The Political Consequences of Crime Victimization in Latin America

A Guatemalan schoolgirl seated next to gang graffiti.

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ABSTRACT: In the last two decades, violent crime rates in Latin America have increased exponentially. Though this is one of the most significant recent developments in the region, the political consequences of Latin America's violent crime epidemic are largely unknown. Many scholars and commentators imply that the crime wave bodes ill for democracy in the region, suggesting that high levels of violent crime cause disillusionment with government, reduce mass political participation, and increase popular support for authoritarianism and *mano dura*. This paper evaluates the micro-foundations of that conventional wisdom. Analysis of data from the Latinobarómetro and LAPOP surveys consistently and convincingly shows that recent crime victimization is associated with *increased* political participation. Rather than becoming disenchanted or disempowered, Latin American crime victims are actually more politically active than comparable citizens who have not been victimized. Crime victimization has a more ambiguous relationship to political opinions. Victims are less satisfied with law enforcement than their non-victimized peers, and they are more likely to be concerned about crime as a public policy issue. Some regressions suggest that victims may have more pro-authoritarian views than their peers and may be more likely to support *mano dura* and vigilantism, but this result is not consistent across analysis of multiple surveys so the true relationship is difficult to ascertain.

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Contemporary Latin America represents both a victory for and a crisis of human rights. In the last several decades, Latin America has seen a tremendous wave of democratization, permanently unseating the authoritarian military governments of the 1970s and 1980s. Democracy is finally predominant in the region (Caldeira 1996; Lowenthal 1997) after a series of "hard-won transitions" (Tulchin and Ruthenburg 2007b: 283). Additionally, following the development of powerful regional human rights advocacy networks (Sikkink 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998), Latin America has emerged at the forefront of a new "justice cascade" of human rights trials to hold government officials accountable for the atrocities of the past (Lutz and Sikkink 2001).

Yet Latin Americans still live in the shadow of violence. Over the past twenty years Latin America has seen a "dramatic rise in criminality" (Bergman 2006: 213) and today Latin America enjoys the dubious distinction of being the most violent region in the world (Tulchin and Fagan 2003; Rico 2003; Oppenheimer 2007). The magnitude of the region's violent crime problem is staggering; crime has rendered many cities "more dangerous than war zones" (Naim 2007: M4). On average, at least 140,000 Latin Americans are murdered each year (Rotker 2002a: 8; Tulchin and Fagan 2003: 13;

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Carrión 2003: 51; Londoño and Guerrero 2000:30), meaning that since the year 2000, more than 1 million Latin Americans have been murdered. It is no exaggeration to say that the violent crime wave constitutes a new human rights emergency in Latin America.

Reliable cross-national crime statistics are scant, but numerous national and sub-national studies offer a sobering portrait of violence in Latin America. A recent survey of children in one Sao Paulo neighborhood found that eight per cent have had a parent murdered and thirteen per cent have witnessed a murder (Cárdia 2002: 158, 156). In 2002 a national survey in Venezuela found that 91% of the population was afraid of being the victim of a crime in the near future (Sanjuán 2003: 120) – and with good reason. On average, every Venezuelan can expect to be the victim of 17 crimes throughout the course of his or her life, four of which will be violent (Rotker 2002a: 8). Since 1993, homicide has been the leading cause of death for Venezuelan men between the ages of fifteen and forty years (Sanjuán 2002: 95). Álvaro Colom, the president of Guatemala, thinks his country is more violent now than during its civil war (quoted in Lacey 2007), and El Salvador has similarly "recovered from a decade of political conflict …. [only] to find [itself] plunged into new sorts of violence and crime" (Cruz 2006: 148). Even countries reputed to be safer are not immune from Latin America's crime wave; between 2001 and 2003, about 40% of the residents of Buenos Aires were victims of crimes each year (Dammert 2007: 75).

This surge of criminality is arguably one of the most significant recent developments in Latin America, yet its political consequences are grievously understudied and basically unknown. As Marcelo Bergman argues,

> Similar changes in the economic and political landscape [of Latin America] would have surely triggered a torrent of books and research interests. Yet, one of the most puzzling questions in the

literature is why such a drastic deterioration in public security and rise in criminal activity have not produced a wave of new volumes in the field (2006: 213).

This paper begins to address that deficit by using survey data to rigorously analyze the political consequences of crime victimization in Latin America. I find robust evidence that crime victimization increases individual political participation and engagement with politics. Victimization also decreases satisfaction with law enforcement and crime control efforts and increases an individual's concern with crime as a policy issue. The regression results are less clear with respect to the relationship between victimization and support for democracy, authoritarianism, *mano dura*[1] and vigilante justice, which merits further quantitative and qualitative study.

1. Research Questions and Hypotheses

Democratic consolidation in Latin America has been "tentative and uneven" (Diamond 1997: xxxviii; see also Lowenthal 1997), and commentary by journalists and academics suggests that violent crime has deleterious effects on democracy in the region. Consider this statement by Victoria Burnett, Associate Professor of History at the University of Texas, Austin:

> Crime in El Salvador is a disaster. … Common crime is so pervasive in El Salvador and such a problem, that I would call it a crisis of democracy. … It's very hard for any government to get a grip on the crime. [El Salvador today] is a place where the average citizen feels an enormous amount of dissatisfaction that the government can't provide basic services, like safety, like the idea that you can walk to the store and walk back safely to your home. Until they find a way to resolve that, that's going to be a challenge to democracy, I think (Burnett 2008: 1).

There are two mechanisms by which Latin America's crime wave might imperil democracy. First, crime victimization could cause citizens to disengage with politics. At the societal level, high levels of violent crime are hypothesized to lead to "lower levels of

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[1] *Mano dura* translates as "the iron fist." The term refers to a variety of repressive policing tactics currently en vogue in Latin America. These measures often incorporate the military into domestic policing, expedite the sentencing of alleged criminals and allow for longer sentences, and expand the definition of criminal behavior to make it easier to arrest suspected gang members and other alleged delinquents.

participation in democratic processes" (Buvinic et al 2002: 74). "There is a broad consensus in the existing literature and among experts that public participation is an indispensable part of building democracy" (Ekiert and Grzymala-Busse 2007: 23), so widespread popular withdrawal from or disenchantment with politics could hamper the development of strong democracies in Latin America.

Second, crime victimization could cause citizens to support authoritarianism, either in the form of dictatorship or repressive policing measures (often called *mano dura*). Support for military government or dictatorship is startlingly high in Latin America, which is worrisome because popular support for democracy is an important component of democratic consolidation (Diamond 1997: xix). In 2007, only 54 per cent of Latin Americans thought that democracy was the best system of government, a statistic that dipped as low as 32% in Guatemala and 33% in Paraguay (Latinobarómetro 2007); "the question of why citizens do not support democracy in Latin America today is an urgent one" (Hagopian 2007: 13). Furthermore, *mano dura* is increasingly popular and often re-empowers the military or political leaders with authoritarian tendencies, directly endangering the principle of democratic, civilian rule in Latin America's nascent democracies.

These two possible causal pathways are analytically distinct; the first deals with the determinants of political behavior, and the second considers the formation of political opinions. They suggest two different research questions:

- Q1: How does crime victimization affect political participation and political engagement?

- Q2: How does crime victimization shape beliefs about dictatorship, democracy, and *mano dura*?

Finding micro-foundational answers to these questions requires the development of hypotheses about how crime victimization impacts individual victims' beliefs and actions.

