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
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**Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina**

# Good Government and Transparency in Honduras After Hurricane Mitch:

## A Study of Citizen Views



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## Summary of the Effort

This report presents the results of a large-scale survey of citizen attitudes toward good governance in Honduras. The devastating impact of Hurricane Mitch has sensitized the entire community to the importance of good government, especially when it comes to honesty and integrity in the public sector. The study is based on a national random sample of 3,000 voting-age adults carried out in 2001. The study was conducted in each of the nation's 18 departments, with samples in each representing their respective rural/urban breakdowns. The results of the survey at the national level are very accurate representations of the views of the population, with a sample "error" of only  $\pm 1.7\%$ , which means that 95% of the time, if we drew repeated samples of the population, our results would be within 1.7% more or 1.7% less than the results that would have been obtained by interviewing all of the millions of voting-aged citizens of Honduras.

### Introduction

The impact of Hurricane Mitch in Honduras was profound. It left an enormous legacy of human suffering, caused the death of thousands, and devastated the country's physical and economic infrastructure. The response of the international donor community to such devastation was generous and fast in coming. Humanitarian assistance to address the most immediate needs poured into Honduras from all parts of the globe. But as the reconstruction effort got under way, the people of Honduras and the international donor community began to realize that, as unpredictable as natural disasters are, their most adverse consequences could be mitigated. The massive destruction caused by flooding, for example, would have been far less damaging if during prior decades proper attention had been given to watershed management and reforestation efforts. At the root of many of the environmental underpinnings of the disaster was the extreme poverty under which so many Hondurans live. Poorly educated and often unhealthy, with incomes well below the poverty line, and facing limited employment opportunities, the poor of Honduras must do whatever it takes to feed their large families, including relying on unsustainable practices that exploit the natural resource base.

Armed with this recognition, and encouraged by the community of nations, the people and Government of Honduras decided to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by large flows of external financial assistance to embark on a far more challenging task. The Honduran people decided that the country must be transformed, not solely reconstructed. Transforming Honduras will entail a profound process of social, economic and institutional change, frequently relearning how to do things according to modern norms, and assimilating new technologies. Achieving these objectives would be just a dream, however, if satisfying basic economic and political rights among the majority of poor or very poor is not accorded the priority it deserves. There are well-defined social and economic initiatives being considered or being implemented with this purpose in mind - in education, health, employment, the environment, gender, water, housing, agriculture and small business sectors, among others. While it will take many years for these initiatives to fully bear fruit, they must be pursued at the same time as Honduras strengthens its democratic governance and administrative procedures to promote accountability, increase efficiency and prevent misuse of public resources.

It is hard to overstate the importance of strengthening good government in Honduras. Democratic governments respectful of and responsive to the will of the people are accountable and make economic decisions that are more sound and efficient. They are also prone to manage the state with greater transparency, willing to engage civil society through a continuous dialogue, and accept the rightful role of a free press as overseer of the nation's affairs. A transparent Honduras, by definition, will be a more peaceful and prosperous nation. When the average citizen has confidence in the legal infrastructure and is aware that proper control systems for financial management and auditing are operating effectively, s/he will have a better understanding of how decisions are made and public resources allocated among competing goals. Opportunities for malfeasance and corruption will diminish in tandem with increased efficiency in government spending, thus giving a major impetus to the country's development. Estimates suggest that in some countries – and Honduras may or may not be among them – up to 30 % of national resources are lost to corruption and other illicit practices, thus compromising the country's economic and social development and perpetuating the inefficiency generally associated with poverty and backwardness. Because of the perverse linkages between corruption and the persistence of abject poverty, the National Strategy for the Reduction of Poverty, released in April 2001, places emphasis on anti-corruption initiatives as a crosscutting issue that should be addressed if the strategy is to succeed.

Given the significance of corruption as an impediment to development and poverty reduction and, as shown in this report, to democratic governance, it is encouraging that Honduras has already taken several steps to bring it under control. Transparency and the reduction of corruption took center stage at the discussions held in Stockholm in May 1999 between the government, civil society

and the international community. This was followed by the establishment of a Transparency and Governance Table within the Consultative Group for the Reconstruction and Transformation of Honduras, whose members include some of the 12 leading international donor organizations (Group of Twelve, or G-12) supporting the reconstruction and transformation effort, as well as participation from civil society organizations and the national government. In February 2001, President Carlos R. Flores issued a decree (Decree 015-2001) creating a National Anti-Corruption Commission under the leadership of Cardinal Oscar Andrés Rodríguez, whereas in March the National Congress authorized the establishment of a Program for Efficiency and Transparency of the Public Procurement System. These are all very significant steps in the fight against corruption and toward the eradication of poverty.

