Cutting Class Action Agency Costs: Lessons from the Public Company

dc.contributor.author	Rose, Amanda M.
dc.date.accessioned	2022-05-05T20:43:29Z
dc.date.available	2022-05-05T20:43:29Z
dc.date.issued	2020
dc.description	article published in a law review	en_US
dc.description.abstract	The agency relationship between class counsel and class members in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions is similar to that between executives and shareholders in U.S. public companies. This similarity has often been noted in class action literature, but until this Article no attempt has been made to systematically compare the approaches taken in these two settings to reduce agency costs. Class action scholars have downplayed the importance of the public company analogy because public companies are subject to market discipline and class actions are not. But this is precisely why the analogy is useful: because public companies are subject to market discipline, the tools they utilize to reduce agency costs are more likely to be efficient. This Article looks to those tools as inspiration for class action reform, proposing several novel ways to improve current practice.	en_US
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.citation	54 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 337 (2020)	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0197-4564
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/1803/17318
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.publisher	University of California at Davis Law Review	en_US
dc.subject	agency, class action, public companies	en_US
dc.title	Cutting Class Action Agency Costs: Lessons from the Public Company	en_US
dc.type	Article	en_US

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