1.1 Crime Victimization and Evaluations of Governmental Effectiveness

Crime victimization could put an individual into contact with governmental offices and state services, but in Latin America such an experience would likely be marked by frustration, corruption, and inefficiency, leaving the victim with a negative impression of the state. Latin American police and other law enforcement agents are generally considered incompetent and untrustworthy (Rico 2003); indeed, 84% of Mexico City residents say they do not trust the police (Méndez Bahena et al 2002: 156). Impunity prevails across the region and in some countries, such as Guatemala, the judicial system is so dysfunctional that "almost all cases go unsolved" (Llana 2007: 6). Similarly, in Mexico City more than 90% of all reported crimes are never investigated (Alvarado Mendoza 2006: 294).

As a result of their interactions with state authorities, Latin American crime victims are likely to become disenchanted with government, feel that politics is meaningless, and lose their sense of citizenship (Caldeira 1996). When crime victims see that the state is unwilling or unable to help them, they may lose their trust in government and their interest in politics, "feeling unprotected or even further victimized by the system that is meant to protect them" (Pérez 2003: 628). This generates hypothesis 1:

- H1: Crime victims will have lower rates of political engagement than their peers.

Crime victims' negative experiences with the government may logically cause them to be dissatisfied with the performance of democracy in general, and they may also believe that government responses to crime are ineffective. This intuition yields two additional hypotheses:

- H2: Crime victims will be less satisfied with the functioning of their democracies than their peers.
- H3: Crime victims will have negative assessments of the state's response to crime.

1.2 Crime Victimization and Social Isolation

Crime victimization may cause individuals to withdraw from society, decreasing their participation in civic and political life. At the societal level, extremely high rates of violent crime and impunity are thought to generate a sense of "civic helplessness," which can "engender paralysis" among citizens (Rotker 2002a: 7, 15). At the individual level, fear of violent crime is believed to lead people to "develop survival strategies that restrict interpersonal contact" (Cárdia 2002, 163), and research in the United States suggests that crime victimization reduces interpersonal trust (Brehm and Rahn 1997). Such behavior could logically decrease participation in political activities, motivating hypothesis four:

- H4: Crime victims will be less likely to participate in politics.

1.3 Crime Victimization and Beliefs about Authoritarianism

Coinciding with the recent wave of crime in Latin America, the last two decades have seen the rise of a new form of repressive policing called *mano dura,* or "the iron fist," as well as disturbingly high levels of support for authoritarianism. The crime crisis

is said to increase support for both dictatorship and *mano dura* (Oppenheimer 2007)*,* jeopardizing human rights, civil liberties, and democracy. As Orlando J. Pérez explains:

> Crime undermines support for democratic regimes. As crime rates increase, pressure mounts for "strong" government action which in many instances results in highly repressive and undemocratic measures (2003: 638).

At its core*, mano dura* inherently necessitates curtailing individual rights and re-empowering the military and police. This bundle of crime fighting tactics, which often violates countries' democratic constitutions, includes deploying the military for internal policing, lengthening prison sentences, suspending due process guarantees and other protections for alleged criminals, and aggressively arresting youths suspected of gang membership. Essentially, *mano dura* consists of

> swift, strong action against crime—sometimes even if this violates the terms of   international agreements, and even if it reverses important, hard-won progress toward demilitarization (Snodgrass Godoy 2005: 614).

In Honduras, for example, individuals merely suspected of being gang members can be imprisoned for up to twelve years (Arana 2005), and all residents of Tegucigalpa are subject to a 2 am curfew (Mejía 2007). For some politicians, even the "iron fist" is not enough; Salvadoran President Tony Saca, striving to reinforce his image as a tough crime-fighter, has called his package of extra-strict policing measures *super mano dura* (Mejía 2007; Oppenheimer 2007)*.*

The concept of "democratic security" requires the subordination of the armed forces to civilian control, promotion of human rights, respect for individual and procedural rights, collaboration with local communities, and an emphasis on preventative crime-fighting strategies (Chinchilla 2002). *Mano dura* violates all these principles and can be considered roundly undemocratic. It emboldens the military, legitimates elements of the state that not long ago were governing through authoritarianism (Tulchin and

Ruthenburg 2006b; Bitencourt 2007), and violates the human rights of alleged criminals. For example, "tough" crime fighting policies in Brazil have resulted in numerous human rights violations; in 1991, 1,171 people in Sao Paulo were killed by the police (Caldeira 1996: 197).

Though its effectiveness is debatable, *mano dura* is seen as a response to crime, so its attendant rights violations and undermining of democracy may be indirect consequences of Latin America's crime epidemic. Numerous authors suggest that fear of violent crime drives citizens to demand violent retribution against alleged criminals (Sanjuán 2003), often in the form of *mano dura.* Some evidence indicates that individual-level relationships may exist between crime victimization and support for heavy-handed, even violent, anti-crime measures. Among Caracas residents surveyed in 1996, Briceño-León et al (2002) find a significant relationship between crime victimization and support for extrajudicial violence against criminals, which they attribute to victims' desire for revenge. Gilberto García, a seventy-five year old Mexican man who was kidnapped in December 2007, expresses exactly this sentiment. Reflecting on his kidnapping in an interview with the *Los Angeles Times,* he said, "If there's no iron hand, this will never end. If I had known they were coming for me that day, I would have run over them. Every man for himself" (quoted in Ellingwood 2008: A1).

Crime victimization may also shape to opinions about military governments and dictatorship. In Brazil, people "look to the armed forces as a solution for controlling violence in the cities" (Bitencourt 2007: 177), and increasingly high levels of crime there are widely believed to have resulted from "weak authority" (Caldeira 1996: 202). Fear can generate demand for strong governance, leading to support for authoritarianism and

dictatorship (Corradi 1992). Concern about violent crime in Latin America appears to be so severe that citizens are "willing to sacrifice certain liberties in order to feel more secure" ((Tulchin and Ruthenburg 2006b: 5). A survey conducted in El Salvador in 1999 found that 55% of the population could support a military coup if crime rates rose too high (Pérez 2003: 638). Similar dynamics occur in other regions of the world; in Africa, fear of crime has been associated with decreased support for democracy (Kuenzi 2006).

These trends prompt two hypotheses:

- H5: Crime victims will be more likely to support *mano dura* and vigilante justice.

- H6: Crime victims will be more likely to support military government or dictatorship.

2. Data

The lack of reliable data about crime in Latin America makes it difficult, if not impossible, to test these hypotheses at the aggregate level. Cross-national homicide data is available from the World Health Organization, and some researchers choose to use that data (ie: Bailey and Flores-Macías 2007). It is true that criminologists consider the WHO mortality data the best cross-national measure of homicide (LaFree and Drass 2002), but in the case of Latin America that designation means little. For example, according to the WHO dataset in Guatemala in 1999 there were 1,978 homicides and 3,268 deaths due to "other violence" (WHO 2008). There is no further explanation of the deaths from "other violence," but it seems possible that they could have been improperly or incompletely recorded homicides.

There are obvious problems with crime data in Latin America; data gathered by the authorities is considered incomplete and inaccurate (Alvarado Mendoza 2006; Bergman 2006). This is a serious handicap for researchers. Indeed,

> the failure to make significant strides in the study, evaluation, and policy recommendations of crime and public security in Latin America lies in the miserable state of the data. Sources are scant, organization is poor, and the quality is substandard (Bergman 2006: 220).