To ensure that these goals are met, future Honduran governments must continue to exercise political will and convince their constituents and the international community of their commitment to implementing the measures required to increase the efficiency of the public sector and do away with corruption. This will entail joint efforts between the executive and legislative branches of government to forge an effective anti-corruption legal framework, and a judiciary willing to enforce it. While commending the government for the initiatives it has taken to modernize the management of the state, future governments should be encouraged to further develop financial management and auditing systems and promote probity and personal accountability in the public sector. An important output of such systems is increased transparency, including wider dissemination of financial and performance information, and of audit reports. With access to information about how the state is managed, citizens and the press will be able to exercise their oversight right, a right which ultimately defines a democracy.

The results of the survey follow. It was conducted to assess the satisfaction level of Hondurans with the reconstruction effort and to investigate selected governance and transparency issues, in particular citizen views regarding the nature and prevalence of corruption, and the relationship between corruption and democratic governance.

It should be stressed that the survey examines experiences and attitudes at the level of the individual citizen and does not attempt to deal with issues of good governance, transparency and corruption at the elite level. Other studies have attempted to focus on that level, but, as is well known, obtaining objective information on issues as sensitive as corruption, for example, at the level of elites is extremely difficult and there are major questions of data validity. Our assumption, however, is that what goes on in the daily lives of citizens is a good reflection of overall society norms and behaviors. We cannot imagine, for example, finding high levels of corruption in a given country at the level of daily citizen experience, which is what we measure here, and also find an uncorrupted upper-level state bureaucracy or private sector. We think that the two are closely associated in all societies, with one a reflection of the other.

Most Hondurans were satisfied with the reconstruction effort. The vast majority indicated that reconstruction projects had been executed according to need and expectation, with relatively few Hondurans reporting irregularities. While 63 % of respondents felt that corruption was widespread in Honduras, this level of perception of corruption is not as high as in three other Latin American countries with comparable data, although higher than in Bolivia. One in five Hondurans has fallen victim to corrupt acts, whereas about a quarter reported having had indirect experiences with corruption. Those most likely to be the object of corruption were male, younger, highly educated,

wealthier and more urban than those with other personal characteristics.

Despite the high prevalence of perceptions of corruption, the survey found that Hondurans are less tolerant of corruption than their neighbors in Nicaragua. Among those social groups reported as more corrupt, several stand out. Customs officials and various categories of politicians and government officials, the police included, are regarded as quite corrupt. Members of the clergy, followed by teachers and university professors, were seen as the most honest.

A striking finding of the survey, with significant policy implications, is that those who have been victimized by corruption are less likely to support Honduras' political system. In fact, support for democratic institutions turns into *indifference* among corruption victims. This is manifested as well in lower levels of trust for the legal system, a belief that public officials ignore the laws, and that politicians want power only to enrich themselves, among other negative findings.

The survey results served to quantify the extent to which Hondurans are familiar and involved with several citizen participation mechanisms, such as *cabildos abiertos* and social auditing programs. It also explored, finally, the media use habits of the Honduran population. These results are relevant to the design of public awareness initiatives intended to mobilize the population in support of transparency, accountability and democratic governance promotion programs.

## Sample Design

A study of good government and transparency should be designed so that it will gather data on the values of *all* citizens, not just the active ones, the politically "important" ones, or

those who live in major towns and cities. Indeed, the major advantage of surveys over elections is that in elections many people do not vote, and often it is the poor or the rural voter who is under-represented in the election.<sup>1</sup> Surprisingly, many studies that claim to represent the views of citizens are often based on samples that systematically under-represent certain sectors of the population. Often the biases that crop up in samples emerge because of cost considerations, which in turn are a function of the dispersion of populations over wide areas, or because the multi-lingual nature of the national population makes it difficult and expensive to conduct the interviews in all of the languages widely spoken in a given country.

In the design of the sample, the factors of population size and its distribution needed to be considered. In addition, Honduras' departments, which range so greatly in population and geographic area, each have their own social and political profiles, and a study that attempts to represent the country ought to be certain to include each of its departments. In order to achieve this objective, it was decided that the sample would be designed to represent each of Honduras' 18 departments, while still being able to speak with confidence about the country as a whole.

It is perhaps easiest to understand the sample design methodology employed in this study by making an analogy to drawing winning raffle tickets. Let us assume that there are 18 high schools in a school district and the district has decided to have a raffle to raise money. Those who

are running the raffle want to be sure that there is at least one winner in each of the 18 schools. If the tickets are each drawn at random, it may well turn out that one or more schools would be left without a winner. In order to achieve this objective, rather than placing all of the raffle tickets in one bowl, and have 18 tickets drawn out at random, the tickets from each school are placed in a separate bowl, and one ticket is drawn from each.

