). We also looked at gender differences, but in the case of religious institutions, men and women scored about the same.

The second highest ranking institution in Table 11 was the Central Head Electoral Office (*Centraal Hoofd Stembureau* = CHS), which organizes the general elections in Suriname. It actually scored much higher (mean 5.16) than the trust people had in the elections themselves (at Nr. 6 with a mean of 5.06); although the difference was small. Thus elections are still considered an honest process. In fact the trust in the electoral process is much higher than the trust in the political parties which ranked at the bottom of the table (mean of 3.79). The National Assembly also scored relatively low (Nr. 13 with mean of 4.47), while the president ranked Nr. 10 (4.89) and the District Commissioner (i.e. the highest bureaucrat in a district) ranked near the bottom (Nr. 14 with mean of 4.35). Thus the electoral process received more trust than the institutions and elected officials that were tied to the elections.

The mass media actually also scored quite high in terms of trust (Nr.4 with mean of 5.11), which is a good sign in a democracy. The Court of Justice followed closely at Nr. 5 (5.07); while the

¹³ See Figure 91 where a 100% scale was used, although the original question used a seven point scale (see Table 11), which we will use in the analysis here.

¹⁴ Note that for this question the respondents could give a score between 1 (lowest) and 7 (highest), which means that 6.28 is actually quite high (90% out of 100%). In a sense 3.5 could be seen as average, while all scores above 3.5 can be considered as above average, while those below 3.5 can be considered as below average.

¹⁵ A score of 5.08 is still 73% (out of 100%).

¹⁶ Even the lowest score of 4.48 is still 64%. The Christians mean trust for Catholics was 5.40 and for Protestants 5.18. Thus the mean scores of the Christians started out much lower (at 5.40) and thus the mean score for the other groups was also lower. Still the difference between the highest and lowest mean score for the Christians was 0.92 (i.e. 5.40 – 4.48 = 0.92), while this was 1.26 for the Muslims and 0.76 for the Hindus.

Justice system as such received less trust (Nr. 11 with mean of 4.85), but still fairly high, which is a good indication for the rule of law. The armed forces (Nr. 7, mean 5.05) received more trust than the national police (Nr. 12, mean 4.77); although both still scored well above average.

We need to address a special case of trust i.e. in the president. We single this one out because the current president, Desi Bouterse, is the former military strongman of the 1980s. His election as president in 2010 fits a pattern in South and Central America, where a number of former military leaders were elected e.g. Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Lucio Gutierrez in Ecuador, and Ollanta Humala in Peru. Bouterse was not elected directly, since in Suriname the National Assembly elects the president, but he formed a coalition of eight parties which elected him. At the time of the elections, he was the main suspect in the killings of 15 opposition leaders in December 1982. A few weeks before the Court would close this case in 2012 his party initiated a law to give amnesty to all those involved in the killings. The law was adopted, which led to protests by several Civil Rights groups; while the court case was suspended due to uncertainty about the effect of the law. In the survey the question about the trust in the president was a general question in a series of questions on trust and not so much about the person of Bouterse. Trust in the president ranked as number 10 in the list with a mean of 4.89 (or 70% out of 100%). The question is whether this trust was equally distributed or not. If we look at party affiliation it becomes clear that Bouterse's own party adherently trusts him much more (6.17) than the opposition adherently trusts (mean of New Front members NPS and VHP is 3.54). The trust level of his main coalition members, ABOP and Pertjajah Luhur, stood at (4.71). Males trusted him somewhat more than females; while respondents in the interior trusted him slightly more than the urban dwellers. Christians trusted him more than Muslims and Hindus. The Indigenous trusted him most (5.76) and Maroons least (4.49). People with less education trusted him more than the higher educated. These levels of trust were not very negative, but they still seemed indicative of underlying differences in attitudes.

IV. Changing Issues

If we look at the trend of the main issues mentioned in different polls, we see two recurring high priority issues. Housing is mentioned in the LAPOP survey as the main issue¹⁷, closely followed by high consumer prices for products (or better price policies). The second issue in fact dominated the list of issues since 1997. The volatile economic situation in the past with high inflation and increasing exchange rates has been mentioned earlier and explains the dominance of this issue between 1997 and 2003. The fact that it is less prominent since 2007 was also explained by the economic growth and a more stable foreign exchange rate. Still the issue is there, which probably has to do with the fact that Suriname is an import economy for most of its consumer items and thus price increases in the world market tend to add to local price increases. In fact the issue of unemployment (11%) also has to do with the economic situation as it does with the issue "economic problems" (7%). Together these three economic issues add up to 32% of all priorities, which indicates that the economy remains an important sector for policy makers.

¹⁷ Respondents could only name one problem i.e. the most serious problem in their view.

Table 12. Main issues that need to be addressed 1997-2012

Main issues that need to be addressed (3 to 5 priorities)	LAIPOP April 2012	LAIPOP April 2010	IDOS Jan. 2007	IDOS Aug. 2003 ¹⁸	IDOS April 2000 ¹⁹	IDOS Nov. 1997
Housing	15%	15%	20%	10%		12%
High prices/price policies	14%	8%	11%	22%	28%	43%
Exchange rate					22%	
Unemployment	11%	11%	8%			
Poverty			15%			
Crime, delinquency	11%		9%	11%		11%
Corruption		8%				
Economic problems	7%	7%				
Health issues					19%	
Education					9%	
Infrastructure					4%	
	N=576 National survey	N=2035 National survey	N=487 Para-maribo	N=458 Para-maribo	N=512 Para-maribo	N=330 Para-maribo

Note: IDOS polls without source mentioned were provided by IDOS

If we go back to the issue of housing in Table 12 it is remarkable that this issue is not registered as a major one in any of the other Latin America and Caribbean countries (see Table 13). This could mean that these countries have other major problems or that basically they have found workable solutions for the housing issues. It seems that housing policies –and most probably also the land distribution policies- in Suriname have not worked, and that they need to be seriously reviewed. This is not the place to discuss Suriname’s housing policy, but subsequent governments always had ambitions to build for the poor segments of society, but underperformed, which is reflected in the different polls. The private sector has always done a better job, but this requires that citizens are able to get long term loans at reasonable interest rates, which -due to high inflation and foreign exchange rates- for many years has been the main problem. Improved macro-economic circumstances and incentives by the Central Bank for lower interest rates have stimulated middle income housing since 2005. For low income families the Low Income Shelter Program (LISP), which is financed by the IDB, has provided some assistance since 2003. The accumulated backlog in houses, however, is still felt and expressed in the survey.²⁰ This is underlined by the fact that in 2009, IDOS reported that in 58% of the households in the Paramaribo and neighboring Wanica district at least one person was in need of a home.²¹

¹⁸Dagblad Suriname 2-9-2003

¹⁹De Ware Tijd 28-4-2000

²⁰A good overview of the housing sector is found in “*Bouwen aan een fundament, een programma voor beleidsondersteunend onderzoek voor de sector huisvesting*” by M.A. Maks & G.A. de Bruijne (Paramaribo 2008). This report was commissioned by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Housing.

²¹De Ware Tijd 23-9-2009. In Maroon households, which are often low income this percentage was 84%.

Table 13. Housing as the most serious problem

Country	% housing most serious problem
Suriname	15.1%
Chile	1.3%
Brazil	1.1%
Venezuela	0.9%
Columbia, Guyana	0.8%
Argentina, Guatemala	0.5%
Ecuador, Panama, Nicaragua, Uruguay, Haiti	0.4%
Jamaica	0.3%
Belize, Trinidad & Tobago, Mexico, Honduras	All 0.1%
Dominican Republic, United States, Peru, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Paraguay, El Salvador	All 0.0%
Average	0.8%

Source: LAPOP 2012

The last main issue mentioned by the respondents was crime (11%). As we can see from Table 12, crime has been a nagging issue in the past as well. In Latin American and Caribbean countries, crime stands out as the main problem (with 20%), followed by unemployment (15%) and problems with the economy (12%). In Table 14, we compare the main issues in Suriname with those of four countries in the region i.e. Brazil, Guyana, Venezuela, and Trinidad & Tobago. We see that crime is the overriding priority in both Trinidad & Tobago and Venezuela mentioned by more than half of the respondents. In Guyana the most pressing problem was unemployment, which was a top priority in most other countries as well. Brazilians were most preoccupied with lack of adequate health services. Corruption was a major issue in Guyana as well, but also in Brazil and Trinidad & Tobago. In Suriname the issues seemed to be less pressing since they scored lower than the most serious issues in the other countries.

Table 14. Three main issues in Suriname and neighboring countries in 2012

Main issue	Suriname	Guyana	Brazil	Trinidad	Venezuela
Crime	11%			54%	51%
Unemployment	11%	29%		8%	8%
Health services poor			21%		
Corruption		20%	11%	11%	
Housing	15%				
High prices/inflation	14%				
Lack of security					13%
Violence			10%		
Roads in bad shape		7%			
	N=576	N=735	N=1496	N=744	N=739

Source: LAPOP 2012

Note: for Suriname four issues since two both were 11%. If nothing has been reported in a cell it does not mean that the issue does not exist in a particular country, but only that it is not among the three top priorities.

The main issues represent the main challenges the population face, and it is therefore important to shed more light on which segments or groups of the population are affected by a certain problem. First we look at the geographical distribution notably the regional distribution between urban, district and hinterland. This analysis reveals that housing is the most important issue for the urban population (21%), followed by high prices (11%) and crime (10%). These are also the three top priorities in rural areas, but all in the 12% to 14% range, followed closely by unemployment (11%) and economic problems (10%). In the interior, the two main issues are unemployment (20%) and high prices (19%), followed by housing (11%); while crime ranks much lower (5%). Thus despite the regional differences, housing and high prices are major issues that need to be addressed; although unemployment and crime deserve major attention as well.

For males housing is the main problem (15%), followed by unemployment (14%), and high prices (12%); while all other issues follow at some distance. Women are also preoccupied by high prices (16%), housing (15%), and crime (14%); while other issues are less pressing.

Young adults (18-29 years) mentioned housing as their main issue (18%), followed by high prices, and unemployment (both 14%). Senior citizens on the other hand were worried about high prices (19%) and crime (15%); while all other issues followed at a distance.

For people without education, unemployment was the main concern (17%), followed to a lesser extent by housing and high prices (both 11%). The respondents with a tertiary education were worried about housing (18%), high prices (15%), and corruption (11%).

The poorest people were mostly worried about the high prices (21%); while those who earned most were preoccupied with housing (15%).

V. Traditional versus Modern Values

It seems that certain values within the household are changing as well. This is especially true when the level of education increases. Traditional values such as discipline and obedience in the upbringing of children are making room for values like creativity and autonomy (see Table 15 and 16).

Table 15. Cross table of what is most important for a child (n=811)

Highest level of education	Which one is most important			Total
	Creativity	Discipline	Both	
None	0 0%	14 15%	14 50%	28 100%
Primary	12 6.3%	103 54.5%	74 39.2%	189 100%
Middle school	39 11.9%	174 52.9%	116 35.3%	329 100%
High school	21 11.4%	87 47%	77 41.6%	185 100%
Post-secondary, not university	11 27.5%	11 27.5%	18 45%	40 100%
University	7 17.5%	12 30%	21 52.5%	40 100%
Total	90 11.1%	401 49.4%	320 39.5%	811 100%

Source: LAPOP 2012

Table 16. Cross table of what is most important for a child (n=819)

Highest level of education	Which one is most important			Total
	Obedience	Autonomy	Both	
None	22 73.7%	0 0%	8 26.7%	30 100%
Primary	111 57.8%	16 8.3%	65 33.9%	192 100%
Middle school	219 66%	28 8.4%	85 25.6%	332 100%
High school	105 56.8%	23 12.4%	57 30.8%	185 100%
Post-secondary, not university	20 50%	6 15%	14 35%	40 100%
University	16 40%	8 20%	16 40%	40 100%
Total	493 60.2%	81 9.9%	245 29.9%	819 100%

Source: LAPOP 2012

VI. Conclusion

Amidst a continued economic growth over more than a decade and changes in the demographic and political landscape, Suriname is in the process of a changing society. If one considers as well the trust in main institutions, the opinions of the own financial and the national economic situation, and changing values on important issues.

Suriname seems to become a more trusting society, at least in terms of the overall trust of citizens in institutions. When the country is compared with other countries in the Americas, it ranks above average for many key institutions. Suriname ranks highest on support for the current political system, trust in the justice system, trust in the electoral commission and trust in the Supreme Court. It ranks second in regards to the belief that courts guarantee a fair trial, trust in Evangelical/Protestant Church, trust in the president, and trust in elections. And it ranks third on trusting the parliament, the police, the Catholic Church, the political parties, and mass media.

Of all the institutions the Catholic Church holds the highest trust in the country, immediately followed by the Central Head Electoral Office. The latter institution scored higher than the trust people had in the elections themselves. Interestingly, the trust in the electoral process is much higher than the trust in the political parties that ranked relatively low.

Considering religious institutions the highest ranking Catholic Church was found to be closely followed by the Protestant Church, while Islamic and Hindu religious institutions follow at a large distance. This distance, however, is explained by the demographic weight of larger numbers and relative weights of Christians in the sample. The different religious groups in Suriname rate each other quite high in terms of mutual respect for another's religion, with even the 'non-believers' having no antagonistic attitude towards the 'believers.' This corresponds with the national feeling of a peaceful multi-religious Surinamese society,

When we look at the major problems of the Surinamese people we identified major shifts both compared to previous years as well as with other countries in the America's. 'Housing' is perceived as the most serious problem facing Suriname, which is in sharp contrast with the ranking of most countries in the America. The geographical distribution between urban, district and hinterland indicates that housing is the most important issue for urban people, followed by high prices and crime. These three issues are also the main priorities in rural areas. Unemployment and high prices are the two most important issues in the interior. Despite regional differences housing and high prices are major issues that need to be addressed.

Finally, if we consider certain values within households a few interesting changes in the Surinamese society become visible. This is particularly true when the level of education increases. Traditional values like discipline and obedience in the upbringing of children are gradually making room for values like creativity and autonomy.

Appendices

Appendix A. Letter of Informed Consent



Stichting Wetenschappelijke Informatie



VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

Paramaribo 21 april 2012

Geachte Mevrouw/ Meneer,

De Stichting Wetenschappelijke Informatie (SWI) doet samen met de Vanderbilt University een opinieonderzoek in geheel Suriname. Het doel van deze studie is inzicht te verkrijgen in de opinies over verschillende aspecten van de Surinaamse samenleving.

In een interview van 30- 40 minuten zou ik u enkele vragen willen stellen. U bent door toeval gekozen en U heeft de vrijheid uw mening te geven. De informatie die u verstrekt wordt in cijfers verwerkt, blijft strikt vertrouwelijk en zal niet gebruikt worden voor andere doeleinden.

U wordt gevraagd mee te werken aan dit kort interview.

Hoogachtend,

Martin Sastroedjo, coordinator





Appendix B. Sample Design

Universe, Population, Unit of Observation

Universe: The survey provides national coverage of voting age adults, focusing on the standard five principal regions of the country: Paramaribo, Wanica/Para, Nickerie/Coronie/Saramancca, Commewijne/Marowijne, and the interior districts Brokopondo/Sipaliwini. In the past, these have been our strata (ESTRATOPRI) for Suriname and will remain our strata for 2012. The universe is comprised of adults (18 years old and over) living in urban and rural areas and the interior in 62 Ressen registered in the 2004 census in Suriname.

Population: The survey is designed to collect information from a nationally representative sample of the entire voting age adult population. Only non-institutionalized adults are eligible to participate in the survey. Therefore, the sample excludes people in boarding schools, hospitals, police academies, military barracks, and inmates of the country's jails.

Unit of Observation: The study contains topics that refer not only to the individual, but also to other members of the household. Thus, the statistical unit of observation is the household. However, in Latin America and the Caribbean, some respondents live in dwellings that could be shared with other households. For this reason, it is more convenient to consider the dwelling as the final unit of analysis. Additionally, the dwelling is an easily identifiable unit in the field, with relative permanence over time, a characteristic that allows it to be considered as the final unit of selection.

Sample frame

The sampling frame covers 100% of the eligible population in the surveyed country. This means that every eligible person in the country has an equal and known chance of being included in the survey sample. It also means that no particular ethnic group or geographical areas are excluded from the sampling frame.

In this sample design, as a sampling frame, we used the list of districts, Ressen, enumeration areas, and maps in Suriname from the 2004 census by the General Bureau of Statistics (GBS).

Suriname is divided into 10 districts and sub-divided into about 62 Ressen. Within each resort, the GBS established the enumeration areas and within them the constituent dwellings.