Due to these serious and insurmountable problems with government-generated crime data, high-quality surveys are the only defensible way to measure crime victimization in Latin America (Bergman 2006). To evaluate my hypotheses, I analyzed data from the LAPOP surveys from 2008 and from the Latinobarómetro surveys conducted in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. Both surveys are personally administered to a random sample of adults from every country in Latin America.[2] This data allows for investigation of the individual-level consequences of crime victimization. Other researchers have used similar surveys to assess relationships between crime victimization and political opinions in Latin American and other regions of the world (Kuenzi 2006; Pérez 2003).

The key independent variable in this project is recent crime victimization. The LAPOP survey asked each respondent if he or she had been the victim of a crime in the past 12 months. In a slightly different variant of the same question, the Latinobarómetro surveys asked respondents if anyone from their family had been the victim of a crime in the last 12 months. Responses to these questions were coded into a dummy variables measuring recent victimization. Sadly, victimization is not a rare event in Latin America; 18 percent of the 2008 LAPOP respondents said that they had been the victim of a crime

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[2] The countries included in the Latinobarómetro surveys from 2003-2006 are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Starting in 2004 the Latinobarómetro survey includes a sample from Dominican Republic as well. All 18 countries are included in the 2008 LAPOP survey.

in the past year, and between 30 and 45 percent of respondents in the Latinobarómetro

surveys said that someone in their household had been the victim of a crime in the last 12

months. Crime victims are somewhat different from the general population; on average,

they are younger, less likely to be married, more educated, have higher socio-economic

status, and live in more urban areas, as shown in Figure 1 of the appendix.

The surveys also included numerous questions measuring different dependent

variables related to hypotheses one through six.[3] The dependent variables and their

corresponding hypotheses are listed in Table 2.

Table 2. *Hypotheses and corresponding dependent variables.*

Hypothesis	Dependent Variables
H1: Crime victims will have lower rates of political engagement than their peers.	• Frequency of conversations about politics • Level of interest in politics • Frequency of attempts to convince others of political views
H2: Crime victims will be less satisfied with democracy than their peers.	• Satisfaction with democracy
H3: Crime victims will have negative assessments of the state's response to crime.	• Belief that the judicial system punishes criminals • Belief that the battle against crime is being won • Belief that the judicial system punishes the guilty • Belief that crime is the country's top problem • Belief that crime threatens the country's future • Belief that justice may be slow, but it eventually comes
H4: Crime victims will be less likely to participate in politics.	• Attendance at the meetings of a party or political movement • Attendance at community improvement committee meetings • Attendance at town council meetings • Participation in protests or demonstrations • Willingness to sign a petition • Willingness to work for a political candidate or group • Willingness to take an active role in a political group • Participation in community politics
H5: Crime victims will be more likely to support *mano dura*.	• Support for *mano dura* • Approval of vigilante justice • Support for police acting at the margin of the law to catch criminals • Preference for social order at the expense of

[3] Questions about every dependent variable were not included in all the annual surveys, which is why some dependent variables appear in all the annual results tables in the appendix, while other dependent variables are only included in one or two years. Dependent variables that are binary are indicated in the results charts and the other dependent variables were scale answers most commonly ranging from 1 to 4 or 1 to 5, though there were a few feeling thermometers that included 7 or 10 distinct values.

	liberties
H6: Crime victims will be more likely to support military government or dictatorship.	• Preference for a strong unelected ruler • Belief that circumstances could justify a president's decision to close Congress • Support for people who join groups seeking to violently overthrow elected governments • Preference for democracy over dictatorship • Belief that democracy is the best form of government • Support for military government

3. Data Analysis and Results

To evaluate these hypotheses, I used several types of regressions and propensity score matching to analyze the relationships between the independent and dependent variables in the 2008 LAPOP survey data and the data from the 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 Latinobarómetro surveys. The basic model estimated is:

$$Y_i = VictimizationDummy_i + MaleDummy_i + Age_i + SES_i + WaterHeater/ClothesWasherDummy_i +$$
$$Education_i + Urbanization_i + CountryFixedEffects_i + u_i$$

The results of these basic regressions are reported in Tables A1 – A13 of the appendix, and the coefficients on the victimization in each regression are summarized graphically in Figures 4-6 of the appendix.[4] All regressions included country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by country. The coefficients reported in the appendix are all from OLS regressions, for ease of interpretation, but each equation was also estimated with probit (or ordered probit, as appropriate) and propensity score matching, and the sign and significance of the coefficient on victimization was generally consistent across those different methods. Additionally, each regression was subjected to numerous robustness checks; the OLS and probit regression were re-run with and without country

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[4] The LAPOP surveys asked whether or not the respondent's household had a clothes washing machine, and the Latinobarometro surveys asked about household ownership of a water heater.

fixed effects and with a large number of additional control variables.[5] Those results are not reported here, but they are available from the author upon request. Calculations were performed in Stata 10.

Summaries of these regression results can be found in the appendix. Most strikingly, victimization is positively and significantly associated with nearly all forms of political engagement and participation in all the years of the Latinobarómetro and LAPOP surveys. This finding is sufficiently strong to suggest a causal relationship between victimization and mobilization.

People never *choose* to become crime victims, so there is no self-selection problem with crime victimization as is often the case with other independent variables like education, occupation, or marital status. However, it is true that individuals may have different personalities, patterns of behavior, or other traits that increase or decrease the likelihood that they or one of their relatives will become the victim of a crime. This presents a possible endogeneity problem, which could threaten our ability to interpret these results causally.

In response to this concern, first consider the fact that the results are quite similar for between the data from the Latinobarómetro surveys, which asked about crime victimization within the respondent's family, and the LAPOP surveys, which asked about the respondent's victimization. A respondent's risk of crime victimization could be correlated with that respondent's proclivity to participate in politics, but the correlation between the respondent's *cousin's* or the respondent's *sister's* risk of victimization and the respondent's interest in politics is likely to be more tenuous. However, to the extent

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[5] The additional controls are income, number of children, marital status, race/ethnicity, religion, computer ownership, and car ownership.

that relatives have similar socio-economic status or live in similar areas, some omitted variable bias could be present even in the Latinobarómetro results.

An individual's environment, background, and lifestyle present sources of omitted variable bias, and they merit serious consideration. We might be concerned that certain types of people tend to live in high-crime areas, either by choice or more commonly because they do not have any other options. If those people were also, by nature or socialization, more politically active than average, then this could be an unobserved variable rendering our correlation spurious. However, this is unlikely. Those people who are likely to have the least control over their personal security are those with the least income and the fewest opportunities to move to a safer area, install security fencing, or take other measures to protect themselves. Standard models of political participation suggest that such people would also have lower than average levels of participation. Furthermore, well-organized neighborhoods with a high level of communication between neighbors tend to have lower-than-average crime rates (Bursik and Grasmick 1993). So any environmental omitted variable or unobserved "neighborhood effect" is likely biasing the reported coefficients toward zero and could not be responsible for the relationships observed here.