In Honduras, if we want to be sure that citizens from each of the 18 departments are interviewed, we must divide the sample into 18 "bowls." We call these bowls "strata." Thus, in the Honduras survey, we have 18 separate strata, one for each department. If we had not divided the country into separate strata, then it is quite likely that many of those to be interviewed would come from Honduras' most populous departments (Francisco Morazán and Cortés), and that few, if any, interviews would take place in the department of Islas de Bahía, the least populous department. By stratifying the sample, we guarantee a distribution of interviews across all 18 departments.

Returning to the analogy of the raffle, what if we also want to guarantee that there would be one prize per grade within each high school? We would follow the same procedure, and utilize one bowl for each grade within each school, and draw one ticket from each bowl. Of course, we would have to increase the number of total tickets drawn in order to achieve that objective. For example, if each high school had 3 grades (10<sup>th</sup>, 11<sup>th</sup>, and 12<sup>th</sup>), then a total of 54 tickets would need to be drawn, (3 grades x 18 schools).

In Honduras it is important to further subdivide the departments into areas of various degrees of urbanization. Here again, if we placed the names of all the residents from each department into separate bowls, it would be likely that in a number of departments we would draw most of the names from the largest cities, since those cities

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<sup>1</sup>This point is argued forcefully by Sidney Verba, recent past President of the American Political Science Association, in Verba, Sidney, "The Citizen as Respondent: Sample Surveys and American Democracy." *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 1 (March 1996): 1-7.

contain the bulk of the population. To avoid drawing the sample largely from urban areas to the exclusion of rural, we need to stratify each department by its urban/rural character. As a result, we divided the sample within each department into urban and rural electoral precincts (i.e., *centros de votación*). We used the official lists from the Tribunal Nacional de Elecciones for the year 2000 to obtain a list of all of the electoral precincts in each department. We then stratified those precincts into urban and rural and drew a sample of precincts in proportion to the urban/rural distributions within each department. In each Department we selected a total of six precincts, except for Francisco Morazán and Cortés, where we doubled that number to 12. Within each precinct, we interviewed 25 respondents. Our sample for each department has been stratified in this fashion.

Since the sample has been stratified at two levels, that of the department and within each department, we have what is called a “multi-stage stratified sample design.” But now the question comes as to how large a sample and how the sample should be distributed among the strata. It is common practice to distribute the sample in direct proportion to the size of the population in each stratum. But such a procedure does not work well when the strata are of very different population sizes, as is the case in Honduras. That is because the smallest departments would have such a small sample that it would be impossible to talk about them with any degree of confidence unless the overall national sample were very, very large. For example, Islas de Bahía comprises only .51 of one percent of Honduras’ population, and if we had a national sample of 3,000 respondents, only about 15 respondents would likely be drawn from there.

In order to overcome this problem, it was decided to draw a sample of 150 respondents per department, which would mean that 95% of the time, our sample would be no more than  $\pm 8.2\%$  away from the true departmental view for a given

question in the survey. This level of  $\pm 8.2\%$  is calculated using the standard formulas for sampling error. Thus, in the worst case scenario<sup>2</sup> at the level of the department the survey would be a reasonably accurate representation of citizen views, erring by no more than 8.2% more or less (95% of the time) than the results if we could interview all adults residing there. Under more favorable conditions<sup>3</sup> the results could be as accurate as  $\pm 5\%$  at the level of the department. Since two departments of Honduras, Francisco Morazán and Cortés house the two major urban centers of the country it was decided to increase the accuracy of the sample in those departments by interviewing an additional 150 respondents in each of them, for a total of 300 in each. In those two departments, our “confidence interval” for the sample is no more than  $\pm 5.8\%$ , or 2.4% more accurate than for the other departments.

The samples of 150 per department were designed to provide equal confidence intervals for each one. But once we attempt to generalize beyond the level of the department to the nation as a whole, it is vital to adjust the sample size so that it accurately reflects the relative population size of each department. For example, referring again to the Islas de Bahía, and comparing it to Francisco Morazán, it is necessary to decrease the relative weight of the Islas in the national sample and increase the relative weight of Francisco Morazán in order to obtain an overall picture of opinion in Honduras. To do this the sample, once drawn, was assigned post-hoc weights so that each department correctly reflected its contribution to the national population total.

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<sup>2</sup>The worst case emerges when opinion is divided right down the middle, and on a given question, 50% express one view and 50% express another.

