Pampered Bureaucracy, Political Stability, and Trade Integration

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dc.contributor.authorStroup, Caleb
dc.contributor.authorZissimos, Benjamin
dc.date.accessioned2020-09-14T01:39:56Z
dc.date.available2020-09-14T01:39:56Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows how, under threat of revolution, a nation's elite are able to maintain political stability and hence ownership of their wealth by creating or expanding a `pampered bureaucracy.' The elite thus divert part of an otherwise entrepreneurial middle class from more productive manufacturing activities, reducing economic efficiency. If the country has a comparative advantage in primary products, trade integration is potentially destabilizing since it raises the payoff to the lower classes of mounting a revolution and challenging the elite for their wealth. In that case trade integration mandates expansion of the pampered bureaucracy. Therefore, trade integration may actually reduce economic efficiency. The econometric results provide supportive evidence for our model.
dc.description.departmentEconomics
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1803/15919
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherVanderbilt Universityen
dc.subjectEfficiency
dc.subjectinefficient institutions
dc.subjectproperty rights
dc.subjectsocial conflict
dc.subjecttrade integration. competition
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: D30
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: D74
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: F10
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: O12
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: P14
dc.subject.other
dc.titlePampered Bureaucracy, Political Stability, and Trade Integration
dc.typeWorking Paperen
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