Nonetheless, it is theoretically possible to imagine rather convoluted (but possible) local scenarios that could be influencing both an individual's risk of crime victimization and his or her level of participation in politics. For example, an increase in crime at the neighborhood level could lead a political entrepreneur to organize marches and mobilize local residents to protest against police inefficiency. In this case, an individual could be the victim of a crime and then increase his or her political activism,

but non-victims in the neighborhood would also be recruited to participate, so individual victimization would not be the cause of the participation. To ensure that we are measuring the effect of crime victimization rather than the effect of living in a high-crime area, I performed nearest-neighbor matching including all the control variables from my main regression models and requiring exact matches by gender and municipality.[6] This required substantial computing time, so thus far it has only been completed for the 2008 LAPOP data. Following the suggestions of Ho, Imai, King, and Stuart (2007), I used this matching as pre-processing, which culled the dataset to ensure that only comparable treatment and control observations were included. Then I re-ran my basic OLS regressions on the culled data, and the results were basically the same as in the previous analyses. Even when the control and treatment groups were exactly balanced by gender and municipality, recent victimization was associated with higher-than-average political participation and engagement. The results of this matching exercise are summarized in the Matching Appendix at the end of this document, and more detailed results are available by request.

To rule out the possibility that prior political participation or a personality trait associated with political participation (such as extroversion) was somehow causing crime victimization, I included measures of pre-victimization political participation as additional controls when possible. The 2008 LAPOP surveys asked respondents if they had worked for a candidate or party in their country's last presidential election, and in a felicitous coincidence the last presidential election in every country but Guatemala and Argentina was more than 12 months before the survey was administered. The survey's

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[6] In some surveys, neighborhood is recorded as well as municipality, but there are too few respondents from each neighborhood (generally 1-5) for exact matching on neighborhood.

crime victimization question asked if the respondent had been the victim of a crime in the last 12 months, making this question a good control for pre-victimization levels of participation. Separate regressions were run on the 2008 data including this variable (and dropping all the observations from Guatemala and Argentina).[7] As expected, this variable was positively and significantly related to present-day levels of political participation and engagement, but even when it was included the coefficients on the victimization variable remained nearly the same and were still statistically significant.

Finally, in an attempt to isolate the effect of crime victimization, fear of crime was also considered. Are crime victims participating in politics only because their victimization made them more fearful of crime? Is fear of crime really the root cause of their participation, rather than victimization? Do non-victims who fear crime also participate in politics more than average? To evaluate this possible confounding variable, I ran additional regressions using the data from the 2008 LAPOP survey. Helpfully, that survey included a question asking how much respondents feared crime in their neighborhoods. I re-ran all the 2008 regressions including both victimization and fear of crime as explanatory variables, and then I re-ran them again dropping victimization and including only fear of crime and the standard control variables. In all the regressions with dependent variables measure participation or political engagement fear of crime was insignificant, both when victimization was also included and when victimization was excluded. When both victimization and fear of crime were included, the coefficient on victimization remained virtually unchanged and was still positive and statistically significant in the vast majority of the regression relating to participation. The consistency

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[7] Full results are available from the author upon request.

and robustness of these results indicate that there may be a true causal relationship between victimization and political mobilization in contemporary Latin America.

Victimization is also associated with low levels of confidence in the judicial system and law enforcement, and crime victims are more likely than their peers to be concerned about the level of crime in their country. In some models victimization appears to be correlated with increased support for vigilantism, authoritarianism, and *mano dura,* but these results are not consistent across the different surveys that were used. In particular, the differences between the results using the 2008 LAPOP data (where victimization does seem to be related to undemocratic views) and the results using the Latinobarómetro data from 2003-2006 (where the victimization coefficients are generally insignificant in these regressions) suggest that question phrasing may have influenced responses. It is also possible that a shift in Latin American public opinion has taken place between 2006 and 2008; perhaps for some reason before 2006 victims did not have above-average support for authoritarianism and undemocratic policing strategies, but now they do. This analysis neither proves nor rules out any relationship between victimization and opinions about democracy, dictatorship, and policing tactics, and drawing any firm conclusions would require further investigation using other data or methods in the future. Generally speaking, my findings refute hypotheses 1 and 4, support hypotheses 2 and 3, and are ambiguous with regard to hypotheses 5 and 6, as shown below.

Table 3. *Summary of findings.*

Hypothesis	Findings
H1: Crime victims will have lower rates of political engagement than their peers.	False; crime victims have higher levels of political engagement than their peers.
H2: Crime victims will be less satisfied with democracy than their peers.	True.
H3: Crime victims will have negative assessments of the state's response to crime.	True.
H4: Crime victims will be less likely to participate in politics.	False; crime victims are more likely than their peers to

	participate in politics.
H5: Crime victims will be more likely to support *mano dura*.	Crime victimization has an ambiguous relationship to opinions about *mano dura*.
H6: Crime victims will be more likely to support military government or dictatorship.	Crime victimization has an ambiguous relationship to support for dictatorship.

4. Conclusion

These findings cast doubt on the conventional wisdom about the political consequences of crime victimization in Latin America. As expected, crime victims have negative assessments of the state of crime-fighting in their countries and they are dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy. But these opinions do not translate into unequivocal support for repressive policing tactics, dictatorship, or military government, and Latin American crime victims do not withdraw from civic life. To the contrary, they are more politically engaged than their peers, and they are more likely to participate in politics. Indeed, crime victimization appears to cause political mobilization at the individual level.

Rather than feeling cynical, socially isolated, or disempowered, Latin American crime victims and their relatives may actually become political activists.[8] Indeed, victimization may be a hitherto unidentified path to political mobilization. From the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo to Cindy Sheehan, history is replete with examples of political participation resulting from victimization. The idea that victimization can lead to political engagement is also consistent with new research suggesting that exposure to violence during civil wars may lead to increased political participation after those wars

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[8] Anecdotally, recent events in Latin America are congruent with this finding. In August 2008, hundreds of thousands of Mexican crime victims participated in demonstrations and marches, demanding greater security from their government (Llana 2008).

end (Blattman 2008; Shewfelt 2008). My research suggests that a similar pattern may also hold in non-conflict settings.

But even if crime victimization does not systematically cause individuals to curtail their participation in democratic politics, all is not well for democracy in Latin America. Regardless of their origins, low rates of participation, anti-democratic sentiments, and *mano dura* are realities in the region, and they present serious threats to democracy in Latin America. Furthermore, every year violent crime violates the basic human rights of millions of Latin Americans (Snodgrass Godoy 2005; International Center for Human Rights Policy 2003). Latin America's newly elected leaders may have succeeded in ousting their authoritarian predecessors, but they have yet to win the confidence of their citizens, protect their peoples' rights, or find an effective, democratic way to control violent crime in the region.

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Figure 1. Demographic Characteristics of Crime Victims and Non-Victims.

Non-Victims		Victims
39.36	Age (Years)	36.79
48%	Male (Percent)	53%
8.71	Education (Years)	10.3
4.07	Income (10-pt Scale)	4.56
2.77	Urbanization (5-pt Scale)	3.34
60%	Married (Percent)	56%
2.4	Children (Number)	2.02
.26	Car (Number)	.36
.45	Washer (Percent)	.51
.25	Computer (Percent)	.35

The blue lines show the overall mean of the survey sample.

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[9] Figures 1, 2, and 3 describe the demographic characteristics and opinions of victims and non-victims from the 2008 LAPOP dataset only.

Figure 2. Percentages of Crime Victims and Non-Victims Naming Each Issue as the Most Serious Problem Facing Their Country.

Non-Victims **Victims**

Non-Victims	Issue	Victims
26.6%	Crime	31.4%
16.9%	Economy	15.4%
14.2%	Unemployment	12.9%
7.9%	Poverty	7.7%
5.0%	Corruption	5.8%
23.0%	Other	19.3%

Figure 3. Feelings of Security and Insecurity among Crime Victims and Non-Victims.