<sup>3</sup>For example, if the results produced a 90/10 split on an item.

The sample design for the 18 departments as a whole, with 150 interviews in 16 departments, and 300 interviews in two departments, called for a total sample of 3,000. A sample of this size is accurate at no worse than  $\pm 1.7\%$ . Technically, our sampling error is  $\pm 1.7\%$ . This means that if we drew repeated samples of this size in Honduras, 95% (the “confidence level”) of them would reflect the views of the population with no greater inaccuracy than  $\pm 1.7\%$ . Of course, factors other than sampling error can reduce the accuracy of the results, including non-response, errors in selecting the respondent, misunderstanding of the question, etc. But in terms of the science of survey sampling, a confidence interval of  $\pm 1.7\%$  is very good.

The above estimates of the accuracy of the sample could stand as stated if it were possible to carry out what is known as a “simple random sample” of each stratum in the study. To do this it would mean that the sample would be scattered randomly all over each of the 18 departments. But, to do so would mean interview costs that would be astronomically high because of very high travel expenses. In virtually all survey research travel costs are reduced by drawing what are known as “clustered samples,” that is, we cluster groups of interviews together in a relatively compact area such as a block, or row of houses, and interview several people together. Clustering dramatically cuts cost, especially in a country like Honduras where the density of population in some areas is so low. Yet, clustering normally widens the confidence interval of the sample and thus lowers its precision. It is not possible to know with precision how much clustering increases the confidence interval because it all depends on the degree of commonality on a given characteristic that the residents in a single block or street have. For example, if all of the residents within a given city block earn a very similar salary, then the impact of clustering on salary would be larger than for age, which presumably would vary more and come close to approximating the variation in age within the

country as a whole. Experience suggests that the confidence for a clustered stratified sample design of 3,000 Hondurans would increase to around  $\pm 2.0\%$  from the level of  $\pm 1.7\%$  stated above. For the purposes of this study, a level of  $\pm 2.0\%$  will be assumed. It should also be noted that probability criteria were used at each stage of selection until the household itself was reached. The individual respondent within the household was selected using quota criteria for both gender and age in order to overcome the commonly confronted problem of having the sample incorporate too many females and too many very young or very old people. That household bias results from a higher probability of females, the very young and the very old to be at home more often than other respondents. Quotas at the level of the household is an economically efficient way to overcome this problem.

The survey itself was efficiently and professionally carried out by Borge & Associates who implemented the above described sample design. The pre-tests were conducted in collaboration with Borge & Associates, under the direct supervision of Dr. Orlando Pérez of Central Michigan University. In addition, the firm was responsible for all data entry.

### Sample Weights

As noted above, in order for the sample to accurately reflect the population distribution in Honduras it is necessary to weight the sample. This involves the calculation of sample weights. The calculations are shown in the table below. In the second column of the table the best estimates of departmental populations as of 2000 are provided by the Honduran census bureau. The percent of the population that each department comprises is given in the third column. For example, Atlántida comprises 5.46% of the national population. In the fourth column, the actual sample size for each department is provided. The fraction of the total

national sample that each department comprises is provided in the fifth column. The sixth column gives the desired sample size which is the result of multiplying the fraction of the national population by the total sample of 3,000. The final column shows the weight factor, by which each respondent in the survey will be weighted.

The weighted sample shows the striking impact of the variation in population size among Honduras' 18 departments. In the Islas de la Bahía, with only 0.51% of the population, but with a sample of 150 respondents, or 5% of the sample, it is necessary to weight down the sample so that

these interviews now comprise only 15 out of the 3,000. If this correction were not introduced, Islas de la Bahía would end up being as influential in the national totals as Olancho. On the other hand, when we wish to examine the Islas alone, we have 150 interviews to examine, thus allowing us to speak of those results with a reasonable level of confidence. If we had interviewed only 15 respondents from the Islas, virtually nothing could have been said about the area. It should also be kept in mind that within each department, the sample was drawn proportional to the population distribution, so that large and small population concentrations are each correctly represented.