According to the 2004 census data, Suriname has a total of 492,829 inhabitants. Forty nine percent of the population was living in urban areas (Paramaribo) and the remaining 51% live in what is categorized as rural areas. Table 1 shows the distribution of the population by District, and urban and rural areas.

District	Urban	Rural	Total
Paramaribo	242,946		242,946
Wanica		85,986	85,986
Nickerie		36,639	36,639
Coronie		2,887	2,887
Saramacca		15,980	15,980
Commewijne		24,649	24,649
Marowijne		16,642	16,642
Para		18,749	18,749
Brokopondo (Interior)		14,215	14,215
Sipaliwini (Interior)		34,136	34,136
Total	242,946	249,883	492,829

Sampling Method

The sampling method chosen takes into consideration a series of elements pre-established by LAPOP. The following requirements for the design of the sample were determined by LAPOP Central beforehand:

(a) Obtain representative samples for the following study strata:

Strata for the first stage

1. Paramaribo
2. Wanica/Para
3. Nickerie/Coronie/Saramacca
4. Commewijne/Marowijne
5. Brokopondo/Sipaliwini

Strata for the second stage:

1. Urban Areas
2. Rural and interior Areas

(b) Calculate the sampling errors corresponding to these strata.

(c) Minimize travel time in survey operations.

(d) Optimal allocation that would allow a reasonable set of trade-offs between budget, sample size, and level of precision of the results.

(e) Use the best and most up-to-date sampling frame available.

(f) Expectation of 24 interviews by Primary sampling unit (PSU) or community

(g) Final sampling unit of 6 interviews in urban and rural areas



On the basis of these requirements, the method that is used in Suriname corresponds to a **stratified multi-stage cluster sampling**. The sample will be stratified based on two factors:

- 1) Paramaribo, Wanica/Para, Nickerie/Coronie/Saramancca, Commewijne/Marowijne, and Brokopondo/Sipaliwini
- 2) Level of Urbanization: Urban areas, and rural areas

The stratified sampling ensures a greater reliability in our sample by reducing the variance of the estimates. Stratification improves the quality of estimates, with the sole condition that the whole sample unit belongs to only one stratum, and the strata in combination cover the total population. Stratification also enables us to ensure the inclusion in the sample of the most important geographic regions in the country and sample dispersion.

The survey design for Suriname follows a multi-stage process as shown in the table 2 below:

1. The first stage, which corresponds to the selection of primary sampling units (PSUs), involves the selection of Communities within each of the strata defined above with probability proportional to the voting age adult population (PPS) of the country. Each PSU consists of 24 interviews.

Strata	Regions, Level of Urbanization,
Primary sampling Unit (PSU)	Ressorten
Secondary sampling Unit (SSU)	Enumeration areas
Tertiary Sampling Unit (TSU)	Blocks
Quaternary Unit (EU)	Households
Final Unit	Respondent

2. The second stage of the sample design consists of the selection of Enumeration areas or Enumeration areas within each PSU using PPS.
3. In the third stage blocks within the Enumeration areas are selected.
4. In the fourth stage, clusters of households are randomly selected within each PSU. A total 6 interviews are to be carried out in each sampling point in both rural and urban areas. Sampling points represent clusters of interviews, and the clusters are kept relatively small in order not to increase the “design effect” of the sample, but are also designed to reduce transportation costs by allowing some concentration in a given geographic point.
5. Finally, in the fifth stage of the sample design, a quota sample by gender and age is employed for selecting *a single respondent in each household*. The objective of the quota sample is to ensure that the distribution of individuals by sex and age in the survey matches the country’s official population statistics or those reported by the Census Bureau. Fully random selection within the household would have required extensive recalls, thus dramatically increasing costs with no assurances that a correct balance by gender and age would be thus achieved.

Stratification

Stratification is the process by which the population is divided into subgroups. Sampling is then conducted separately in each subgroup. Stratification allows subgroups of interest to be included in the sample whereas in a non-stratified sample some may have been left out due to the random nature of the

selection process. In an extreme case, samples that are not stratified can, by chance, exclude the nation's capital or largest city. Stratification helps us increase the precision of the sample. It reduces the sampling error. In a stratified sample, the sampling error depends on population variance within strata and not between them.

Since sampling is conducted separately in each stratum, it is desirable and important to ensure that there are a sufficient number of people in each subgroup to allow meaningful analysis.

The sample for Suriname is stratified by regions (Paramaribo, Wanica/Para, Nickerie/Coronie/Saramacca, Commewijne/Marowijne, and Brokopondo/Sipaliwini), level of urbanization (Urban areas, and rural areas). Table 3 displays the distribution of the interviews within each region by level of urbanization for Suriname¹. A total of 528 interviews are conducted in the urban areas and 984 in the rural areas.

Population	Urban Areas	Rural Areas & Interior	Total
Paramaribo	242,946		242,946
Wanica / Para		104,735	104,735
Nickerie / Coronie / Saramacca		55,506	55,506
Commewijne / Marowijne		41,291	41,291
Brokopondo / Sipaliwini		48,351	48,351
Total	242,946	49,883	492,829
Number of interviews	Urban Areas	Rural Areas	Total
Paramaribo	520		520
Wanica / Para		306	306
Nickerie / Coronie / Saramacca		240	240
Commewijne / Marowijne		215	215
Brokopondo / Sipaliwini		211	211
Total	520	972	1492

Sample Selection

First Stage: Primary Sampling Units.

At the first stage, Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) are selected within each of the five regions (i.e., strata, with allocation proportional to stratum size). The PSU are the country's 62 Ressennten that we have classified by level of urbanization:

1. Urban Areas
2. Rural Areas and Interior

¹ The square root allocation was used to distribute the number of interviews per stratum. Under this method, the sample is allocated proportionally to the square root of the stratum size. This means that the final sample will be weighted



The Ressornten are selected within each stratum, with probability proportional to the population size (PPS) of the municipality, on a systematic basis, with a random starting point. Table 4 shows the number of Ressornten that were selected in the five large regions in Suriname. A fixed number of 24 interviews are conducted in each resort, except for the 12 large Ressornten in Paramaribo. How those are selected is explained below.

Table 4. Ressornten Selected by Regions			
Number of Ressornten in Suriname	Urban Areas	Rural Areas/Interior	Total
Paramaribo	12		12
Wanica / Para		12	12
Nickerie / Coronie / Saramacca		14	14
Commewijne / Marowijne		12	12
Brokopondo / Sipaliwini		12	12
Total	12	50	62
Number of interviews	Urban Areas	Rural Areas/Interior	Total
Paramaribo	520		520
Wanica / Para		306	306
Nickerie / Coronie / Saramacca		240	240
Commewijne / Marowijne		215	215
Brokopondo / Sipaliwini		211	211
Total	520	972	1492
Number of selected communities	Urban Areas	Rural Areas/Interior	Total
Paramaribo	12		12
Wanica / Para		12	12
Nickerie / Coronie / Saramacca		10	10
Commewijne / Marowijne		9	9
Brokopondo / Sipaliwini		9	9
Total	12	40	52

The interviews are distributed in each of the 12 Ressen of Paramaribo with allocation proportional to population size. Table 5 shows the number of interviews to be carried out in each of the 12 Ressen of Paramaribo.

District	Ressort	Population	Percent	Number of interviews
Paramaribo	Blauwgrond	28436	11.7%	68
Paramaribo	Rainville	28853	11.9%	72
Paramaribo	Munder	16049	6.6%	24
Paramaribo	Centrum	29274	12.0%	70
Paramaribo	Beekhuizen	19783	8.1%	48
Paramaribo	Wegnaar Zee	13172	5.4%	24
Paramaribo	Welgelegen (Par'bo)	23709	9.8%	47
Paramaribo	Tammenga	14313	5.9%	24
Paramaribo	Flora	15346	6.3%	24
Paramaribo	Latour	26148	10.8%	48
Paramaribo	Pontbuiten	19477	8.0%	47
Paramaribo	Livorno	8386	3.5%	24
Total		242946	100.0%	520

In sum, a total of 52 PSUs with at least 24 interviews each is selected. The PSUs correspond to 12 Ressen in Paramaribo, and 40 Ressen in rural areas.

Second Stage: Selection of Enumeration areas

In a second stage of the sample selection process, Enumeration areas are selected in each PSU with allocation proportional to population size. The Enumeration areas are selected with probability proportional to size (PPS) on a systematic basis with a random starting point within each PSU. The number of Enumeration areas to be selected in each PSU was set taking into account the LAPOP Central requirement of establishing final sampling units of size 6 in both urban areas and rural areas. Table 6 shows the number of Enumeration areas within each stratum. A total of 252 Enumeration areas were selected: 88 in the urban areas and 164 rural ones, distributed across the 52 selected Ressen.

Strata code	Strata name	District code	District name	Number of Interviews	Number of Enumeration Areas
1	Paramaribo	1	Paramaribo	520	95
2	Wanica / Para	2	Wanica	192	36
2	Wanica/ Para	8	Para	120	20
3	Nickerie / Coronie / Saramacca	3	Nickerie	48	20
3	Nickerie / Coronie / Saramacca	4	Coronie	72	8
3	Nickerie / Coronie / Saramacca	5	Saramacca	119	8
4	Commewijne / Marowijne	6	Commewijne	96	20
4	Commewijne / Marowijne	7	Marowijne	114	16
5	Brokopondo / Sipaliwini	9	Brokopondo	94	16
5	Brokopondo / Sipaliwini	10	Sipaliwini	117	21
Total				1492	260

Third Stage: Selection of Blocks.

In the third stage, blocks within the Enumeration areas are selected. Each country team is expected to obtain the appropriate maps of the selected Enumeration areas or Enumeration areas from their own census bureaus. Each selected sector will be divided into three or more blocks. One block will be selected randomly in each sector. The selected block will constitute the sampling point or cluster within the sector. The interviewer is required to interview 6 persons in each selected block or cluster.

Fourth Stage: Selection of Households.

This stage of selection begins once interviewers locate the starting point of the. Each interviewer will select a number of households in a systematic way. Specifically, interviews should be carried out every three households. In other words, each time an interview is completed, the next interview cannot be carried out in the following two households.

In case of rejection, empty dwelling, or nobody at home, the interviewer selects the adjacent dwelling. In those cases in which the interviewer reaches the end of the block without completing the quota of six interviews, he or she can proceed to the next block follow the same routine as in the first block.

Fifth Stage: Selection of the Respondents.

A single respondent will be selected in each household, following a quota sampling based on sex and age (as shown in Table 6 below). The quota for each age group and sex was estimated based on the 2004 census. The respondent should be a permanent household member- neither a domestic

employee nor a visitor. If there are two or more people of the same sex and age group in the household, the questionnaire should be applied to the person with the next birthday.

Sex/Age group	18- 29	30- 45	45 and over	Total
Male	1	1	1	3
Female	1	1	1	3
Total	2	2	2	6

Confidence Level and Margins of Error

The confidence levels anticipated for the national sample was 95 percent, with a margin of error of 2.5 percent, assuming a 50/50 proportion in dichotomous variables (in any other proportion, the sampling error is lower). The margins of error for a confidence level of 95 percent assuming a Simple Random Sample (SRS) design are:

Region	Sample size	Margin of error
Paramaribo	520	4.26
Wanica / Para	306	5.54
Nickerie / Coronie / Saramancca	240	6.31
Commewijne / Marowijne	215	6.65
Brokopondo / Sipaliwini	211	6.65
Areas		
Urban	520	4.26
Rural	972	3.12
Total Country	1492	2.52

The sample is self-weighted. Different sampling fractions were used in each stratum.

Consequently, different sample weights were calculated for each stratum. The major component of the weight is the reciprocal of the sampling fraction employed in the particular stratum:

$$W_h=1/f_h$$

Since the sample is stratified, clustered and weighted (Kish 1995), we have to take into account the complex sample design to accurately estimate the precision of the sample. It is not possible to determine the sampling error a priori. We recommend including the sampling error taking into account the design effect for a set of variables once the survey is completed.

Appendix C. Questionnaire

Suriname 2012, Version # 10.0.2.2 IRB Approval: 110627



AmericasBarometer: Suriname, 2012

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PAIS. Country:					27
01. Mexico	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua	
06. Costa Rica	07. Panama	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia	
11. Peru	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brazil	
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Dom. Rep.	22. Haiti	23. Jamaica	
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad & Tobago	26. Belize	40. United States	41. Canada	
27. Suriname					
IDNUM. Questionnaire number [assigned at the office]					_ _ _ _
ESTRATOPRI:					
(2701) Paramaribo (2702) Wanica/Para (2703) Nickerie / Coronie / Saramancca					_ _
(2704) Commewijne / Marowijne (2705) Brokopondo / Sipaliwini					
ESTRATOSEC. Size of the Ressoriten:					
(1) Large (more than 20000) (2) Medium (5000 - 20000) (3) Small (< 5000)					_
UPM (Primary Sampling Unit): _____					_ _ _
PROV. Province (or department) : _____					27 _ _
MUNICIPIO. County (or Ressorit): _____					27 _ _
SURDISTRITO. District (or parish, etc.): _____					_ _
SURSEGMENTO. Census Segment: _____					_ _ _
SURSEC. Sector _____					_ _ _
CLUSTER. [CLUSTER, Final sampling unit, or sampling point]: _____					_ _
[A cluster must have 6 interviews]					
UR. (1) Urban (2) Rural (3) Interior					_ _
TAMANO. Size of place: (1) National Capital (Metropolitan area) (2) Large City					
(3) Medium City (4) Small City (5) Rural Area					_
IDIOMAQ. Questionnaire language: (11) English (12) Dutch (13) Sranan Tongo					_
Start time: _____:_____					_ _ _ _
FECHA. Date Day: _____ Month: _____ Year: 2012					_ _ _ _

Do you live in this home?
Yes → continue
No → Thank the respondent and end the interview

Are you a Suriname citizen or permanent resident of Suriname?
Yes → continue
No → Thank the respondent and end the interview

Are you at least 18 years old?
Yes → continue
No → Thank the respondent and end the interview

NOTE: IT IS COMPULSORY TO READ THE STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT BEFORE STARTING THE INTERVIEW.

Q1. [Note down; do not ask] Sex: (1) Male (2) Female

LS3. To begin, in general how satisfied are you with your life? Would you say that you are... [Read options]?