Non-Victims **Victims**

Non-Victims		Victims
23.3%	Feels Very Safe	11.6%
40.7%	Feels Somewhat Safe	32.5%
26.8%	Feels Somewhat Unsafe	34.8%
9.2%	Feels Unsafe	21.2%

Figure 4.

Victimization Coefficients from OLS Regressions with Political Engagement and Participation Dependent Variables.

The colored dots represent the estimated coefficients on the crime victimization independent variable in 27 separate OLS regressions.

These regressions used 5 different sources of data: the Latinobarómetro Surveys from 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, and the LAPOP surveys from 2008.

The thicker bands show the 50% confidence interval for each coefficient, and the thinner lines show the 95% confidence interval.

Dependent variables are indicated in brackets to the right of each set of coefficients. All coefficients are from the basic regression models described in the paper. Full results from these regressions are provided in Tables A1-A13.

Figure 5.

Victimization Coefficients from OLS Regressions with
Political Opinion Dependent Variables.

The colored dots represent the estimated coefficients on the crime victimization independent variable in 24 separate OLS regressions.

These regressions used 5 different sources of data: the Latinobarómetro Surveys from 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, and the LAPOP surveys from 2008.

The thicker bands show the 50% confidence interval for each coefficient, and the thinner lines show the 95% confidence interval.

Dependent variables are indicated in brackets to the right of each set of coefficients. All coefficients are from the basic regression models described in the paper. Full results from these regressions are provided in Tables A1-A13.

Figure 6.

Victimization Coefficients from OLS Regressions with
Dependent Variables Related to Policy Opinions

The colored dots represent the estimated coefficients on the crime victimization independent variable in 7 separate OLS regressions.

These regressions used 3 different sources of data: the Latinobarómetro Surveys from 2003, 2004, and the LAPOP surveys from 2008. Questions about these issues were not included in the Latinobarómetro 2005 and 2006 surveys.

The thicker bands show the 50% confidence interval for each coefficient, and the thinner lines show the 95% confidence interval.

Dependent variables are indicated in brackets to the right of each set of coefficients. All coefficients
are from the basic regression models described in the paper. Full results from these regressions are provided in Tables A1-A13.

Table A1. Crime Victimization and Political Engagement and Participation, 2008.

|	(1) Frequency of Political Conversations	(2) Level of Interest in Politics	(3) Frequency of Attempts to Convince Others to Vote for a Candidate	(4) Frequency of Attendance at Meetings of a Party or Political Movement	(5) Frequency of Attendance at Meetings of Community Improvement Group	(6) Frequency of Participation in Demonstrations or Protests	(7) Town Council Meeting Attendance (d)
Victim (d)	0.169*** (0.0267)	0.0931*** (0.0171)	0.0843*** (0.0174)	0.0545** (0.0162)	0.104*** (0.0159)	0.134*** (0.0193)	0.0423*** (0.00736)
Male (d)	0.342*** (0.0252)	0.200*** (0.0133)	0.138*** (0.0175)	0.0654*** (0.0112)	0.0592** (0.0182)	0.0456** (0.0133)	0.0250** (0.00639)
Age in Years	0.00740*** (0.00106)	0.00380*** (0.000758)	0.00314*** (0.000665)	0.00124** (0.000325)	0.00516*** (0.000549)	-0.0000741 (0.000606)	0.00110*** (0.000267)
Economic Situation	0.0426* (0.0160)	0.0551*** (0.0116)	0.0304* (0.0119)	0.0179* (0.00643)	0.0197* (0.00748)	-0.00245 (0.00907)	0.00446 (0.00277)
Clothes Washer (d)	0.0725* (0.0276)	0.0379* (0.0179)	0.0128 (0.0196)	-0.0192 (0.0185)	-0.0353 (0.0171)	-0.0149 (0.0151)	-0.0106 (0.00691)
Years of Education	0.0657*** (0.00328)	0.0419*** (0.00287)	0.0223*** (0.00348)	0.00967*** (0.00164)	0.00591* (0.00242)	0.0150*** (0.00235)	0.00369*** (0.000720)
Level of Urbanization	0.00306 (0.00919)	-0.0146 (0.00783)	-0.0178 (0.0102)	-0.0260*** (0.00409)	-0.0622*** (0.00922)	-0.00432 (0.00512)	-0.0187*** (0.00457)
Constant	1.035*** (0.0951)	1.303*** (0.0735)	0.950*** (0.0631)	1.048*** (0.0404)	1.249*** (0.0454)	1.673*** (0.0563)	0.0549** (0.0178)
N	29137	29134	28987	29012	29091	20406	29096

OLS regressions using data from the 2008 LAPOP surveys. All models include country fixed effects, though those coefficients are not reported. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. Variables followed by (d) are dummies. $^{*} p < 0.05, ^{**} p < 0.01, ^{***} p < 0.001$

Table A2. Crime Victimization and Political Engagement and Participation, 2006.

	(1) Frequency of Conversations about Politics	(2) Frequency of Attempts to Convince Others of Political Views	(3) Frequency of Work for a Political Candidate or Party	(4) Willingness to Attend a Legal Demonstration	(5) Willingness to Sign a Petition
Victim (d)	0.0723***	0.0404	0.00535	0.0459*	0.0655**
	(0.0178)	(0.0239)	(0.0225)	(0.0171)	(0.0204)
Male (d)	0.260***	0.166***	0.0768***	0.0887***	0.0757***
	(0.0117)	(0.0144)	(0.00985)	(0.0100)	(0.0122)
Age in Years	0.00277***	0.000429	0.00102	-0.000923*	0.000469
	(0.000521)	(0.000412)	(0.000492)	(0.000418)	(0.000533)
Household SES	0.0501***	0.0321**	0.0192	-0.00156	0.0129
	(0.0109)	(0.00915)	(0.0102)	(0.0119)	(0.0126)
Water Heater (d)	0.0987*	0.0533*	0.0317	0.0219	0.0377
	(0.0382)	(0.0244)	(0.0193)	(0.0232)	(0.0266)
Years of Education	0.0402***	0.0199***	0.00624*	0.0134***	0.0162***
	(0.00406)	(0.00303)	(0.00286)	(0.00329)	(0.00382)
Level of Urbanization	0.000525	-0.00642	-0.0100*	-0.00103	0.00634
	(0.00717)	(0.00528)	(0.00471)	(0.00562)	(0.00542)
Constant	1.092***	1.234***	1.243***	1.354***	1.276***
	(0.0832)	(0.0421)	(0.0563)	(0.0776)	(0.0853)
N	19530	19493	19379	18545	18432

*OLS regressions using data from the 2006 Latinobarómetro surveys. All models include country fixed effects, though those coefficients are not reported. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. Variables followed by (d) are dummies. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001*

Table A3. Crime Victimization and Political Engagement and Participation, 2005.

