A Revelation Principle for Dominant Strategy Implementation

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dc.contributor.authorSchwartz, Jesse A.
dc.contributor.authorWen, Quan
dc.date.accessioned2020-09-14T01:04:38Z
dc.date.available2020-09-14T01:04:38Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.description.abstractWe introduce a perfect price discriminating (PPD) mechanism for allocation problems with private information. A PPD mechanism treats a seller, for example, as a perfect price discriminating monopolist who faces a price schedule that does not depend on her report. In any PPD mechanism, every player has a dominant strategy to truthfully report her private information. We establish a revelation principle for dominant strategy implementation: any outcome that can be dominant strategy implemented can also be dominant strategy implemented using a PPD mechanism. We apply this principle to derive the optimal, budget-balanced, dominant strategy mechanisms for public good provision and bilateral bargaining.
dc.description.departmentEconomics
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1803/15837
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherVanderbilt Universityen
dc.subjectDominant strategy implementation
dc.subjectVickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms
dc.subjectpublic good provision
dc.subjectbilateral bargaining
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: C72
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: C78
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: D44
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: D82
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: H41
dc.subject.other
dc.titleA Revelation Principle for Dominant Strategy Implementation
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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