(1) Very satisfied	(2) Somewhat satisfied	(3) Somewhat dissatisfied
(4) Very dissatisfied	(88) Doesn't know	(98) Doesn't Answer

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES			
[THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" OR "8")]			
A4. In your opinion, what is the most serious problem faced by the country? [DO NOT READ THE RESPONSE OPTIONS; ONLY A SINGLE OPTION]			
Water, lack of	19	Impunity	61
Roads in poor condition	18	Inflation, high prices	02
Armed conflict	30	Politicians	59
Corruption	13	Bad government	15
Credit, lack of	09	Environment	10
Crime	05	Migration	16
Human rights, violations of	56	Drug trafficking	12
Unemployment	03	Gangs	14
Inequality	58	Poverty	04
Malnutrition	23	Popular protests (strikes, road blockages, work stoppages, etc.)	06
Forced displacement of persons	32	Health services, lack of	22
External debt	26	Kidnappings	31
Discrimination	25	Security (lack of)	27
Drug addiction	11	Terrorism	33
Economy, problems with, crisis of	01	Land to farm, lack of	07
Education, lack of, poor quality	21	Transportation, problems of	60
Electricity, lack of	24	Violence	57
Population explosion	20	Housing	55
War against terrorism	17	Other	70
Doesn't know	88	Doesn't answer	98
N/A	99		



<p>SOCT1. How would you describe Suriname's economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer</p>
<p>SOCT2. Do you think that Suriname's current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer</p>
<p>IDIO1. How would you describe your overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer</p>
<p>IDIO2. Do you think that your economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer</p>

Now, moving on to a different subject, sometimes people and communities have problems that they cannot solve by themselves, and so in order to solve them they request help from a government official or agency.					
In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from...? [Read the options and mark the response]	Yes	No	DK	DA	
CP2. A member of Parliament	1	2	88	98	
CP4A. A local public official or local government for example, a District Commissioner, District Commission member or Ressor commission member.	1	2	88	98	
CP4. Any ministry or minister (national), state agency or public agency or institution	1	2	88	98	

Now let's talk about your local Ressor and District...					
<p>NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, ressor commission meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer</p>					
<p>NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the ressor or District within the past 12 months? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to SGL1] (88) Doesn't know [Go to SGL1] (98) Doesn't answer [Go to SGL1]</p>					
<p>MUNI10. Did they resolve your issue or request? (1) Yes (0) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A</p>					
<p>SGL1. Would you say that the services the ressor commission is providing to the people are...? [Read options] (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer</p>					

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK	DA
<p>CP5. Now, changing the subject. In the last 12 months have you tried to help to solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood? Please, tell me if you did it at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year or never in the last 12 months.</p>	1	2	3	4	88	98

I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. [Repeat “once a week,” “once or twice a month,” “once or twice a year,” or “never” to help the interviewee]										
	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	Attend/member	Leader/Board member	DK	DA	INAP	
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4 [Go to CP7]			88	98		
CP6L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role? [If the interviewee says “both,” mark “leader”]					1	2	88	98	99	
CP7. Meetings of a parents’ association at school? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4 [Go to CP8]			88	98		
CP7L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? [If the interviewee says “both,” mark “leader”]					1	2	88	98	99	
CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4 [Go to CP9]			88	98		
CP8L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? [If the interviewee says “both,” mark “leader”]					1	2	88	98	99	
CP9. Meetings of an association of professionals, merchants, manufacturers or farmers? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4			88	98		
CP13. Meetings of a political party or political organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4			88	98		
CP20. [Women only] Meetings of associations or groups of women or home makers. Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4			88	98	99	
CP21. Meetings of sports or recreation groups?	1	2	3	4			88	98		
IT1. And speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...? [Read options] (1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) Not very trustworthy (4) Untrustworthy (88) DK (98) DA										

JC13. When there is a lot of corruption.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA
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JC15A. Do you believe that when Suriname is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of Suriname to close the National Assembly and govern without National Assembly?	(1) Yes, it is justified	(2) No, it is not justified	(88) DK	(98) DA
JC16A. Do you believe that when Suriname is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of Suriname to dissolve the Supreme Court and govern without the Supreme Court?	(1) Yes, it is justified	(2) No, it is not justified	(88) DK	(98) DA

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Skip toVIC1HOGAR] (88) DK [Skip toVIC1HOGAR] (98) DA [Skip toVIC1HOGAR]
VIC1EXTA. How many times have you been a crime victim during the last 12 months? ____ [fill in number] (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A
VIC2. Thinking of the last crime of which you were a victim, from the list I am going to read to you, what kind of crime was it? [Read the options] (01) Unarmed robbery, no assault or physical threats (02) Unarmed robbery with assault or physical threats (03) Armed robbery (04) Assault but not robbery (05) Rape or sexual assault (06) Kidnapping (07) Vandalism (08) Burglary of your home (thieves got into your house while no one was there) (10) Extortion (11) Other (88) DK (98)DA (99) N/A (was not a victim)
VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred? [Read options] (1) In your home (2) In this neighborhood (3) In this ressort (4) In another ressort (5) In another country (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)
AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line? (1) Should always abide by the law (2) Occasionally can cross the line (88) DK (98) DA



<p>AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe? (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>AOJ12. If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty? [Read the options] (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>AOJ17. To what extent do you think your neighborhood is affected by gangs? Would you say a lot, somewhat, a little or none? (1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA</p>	

[GIVE CARD B TO THE RESPONDENT]

On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 1 to 7, where 1 is the lowest step and means NOT AT ALL and 7 the highest and means A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent do you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, in contrast, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is between not at all and a lot, you would choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the number. **[Make sure that the respondent understands correctly].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Not at all						A lot	Doesn't know	Doesn't Answer
Note down a number 1-7, or 88 DK and 98 DA								
I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.								
B1. To what extent do you think the courts in Suriname guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice <u>at all</u> , choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)								
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Suriname?								
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Suriname?								
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Suriname?								
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Suriname?								
B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?								
B11. To what extent do you trust the Central Head Electoral Bureau (CHS)?								
B12. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces?								
B13. To what extent do you trust the National Assembly?								
B18. To what extent do you trust the National Police?								
B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?								
B20A. To what extent do you trust the Protestant Church?								
B20B. To what extent do you trust Hindu religious institutions?								
B20C. To what extent do you trust Islamic religious institutions?								
B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?								
B21A. To what extent do you trust the President?								
B31. To what extent do you trust the Court of Justice?								
B32. To what extent do you trust the District Commissioner?								
B43. To what extent are you proud of being a Surinamese?								
B37. To what extent do you trust the mass media?								
B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country?								

Now, using the same ladder, [continue with Card B: 1-7 point scale] NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT	Note 1-7, 88 = DK, 98 = DA
N1. To what extent would you say the current government fights poverty?	
N3. To what extent would you say the current government promotes and protects democratic principles?	
N9. To what extent would you say the current government combats government corruption?	
N11. To what extent would you say the current government improves citizen safety?	
N15. To what extent would you say that the current government is managing the economy well?	

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES	Note
[THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER (“1” “3” “5” “7” OR “9”)]	1-7,
And continuing to use the same card,	88 = DK,
NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT	98 = DA,
EPP1. Thinking about political parties in general, to what extent do Surinamese political parties represent their voters well? (99) N/A	99 = N/A
EPP3. To what extent do political parties listen to people like you? (99) N/A	

Now, using the same ladder, [continue with Card B: 1-7 point scale] NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT	Note 1-7, 88 = DK, 98 = DA
MIL1. To what extent do you believe that the Surinamese Armed Forces are well trained and organized?	
MIL2. To what extent do you think that the Armed Forces in Suriname have done a good job when they have helped to deal with natural disasters?	
B3MILX. To what extent do you believe that the Surinamese Armed Forces respect Surinamese’s human rights nowadays?	
MIL3. Changing the topic a little, how much do you trust the Armed Forces of the United States of America?	
MIL4. To what extent do you believe that the Armed Forces of the United States of America ought to work together with the Armed Forces of Suriname to improve national security?	

[Take Back Card B]

M1. Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President Dési Bouterse? [Read the options] (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA	
M2. Now speaking of National Assembly, and thinking of members as a whole, without considering the political parties to which they belong, do you believe that the members of the National Assembly are performing their jobs: very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very poorly? (1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor poorly (fair) (4) Poorly (5) Very poorly (88) DK (98) DA	



<p>SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?</p> <p>(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? [Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]</p> <p>(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? [Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]</p> <p>(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA</p>	

[GIVE CARD C]

Now we will use a similar ladder, but this time 1 means “strongly disagree” and 7 means “strongly agree.” A number in between 1 and 7 represents an intermediate score.

Write a number 1-7, or 88 = Doesn't Know, 98 = Doesn't Answer

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98	
Strongly disagree						Strongly agree		Doesn't know	Doesn't answer

Note down 1-7, 88 = DK 98=DA

<p>Taking into account the current situation of this country, and using that card, I would like you to tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements</p> <p>POP101. It is necessary for the progress of this country that our presidents limit the voice and vote of opposition parties, how much do you agree or disagree with that view?</p> <p>POP107. The people should govern directly rather than through elected representatives. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?</p> <p>POP113. Those who disagree with the majority represent a threat to the country. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?</p> <p>We are going to continue using the same ladder. Please, could you tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements?</p> <p>EFF1. Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?</p> <p>EFF2. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?</p>	
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Write a number 1-7, or 88=DK and 98=DA

<p>ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?</p> <p>DEM23. Democracy can exist without political parties. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?</p>	
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Now I am going to read some items about the role of the national government. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. We will continue using the same ladder from 1 to 7. **(88) DK (98) DA**

<p>ROS1. The Surinamese government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?</p> <p>ROS2. The Surinamese government, more than individuals, should be primarily responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?</p> <p>ROS3. The Surinamese government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for creating jobs. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?</p>	
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ROS4. The Surinamese government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
ROS6. The Surinamese government, more than the private sector should be primarily responsible for providing health care services. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
MIL7. The Armed Forces ought to participate in combatting crime and violence in Suriname. How much do you agree or disagree?	

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES

[QUESTIONS CCT3-RAC2A SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER (“1” “3” “5” “7” OR “9”)]

CCT3. Changing the topic...Some people say that people who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy. How much do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A

GEN1. Changing the subject again, some say that when there is not enough work, men should have a greater right to jobs than women. To what extent do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A

Now I would like to know how much you are in agreement with some policies I am going to mention. I would like you to respond thinking about what should be done, regardless of whether the policies are being implemented currently. **[Write Down Number 1-7, 88 for those who DK, 98 for those who DA, 99 for N/A.]**

GEN6. The state ought to require that political parties reserve some space on their lists of candidates for women, even if they have to exclude some men. How much do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A

RAC2A. Universities ought to set aside openings for students with darker skin, even if that means excluding other students. How much do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A

[Interviewer: “dark skin” refers to blacks, Amerindians, “non-whites” in general]

[Take Back Card C]

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES

[QUESTIONS W14-PN5 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER (“1” “3” “5” “7” OR “9”)]

W14A. And now, thinking about other topics. Do you think it’s justified to interrupt a pregnancy, that is, to have an abortion, when the mother’s health is in danger?

(1) Yes, justified (2) No, not justified (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

PN4. And now, changing the subject, in general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Suriname?

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

PN5. In your opinion, is Suriname very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not at all democratic?

(1) Very democratic (2) Somewhat democratic (3) Not very democratic
(4) Not at all democratic (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A



[Give the respondent Card D]

Now we are going to use another card. The new card has a 10-point ladder, which goes from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you strongly disapprove and 10 means that you strongly approve. I am going to read you a list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals and objectives. Please tell me how strongly you would approve or disapprove of people taking the following actions.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88 Doesn't know	98 Doesn't Answer
Strongly disapprove					Strongly approve						

	1-10, 88=DK, 98=DA
E5. Of people participating in legal demonstrations. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E8. Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community problems. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E11. Of people working for campaigns for a political party or candidate. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E15. Of people participating in the blocking of roads to protest. Using the same scale, how much do you approve or disapprove?	
E14. Of people seizing private property or land in order to protest. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E3. Of people participating in a group working to violently overthrow an elected government. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E16. Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals. How much do you approve or disapprove?	

The following questions are to find out about the different ideas of the people who live in Suriname. Please continue using the 10 point ladder.

	1-10, 88=DK, 98=DA
D1. There are people who only say bad things about the Suriname form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's right to vote ? Please read me the number from the scale: [Probe: To what degree?]	
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views? Please read me the number.	
D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Suriname form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office ?	
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches ?	
D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office ?	

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES

[QUESTIONS D6-D8 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER (“1” “3” “5” “7” OR “9”)]

D6. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of same-sex couples having the right to marry?
(99) N/A

D7. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of people who are physically handicapped being permitted to run for public office? (99) N/A

D8. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of the state/government having the right to prohibit newspapers from publishing news that can be **politically damaging** to it? (99) N/A

[Take back Card D]

DEM2. Now changing the subject, which of the following statements do you agree with the most:

- (1) For people like me it doesn't matter whether a government is democratic or non-democratic, or
 - (2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government, or
 - (3) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one.
- (88) DK (98) DA

DEM11. Do you think that our country needs a government with an iron fist, or do you think that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation?

- (1) Iron fist
 - (2) Everyone's participation
- (88) DK (98) DA

AUT1. There are people who say that we need a strong leader who does not have to be elected by the vote of the people. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What do you think? **[Read the options]**

- (1) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected
 - (2) Electoral democracy is the best
- (88) DK (98)DA

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC20. In the last twelve months, did any soldier or military officer ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the district commissioner? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99				
		0	1	88	98
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99				
		0	1	88	98
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99				
		0	1	88	98
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99				
		0	1	88	98
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99				
		0	1	88	98
EXC18. Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified?		0	1	88	98
EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is [Read] (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA					

[EXC7MIL. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption in the **Armed Forces** is **[Read options]** (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA

Now, changing the subject, and thinking **about your experiences in the past year**, have you ever felt discriminated against, that is, treated worse than other people, in the following places?

	Yes	No	DK	DA	INAP
DIS2. In government offices [courts, agencies, municipal government]	1	2	88	98	99
DIS3. At work or school or when you have looked for work	1	2	88	98	99
DIS5. In public places, such as on the street, in public squares, in shops or in the market place?	1	2	88	98	

VB1. Are you registered to vote?
 (1) Yes (2) No (3) Being processed (88) DK (98) DA

INF1. Do you have a national identification card?
 (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

VB2. Did you vote in the last 2010 elections?
 (1) Voted **[Continue]**
 (2) Did not vote **[Go to VB10]**
 (88) DK **[Go to VB10]** (98) DA **[Go to VB10]**

VB3. Who did you vote for in the last 2010 elections? **[DON'T READ THE LIST]**
 (00) none (Blank ballot or spoiled or null ballot)
 (2731) Nieuw Front (New Front) (NPS/SPA/VHP/DA'91)
 (2732) Volksalliantie (People's Alliance for Progress) (PL/UPS/PSV/TP 2000)
 (2733) Mega Combinatie (NDP/KTPI/PALU/NS)
 (2734) BVD/PVF Combinatie (BVD/PVF)
 (2735) A-Combinatie (ABOP/BEP/SEEKA)
 (2736) Democratische Unie Suriname (Democratic Union Suriname) (DUS)
 (2713) Partij voor Democratie en Ontwikkeling door Eenheid (Party for Democracy and Development in Unity) (DOE)
 (2737) Nationale Unie (National Union) (NU)
 (2738) Permanente Voorspoed Republiek Suriname (PVRs)
 (77) Other
 (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Did not vote)

VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party?
 (1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to POL1]** (88) DK **[Skip to POL1]**
 (98) DA **[Skip to POL1]**



<p>VB11. Which political party do you identify with? [DON'T READ THE LIST]</p> <p>(2702) Democraten 21 (Democrats of the 21st Century) (D21) (2703) Nieuw Suriname (New Suriname) (NS) (2704) Politieke Vleugel van de FAL (Political Wing of the FAL) (PVF) (2705) Trefpunt 2000 (Meeting Point 2000) (2706) Algemene Bevrijdings- en Ontwikkelingspartij (General Interior Development Party) (ABOP) (2707) Nationale Democratische Partij (National Democratic Party) (NDP) (2708) Democratisch Alternatief '91 (Democratic Alternative '91) (DA'91) (2709) Nationale Partij Suriname (National Party Suriname) (NPS) (2710) Verenigde Hervormings Partij (United Reform Party) (VHP) (2711) Pertjaja Luhur (2712) Surinaamse Partij van de Arbeid (Surinamese Labor Party) (SPA) (2713) Partij voor Democratie en Ontwikkeling door Eenheid (Party for Democracy and Development in Unity) (DOE) (2715) Basispartij voor Vernieuwing en Democratie (Grassroots Party for Renewal and Democracy) (BVD) (2716) Kerukunan Tulodo Prenatan Inggil (Party for National Unity and Solidarity of the Highest Order) (KTPI) (2719) Progressieve Arbeiders en Landbouwers Unie (Progressive Laborers and Farmers Union) (PALU) (2720) Progressieve Politieke Partij (Progressive Political Party) (PPP) (2721) Seeka (2722) Unie van Progressieve Surinamers (Union of Progressive Surinamers) (UPS) (2723) Broederschap en Eenheid in de Politiek (Brotherhood and Unity in Politics) (BEP) (2736) Democratische Unie Suriname (Democratic Union Suriname) (DUS) (2737) Nationale Unie (National Union) (NU) (2738) Permanente Voorspoed Republiek Suriname (PVRS) (2739) Progresieve Surinaamse Volkspartij (PSV) (77) Other (88) DK (98) DA (99) NA</p>	
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<p>POL1. How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?</p> <p>(1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
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<p>VB20. If the next presidential elections were being held this week, what would you do? [Read options]</p> <p>(1) Wouldn't vote (2) Would vote for the incumbent candidate or party (3) Would vote for a candidate or party different from the current administration (4) Would go to vote but would leave the ballot blank or would purposely cancel my vote (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>PP1. During election times, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate? [Read the options]</p> <p>(1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>PP2. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last 2010 elections?</p> <p>(1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>VB50. Some say that in general, men are better political leaders than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?</p> <p>(1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree (88) DK (98) DA</p>	

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES

[QUESTIONS VB51-AB5 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER (“1” “3” “5” “7” OR “9”)]

VB51. Who do you think would be more corrupt as a politician, a man or a woman, or are both the same?

- (1) A man (2) A woman (3) Both the same
 (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

VB52. If a politician is responsible for running the national economy, who would do a better job, a man, or a woman or does it not matter?

- (1) A man (2) A woman (3) It does not matter
 (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

Now we are going to talk about race or skin color of politicians.

VB53. Some say that in general, people with dark skin are not good political leaders. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?

[Interviewer: “dark skin” refers to blacks, Amerindians, “non-whites” in general]

- (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree
 (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

RAC1CA. According to various studies, people with dark skin are poorer than the rest of the population. What do you think is the main reason for this?