	(1) Frequency of Conversations about Politics	(2) Level of Interest in Politics	(3) Frequency of Attempts to Convince Others of Political Views	(4) Willingness to Attend a Demonstration	(5) Willingness to Attend an Illegal Protest	(8) Frequency of Participation in Community Politics	(6) Frequency of Work for a Political Candidate or Party	(7) Willingness to Sign a Petition
Victim (d)	0.177***	0.111***	0.0978***	0.114***	0.0458***	0.155***	0.0248	0.156***
	(0.0180)	(0.0226)	(0.0175)	(0.0191)	(0.00836)	(0.0137)	(0.0134)	(0.0205)
Male (d)	0.356***	0.160***	0.226***	0.127***	0.0510***	0.157***	0.0735***	0.110***
	(0.0275)	(0.0249)	(0.0213)	(0.0180)	(0.00683)	(0.0221)	(0.0153)	(0.0123)
Age in Years	0.00226**	-0.000683	-0.000115	-0.000320	-0.00126***	0.00216***	0.000941*	0.00191***
	(0.000720)	(0.000776)	(0.000553)	(0.000440)	(0.000249)	(0.000533)	(0.000325)	(0.000308)
Household SES	0.0495**	0.0463**	0.0261	0.0116	-0.00344	0.0303*	0.00833	0.0243*
	(0.0144)	(0.0146)	(0.0137)	(0.0111)	(0.00730)	(0.0135)	(0.0119)	(0.0112)
Water Heater (d)	0.0617	0.136*	-0.0116	0.0541*	0.0380*	0.00722	-0.0269	0.104
	(0.0304)	(0.0506)	(0.0301)	(0.0252)	(0.0175)	(0.0270)	(0.0290)	(0.0503)
Years of Education	0.0393***	0.0283***	0.0194***	0.0219***	0.00523**	0.0299***	0.00948***	0.0301***
	(0.00487)	(0.00408)	(0.00339)	(0.00238)	(0.00138)	(0.00395)	(0.00222)	(0.00346)
Level of Urbanization	-0.00252	-0.0000597	-0.00484	-0.00385	0.00101	-0.0249***	-0.0138**	-0.00455
	(0.00433)	(0.00456)	(0.00476)	(0.00573)	(0.00256)	(0.00542)	(0.00385)	(0.00629)
Constant	1.420***	1.627***	1.492***	1.285***	1.137***	1.417***	1.334***	1.244***
	(0.0898)	(0.166)	(0.100)	(0.0616)	(0.0370)	(0.0604)	(0.119)	(0.137)
N	19637	19689	19602	19500	19510	19519	19521	19216

OLS regressions using data from the 2005 Latinobarómetro surveys. All models include country fixed effects, though those coefficients are not reported. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. Variables followed by (d) are dummies. $^* p < 0.05, ^{**} p < 0.01, ^{***} p < 0.001$

Table A4. Crime Victimization and Political Engagement and Participation, 2004.

	(1) Level of Interest in Politics
Victim (d)	0.0881**
	(0.0233)
Male (d)	0.158***
	(0.0175)
Age in Years	-0.00156
	(0.000870)
Household SES	0.0742***
	(0.0158)
Water Heater (d)	0.0688**
	(0.0219)
Years of Education	0.0376***
	(0.00504)
Level of Urbanization	0.000189
	(0.00518)
Constant	1.692***
	(0.0721)
N	19211

*OLS regression using data from the 2004 Latinobarómetro surveys. Country fixed effects included, though those coefficients are not reported. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. Variables followed by (d) are dummies. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001*

Table A5. Crime Victimization and Political Engagement and Participation, 2003.

	(1) Frequency of Conversations about Politics	(2) Level of Political Interest	(3) Frequency of Attempts to Convince Others about Political Views	(4) Willingness to Attend a Legal Demonstration	(5) Willingness to Attend an Illegal Protest	(6) Willingness to Take an Active Role in a Political Party or Organization
Victim (d)	0.118***	0.0623**	0.0774***	0.0972***	0.0435***	0.138***
	(0.0208)	(0.0198)	(0.0184)	(0.0110)	(0.0103)	(0.0236)
Male (d)	0.304***	0.198***	0.191***	0.110***	0.0865***	0.308***
	(0.0220)	(0.0210)	(0.0233)	(0.0165)	(0.0123)	(0.0313)
Age in Years	0.00161*	-0.000234	-0.000247	-0.00145**	-0.00126***	-0.00299**
	(0.000608)	(0.000706)	(0.000455)	(0.000455)	(0.000260)	(0.000776)
Household SES	0.0675***	0.0560**	0.0229	-0.000472	0.00476	0.0383*
	(0.0146)	(0.0157)	(0.0111)	(0.0107)	(0.00948)	(0.0164)
Water Heater (d)	0.0278	0.00616	-0.00369	0.0225	0.0234	0.0335
	(0.0288)	(0.0239)	(0.0231)	(0.0262)	(0.0211)	(0.0465)
Years of Education	0.0432***	0.0319***	0.0215***	0.0164***	0.00755*	0.0404***
	(0.00482)	(0.00384)	(0.00374)	(0.00379)	(0.00261)	(0.00481)
Level of Urbanization	0.000641	-0.00307	-0.00243	-0.00385	0.00174	-0.00601
	(0.00638)	(0.00389)	(0.00513)	(0.00525)	(0.00411)	(0.00794)
Constant	1.335***	1.826***	1.218***	1.358***	1.224***	1.471***
	(0.0507)	(0.0712)	(0.0424)	(0.0471)	(0.0347)	(0.0764)
N	18130	18059	18072	17817	17787	17636

OLS regressions using data from the 2003 Latinobarómetro surveys. All models include country fixed effects, though those coefficients are not reported. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. Variables followed by (d) are dummies. $^{*} p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$

Table A6. Crime Victimization and Political Opinions, 2008.

	(1) Belief that Democracy is the Best Form of Government	(2) Preference for Democracy over Dictatorship	(3) Satisfaction with the Functioning of Democracy in the Respondent's Country	(4) Thinks We Need a Strong, Non-Elected Leader (d)	(5) Thinks Circumstances Could Justify a President's Decision to Close Congress	(6) Approves of People Joining Groups Seeking the Violent Overthrow of Elected Governments	(7) Supports *Mano Dura* (d)	(8) Approves of Vigilante Justice when the State Doesn't Punish Criminals
Victim (d)	0.0342	-0.0323*	-0.0691**	0.0127*	0.0455***	0.0554	0.0216*	0.467***
	(0.0240)	(0.0119)	(0.0190)	(0.00564)	(0.00859)	(0.0301)	(0.00872)	(0.0553)
Male (d)	0.0686*	0.0162	0.0258*	-0.00376	0.0182	0.125***	0.00681	0.168**
	(0.0258)	(0.0107)	(0.0113)	(0.00417)	(0.00925)	(0.0308)	(0.00746)	(0.0530)
Age in Years	0.00989***	0.00369***	0.00114*	-0.00123***	-0.0000605	-0.0102***	0.000469	-0.0196***
	(0.00109)	(0.000633)	(0.000461)	(0.000184)	(0.000297)	(0.00128)	(0.000273)	(0.00299)
Economic Situation	0.0457*	0.00673	0.162***	-0.00272	0.00668	-0.0861**	-0.00629	-0.103*
	(0.0195)	(0.00883)	(0.0145)	(0.00511)	(0.00704)	(0.0275)	(0.00546)	(0.0433)
Clothes Washer (d)	0.0306	0.00951	-0.000138	-0.00181	-0.00785	-0.0261	0.000195	-0.0483
	(0.0352)	(0.0138)	(0.0138)	(0.00593)	(0.00927)	(0.0475)	(0.00860)	(0.0809)
Years of Education	0.0300***	0.0101***	-0.00991***	-0.00636***	0.000594	-0.0239***	-0.0104***	-0.0451***
	(0.00453)	(0.00195)	(0.00214)	(0.000905)	(0.00137)	(0.00416)	(0.00159)	(0.00838)
Level of Urbanization	-0.0182	-0.0118*	-0.0295***	0.00364	0.0141**	0.0119	0.0132**	0.0121
	(0.0163)	(0.00491)	(0.00657)	(0.00290)	(0.00414)	(0.0274)	(0.00363)	(0.0329)
Constant	4.315***	2.397***	2.178***	0.249***	0.180***	2.979***	0.303***	4.463***
	(0.106)	(0.0489)	(0.0458)	(0.0239)	(0.0341)	(0.156)	(0.0305)	(0.293)
N	27692	27257	28022	27739	25636	28706	28342	28736

OLS regressions using data from the 2008 LAPOP surveys. All models include country fixed effects, though those coefficients are not reported. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. Variables followed by (d) are dummies. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A7. Crime Victimization and Political Opinions, 2006.