[Read alternatives, just one answer]

- (1) Because of their culture, or (2) Because they have been treated unjustly
 (3) **[Do not read]** Another response (88) DK (98) DA
 (99) N/A

Changing the subject, and talking about the qualities that children ought to have, I am going to mention various characteristics and I would like you to tell me which one is the most important for a child:

- AB1.** (1) Independence, or (2) Respect for adults (3) **[Don’t read]** Both
 (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

- AB2.** (1) Obedience, or (2) Autonomy (self-sufficiency, taking care of oneself)
 (3) **[Don’t read]** Both (88) DK (98) DA
 (99) N/A

- AB5.** (1) Creativity, or (2) Discipline (3) **[Don’t read]** Both
 (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES

[QUESTIONS SNW1A-MIL11E SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN EVEN NUMBER (“0” “2” “4” “6” OR “8”)]

SNW1A. Do you personally know an elected official or some person who was a candidate in the most recent national or local elections?

- (1) Yes (2) No **[Go to MIL10A]**
 (88) DK **[Go to MIL10A]** (98) DA **[Go to MIL10A]** (99) N/A

SNW1B. And is this position at the local or national level?

- (1) Local (3) National
 (4) Candidates at more than one level (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES

[ASK ONLY FOR RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN EVEN NUMBER (“0” “2” “4” “6” “8”).]

Now, I would like to ask you how much you trust the governments of the following countries. For each country, tell me if in your opinion it is very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or if you don't have an opinion.

	Very trustworthy	Somewhat trustworthy	Not very trustworthy	Not at all trustworthy	DK/No opinion	DA	N/A
MIL10A. The government of China. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
MIL10B. That of Russia. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
MIL10C. Iran. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
MIL10D. Israel. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
MIL10E. United States. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99

Now I would like to ask you about the relations in general of our country with other nations around the world. When you think of our country's relationship with **China**, would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?

	Closer	About the same	More distant	No opinion	DA	N/A
MIL11A. China.	1	2	3	88	98	99
MIL11B. And our country's relationship with Russia. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	88	98	99
MIL11C. And with Iran. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	88	98	99

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES							
	Closer	About the same	More distant	No opinion	DA	N/A	
MIL11D. And with Israel. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	88	98	99	
MIL11E. Finally, with the United States. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	88	98	99	

On a different subject...

CCT1NEW. Do you or someone in your household receive monthly assistance in the form of money or products from the government?

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

ED. How many years of schooling have you completed?

_____ Year _____ (primary, secondary, university, post-secondary not university) = _____ total number of years **[Use the table below for the code]**

	1 ⁰	2 ⁰	3 ⁰	4 ⁰	5 ⁰	6 ⁰	7 ⁰
None	0						
School	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Middle School	7	8	9	10			
High school	11	12	13				
University	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Post-secondary, not university	13	14	15	16			
Doesn't know	88						
Doesn't respond	98						

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES

[ED2 AND MOV1 SHOULD ONLY BE ASKED FOR INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER (“1” “3” “5” “7” “9”)]

ED2. And what educational level did your mother complete? [DO NOT READ OPTIONS]

- (00) None
- (01) Primary incomplete
- (02) Primary complete
- (03) Secondary incomplete
- (04) Secondary complete
- (05) Technical school/Associate degree incomplete
- (06) Technical school/Associate degree complete
- (07) University (bachelor’s degree or higher) incomplete
- (08) University (bachelor’s degree or higher) complete
- (88) DK
- (98) DA
- (99) N/A

MOV1. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the ...? [READ OPTIONS]

- | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------------|------------------|
| (1) Upper class | (2) Upper middle class | (3) Middle class |
| (4) Lower middle class, or | (5) Lower class? | |
| (88) DK | (98) DA | (99) N/A |

Q2D-Y. On what day, month and year were you born? [If respondent refuses to say the day and month, ask for only the year, or ask for the age and then calculate the year.]

_____ Day _____ Month (01 = January) _____ Year

(For Q2D and Q2M: 88 =DK and 98 = DR)

(For Q2Y: 8888 = DK and 9888 = DR)

Q2D

Day

Q2M

Month

Q2Y

Year

Q3C. What is your religion, if any? [Do not read options]

[If the respondent says that he/she has no religion, probe to see if he/she should be located in option 4 or 11]

- (1) Catholic
- (2) Protestant, Mainline Protestant or Protestant non-Evangelical (Christian; Calvinist; Lutheran; Methodist; Presbyterian; Disciple of Christ; Anglican; Episcopalian; Moravian).
- (2701) Muslim
- (2702) Hindu
- (2703) Other non-Christian Eastern Religions (Buddhist; Taoist; Confucianism; Baha’i).
- (4) None (Believes in a Supreme Entity but does not belong to any religion)
- (5) Evangelical and Pentecostal (Evangelical; Pentecostals; Church of God; Assemblies of God; Universal Church of the Kingdom of God; International Church of the Foursquare Gospel; Christ Pentecostal Church; Christian Congregation; Mennonite; Brethren; Christian Reformed Church; Charismatic non-Catholic; Light of World; Baptist; Nazarene; Salvation Army; Adventist; Seventh-Day Adventist; Sara Nossa Terra).
- (6) LDS (Mormon).
- (7) Traditional Religions or Native Religions (Candomblé, Voodoo, Rastafarian, Mayan Traditional Religion; Umbanda; Maria Lanza; Inti; Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica).
- (10) Jewish (Orthodox; Conservative; Reform).
- (11) Agnostic, atheist (Does not believe in God).
- (12) Jehovah’s Witness.
- (88) DK (98) DA

<p>Q5A. How often do you attend religious services? [Read options] (1) More than once per week (2) Once per week (3) Once a month (4) Once or twice a year (5) Never or almost never (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>Q5B. Please, could you tell me how important is religion in your life? [Read options] (1) Very important (2) Rather important (3) Not very important (4) Not at all important (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>MIL8. Do you or your spouse or partner or one of your children currently serve in the Armed Forces, or have one of you ever served in the Armed Forces? (1) Yes, currently serving (2) Previously served (3) Never served (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>OCUP4A. How do you mainly spend your time? Are you currently [Read options] (1) Working? [Continue] (2) Not working, but have a job? [Continue] (3) Actively looking for a job? [Go to Q10NEW] (4) A student? [Go to Q10NEW] (5) Taking care of the home? [Go to Q10NEW] (6) Retired, a pensioner or permanently disabled to work [Go to Q10NEW] (7) Not working and not looking for a job? [Go to Q10NEW] (88) DK [Go to Q10NEW] (98) DA [Go to Q10NEW]</p>	
<p>OCUP1A. In this job are you: [Read the options] (1) A salaried employee of the government or an independent state-owned enterprise? (2) A salaried employee in the private sector? (3) Owner or partner in a business (4) Self-employed (5) Unpaid worker (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A</p>	

[GIVE CARD "F"]



Q10NEW. Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children?

[If the interviewee does not get it, ask: “Which is the total monthly income in your household? This question refers to net income.]

- (00) No income
- (01) Less than SRD 200
- (02) SRD 200 - 300
- (03) SRD 301 - 400
- (04) SRD 401 - 600
- (05) SRD 601 - 800
- (06) SRD 801 - 900
- (07) SRD 901 - 1000
- (08) SRD 1001 - 1200
- (09) SRD 1201 - 1500
- (10) SRD 1501 - 1800
- (11) SRD 1801 - 2400
- (12) SRD 2401 - 3000
- (13) SRD 3001 - 3600
- (14) SRD 3601 - 4800
- (15) SRD 4801 - 6000
- (16) More than SRD 6000
- (88) DK
- (98) DA

[ASK ONLY IF RESPONDENT IS WORKING OR IS RETIRED/DISABLED/ON PENSION (VERIFY OCUP4A)]

Q10G. How much money do you personally earn each month in your work or retirement or pension?

[If the respondent does not understand: How much do you alone earn, in your salary or pension, without counting the income of the other members of your household, remittances, or other income?]

- (00) No income
- (01) Less than SRD 200
- (02) SRD 200 - 300
- (03) SRD 301 - 400
- (04) SRD 401 - 600
- (05) SRD 601 - 800
- (06) SRD 801 - 900
- (07) SRD 901 - 1000
- (08) SRD 1001 - 1200
- (09) SRD 1201 - 1500
- (10) SRD 1501 - 1800
- (11) SRD 1801 - 2400
- (12) SRD 2401 - 3000
- (13) SRD 3001 - 3600
- (14) SRD 3601 - 4800
- (15) SRD 4801 - 6000
- (16) More than SRD 6000
- (88) DK
- (98) DA
- (99) N/A (Not working and not retired)

[TAKE BACK CARD “F”]

<p>Q10A. Do you or someone else living in your household receive remittances, that is, economic assistance from abroad? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>Q14. Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>Q10D. The salary that you receive and total household income: [Read the options] (1) Is good enough for you and you can save from it (2) Is just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems (3) Is not enough for you and you are stretched (4) Is not enough for you and you are having a hard time (88) [Don't read] DK (98) [Don't read] DA</p>	
<p>Q10E. Over the past two years, has the income of your household: [Read options] (1) Increased? (2) Remained the same? (3) Decreased? (88) DK (98) DA</p>	

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES					
[FS2 AND FS8 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" OR "8")]					
Now I am going to read you some questions about food.					
	No	Yes	DK	DA	N/A
FS2. In the past three months, because of a lack of money or other resources, did your household ever run out of food?	0	1	88	98	99
FS8. In the past three months, because of lack of money or other resources, did you or some other adult in the household ever eat only once a day or go without eating all day?	0	1	88	98	99

<p>Q11. What is your marital status? [Read options] (1) Single [Go to Q12C] (2) Married [CONTINUE] (3) Common law marriage [CONTINUE] (4) Divorced [Go to Q12C] (5) Separated [Go to Q12C] (6) Widowed [Go to Q12C] (88) DK [Go to Q12C] (98) DA [Go to Q12C]</p>	
<p>GEN10. Thinking only about yourself and your spouse and the salaries that you earn, which of the following phrases best describe your salaries [Read alternatives] (1) You don't earn anything and your spouse earns it all; (2) You earn less than your spouse; (3) You earn more or less the same as your spouse; (4) You earn more than your spouse; (5) You earn all of the income and your spouse earns nothing. (6) [DON'T READ] No salary income (88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP</p>	
<p>Q12C. How many people in total live in this household at this time? _____ (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>Q12. Do you have children? How many? _____ (00 = none → Skip to ETID) (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
<p>Q12B. How many of your children are under 13 years of age and live in this household? 00 = none, (88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP (no children)</p>	



<p>ETID. Do you consider yourself...?</p> <p>(9) Hindustani ("East Indians") (3) Afro-Surinamese (5) Mixed (10) Javanese (11) Maroons (2) Amerindian (6) Chinese (1) White (13) Jews (7) Other (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
---	--

<p>LENG1. What is your mother tongue, that is, the language you spoke first at home when you were a child? [Mark only one answer] [Do not read the options]</p> <p>(2701) Dutch (2702) Sranan tongo (2703) Sarnami (2704) Javanese (2705) Arowaks (2706) Caraib (2707) Saramaccaans (2708) Aucaans (2709) Paramaccaans (2710) Chinese (2711) Portugese (2712) English (2713) French (2714) Other (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
--	--

<p>WWW1. Talking about other things, how often do you use the internet? [Read options]</p> <p>(1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month (4) Rarely (5) Never (88) [Don't read] DK (98) [Don't read] DA</p>	
--	--

<p>For statistical purposes, we would like to know how much information people have about politics and the country...</p> <p>G10. About how often do you pay attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers or the internet? [Read alternatives]: (1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month (4) Rarely (5) Never (88) DK (98) DA</p>	
--	--

	Correct	Incorrect	Don't know	Don't answer
G11. What is the name of the current president of the United States of America? [Don't read: Barack Obama, accept Obama]	1	2	88	98
G14. How long is the presidential term of office in Suriname? [Don't read: 5 years]	1	2	88	98

G17. How many members does the National Assembly have? [NOTE EXACT NUMBER. REPEAT ONLY ONCE IF THE INTERVIEWEE DOESN'T ANSWER]	Number: _____	88	98	
---	---------------	----	----	--

To conclude, could you tell me if you have the following in your house: **[read out all items]**

R1. Television	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R3. Refrigerator	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R4. Landline/residential telephone (not cellular)	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R4A. Cellular telephone	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R5. Vehicle/car. How many? [If the interviewee does not say how many, mark "one."]	(0) No	(1) One	(2) Two
			(3) Three or more
R6. Washing machine	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R7. Microwave oven	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R8. Motorcycle	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R12. Indoor plumbing	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R14. Indoor bathroom	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R15. Computer	(0) No [GO TO R16]	(1) Yes	
R18. Internet	(0) No	(1) Yes	(99) N/A
R16. Flat panel TV	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R26. Is the house connected to the sewage system?	(0) No	(1) Yes	

These are all the questions I have. Thank you very much for your cooperation.

COLORR. [When the interview is complete, WITHOUT asking, please use the color chart and circle the number that most closely corresponds to the color of the face of the respondent] _____	_ _ _
(97) Could not be classified [Mark (97) only if, for some reason, you could not see the face of the respondent]	
Time interview ended _____ : _____	_ _ _
TI. Duration of interview [minutes, see page # 1] _____	
INTID. Interviewer ID number: _____	_ _ _
SEXI. Note your own sex: (1) Male (2) Female	
COLORI. Using the color chart, note the color that comes closest to your own color.	_ _ _

I swear that this interview was carried out with the person indicated above.

Interviewer's signature _____ Date ____/____/____

Field supervisor's signature _____

Comments:

[Not for PDA use] Signature of the person who entered the data

[Not for PDA use] Signature of the person who verified the data




Card A

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

Left **Right**




Card B






Card C





Card D





Card F

- (00) No income
- (01) Less than SRD 200
- (02) SRD 200 - 300
- (03) SRD 301 - 400
- (04) SRD 401 - 600
- (05) SRD 601 - 800
- (06) SRD 801 - 900
- (07) SRD 901 - 1000
- (08) SRD 1001 - 1200
- (09) SRD 1201 - 1500
- (10) SRD 1501 - 1800
- (11) SRD 1801 - 2400
- (12) SRD 2401 - 3000
- (13) SRD 3001 - 3600
- (14) SRD 3601 - 4800
- (15) SRD 4801 - 6000
- (16) More than SRD 6000



Color Palette



Suriname 2012, Version # 10.0.2.2 IRB Approval: 110627



AmericasBarometer: Suriname, 2012
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PAIS. Kondre:Sranan					27
01. Mexico	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua	
06. Costa Rica	07. Panama	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia	
11. Peru	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brazil	
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Dom. Rep.	22. Haiti	23. Jamaica	
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad	26. Belize	40. United States	41. Canada	
27. Suriname					
IDNUM. Vragenlijstnombroe [sa ini wan kantoro e kisi wan]					
ESTRATOPRI:					
(2701) Paramaribo (2702) Wanica/Para (2703) Nickerie / Coronie / Saramancca					
(2704) Commewijne / Marowijne (2705) Brokopondo / Sipaliwin					
ESTRATOSEC. Bigi foe a kontreng(ressort): (1) Heri bigi (moro dang 20000)					
(2) No toemsi bigi (5000 – 20000) (3) Pikin (< 5000)					
UPM (Foenamku Sampling Unit) _____					
PROV. Provincie (of departement) : _____					27 _
MUNICIPIO. Kontreng(ressort): _____					27 _
SURDISTRITO. Wijk: _____					
SURSEGMENTO. Stembureau: _____					
SURSEC. Strati _____					
CLUSTER. [CLUSTER, Finale steekproefeenheid, meetpunt]: _____					
[Wan cluster no mag de moro dang 6 interview]					
UR. (1) Kontren foe Foto (Urbaan) (2) Dorose noso fara fo foto (Ruraal) (3) Binnenland					
TAMANO. Bigi foe a presi:					
(1) Na ede foto foe a kondre(Hoofdstad) (2) Wan bigi foto					
(3) Wan no toemsi bigi foto (4)Wan pikin foto					
(5) Na tra kontren foe kondre(Landelijk Gebied)					
IDIOMAQ. A tongo dji na Vragenlijst (12) Bakra tongo (11) Englishman tongo					
(13) Sranang Tongo					
Na joeru foe bigin(Starttijd): _____:_____					

FECHA. Datum Dei: _____ Mung : _____ Airi: 2012
Joe tang na oso dai?
Ai→go doro nanga a vragenlijst
No → taigi a respondent tanga en stop a interview
Joe na wan borgoe foe sranang?
Ai→go doro nanga a vragenlijst
No → taigi a respondent tanga en stop a interview
Joe de 18 airi of moro auro?
Ai→go doro nanga a vragenlijst
No → taigi a respondent tanga en stop a interview
OPMERKING: A de verplichti foe lesi na verklaring foe akkoord (informed consent) befo joe biging nanga interview