	(1) Belief that Democracy is the Best Form of Government	(2) Preference for Democracy over Dictatorship	(3) Satisfaction with the Functioning of Democracy in the Respondent's Country	(4) Preference for Social Order at the Expense of Some Liberties (d)
Victim (d)	-0.0105	-0.0234	-0.0891***	-0.0129
	(0.0143)	(0.0173)	(0.0124)	(0.00973)
Male (d)	0.0248	0.0311	0.000499	-0.0162
	(0.0146)	(0.0170)	(0.0138)	(0.0109)
Age in Years	0.00207***	0.00202**	0.000508	0.00121**
	(0.000513)	(0.000630)	(0.000496)	(0.000325)
Household SES	0.0528**	0.0149	0.0539***	0.0121
	(0.0136)	(0.0185)	(0.0108)	(0.0100)
Water Heater (d)	-0.0390	-0.00780	-0.0115	-0.0500*
	(0.0460)	(0.0342)	(0.0203)	(0.0178)
Years of Education	0.0103***	0.0132***	-0.00547	-0.0000905
	(0.00228)	(0.00302)	(0.00295)	(0.00140)
Level of Urbanization	0.00319	-0.00157	-0.00573	0.000138
	(0.00555)	(0.00470)	(0.00552)	(0.00262)
Constant	2.727***	2.244***	2.300***	0.669***
	(0.215)	(0.0698)	(0.110)	(0.0618)
N	18545	18282	18992	19037

OLS regressions using data from the 2006 Latinobarómetro surveys. All models include country fixed effects, though those coefficients are not reported. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. Variables followed by (d) are dummies. $^{*} p < 0.05,$ $^{**} p < 0.01,$ $^{***} p < 0.001$

Table A8. Crime Victimization and Political Opinions, 2005.

	(1) Belief that Democracy is the Best Form of Government	(2) Preference for Democracy over Dictatorship	(3) Satisfaction with the Functioning of Democracy in the Respondent's Country	(4) Support for Military Government (d)
Victim (d)	-0.00823	0.0224	-0.136***	0.0259
	(0.0121)	(0.0197)	(0.0161)	(0.0124)
Male (d)	0.0529**	-0.0662***	0.00218	0.0115
	(0.0157)	(0.0159)	(0.0129)	(0.00941)
Age in Years	0.00110*	-0.00420***	-0.0000620	-0.000319
	(0.000457)	(0.000543)	(0.000750)	(0.000366)
Household SES	0.0199*	-0.0310**	0.00353	-0.00000291
	(0.00911)	(0.0105)	(0.00940)	(0.00485)
Water Heater (d)	0.0136	-0.00731	-0.0403	-0.00336
	(0.0273)	(0.0325)	(0.0386)	(0.0156)
Years of Education	0.0108**	-0.0186***	-0.00488	-0.00691**
	(0.00295)	(0.00383)	(0.00276)	(0.00177)
Level of Urbanization	-0.00490	0.00499	-0.0138*	-0.00428
	(0.00417)	(0.00432)	(0.00586)	(0.00399)
Constant	2.744***	1.962***	2.388***	0.363***
	(0.0427)	(0.0947)	(0.138)	(0.0585)
N	17912	17415	18361	18239

OLS regressions using data from the 2005 Latinobarómetro surveys. All models include country fixed effects, though those coefficients are not reported. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. Variables followed by (d) are dummies. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A9. Crime Victimization and Political Opinions, 2004.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Belief that Democracy is the Best Form of Government	Preference for Democracy over Authoritarianism	Satisfaction with the Functioning of Democracy in the Respondent's Country	Support for *Mano Dura* (d)	Support for Military Government (d)
Victim (d)	-0.0237	-0.0196	-0.0799[***]	0.000283	0.0174
	(0.0121)	(0.0147)	(0.0151)	(0.00779)	(0.0101)
Male (d)	0.0386[**]	0.0395[*]	0.0311	-0.0235[*]	0.0203
	(0.0125)	(0.0148)	(0.0168)	(0.00869)	(0.0104)
Age in Years	0.00233[***]	0.00197[***]	0.000249	0.000320	-0.0000286
	(0.000468)	(0.000418)	(0.000490)	(0.000342)	(0.000371)
Household SES	0.0129	0.0140	0.0291[**]	0.00308	-0.0229[***]
	(0.00996)	(0.00881)	(0.00837)	(0.00568)	(0.00504)
Water Heater (d)	0.0545[*]	-0.0487	-0.0392	-0.0254	-0.00140
	(0.0236)	(0.0342)	(0.0496)	(0.0198)	(0.0135)
Years of Education	0.0120[***]	0.00678[*]	-0.00271	-0.00106	-0.00550[**]
	(0.00279)	(0.00281)	(0.00288)	(0.00169)	(0.00153)
Level of Urbanization	-0.00521	-0.00322	-0.0216[***]	-0.00244	-0.00359
	(0.00511)	(0.00549)	(0.00441)	(0.00287)	(0.00240)
Constant	2.759[***]	2.348[***]	2.208[***]	0.639[***]	0.344[***]
	(0.0465)	(0.0717)	(0.160)	(0.0504)	(0.0402)
N	17933	17448	18208	18359	17724

OLS regressions using data from the 2003 Latinobarómetro surveys. All models include country fixed effects, though those coefficients are not reported. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. Variables followed by (d) are dummies. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A10. Crime Victimization and Political Opinions, 2003.

	(1) Belief that Democracy is the Best Form of Government	(2) Preference for Democracy over Authoritarianism	(3) Satisfaction with the Functioning of Democracy in the Respondent's Country	(4) Support for *Mano Dura*
Victim (d)	0.00447	0.00636	-0.0791[***]	-0.00323
	(0.0208)	(0.0212)	(0.0136)	(0.0214)
Male (d)	0.0525[**]	0.0362[*]	0.0541[**]	-0.0297
	(0.0137)	(0.0134)	(0.0164)	(0.0165)
Age in Years	0.00248[***]	0.00183[***]	0.000140	-0.000195
	(0.000440)	(0.000428)	(0.000483)	(0.000497)
Household SES	0.0196	-0.00457	0.0339[*]	0.0182
	(0.0146)	(0.0116)	(0.0133)	(0.0122)
Water Heater (d)	-0.0208	0.0142	0.0339	0.00184
	(0.0384)	(0.0380)	(0.0285)	(0.0168)
Years of Education	0.0109[***]	0.00810[*]	-0.00338	-0.00236
	(0.00267)	(0.00299)	(0.00284)	(0.00238)
Level of Urbanization	-0.00127	-0.00873	-0.0273[***]	0.000235
	(0.00437)	(0.00510)	(0.00490)	(0.00471)
Constant	2.597[***]	2.286[***]	1.986[***]	2.372[***]
	(0.0704)	(0.0574)	(0.0619)	(0.0399)
N	16774	16982	17464	16999

OLS regressions using data from the 2003 Latinobarómetro surveys. All models include country fixed effects, though those coefficients are not reported. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. Variables followed by (d) are dummies. [*] *p < 0.05,* [**] *p < 0.01,* [***] *p < 0.001*

Table A11. Crime Victimization and Policy Opinions, 2008.