Q1. Geslacht (joe musu srifi ; no aksi): (1) wan mang (2) wan uma sma

LS3. Foe biging, algemeen, joe de tevreden nanga joe libi? Joe sa taki dati joe ... [kar deng opties]?
 (1) Heri tevreden (2) Tevreden (3) Pikinso ontevreden
 (4) Heri ontevreden (88) No sabi (98) No gi wan piki

EVEN VRAGENLIJST			
[DENG VRAGEN SA E KON NOW JOE MUSU AKSI DENG RESPONTENTEN SA DENG VRAGENLIJST TAPU NANGA WAN EVEN NOMBROE (“0” “2” “4” “6” OF “8”)]			
A4. Volgens joe, sang na moro prenspari foeka (probleem) sang a kondre Suriname abi? [NO LESI DENG OPTIES FOE PINGI; NOMO WAN]			
Watra (foe dringi), no de nofo	19	Straffeloosheid/Ogri man nanga foerman no e kisie strafoe	61
Den strati no boeng	18	Moni las waarde nanga hei prijs(inflatie)	02
Oorlog /feti nanga wapen	30	Deng politici	59
Cruka (corruptive) of fromoe tori	13	Lanti no boeng	15
Borgu monie, a no de nofo, joe no mang borgu	09	Omgeving/milieu/joe kontren	10
Ogri tori (criminality)	05	Suma go tan trapresi	16
Libi soema leti, no abi lespeki	56	Droga handel	12
Wroko no de	03	Gangs	14
Ala suma ne kies a sem behandeling	58	Armoede(pina)	04
Naing mangkeri	23	Mang e staak nanga protesteer	06
Sondro jo wani den poti jo wan trapresi	32	Datra jepi	22
A kondre abi bigi dorosee paimang	26	(Ontvoeringen) kidnap	31
Discrimineer(disco)	25	Fier fri (a no de helemaal)	27
Droga siki	11	Terrorisme	33
A ekonomia de ini wang crisi	01	Nofo gron no de foe prani nange kwetji(Agrarisch)	07
A skoro leri no de ini wan boeng kwaliteit nos a no de nofo	21	Problema nanga Transport	60
Elektriciteit/ stroom no de nofo	24	Geweld	57
Bevolkingsexplosie/foeroe libisma gebore	20	Oso tori(Oso no de)	55
Feti tegen terrorisme	17	Ander(Tra wang)	70
Mi no sabi	88	Geen antwoord(No gi wan piki)	98



<p>SOCT1. Fa joe feni tak a ekonomia foe na kondre (Sranang) de? I feni taki dati a de heri boeng, boeng, no boeng no takru, takru of boen takru? (1) Heri boeng (2) Boeng (3) No boeng no takroe (4) Takru (5) Boen takru (88) No sabi (98) No gi wan piki</p>
<p>SOCT2. Joe denki tak a ekonomia foe na kondre (Sranang) foe tide, a moro betre, a srefi noso a moro takru moro leki 12 mung bifo? (1) Moro betre (2) Srefi (3) Moro Takru (88)No Sabi (98)No gi wan piki</p>
<p>IDIO1. Fa joe feni foe joe ekonomische situatie? Joe sa taki dati a de heri boeng, boeng, no boeng no takru, takru, of boen takru? (1) Heri boeng (2) Boeng (3) no boeng no takru (4) takru (5) boen takru (88) No sabi (98) No gi wan piki</p>
<p>IDIO2. I feni dati a joe ekonomische situatie now a de moro betre, a tang srefi noso a moro takru dan 12 mung bifo? (1) Moro betre (2) Srefi (3) Moro traku(88) No sabi (98) No gi wan piki</p>

Now we go taki over wan tra onderwerp/tori, song teng libi suma nanga grupo suma te de abi foeka/problema sa de no mang tari wan egi oplossing e suku jepi na wan lanti mang noso wan lanti kantoro.

Foe feni na oplossing foe joe foeka/problema joe beng aksi jepi nanga feni jepi foe ...? [Lesi na opties en srfifi na reaktie]	Ai	Nee	NS	NGWP
CP2. Wan memre foe Parlement/de nationale Assemblee	1	2	88	98
CP4A. Wan lanti wrokoman noso memre foe a lanti kantoro leki wan District commissarsi, Districtsraad lid noso, Ressort raadslid,	1	2	88	98
CP4. Ini wan ministerie noso minister, noso wan wan tra lanti kantoro	1	2	88	98

Now we go taki foe joe kontren, ressort...

<p>NP1. Joe beng tek prati na wan konmakandra foe na ressortraad noso tra konmakandra na 12 mung di pesa? (1) Ai (2) No wang (88) No sabi (98) No gi wan piki</p>
<p>NP2. Joe beng suku jepi noso sen aksi wan yepi foe wan kantoro, wan lanti wrokomang noso na ressort raad na a 12 mung di pesa? (1) Ai [Go doru] (2) No [Go na SGL1] (88) No sabi [Go na SGL1] (98) No gi wan piki [Go na SGL1]</p>
<p>MUNI10. Deng man tairi wan oplossing foe joe problema noso joe aksi? (1) Ai (0)No (88) NS (98) NGWP (99) NVT</p>
<p>SGL1. Joe feni dati a wroko sa deng ressortraad e doe, de...gi deng suma? [Lees opties] (1) Heri boeng (2) Boeng (3) No boeng no takru (redelijk) (4) Takru (5) Boen takru (88) No sabi (98) No gi wan piki</p>

	1 Lesi ini a wik	1 lesi noso 2 lesi ini wan mung	1 lesi noso 2 lesi ini wan airi	noiti	NS	NGWP
<p>CP5. Now wo taki abra wan tra tori. Ini na 12 mung di pesa, joe beng jepi foe tairi wan oplossing ini a foeka/problema foe joe birti noso kontren? Fertermie if joe beng doe dati minstens wan trong ini a wiki, noso tu lesi wan wiki, noso 2 lesi ini wan mung, noso 2 lesi ini wan airi, sobu noiti ini na 12 mung di pesa.</p>	1	2	3	4	88	98

Mi e o lesi (kari) deng neng foe grupu nanga orga. Ferter mi if joe beng go na deng konmakandra wan lesi ini wan wiki, 2 lesi ini wan mung, 2 lesi ini wan ari, noso noiti? **[Joe jepi na suma san gin a piki joe musu herhaal disi tap alla aksi "wan lesi ini wan wiki", "wan noso 2 lesi ini wan mung", "wan noso 2 lesi ini wan ari" noso "noiti"]**

	1 Lesi ini a wiki	1 lesi noso 2 lesi ini wan mung	1 lesi noso 2 lesi ini wan ari	Noiti	Go gewoon /lid	Leider/ Bestuurslid	NS	NGWP	NVT
CP6. Konmakandra foe wan religieuze organisatie(kerki orga)? Joe beng tek prati ...joe foe	1	2	3	4 [Go na CP7]			88	98	
CP6L. Fa joe e tek prati? lek wan lid of wan foe den leiders? [If a respondent piki "ala to" pot dan leider]					1	2	88	98	99
CP7. Konmakandra foe den ouders foe den pikin na skoro? Joe beng tek prati ...joe foe	1	2	3	4 [Go na CP8]			88	98	
CP7L. Fa joe e tek prati? lek wan lid of wan foe den leiders? [If a respondent piki "ala to" pot dan leider]					1	2	88	98	99
CP8. Konmakandra foe betre foe joe kontren noso birti? Joe beng tek prati.....joe foe	1	2	3	4 [Go na CP9]			88	98	
CP8L. Fa joe e tek prati? lek wan lid of wan foe den leiders? [If a respondent piki "ala to" pot dan leider]					1	2	88	98	99
CP9. Konmakandra foe grupu foe professionals (bigi skoro man), zakenman, prodoectieman noso kweki nanga prangronman? Joe beng tek prati ...	1	2	3	4			88	98	
CP13. Konmakandra foe politieke partij noso politieke orga? Joe beng tek prati ...	1	2	3	4			88	98	
CP20. [Gi uma suma] Konmakandra foe organ noso grupu spesrutu gi uma suma noso huis vrouwen. Joe beng tek prati? foejoe	1	2	3	4			88	98	99
CP21. Konmakandra foe orga sport nanga recreatie? Joe beng tek prati?	1	2	3	4			88	98	

IT1. Now, te wi luku a deng suma in joe birti, joe kan taki dati a libi mankandra de foe vertrouw foetru, de foe vertrouw pikin so, no de foe vertrouw...?**[Joe mus lesi deng opties]**
 (1) De foe vertrouw foetru (2) De foe vertrouw pikin so (3) No de foe vertrouw temusi (4) No de foe vertrouw (88) NS (98) NGWP



<p>MIL6. Now wan tra tori, O trots joe de abra legre nanga skowtu in Sranang? [Joe mus lesi deng opties]</p> <p>(1) Boeng foeroe trots (2) Foeroe trots (3) Pikinso trots (4) No trots (5) No abi belangstelling (88)WN (98) GA</p>	
<p>MIL5. O trots joe de lekki sranang mang noso uma, te joe e jere a sranang volkslied? [Joe mus lesi deng opties]</p> <p>(1) Boeng foeroe trots (2)Foeroe trots (3) Pikinso trots (4)No trots (5) No abi belangstelling (88) NS (98) NGWP</p>	

[GI NA KARTA "A"]

L1. Now we go na wan tra tori. Tap na karta disi wan trapu nanga stappen abi nombroe foe 1 te nanga 10, pe 1 de na links sey nanga 10 de na rechts sey. Tide na day, te we taki abra politieke kloru, we tak abra linkse nanga rechtse politiek. So boeng, bepaalde suma e lobi "links" terwijl trawan e lobi "rechts". Te we luku a betekenis foe "links" nanga "rechts" da we tak abra joe politiek kloru, pe joe bo pot joe srefi tap a schaal disi? I kang gi mi wan nombroe?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	98
Links						Rechts				NS	NGWP	

[TEKI NA KARTA "A"]

<p>PROT3.Ini deng 12 mung di pesa joe beng tek prati na wan demonstratie noso protest mars?</p> <p>(1) Ai [Go doro] (2) No [Go na PROT6] (88) NS [Go na PROT6] (98) NGWP [Go na PROT6]</p>	
<p>PROT4. Omeni lesi joe tek prati na wan demonstratie noso protest mars ini na 12 mung di pesa?</p> <p>_____ (88) NS (98) NGWP (99)NVT</p>	
<p>PROT7. Ini deng 12 mung di pesa joe beng tek prati foe blokeer wan pasi noso wan openbaar presi foe sori joe node eens nanga wan sani?</p> <p>(1) Ai, mi tek prati (2) No, mi no tek prati (88) NS (98) NGWP (99) NVT</p>	
<p>PROT6. Ini deng 12 mung di pesa joe beng onderteken wan petitie?</p> <p>(1) Ai, mi ondertekend (2) No, mi no ondertekend (88) NS (98) NGWP</p>	
<p>PROT8. Ini deng 12 mung di pesa joe beng lesi politieke informatie noso tek prati in wan sociaal netwerk via internet leki Twitter, Facebook nanga Orkut?</p> <p>(1) Ai, mi doing (2) No, mi no doing (88) NS (98) NGWP</p>	

Now, wan tra tori. Song suma feni dati te bepaalde situatie a gi leti foe a legre foe Sranang e teki na maktie foe a kondre via wan coup. San na joe denki, sortu situatie noso omstandigheden e gi leti foe na legre e teki na makti? **[Lesi deng opties na ini wan vraag]**

<p>JC1. Te foeru suma no abi wroko (hei werkloosheid)</p>	(1) Legre abi leti foe tek na makti	(2) Legre no abi leti foe tek na makti abra	(88) NS	(98) NGWP
<p>JC10. Te foeroe ogri (criminaliteit) de ini a kondre.</p>	(1) Legre abi leti foe tek na makti	(2) Legre no abi leti foe tek na makti abra	(88) NS	(98) NGWP
<p>JC13. Te kruka (corruptie) de temusi foeru.</p>	(1) Legre abi leti foe tek na makti	(2) Legre no abi leti foe tek na makti abra	(88) NS	(98) NGWP

<p>JC15A. Te a kondre abi bigi foeka/problema, joe feni dati na presidenti abi leti foe saka na parlementie nanga drai a kondre sondro a parlementie?</p>	(1) Ai, a de gerechtvaardigd	(2) No, a no de gerechtvaardigd	(88) NS	(98) NGWP
<p>JC16A. Te a kondre abi bigi foeka/problema joe feni dati a presidenti abi leti foe saka a Hof van Joestitie (A moro hei Kroetoe Basi)?</p>	(1) Ai, is het gerechtvaardigd	(2) No, a no de gerechtvaardigd	(88) NS	(98) NGWP
<p>VIC1EXT. Now wi e go na wan tra tori, joe beng de slachtoffer foe ini wan sortu criminaliteit ini deng 12 mung di pesa? So boeng joe ben de slachtoffer foe ogri leki fefoeroe , inbraak, geweld, fraude, chantage, afpersing, geweldadige bedreigingen noso tra sortu orgri ini deng 12 mung dipesa? (1) Ai [Go doroe] (2) No [Go na VIC1HOGAR] (88) NS [Go na VIC1HOGAR] (98) NGWP [Go na VIC1HOGAR]</p>				
<p>VIC1EXTA. Omeni lesi joe beng deslachtoffer foe wan misdrijf(ogri) ini na 12 mung die pesa? [Srif nombroe] (88) NS (98) NGWP (99) NVT</p>				
<p>VIC2. Te joe e denki na laatste ogri pe joe beng de wan slachtoffer, sortu ogri a beng de? [Lesi na] (01) Sondro wapen overval, aanval of sking bedreiging (02) Sondro wapen foefoeroe of sking bedreiging (03) Nanga wapen overval (04) Bedreiging maar no foefoeru joe (05) Verkrachting of aanranding (06) Ek joe tai gwe (07) Broko ala sani (08) Broko kong ini joe oso (10) Afpersing (11) Andere (88) NS (98) NGWP (99) NVT (a no beng de wan slachtoffer)</p>				
<p>VIC2AA. Joe kang fertermi a presi foe na laatste misdrijf? [Lesi opties] (1) Ini joe oso (2) Ini joe birti (3) Ini disi resort/kontren (4) Ini wan tra ressourt/kontren/Districti (5) Ini wan tra kondre (88) NS (98)NGWP (99) NVT</p>				
<p>VIC1HOGAR. Wan tra suma foe joe oso beng de slachtoffer foe ini wan sortu ogri (criminaliteit) ini na 12 mung di pesa? Soboeng, ini wan suma foe joe oso beng de wan slachtoffer foe foefoeru (diefstal), inbraak, geweld, fraude, chantage, afpersing, geweldadige bedreigingen noso wan tra sortu ogri ini na 12 mung di pesa? (1) Ai (2) No (88) NS (98) NGWP</p>				
<p>AOJ8. Foe kisi deng ogri man(criminelen), joe denki tak gran lati mus hori ing srefi na wet alla lesi noso deng kang libi na wet song teng? [Lesi opties] (1) A musu hori na wet alla lesi (2) A kang libi na wet song teng (88) NS (98) NGWP</p>				
<p>AOJ11. Te wi e go luku na birti pe joe e tang nanga deng ogri san kang tek presi leki geweld, sobu beroving; Je firi dat joe de temusi veilig, pikinso veilig,pikinso onveilig noso no de veilig kwit kwiti? (1) Temusi veilig (2) Pikinso veilig (3) Pikinso onveilig (4) No de veilig kwit kwiti (88) NS (98) NGWP(no gi wan pingi)</p>				
<p>AOJ12. If joe beng de wan slachtoffer foe foefoeroe (diefstal) noso geweldpleging. O meni vertrouwen joe abi dati deng gran lanti foe joestitie go poti deng orgiman na strafeoe? [Lesi deng opties] (1) Foeroe (2) Redelijk (3) Pikinso (4) No (88) NS (98) NGWP</p>				
<p>AOJ17. O fara joe denki dati joe ogriman abi invloed ini joe birti? Joe feni dati a de foeru, pikinso noso no abi invloed? (1) Foeru (2) Redelijk (3) Pikinso (4) No (88) NS (98) NGWP</p>				

[GI KARTA "B" NA A SUMA]

Tap a karta disi wan trapu de foe 1 go mit 7, pe nombroe 1 na moro lagi stap dat wan taki NO KWIT KWITI nanga 7 na moro hei wang dat wan taki BOENG FOEROE. Foe esempre, ifoe mi aksi joe if joe lobi luku na Lukudosu (televisie), ifoe joe no libi luku na Lukudosu kwit kwiti, joe bo kisi na score 1, nanga ifoe, ini kontrasti, joe lobi luku a Lukudosu boeng foeru, joe go gi a score foe 7. Ma if joe feni dati joe no lobi boeng foeru nanga no lobi kwit kwiti, joe sa gin a score sang de na mindri. Sobu, a krin aksi na ifoe joe lobi luku na Lukudosu? Lesi gi mi a nombroe. **[Joe mus de zeker dati a suma begriip a tori her boeng].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98	
No kwit kwiti						Boeng foeroe		No sabi	No gi wan piki

Srifi a nombroe 1-7, noso 88 SB noso 98 NGWP

Mie ó aksi joe wan toe sani (vraag). Me é aksi joe foe kebroiki den nummer tap a trapoe foe piekie mie tap san mie e aksi joe. Joe kan kar sort nummer joe wani.	
B1. O fara joe denki dati a rechter sytema (rechtbank) e garanti joe wan eerlijk proces? (Lesi: If joe e denki dat a rechtersystema (rechtbank) no de tap a let fasi dan kari numbru 1, if joe denki dat a rechtersystema e wroko boeng dan kari numbru 7 of tek wan na mindri fa joe fierie. O fara joe denki taki deng suma in sranang habi bribi ini a rechtersystema foe sranang?)	
B2. O fara joe habi respekti gi deng diferenti Lanti kantoro san de na Sranang?	
B3. O fara joe denki taki a politiek systema e yepi foe bescherm wan Sranang man?	
B4. O fara Joe firi joe srefi boeng foe libi nanga a politiek systema foe Sranang?	
B6. O fara joe denki taki wan sranang man mus foe yepi ondersteun a systema?	
B10A. O fara joe habi bribi ini a recht systema foe Sranang?	
B11. O fara joe habi bribi ini a Centraal Hoofd Stem Bureau (CHS)?	
B12. O fara joe habi bribi ini a legre foe a kondre?	
B13. O fara joe habi bribi in a Nationale Assemblee foe sranang?	
B18. O fara joe habi bribi in skowtu?	
B20. O fara joe habi bribi ini Rk (lomsoe) kerki ?	
B20A. O fara joe habi bribi ini den tra evangeli nos protestants kerki sa de ini sranang?	
B20B. O fara joe habi bribi ini den hindoe kerki orga sa de ini sranang?	
B20C. O fara joe habi bribi ini den moslim kerki orga sa de ini sranang?	
B21. O fara joe habi bribi ini den diferenti politiek partij ini sranang?	
B21A. O fara joe habi bribi ini a president foe sranang?	
B31. O fara joe habi bribi ini a Krutu Basi foe a kondre?	
B32. O fara joe habi bribi ini den distrikt comsarsi nanga den kantoro foe den?	
B43. O fara joe breti taki joe de wan sranang man?	
B37. O fara joe habi bribi ini a njoensu sa de man tairi kon na fesi tapu radio nanga TV?	
B47. O fara joe habi bribi ini den verkiezing?	

Now, gebruik na srefi trapoe, [go doro nanga Karta B: 1-7 deng punt foe verdeling] NO KWIT KWITI 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 BOENG FOEROE	Srifi 1-7, 88 = NS 98=NGWP
N1. O fara joe firi taki a regering foe now e feti gi den poti wan foe sranang?	
N3. O fara joe denki taki lanti e yepi foe horing na den demokratia ienie a Kondre (waarden en normen)?	
N9. O fara joe denki taki a regering disi ai feti corruptie na Lanti srefi?	
N11. O fara joe denki a regering yepi foe tari veiligheid?	
N15. O fara ye denki taki a regring e tair a kondre na wan leti ekonomia fasi?	

ONEVEN VRAGENLIJSTEN		Srefi1-7
[Den vragen disi joe musu aksi soso den suma sa a vragenlijst e stop nanga wan oneven nombroe (“1” “3” “5” “7” noso “9”)] We gebruikt karta “B” ete, No kwit kwiti 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Boeng foeroe		88= NS 98= NGWP 99= NVT
EPP1. If joe denki abra politieke partijen; tap sorto fasii feni dati deng sranang politieke partijen e vertegenwoordigd deng kiezers? (99) NVT		
EPP3. Tap sorto fasi i feni dati politieke partijen e arki deng borgu leki joe? (99) NVT		

We gebruikt karta “B” doro, No kwit kwiti 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Boeng foeroe	Srefi 1-7 88= NS 98= NGWP
MIL1. Tap sorto fasi joe feni dati den mang sa e tair gong (wapen) leki skowtu nanga surdati in sranang abi boeng training nanga den orga seti boeng?	
MIL2. Tap sorto fasi joe feni dati den mang sa e tair gong (wapen) leki skowtu nanga surdati in sranang e do boeng wroko te natuur rampen de?	
B3MILX. Tap sorto fasi joe feni dati den mang sa e tair gong (wapen) leki skowtu nanga surdati in sranang e lispeki sranang libisma leti deteng disi?	
MIL3. Even wan tra tori, Tap sorto fasi joe e vertrouw den mang sa e tair gong (wapen) leki skowtu nanga surdati foe de verenigde staten foe Amerika?	
MIL4. Tap sorto fasi joe feni dati den mang sa e tair gong (wapen) leki skowtu nanga surdati in de verenigde staten foe Amerika nanga dief foe sranang musu wroko samen foe tair wan moro betre veiligheid?	
[TEKI KARTA “B” BAKA]	

M1. If oen loekoe a regering foe now, joe denki taki a sranang president Desi Bouterse ai doing Wroko...? [Lesi deng opties] (1) Vaarlijk boeng (2) Boeng (3) A no boeng a no takroe (4) Takroe (5) Boeng takroe (88) NS (98) NGWP	
M2. If wé denki a Nationale Assemblée foe Sranang, en wie loekoe den lek wan, we vergietie dat deferenti partij drape, joe e denki dat a essemblée e doe en wroko: Vaarlijk boeng, boeng, a no boeng a no takroe, a takroe, a de boeng takroe? (1) Vaarlijk boeng (2) Boeng (3) A no boeng a no takroe (4) Takroe (5) Boeng takroe (88) NS (98) NGWP	

SD2NEW2. If joe e denki abra a kontrin pe joe e tang, joe de heri agri, agri, no agri, heri no agri abra fas fa deng bigi nanga pikin pasi de? (1) Heri agri (2) Agri (3) No agri (4) Heri no agri (99) NVT (no e mek gebruikt) (88) NS (98) NGWP	
SD3NEW2. Fa joe agrie nanga a kwaliteit foe deng openbaar skoro de? [Aksi doro: joe de heri agri, agri, no agri, heri no agri?] (1) Heri agri (2) Agri (3) No agri (4) Heri no agri (99) NVT (no e mek gebruikt) (88) NS (98) NGWP	
SD6NEW2. Fa joe agrie nanga a kwaliteit de foe datra nanga openbaar gezondheidszorg? [Aksi doro: joe de heri agri, agri, no agri, heri no agri?] (1) Heri agri (2) Agri (3) No agri (4) Heri no agri (99) NVT (no e mek gebruikt) (88) NS (98) NGWP	

**[GI KARTA “C”]**

Now wo gebruik a srefi trapoe, maar dies tron 1 na “Né agrie sref srefi” en 7 beteken “Agrie serioesoe” A numroe miendrie1 nanga 7 wan tak wan presie na miendrie.

Srefi a numbru 1-7, noso 88 = No sabi (NS), 98 = No gi wan piki(NGWP)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98	
Né agrie sref srefi						Agrie serioesoe		No sabi	NGWP
Scrifi 1-7, 88 = NS 98=NGWP									

If we tek a situatie foe Sranang now now de en we gebruik a karta, joe moesoe taiga mie o fara joe a agrie of Né agrie sref srefi nanga de san sa mie taki now.

POP101. Joe denki taki a president kan teki ing egi besroitie ini a parlement sondro foe arki den membre foe a oppositie partij? O fara joe agri noso no agri nanga a tori disi?

POP107. Den borgoe moes drai a kondre srefi **en no via deng** man san tap san deng e stem? Joe e agrie of joe no e agrie?

POP113. Den borgoe san no e agrie nanga a meerderheid na wan gevaar gie Sranang. O fara joe e agrie of joe no e agrie?

We go doro nanga sref trapoe. Joe can taigi mi sang joe denki de tapu deng vraag disi. Boeng o no boeng

EFF1. Lanti e arki sa a people abi foe taki.... joe denki taki a de so of no? O fara joe e agrie of joe no e agrie?

EFF2. Joe verstan of sabi den moro belangrijk sani sa e psa ini a politiek. O fara joe e agrie of joe no e agrie?

Sref a numbru tussen 1-7, noso 88= NS noso 98= NGWP

ING4. Even wan tra tori, A demokrasie kan ab problemas ma a de wan moro betre fasi foe set a kondre? O fara joe agri noso no agri nanga a tori disi ?

DEM23. Democratie sondro politiek partij kan wroko. O fara joe agri noso no agri nanga a tori disi?

Now mie ó lees wan san abra a rol foe Gran lanti. Joe moes taiga mie o fara joe e agrie of joe no e agrie?. Wo gebruik na srefi trapoe baka foe 1 ko miet 7. **(88) NS (98)NGWP**

ROS1. Lanti mus foe de eigenaar foe den moro belangrijk indoesria ini a kondre. Sa joe denki? o fara joe e agrie of joe no e agrie ?

ROS2. Lanti ini algemeen habi a taak foe sorgoe gi wan boeng nanga gesontoe sranang. troe? o fara joe e agrie of joe no e agrie ?

ROS3. Behalve a private sector/particulier bedrijf, lanti mus foe de a basi sa e sorgoe taki wroko de.gi ini wan. Troe? o fara joe e agrie of joe no e agrie ?

ROS4. Lanti mus foe sorgoe taki wan boeng loonstruktoeroe. Foe jep den poti sma toe. o fara joe e agrie of joe no e agrie ?

ROS6. Behalve a private sector, lanti mus foe sorgoe gi boeng gezondheids zorg. o fara joe e agrie of joe no e agrie ?

MIL7. Den mang sa e tair gong (wapen) leki skowtu nanga surdati in sranang must wroko samen foe feti criminaliteit nanga gewel in sranang. O fara joe agri noso no agri nanga a tori disi?

ONEVEN VRAGENLIJSTEN		Srefi1-7
<p>[DENG VRAGEN CCT3 GO MIET RAC2A JOE MUSU AKSI DENG SMA SA A VRAGENLIJSTNOMBROE E STOP NANGA WAN ONEVEN NOMBROE (“1” “3” “5” “7” “9”)]</p> <p>CCT3. Wo tak wan tra tori. Bepaalde sma e taki dati deng sma sa e kisi jepi (sociale bijstand) foe gran lanti deng sma dati lesi. O fara joe agri, noso no agri nanga a tori disi? (99) NVT</p> <p>GEN1. Bepaalde sma e taki dati te wroko de nofo, mang abi moro leti dang uma sma foe kisi wroko. O fara joe agri, noso no agri nanga a tori disi? (99) NVT</p> <p>Now, mo aksi, o fara joe agri nanga wan tu sani sang gran lanti do, noso must do. [Srefi wan nombroe foe 1 te 7 noso 88=NS noso 98=NGWP noso 99=NVT]</p> <p>GEN6. Gran lanti musu sorgu dati politieke partijen musu meki presi gi uma sma tap wan kandidatenlijst, desnoods mang sma no vind presi. O fara joe agri, noso no agri nanga a tori disi? (99) NVT</p> <p>RAC2A. Universiteiten noso hee skoro moes meki presi gi skoro pikin nanga wan doengru kloru. O fara joe agri noso no agri nanga a tori disi? (99) NVT</p> <p>[Enqueteur : nanga doengru kloru sma we bedoel blaka sma/bushnegre, ingi, ‘no witti sma’ in a algemeen]</p>		<p>88= NS 98= NGWP 99= NVT</p>

[TEK BAKA KARTA "C"]

ONEVEN VRAGENLIJSTEN	
<p>[Deng vragen W14 te nanga PN5 joe musu aksi deng sma sa a vragenlijstnombroe e stop nanga wang oneven numbru (“1” “3” “5” “7” noso “9”)]</p> <p>W14A. Now, we taki abra wang tra tori. I denki a de na leti foe pur a bere te a gosontu foe a mama de na problema?</p> <p>(1) Ai, a de na leti (2) No, a no de na leti (88) NS (98)NGWP (99) NVT</p> <p>PN4. In a algemeen, joe de heri tevreden, tevreden, ontevreden noso heri ontevreden nanga a fas fa a democratie ini Sranang e go?</p> <p>(1) heri tevreden (2) tevreden (3) ontevreden (4) heri ontevreden (88) NS (98) NGWP (99) NVT</p> <p>PN5. I feni dati Sranang de, na wan heri boeng democratisch, pikinso democratisch, no de democratisch noso helemaal no democratisch, kondre?</p> <p>(1) Wan heri boeng democratisch (2) Pikinso democratisch (3) no de democratisch (4) Helemaal no democratisch (88) NS (98) NGWP (99) NVT</p>	

[GI KARTA “D”]

Now wie go gebruik wan tra karta. A njoen karta disi ab wan 10-punten trapoe, san e go foe wan(1) kon miet 10, pe 1 na “No boeng sref srefi” en 10 na “boeng serioesoe”. Mie o lees wan toe san fa sma kan feti foe kies leti gie den politiek denki. Taigi mie o fara joe feni ing boeng noso no boeng tap a san sang de man dies go doe.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	98
No boeng sref srefi							Boeng serioesoe			No Sabi	NGWP

	<p>1-10, 88=NS, 98=NGWP</p>
<p>E5.Foe sma sa e doedoe mee nanga demonstraties(a no ogri wan). O fara joe feni ing boeng noso no boeng?</p> <p>E8. Foe sma sa moksi ini wan orga foe los den problema foe den kontren op? O fara joe feni ing boeng noso no boeng?</p>	



E11. Foe sma sa e wroko gi wan politiek partij of de kandidaat foe a partij dati. O fara joe feni ing boeng noso no boeng?	
E15. Foe sma se e tapu / blokkeer a stratie gi wan protest O fara joe feni ing boeng noso no boeng?	
E14. Foe sma sa e teki tra man gron leki wan fasi foe protesteer. O fara joe feni ing boeng noso no boeng?	
E3. Foe sma sa e teki prati ini wan orga foe feti tegen lanti foe saka wan democrati regering nanga tranga. O fara joe feni ing boeng noso no boeng?	
E16. Foe sma sa e teki machti ini egi anu te lanti no habi nofo anu na tap deng crimineel. O fara joe feni ing boeng noso no boeng?	

Den vraag san e kon na foe sabi san joe e denki abra den diffrenti prakseri foe den sma san e libi na Sranang. We go doro nanga a 10 punt foe karta D.

	1-10, 88=NS, 98=NGWP
D1. Joe habi sma sa e taki soso takru foe sranang, lanti, nanga ing heri systema. Joe feni taki deng den suma disi habi a recht foe go stem? O fara joe feni ing boeng noso no boeng? Joe kan sor mi tap a karta D o fara joe feni ing boeng noso no boeng? [Aksi doro: O fara a sma feni ing?]	
D2. Joe feni taki den sma (people) disi mus foe habi a recht foe doewan demonstratie? Lees de nummers. O fara joe feni ing boeng noso no boeng?	
D3. Denki habra deng man sa taki soso takru sani foe lanti. O fara joe feni ing boeng noso no boeng taki den people disi mus foe kis wan lanti wroko presi foe draai a kondre?	
D4. O fara joe feni ing boeng noso no boeng, dati den people disi kan kon tapu na televisie foe taki?	
D5. Wan tra tori now. O fara joe feni ing boeng noso no boeng dati homo sma/people mus foe kang wroko ini wan hee foentje na gran lanti?	

ONEVEN VRAGENLIJSTEN

[Deng vragen D6 te nanga D8 joe musu aksi deng sma sa a vragenlijstnombroe e stop nanga wang oneven nombroe (“1” “3” “5” “7” noso “9”)]

D6. O fara joe feni a boeng noso no boeng taki man nanga man noso uma sma nanga uma sma e trouw nanga deng srefi? (99) NVT

D7. O fara joe feni a boeng noso no boeng, taki sma nanga wan sking (lichamelijke) beperking e do wan lanti wroko? (99) NVT

D8. O fara joe feni a boeng noso no boeng, dati gran lanti abi a leti foe tapu kranti di e skrefi sani di kan tair gran lanti na ini problema? (99) NVT

[Teki baka karta "D"]

DEM2. Joe moes taiga mie sorto wan foe den tori sa mo kar now, joe agrie moro: (1) Gi wan suma lek mi a ne mek uit: foe habi wan democratisch regering, (2) Democrasia na moro boeng fasi, noso (3) A kan de so taki wan dictatuur beleid boeng moro wan democratisch beleid (88) NS (98) NGWP	
DEM11. Joe feni taki lanti mus foe draai a kondre ini wan tranga fasi, noso joe feni taki ala suma mus foe habi wan steng (participeer)? (1) Nanga tranga fasi (2) Alla sma ab wan steng (88) NS (98) NGWP	

AUT1. Sa joe feni sma e taki a kondre mus foe habi wan boeng leider winsi a no kon na makti via verkiezing. Tra suma e taki dati via wan verkiezing a moro boeng fasi foe tiri noso drai wan kondre

[Lesi na opties]

(1) Un mus foe habi wan tranga leider wasi a no kon na makti via verkiezing

(2) Democratie via Verkiezing na moro boeng fasi.