	(1) Belief that the Judicial System Punishes the Guilty	(2) Belief that Crime is the Country's Most Serious Problem (d)	(3) Belief that Crime Poses a Threat to the Future of the Country
Victim (d)	-0.187***	0.0250**	0.0917***
	(0.0237)	(0.00689)	(0.0206)
Male (d)	-0.00706	-0.0200	-0.0453**
	(0.0149)	(0.00975)	(0.0148)
Age in Years	0.00136	0.000706	0.00173***
	(0.000835)	(0.000354)	(0.000435)
Economic	0.106***	0.0238***	-0.0349**
Situation	(0.0130)	(0.00540)	(0.00964)
Clothes	-0.0514*	0.0213	0.0230
Washer (d)	(0.0205)	(0.0111)	(0.0168)
Years of	-0.0153***	0.00139	0.0119***
Education	(0.00247)	(0.00102)	(0.00206)
Level of	-0.0441***	0.0125**	0.0158*
Urbanization	(0.00766)	(0.00385)	(0.00630)
Constant	2.172***	0.158***	3.293***
	(0.0668)	(0.0331)	(0.0511)
N	28748	29377	28916

*OLS regressions using data from the 2008 LAPOP surveys. All models include country fixed effects, though those coefficients are not reported. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. Variables followed by (d) are dummies. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$*

Table A12. Crime Victimization and Political Engagement and Policy Opinions, 2004.

	(1) Belief that the Battle Against Crime is Being Won
Victim (d)	-0.0524[*]
	(0.0184)
Male (d)	0.0348[*]
	(0.0148)
Age in Years	-0.00124[*]
	(0.000470)
Household SES	-0.0182
	(0.0112)
Water Heater (d)	-0.0111
	(0.0303)
Years of Education	-0.0115[**]
	(0.00301)
Level of Urbanization	-0.0119[**]
	(0.00313)
Constant	2.340[***]
	(0.0355)
N	18489

OLS regression using data from the 2004 Latinobarómetro surveys. Country fixed effects included, though those coefficients are not reported. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. Variables followed by (d) are dummies. $^*p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Table A13. Crime Victimization and Policy Opinions, 2003.

	(1) Belief that Justice May be Slow, but It Eventually Comes	(2) Belief that the Judicial System Punishes the Guilty	(3) Belief that the Battle Against Crime is Being Won
Victim (d)	-0.0834**	-0.0434**	-0.124***
	(0.0223)	(0.0139)	(0.0178)
Male (d)	0.00368	0.00424	0.00217
	(0.0127)	(0.0139)	(0.00966)
Age in Years	-0.000608	-0.00126***	-0.000229
	(0.000514)	(0.000309)	(0.000450)
Household SES	-0.00676	-0.0147	0.00164
	(0.0198)	(0.0133)	(0.0148)
Water Heater (d)	-0.0857**	-0.0548**	-0.0836
	(0.0278)	(0.0176)	(0.0415)
Years of Education	-0.0207**	-0.0126**	-0.0163**
	(0.00588)	(0.00386)	(0.00456)
Level of Urbanization	-0.00655	-0.00665	-0.00992
	(0.00777)	(0.00711)	(0.00770)
Constant	2.591***	2.476***	2.259***
	(0.100)	(0.0759)	(0.0860)
N	17269	17102	17335

OLS regressions using data from the 2003 Latinobarómetro surveys. All models include country fixed effects, though those coefficients are not reported. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses. Variables followed by (d) are dummies. $^{*} p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$, $^{***} p < 0.001$

Matching Appendix

To control for the possibility that different local experiences or other unobserved characteristics correlated with local place of residence could be causing the observed relationship between crime victimization and increased political participation, I used matching as preprocessing (with King et al's MatchIt package and Zelig package in R) before re-running my core regressions using the LAPOP 2008 data.

The matching was nearest-neighbor with replacement considering age, economic situation, clothes washer ownership, and education, with the specification that the matches had to be exact on municipality and gender. The matching process effectively culled the "control" observations, leaving only those that were most comparable to the "treated" observations in the dataset.

This culled data was then used to re-run the basic regressions for all the participation/engagement dependent variables. The results are nearly the same as those reported in Tables A1-A13 of the paper; victimization is positively associated with increased participation.

Frequency of Political Conversations

Victimization Coefficient: .163*** (.0226)

Balance:

	All Data		Matched Data	
	Treated	Control	Treated	Control
Age	36.8	39.3	36.7	37.2
Education	10.3	8.73	10.3	10.2
Econ. Situation	2.91	2.89	2.91	2.95
Washer	.508	.451	.507	.511
Male	.528	.476	.528	.528

Level of Interest in Politics

Victimization Coefficient: .0922*** (.0193)

Balance:

	All Data		Matched Data	
	Treated	Control	Treated	Control
Age	36.8	39.3	36.8	37.2
Education	10.3	8.73	10.3	10.2
Econ. Situation	2.91	2.89	2.91	2.94
Washer	.508	.452	.508	.514
Male	.528	.476	.528	.528

Frequency of Attempts to Convince Others of Political Views

Victimization Coefficient: .0712*** (.0192)

Balance:

	All Data		Matched Data	
	Treated	Control	Treated	Control
Age	36.8	39.3	36.8	37.2
Education	10.3	8.75	10.3	10.2
Econ. Situation	2.91	2.89	2.91	2.95
Washer	.510	.452	.510	.519
Male	.529	.476	.529	.529

Attendance at Political Meetings

Victimization Coefficient: .0609*** (.0123)

Balance:

	All Data		Matched Data	
	Treated	Control	Treated	Control
Age	36.8	39.3	36.8	37.0
Education	10.3	8.73	10.3	10.2
Econ. Situation	2.91	2.89	2.91	2.97
Washer	.510	.448	.510	.519
Male	.528	.475	.528	.528

Demonstration or Protest Participation

Victimization Coefficient: .130*** (.0169)

Balance:

	All Data		Matched Data	
	Treated	Control	Treated	Control
Age	36.2	38.7	36.1	36.8
Education	10.5	9.06	10.5	10.5
Econ. Situation	2.91	2.87	2.91	2.96
Washer	.465	.407	.464	.476
Male	.539	.487	.539	.539

Participation in Community Improvement Meetings

Victimization Coefficient: .0978*** (.0165)

Balance:

	All Data		Matched Data	
	Treated	Control	Treated	Control
Age	36.8	39.3	36.8	37.3
Education	10.3	8.72	10.3	10.2
Econ. Situation	2.91	2.89	2.91	2.95
Washer	.508	.451	.508	.515
Male	.529	.476	.529	.529

Attendance at Town Council Meetings

Victimization Coefficient: .0400*** (.00645)

Balance:

	All Data		Matched Data	
	Treated	Control	Treated	Control
Age	36.8	39.3	36.8	37.2
Education	10.3	8.73	10.3	10.2
Econ. Situation	2.91	2.89	2.91	2.95
Washer	.509	.452	.509	.517
Male	.527	.476	.527	.527