(88) NS (98) NGWP

	NVT No beng proberi/ no abi contact	No	Ai	NS	NGWP	
Now, mi go aksi joe sani sa joe ondro feni di kan pesa in a ala dey libi...						
EXC2. Ini wan periode foe 12 moeng ooit wan skowtu aksi joe wan tjoekoe?		0	1	88	98	
EXC6. Ini wan periode foe 12 moeng ooit wan lanti man aksi joe wan tjoekoe?foejoe		0	1	88	98	
EXC20. Ini wan periode foe 12 moeng ooit wan hee sordati aksi joe wan tjoekoe ?		0	1	88	98	
EXC11. Ini wan periode foe 12 moeng san psa, joe ben regel lanti papiera na joe resort noso distriktbestuur kantoro? Ifoe na pingi na no → scrifi 99 Ifoe na pingi na ai→ aksi disi:	99					
In den twaalf moeng san psa, joe ben abi foe pay moro moni dan de fanowdoe gie ini wan lanti papiera.		0	1	88	98	
EXC13. Ye wroko? Ifoe na pingi na no → scrifi 99 Ifoe na pingi na ai→ aksi disi:	99					
Tap joe wroko presi, wan suma aksi joe foe pai tjoekoe?		0	1	88	98	
EXC14. In the twaalf moen san pasa, joe ben ab wan toeka nanga kroetoe basi? Ifoe na pingi na no → scrifi 99 Ifoe na pingi na ai→ aksi disi:	99					
Ini wan periode foe 12 moeng, joe ben habi foe pay tjoekoe foe do wan sani ini a recht systema?		0	1	88	98	
EXC15. Ini a periode foe 12 moeng joe tek yepi foe na wan foe den datra oso ? Ifoe na pingi na no → scrifi 99 Ifoe na pingi na ai→ aksi disi:	99					
Foe teki yepi ini wan clinic o wan atoson wan sma aksi joe foe pai tjoekoe in deng 12 moeng di pesa?		0	1	88	98	
EXC16. Joe habi wan pikin na skoro ini a periode foe 12 moeng? Ifoe na pingi na no → scrifi 99 Ifoe na pingi na ai→ aksi disi:	99					
Wan sma aksi joe foe pai tjoekoe na skoro ini disi 12 moeng?		0	1	88	98	
EXC18. Ifoe we lokoe fa san e waka joe feni taki foe pai wan tjoekoe someni lesi song lesi na wan boeng sani?		0	1	88	98	
EXC7. Foe san joe meki mee, of sang joe yere, lanti man e tek tjoekoe so boeng doedoe corruptie na: [Lesi na opties] (1) A de heri Normaal (2) Normaal (3) A no de normal of (4) A no de normal sref srefi (88) NS (98) NGWP						

EXC7MIL. Foe san joe meki mee, noso sang joe yere, den man sa e tair wapen leki skowto nanga sordati e tek tjoekoe so boeng doe corruptive na: **[Lesi na opties]**

- (1) A de heri Normaal (2) Normaal (3) A no de normal of
 (4) A no de normal sref srefi (88) NS (98) NGWP

Wo tak wan tra tori. If joe denki abra den sani sa joe ondro feni ini a **airi di psa** de, joe abi a firi dati sma e disco (discrimineer) joe noso behandel joe moro takro dang tra sma ini bepaalde presi, leki ...

	Ai	No	NS	NGWP	NVT
DIS2. Tap lanti kantoro [krutu bangi, kantoro, district lanti kantoro]	1	2	88	98	99
DIS3. Tap wroko presi noso skoro noso te joe sukoe wroko?	1	2	88	98	99
DIS5. Tap openbaar presi leki strati, openbaar plein, winkri, noso tap wojo?	1	2	88	98	

VB1. Joe registreer tap a kiezerslijst foe go stem?

- (1) Ai (2) No (3) Den man e pot mie nen now now de (88) NS (98) NGWP

IF11. Joe ab ID karta foe sranang?

- (1) Ai (2) No (88) NS (98) NGWP

VB2. Joe ben stem ini a verkiezing foe 2010?

(1) Stem **[Go doro]**

(2) No Stem **[Go na VB10]**

(88) NS **[Go na VB10]** (98) NGWP **[Go na VB10]**

VB3. Tap soema joe stem in a verkiezing foe 2010? **[NO LESI NA LIJST]**

(00) Noti (libi Blanco noso stem verkeer)

(2731) Nieuw Front (NPS/SPA/VHP/DA'91)

(2732) Volksalliantie (PL/UPS/PSV/TP 2000)

(2733) Mega Combinatie (NDP/KTPI/PALU/NS)

(2734) BVD/PVF Combinatie (BVD/PVF)

(2735) A-Combinatie (ABOP/BEP/SEEKA)

(2736) Democratische Unie Suriname (DUS)

(2713) Partij voor Democratie en Ontwikkeling door Eenheid (DOE)

(2737) Nationale Unie (NU)

(2738) Permanente Voorspoed Republiek Suriname (PVRS)

(77) Tra wan

(88) NS (98) NGWP (99) NVT (No stem)

VB10. No ja so, joe e sie den denki foe joe in wan politiek partij ?

- (1) Ai **[Go doro]** (2) No **[Go na POL1]** (88) NS **[Go na POL1]** (98) NGWP **[Go na POL1]**

<p>VB11.In sort politiek partij joe e sie den denki foe joe ? [NO LESI A LIJST] (2702) Democraten 21 (D21) (2703) Nieuw Suriname (NS) (2704) Politieke Vleugel van de FAL (PVF) (2705) Trefpunt 2000 (2706) Algemene Bevrijdings- en Ontwikkelingspartij (ABOP) (2707) Nationale Democratische Partij (NDP) (2708) Democratisch Alternatief '91 (DA'91) (2709) Nationale Partij Suriname (NPS) (2710) Verenigde Hervormings Partij (VHP) (2711) Pertjaja Luhur (2712) Surinaamse Partij van de Arbeid (SPA) (2713) Partij voor Democratie en Ontwikkeling door Eenheid (DOE) (2715) Basispartij voor Vernieuwing en Democratie (BVD) (2716) Kerukunan Tulodo Prenatan Inggil (KTPI) (2719) Progressieve Arbeiders en Landbouwers Unie (PALU) (2720) Progressieve Politieke Partij of PPP (2721) Seeka (2722) Unie van Progressieve Surinamers (UPS) (2723) Broederschap en Eenheid in de Politiek (BEP) (2736) Democratische Unie Suriname (DUS) (2737) Nationale Unie (NU) (2738) Permanente Voorspoed Republiek Suriname (PVRS) (2739) Progresieve Surinaamse Volkspartij (PSV) (77) Tra wan (88) NS (98) NGWPA (99) NVT (No stem)</p>	
<p>POL1. Joe lob politiek: foeroe, wan fasi, tjinsu noso no lob sref sref? (1) Foeroe (2) Wan fasi (3) Tjinso (4) No lob sref sref (88) NS (98) NGWP</p>	
<p>VB20.If verkiezing bo hor tra wieki, san joe bo doe? [Lesi na opties] (1) Mie no bo stem (2) Mie bo stem gie den man of partij san e ston now (3) Mie no bo stem gie den man of partij san e ston now, maar gie wan trawan (4) Mie bo go stem maar mie no bo vul neks in of mie bo broeai a stembiljet (88) NS (98) NGWP</p>	
<p>PP1. Ini verkiezing teng, sma e proberi foe taki nanga sma foe poti stem gi wan partij noso wan kandidaat. O meni lesi joe proberi foe taki nanga sma foe poti stem gi wan partij noso kandidaat? [Lesi na opties] (1) foeru lesi (2) wan to lesi (3) No foeru lesi (4) noiti (88) NS (98) NGWP</p>	
<p>PP2. Ini verkiezing teng, sma e wroko gi wan politieke partijen noso kandidaten. Joe beng wroko gi wan polieke partij noso wan kandidaat ini a laatste verkiezing foe 2010? (1) Ai, mi wroko (2) No, mi no wroko (88) NS (98) NGWP</p>	
<p>VB50. Sma e taki dati mang sma de moro betre politieke leiders dan uma sma. Joe de heri agrie helemaal, no agrie, noso heri no agrie sref srefi, nanga a tori disi? (1) Agrie helemaal (2) Agrie (3) No agrie (4) No agrie sref srefi (88) NS (98) NGWP</p>	



ONEVEN VRAGENLIJSTEN

[Deng vragen VB51 te nanga AB5 joe must aksi deng sma sa a vragenlijstnombroe e stop nanga wang oneven nombroe (“1” “3” “5” “7” noso “9”)]

VB51. Ini a wroko foe wan politicus. Suma joe denki de moro kruka (corruptiver). Wan mang sma, uma sma noso alatoe a srefi.

(1) Wan mang (2) Uma sma (3) Alatoe a srefi (88) NS (98) NGWP (99) NVT

VB52. Ini a wroko foe wan politicus foe seti a ecomonia fa kondre. Suma joe denki de moro boeng. Wan mang sma, uma sma, noso a no mek noti uit.

(1) wan mang (2) Uma sma (3) A no mek noti uit (88) NS (98) NGWP (99) NVT

ONEVEN VRAGENLIJSTEN

Now, wo tak abra ras noso sking kloru foe politici.

VB53. Suma e taki dati sma nanga wan dongru sking kloru no de wan boeng politieke leider. Joe de heri agrie, agrie, no agrie, noso heri no agrie naga a tor disisi?

[Enqueteur: “dongru kloru” na sma leki blaka mang/marrons, ingi, dus no “witti sma”.

(1) Heri agrie (2) Agrie (3) No agrie (4) Heri no agrie (88) NS (98) NGWP (99) NVT

RAC1CA. Ini foeru studies /buku a sori dati dongru kloru sma moro poti, deng tra sma in wan libi makandra. Fa joe denki dat kon? [Lesi optie, soso wan piki]

(1) A kon foe deng kulturu (2) A kon omdati sma ne behandel deng na leti

(3) [No lesi] Tra piki (88) NS (98) NGWP (99) NVT

Now, we tak wan tra tori, abra kwaliteiten sa wan pikin musu foe abi. Mo kar wan toe sani. Joe kan taki sang na moro prenspari sani gi wan pikin?

AB1. (1) do sani srefi (2) lespeki gi bigi wan (3) [No lesi] alatoe

(88) NS (98) NGWP (99) NVT

AB2. (1) E arki (2) do sani srefi (sorgu en srefi) (3) [No lesi] alatoe

(88) NS (98) NGWP (99) NVT

AB5. (1) A creatief (2) Abi Discipline (3) [No lesi] alatoe

(88) NS (98) NGWP (99) NVT

EVEN VRAGENLIJSTEN

[Deng vragen SNW1A te nanga MIL11E joe musu aksi deng sma sa a vragenlijstnombroe e stop nanga wang even nombroe (“0” “2” “4” “6” noso “8”)]

SNW1A. Joe sabi wan sma sa abi wan bigi/hee positie na gran lanti noso wan sma sa beng de kandidaat na a laatste verkiezingen ini kondre noso ressort niveau.

(1) Ai (2) No **[Go na MIL10A]** (88) NS **[Go na MIL10A]** (98) NGWP **[Go na MIL10A]** (99) NVT

SNW1B. A positie disi, a de na kondre noso ressort niveau?

(1) Ressort (3) kondre (4) kandidaten tap moro dan wang niveau (88) NS (98) NGWP (99) NVT

Deng vragen sa e kon now, e go abra a fasi fa joe e vertrouw gran lanti foe dorose kondre. Joe kan gi mi mening abra den kondre sa mo kar kong na in a fasi foe: heri betrouwbaar, pikinso betrouwbaar, no so betrouwbaar, heri no betrouwbaar noso no abi wan mening.

	heri betrouwbaar	pikinso betrouwbaar	no so betrouwbaar	heri no betrouwbaar	NS/no abi wan mening	NGWP	NVT
MIL10A. Chinesi regering. Joe feni deng heri betrouwbaar, pikinso betrouwbaar, no so betrouwbaar, heri no betrouwbaar noso no abi wan mening.	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
MIL10B. Russa regering. Joe feni deng heri betrouwbaar, pikinso betrouwbaar, no so betrouwbaar, heri no betrouwbaar noso no abi wan mening.	1	2	3	4	88	98	99



EVEN VRAGENLIJSTEN								
	heri betrouw- baar	pikinso betrouw- baar	no so betrouw- baar	heri no betrouw- baar	NS/no abi wan mening	NGWP	NVT	
MIL10C. Iran. Joe feni deng heri betrouwbaar, pikinso betrouwbaar, no so betrouwbaar, heri no betrouwbaar noso no abi wan mening.	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	
Mil10D. Israel. Joe feni deng heri betrouwbaar, pikinso betrouwbaar, no so betrouwbaar, heri no betrouwbaar noso no abi wan mening.	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	
MIL10E. Amerkang kondre. Joe feni deng heri betrouwbaar, pikinso betrouwbaar, no so betrouwbaar, heri no betrouwbaar noso no abi wan mening.	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	
Mo aksi joe abra deng contacti sa un kondre abi nanga tra kondre. If joe denki a contacti sa sranang abi nanga China, joe kan taki dati a contacti dati de moro stefi, moro fara, a srefi ini deng laatste 5 airi noso joe no ab wan mening?								
			Moro stefi	A srefi	Moro fara	No ab mening	NGWP	NVT
MIL11A. China			1	2	3	88	98	99
MIL11B. A contacti nanga Russa. Joe kan taki dati a contacti dati de moro stefi, moro fara, a srefi ini deng laatste 5 jari noso joe no ab wan mening?			1	2	3	88	98	99
Mil11C. A contacti nanga Iran. Joe kan taki dati a contacti dati de moro stefi, moro fara, a srefi ini deng laatste 5 jari noso joe no ab wan mening?			1	2	3	88	98	99
MIL11D. Nanga Israel. Joe kan taki dati a contacti dati de moro stefi, moro fara, a srefi ini deng laatste 5 jari noso joe no ab wan mening?			1	2	3	88	98	99
MIL11E. A contacti nanga Amerkang kondre. Joe kan taki dati a contacti dati de moro stefi, moro fara, a srefi ini deng laatste 5 jari noso joe no ab wan mening?			1	2	3	88	98	99

Wan tra tori...

CCT1NEW. Joe noso wan sma ini a oso foe joe, e kisi wan stontji (bijstand) ala mong, leki moni noso pakket foe lanti?

(1) Ai (2) No (88) NS (98) NGWP

ED. San na laatste tron/airi joe klar wan stuka?

_____ airi _____ (Lagi skoro , Mulo, Middelbaar skoro, Universiteit, moro hei moro Mulo ma a no doro universiteit) = _____ aantal airi **[Gebruik na tabel gi na code]**

	1 ^o	2 ^o	3 ^o	4 ^o	5 ^o	6 ^o	7 ^o
No go na skoro	0						
Lagere skoro	1	2	3	4	5	6	
MULO, LBGO, LTS	7	8	9	10			
Middelbare skoro & Schakel University (VWO, HAVO, IMEAO etc)	11	12	13				
Universiteit	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
HBO, IOL etc.	13	14	15	16			
Mie no sabi	88						
No Gi wan piki	98						

ONEVEN VRAGENLIJSTEN

[Deng vragen ED2 nanga MOV1 joe musu aksi deng sma sa a vragenlijstnombroe e stop nanga wang oneven nombroe (“1” “3” “5” “7” noso “9”)]

ED2. Sorto skoro joe ma go nanga a klaring? [No Lesi na opties]

- (00) A no go na skoro
- (01) Lagi skoro ma na klaring
- (02) Lagi skoro nanga a klaring
- (03) MULO/LBGO
- (04) Middelbare skoro & Schakel University (VWO, HAVO, IMEAO etc)
- (05) LTS no klaring
- (06) LTS klaring
- (07) Universiteit no klaring
- (08) Universiteit klaring
- (88) NS
- (98) NGWP
- (99) NVT

MOV1. Fa joe e see joe srefi..? [Lesi optie]

- (1) Wan hee klasse so boeng leki wan goedoe sma
- (2) Wan no toemosi goedoe sma so boeng leki wan hee midden klasse sma
- (3) Wan Middenklasse sma
- (4) Wan Lagi midden klasse sma
- (5) Wan lagi klasse sma, leki poti sma
- (88) NS
- (98) NGWP
- (99) NVT

Q2D-Y. Tap sort day, moeng nanga yari joe gebore? [If a sma no wan tak a day nanga mong, aksi soso a geborte airi noso aksi o owro a de, dang joe e reken a geboorte airi.]

_____ Day _____ Mong (01 = januari) _____ jari

(Voor Q2D en Q2M: 88 =NS 98 = NGWP)

(Voor Q2Y: 8888 = NS 9888 = NGWP)

Q2D
 Day
 Q2M
 Moeng
 Q2Y
 Jari



<p>Q3C. Soort geloof joe habi, if ini wan ? [No Lesi na opties] [Ifoe a suma taki dat ing no abi geloof, luku if na wan suma sa bribi ini wan bigi krakti ma a no wan geloof of taki a sma ne bribi in no wan Gado]</p> <p>(1) R.K. (Lomsoe) (2) Protestant, Echte Protestant or Protestant niet-Evangelisch (Christen; Calvinist; Lutherse gemeente; Methodistische gemeente; Presbyteriaanse gemeente; Discipel foe Christus; Anglicaanse gemeente; Episcopaliaanse gemeente; Moravische gemeente) (2701) Islam (2702) Hindoe (2703) Tra no–Christelijke Oosters kerki (Buddhist; Taoist; Confoecianisme; Baha’i) (4) Geloof no de (Bribi in wan bigi krakti ma a no wan geloof) (5) Evangelische & Pinksterbeweging (Evangelisch; Pinksterbeweging; Kerk van God; Assemblee van God; Universele kerk van het koninkrijk Gods; Christelijke pinkster gemeente; Christelijke Congregatie ; Mennonieten; Brethren; Hervormde kerk; Charismatisch niet-katholiek; Baptiste gemeente; Nazarenen; Leger des Heils; Adventisten; Zeven daags adventisten). (6) Mormoon gemeente (7) Den bribi foe den boesi sma (Winti, Ingi winti, Ingi bribi, Rastafarian) (10) Jood (Djoe) (Orthodox; Conservatief; Hervorm) (11) Agnostisch, atheïst (Joe no e bribi en no wan Gado) (12) Jehovah’s Getuigen (88) NS (98) NGWP</p>	
<p>Q5A. O meni lesi joe e go na kerki ? [Lesi optie]</p> <p>(1) Moro wan lesi en wan wiki (2) Wan lesi ini wan wiki (3) Wan lesi in wan moen (4) Wan of two lesi ini wan airi (5) Nooit of bijna nooit (88) NS(98) NGWP</p>	
<p>Q5B. Nanga lespeki, joe kang fetermi o belangrijk a geloof de ini joe libi? [Lesi deng opties]</p> <p>(1) Temusi belangrijk (2) A belangrijk (3) A no de belangrijk (4) A No belangrijk kwit kwiti (88) NS (98) NGWP</p>	

<p>MIL8. Joe noso joe vrouw noso partner noso wan foe deng pikin noso wang sma na oso disi beng de nanga de na legre noso skowtu?</p> <p>(1) Ai, de ete (2) Beng de (3) Noiti beng de (88) NS (98) NGWP</p>	
<p>OCUP4A. Fa joe a psa a dei moro foeroe? Now now de joe e ... [Lesi na opties]</p> <p>(1) Wroko ? [Go doru] (2) No de na wroko, maar habi wan wroko? [Go doru] (3) Loekoe gie wan wroko serioesoe? [Go na Q10NEW] (4) Stoeka? [Go na Q10NEW] (5) Mie e doe a oso-wroko? [Go na Q10NEW] (6) Mie de nanga pensioen, of mie handicap foe wroko [Go na Q10NEW] (7) No wroko en no e soekoe wan wroko? [Go na Q10NEW] (88) NS [Go to Q10NEW] (98) NGWP[Go na Q10NEW]</p>	
<p>OCUP1A. Ini a wroko san joe de now:[Lesi na options]</p> <p>(1) Wroko gie Lanti of Lanti bedrijf ? (2) Wroko gie wan particulier bedrijf? (3) Eigenaar of partner foe wan business (4) Mie e wroko gie mie srefi (5) Mie e wroko maar mie no e kiesi pai (88) NS (98) NGWP (99) NVT</p>	

[GI NA KARTA “F”]

Q10NEW. Ini sort wan foe den groepoe a oso foe joe e fiti efoe wo teri ala moni san ala sma en a oso desi e wroko wan moen. Joe moes teri oocktoe alla moni san joe e kisi foe doro se kondre en foe tjing san e wroko toe?

[Ifoe a suma no e begriip na tori, aksi: "O'mei moni en kon ienie a oso disi wan moen?"]

- (00) Oenoe no e wroko moni
- (01) A no doro SRD 200
- (02) SRD 200 – 300
- (03) SRD 301 – 400
- (04) SRD 401 – 600
- (05) SRD 601 – 800
- (06) SRD 801 - 900
- (07) SRD 901 – 1000
- (08) SRD 1001 – 1200
- (09) SRD 1201 – 1500
- (10) SRD 1501 – 1800
- (11) SRD 1801 – 2400
- (12) SRD 2401 – 3000
- (13) SRD 3001 - 3600
- (14) SRD 3601 – 4800
- (15) SRD 4801 – 6000
- (16) Moro dan SRD 6000
- (88) NS(98) NGWP

[A vraag disi na gi deng sma sa e wroko noso abi wan pension/no kan wroko (loekoe OCUP4A)]

Q10G. O meni joe e kisi wan mong noso pension? **[If a sma no e begriip boeng: o meni joe e verdien, sondo deng moni foe deng tra suma fa oso, moni foe dorose no musu teri toe]**

- (00) Oenoe no e wroko moni
- (01) A no doro SRD 200
- (02) SRD 200 – 300
- (03) SRD 301 – 400
- (04) SRD 401 – 600
- (05) SRD 601 – 800
- (06) SRD 801 - 900
- (07) SRD 901 – 1000
- (08) SRD 1001 – 1200
- (09) SRD 1201 – 1500
- (10) SRD 1501 – 1800
- (11) SRD 1801 – 2400
- (12) SRD 2401 – 3000
- (13) SRD 3001 - 3600
- (14) SRD 3601 – 4800
- (15) SRD 4801 – 6000
- (16) Moro dan SRD 6000
- (88) NS (98) NGWP(99) NVT (no e wroko nanga no pension)

[TEKI BAKA KARTA "F"]

Q10A. Joe noso wan sma ini a oso e feni moni ondersteuning kemoto foe dorose kondre?

- (1) Ai (2) No (88) NS (98) NGWP

Q14. Joe abi wan denki foe go liebi of wroko ienie wan tra kondre ienie den drie airie san e kon?

- (1) Ai (2) No (88) NS (98) NGWP

<p>Q10D. A moni san a heri oso e wroko: [Lesi deng opties]</p> <p>(1) A sari gie joe en joe kan spaar ete (2) A sari net, mie no habie bigi probleem ete (3) A no sari en a san e gie mie span ede (4) A no sari en a libi tranga (88) [No lesi] NS (98) [No lesi] NGWP</p>	
<p>Q10E. If joe denki den toe airi san pasa, a moni foe a oso disi: [Lesi deng opties]</p> <p>(1) Kon moro bigi ? (2) Tan srefi? (3) Kon saka? (88) NS (98) NGWP</p>	

EVEN VRAGENLIJSTEN					
[Deng vragen FS2 nanga FS8 joe musu aksi deng sma sa a vragenlijstnombroe e stop nanga wang even nombroe ("0" "2" "4" "6" noso "8")]					
Mo aksi joe abra taing sani (voedsel)....					
	No	Ai	NS	NGWP	NVT
FS2. Ini deng 3 moeng de psa de, joe beng abi moni problema noso tra problema dati taing no beng de na oso?	0	1	88	98	99
FS8. Ini deng 3 moeng de psa de, joe beng abi moni problema noso tra problema dati joe noso wan trawan ini a oso beng tjang wan lesi na day noso no beng taing?	0	1	88	98	99

<p>Q11. Fa joe e lebi nanga joe man noso vrouw/wefi ? [No Lesi na opties]</p> <p>(1) Liebie joe wan [Go na Q12C] (2) Trow [Go doro] (3) Libi makandra (concubinaat)[Go doro] (4) Prati[Go na Q12C] (5) Prat trow(tafel en bed)[Go na Q12C] (6) Partner kon dede[Go na Q12C] (88) NS[Go na Q12C] (98) NGWP[Go na Q12C]</p>	
<p>GEN10. If joe e denki abra joe nanga joe partner nanga a moni sa joe e kisi. San na deng sani di e pas na joe situatie?</p> <p>(1) Joe verdien/kisi noti nanga joe partner e verdien/kisi ala moni (2) Joe verdien moro minder dan joe partner (3) Joe verdien na srefi leki joe partner (4) Joe e verdien moro dang joe partner (5) Joe e verdien ala moni nanga joe partner no e verdien (6) [no lesi] No wan moni ne kisi (88) NS (98) NGWP (99) NVT</p>	
<p>Q12C. O meni sma e tang na oso dai? _____ (88) NS (98) NGWP</p>	
<p>Q12. Joe habi pikin? O meni pikin joe habi ? _____ (00 = no wan → Go na ETID) (88) NS (98) NGWP</p>	
<p>Q12B. O meni pikin foe joe di jongo mora dang 13 jari e tang ini a oso foe joe? _____ 00 = No wan, (88) NS (98) NGWP (99) NVT (No pikin)</p>	

<p>ETID. Fa joe e zie joe srefi?, leki wan...?</p> <p>(9) Hindostani (3) Creoro sma (5) Moksi sma (10) Jampanesi (11) Marron/bushnegre (2) Ingi (6) Chinesi (1) Bakra (13) Joe (jood) (7) Tra fasi (88) NS (98) NWGP</p>	
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<p>LENG1. Sang na joe mama tongo, dat na tongo sang joe e taki na oso di joe beng de pikin?[Skrifi wan antwortu nomo] [No lesi deng opties]</p> <p>(2701) Bakra tongo (2702) Sranan Tongo (2703) Sarnami (2704) Aimpanees tongo (2705) Arowaks (2706) Caraibs (2707) Saramaccaans (2708) Aucaans (2709) Paramaccaans (2710) Chinesi (2711) Portugees (2712) English tongo (2713) Frans (2714) Tra wan (88) NS (98) NGWP</p>	
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<p>WWW1. Wo tak wan tra tori now, o meni lesi joe e gebruik a internet? [Lesi options]</p> <p>(1) Ala dei (2) Wan toe lesi ienie wan wiekie (3) Wan wan lesi wan moeng (4) Sonteng (5) Noiti (88) [No lesi]NS (98) [No Lesi]NGWP</p>	
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<p>Gie papiera wroko foe ono, oen wan sabi o meni den sma fa kondre sabi foe a politiek nanga Sranang kondre srefi...</p> <p>G10. Omeni tron joe e arki njoensoe, if na TV, if na radio, if na kranti joe e leesi of internet joe e loekoe? [Lesi na alternatieven]</p> <p>(1) Alla dei (2) Wan toe lesi ien wan wiekie (3) Wan toe lesi ienie wan moen (4) Wan wan lesi (5) Nooit (88) NS (98) NGWP BoenBoengai</p>	
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	Boeng	No Boeng	NS	NGWP
G11. San na a neng foe a presidentie foe Amerikan Kondre? [No lesi:Barack Obama, accept "Obama"]	1	2	88	98
G14. O langa wan regering kan ston if den kon na machtie ini Sranang? [No Lesi, 5 jaren]	1	2	88	98
G17. O meni sma e tek presi na a Nationale Assemble? [Arefi a aantal sa a sma taki. If a sma no piki herhaal a vraag wan lesi]	Aantal: _____		88	98

Foe kon tap a piesie tori disi, joe kan taiga mie if joe habi den san san mie go kar kon in joe oso: **[Lesi ala alternatieven]**

R1. Televisie	(0) No	(1) Ai
R3. Ijskast	(0) No	(1) Ai
R4. Oso telefoon (no cellulair)	(0) No	(1) Ai
R4A. Cellulair telefoon	(0) No	(1) Ai
R5. Wagie / o meni wagie? [If a sma no piki o meni dang skrifi "wan".]	(0) No	(1) wan (2) Toe (3) Drie noso moro
R6. Wasmachine	(0) No	(1) Ai
R7. Microwave oven	(0) No	(1) Ai
R8. Bromfiets	(0) No	(1) Ai
R12. Toilet ini oso	(0) No	(1) Ai
R14. Badkamer ini oso	(0) No	(1) Ai
R15. Computer	(0) No [Go na R16]	(1) Ai
R18. Internet	(0) No	(1) Ai (99) NVT
R16. Flat screen TV(Plasma,LCD noso Led)	(0) No	(1) Ai
R26. A oso abi wan afwateringsystema?	(0) no	(1) Ai

Disi na all den sani sa mie bin wan aksi joe. Mie e taigi joe gran tangi gie joe pasensi.

COLORR. [foe na interview disi klari, SONDR0 foe aksi, joe musu gebroiki na karta foe deng kloru da joe musu poti wang rondje na a nombroe sang gersi na fesi foe a suma] _____ (97) No mang gin a kloru foe a suma [Skrifi (97) soso ifoe joe no mang si a fesi foe a suma]	_ _
Srefi a teng dati a interview kaba _____ : _____ TI. Lengte van interview uitgedrukt in tijd [na minut, luku na pagina # 1]	_ _
INTID. Interviewer ID numbru: _____	_ _
SEXI. Eigen geslacht aangeven: (1) Man (2) Vrouw	
COLORI. Gebruiki a kloru grafiek dan noteer a kloru sa e pas na joe.	_ _

Ik verklaar hierbij dat het interview is afgenomen van de persoon zoals hierboven aangegeven. Aldoes naar waarheid opgemaakt.

Handtekening van de Interviewer _____ Datum ____ / ____ / ____

Field supervisor's handtekening _____

Kommentaar:

[Not for PDA use] Handtekening van de persoon die de data heeft ingevoerd _____
[Not for PDA use] Handtekening van de persoon die de data heeft geverifieerd _____




Karta A

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Links					Rechts				




Karta B






Karta C





Karta D



Karta F

- (00) Oenoe no e wroko moni
- (01) A no doro SRD 200
- (02) SRD 200 - 300
- (03) SRD 301 - 400
- (04) SRD 401 - 600
- (05) SRD 601 - 800
- (06) SRD 801 - 900
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- (13) SRD 3001 - 3600
- (14) SRD 3601 - 4800
- (15) SRD 4801 - 6000
- (16) Moro dang SRD 6000



Kloru Karta



The AmericasBarometer

This study forms part of a research program that the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has been carrying out for more than two decades. LAPOP is a consortium of academic and research institutions spread throughout the Americas, with its headquarters at Vanderbilt University, in the United States. More than 30 institutions throughout the region participate in LAPOP, whose efforts are directed at producing objective, non-partisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion. Those studies focus primarily on the measurement of political attitudes and behavior related to democracy and quality of life.

The project has received generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the College of Arts and Science at Vanderbilt University, the Tinker Foundation, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United States National Science Foundation, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia as well as Duke University, Florida International University, University of Miami, Princeton University, the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, the National Center for Research in Brazil (CNPq) and the Kellogg Institute of Notre Dame University. LAPOP also maintains linkages with entities such as the Organization of American States.

The current surveys, whose results are analyzed and discussed in this publication, were carried out in face-to-face interviews in 2012, using nationally representative stratified and clustered probability samples in both urban and rural areas. Interviews were in the national language or in the major indigenous/creole languages of each country. The 2012 round of studies included 26 countries in the Americas and more than 41,000 interviews, which allows for comparison of the results of each individual country with other countries in the region. LAPOP offers its AmericasBarometer datasets free to the public via its web page: www.lapopsurveys.org.

In addition to the datasets, the reports, articles and books that the Latin American Public Opinion Project produces are free to the public. This research and the data can also be accessed at our "data repositories" and subscribers in major universities in the United States and Latin America. With these initiatives, LAPOP continues to collaborate with the development of academic and policy excellence throughout the Americas.

Stichting Wetenschappelijke Informatie -
Foundation for Information and Development
Prins Hendrikstraat 38,
Paramaribo, Suriname.
Phone: 597-422195