**Introduction Table 1. Sample Design for 2001 Survey of Honduras**

1. Department	2. 2000 Population (census data)	3. % of Population	4. Survey N	5. Fraction of national pop	6. Desired N: (#5 * 3,000)	7. Weight factor (#6/#4)
Atlántida	338,073	5.46%	150	0.0546	164	1.092
Colón	221,809	3.58%	150	0.0358	107	0.716
Comayagua	356,487	5.75%	150	0.0575	173	1.150
Copán	304,570	4.92%	150	0.0492	148	0.984
Cortés	905,705	14.62%	300	0.1462	439	1.462
Choluteca	403,790	6.52%	150	0.0652	196	1.304
El Paraiso	354,788	5.73%	150	0.0573	172	1.146
Francisco Morazán	1,109,162	17.90%	300	0.1790	537	1.790
Gracias a Dios	52,897	0.85%	150	0.0085	26	0.170
Intibucá	175,317	2.83%	150	0.0283	85	0.566
Islas de la Bahía	31,311	0.51%	150	0.0051	15	0.102
La Paz	152,021	2.45%	150	0.0245	74	0.490
Lempira	246,893	3.99%	150	0.0399	120	0.798
Ocotepeque	103,836	1.68%	150	0.0168	50	0.336
Olancho	421,342	6.80%	150	0.0680	204	1.360
Santa Bárbara	381,807	6.16%	150	0.0616	185	1.232
Valle	163,784	2.64%	150	0.0264	79	0.528
Yoro	471,339	7.61%	150	0.0761	228	1.522
Total	6,194,931	100.00%	3,000	1	3,000	

Source: Projections from 1988 population census of Honduras.

A graphic image of the sample design is obtained from examining the map of Honduras, on which the distribution of the sample is displayed. The following map shows each of the departments

and a dot indicating each group of ten *weighted* interviews. The actual location of the dots is schematic, retaining the confidentiality of the location of the respondents.



**Introduction Figure 1** Distribution of Weighted Sample

Each dot = 10 interviews



## Synopsis of Findings

- ▶ The majority of the respondents said their communities had been affected by Hurricane Mitch. Damages to crops, roads, housing and bridges were reported most frequently.
- ▶ The survey clearly shows that reconstruction assistance was greatest in the communities that suffered the most damage. Moreover, the assistance seems to have been closely targeted to the nature of the damage suffered. For example, among those respondents who stated that they live in communities heavily damaged by Mitch, 73% reported that roads were reconstructed in those areas.
- ▶ Over two-thirds of respondents said they were “completely” or “somewhat” satisfied with reconstruction effort by all parties (GOH, local governments, NGOs, donors) with international aid receiving the highest rating for its contribution.
- ▶ More than 40% of respondents felt that the reconstruction resources had been used for their intended purpose. Another 30% believed that “some” resources had been misused, while only 11% replied that most had been diverted.
- ▶ There is a very high perception of widespread corruption in Honduras and a very low level of tolerance for most forms of corruption. These feelings are ubiquitous in Honduras, cutting across party lines and education levels. We did find, however, that younger females, as well as rural residents, are somewhat more tolerant of corruption than others.
- ▶ Perception of corruption in Honduras is, however, lower than in the other countries in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project series, with the exception of Bolivia. Paraguay had the highest level, not surprisingly; then El Salvador; with Nicaragua and Honduras closely ranked somewhat above Bolivia. Hondurans are, however, much less tolerant of corruption than are Nicaraguans.
- ▶ One in 5 Hondurans (19.7%) was a direct personal victim of corruption in the past year, compared with .7% in Northern Europe, or 28 times higher. This level of corruption victimization is double the reported rate of victimization by violent crime in Honduras, which in many local surveys is considered to be the nation’s most serious problem. If we include the indirect experiences with corruption for an overall index of corruption experience, one-third of all Honduran voting-aged adults were affected by corruption in the year prior to the survey.
- ▶ Of those who were victimized with greatest frequency, 23.5% reported the act, most often to the police. Political party preference was not a significant factor in the reporting of corruption.
- ▶ Of those with the highest frequency of vicarious corruption experience almost 33% reported it.
- ▶ Victims of corruption are more likely to be males, in the age range of mid-20s to mid-30s, better educated, from an urban area, and with a higher level of wealth.

- ▶ Three in five Hondurans believe that bribery facilitates cutting through red tape, i.e., that it has a positive function. Those who believe that corruption does facilitate cutting through red tape are twice (or more) as likely to have been victims of corruption than those who have not. This is certainly a very disturbing finding. It suggests that not only is corruption viewed as functional by a majority of Hondurans, but also that those who are its victims are the very ones significantly more likely to see corruption as serving a functional purpose.
- ▶ Hondurans may see corruption as helping them cut red tape, but they are not happy with its practice. Overwhelmingly, Hondurans see corruption as wrong and believe that the guilty should be punished.
- ▶ When it comes to the perception of honesty/corruption of various groups in Honduran society, customs officials were perceived to be the most corrupt, followed by party leaders. These results were somewhat expected, but it was disturbing to find that municipal council members were also perceived as quite corrupt. Perceived as being less corrupt were business people, business association leaders, store owners, and even less so, NGO leaders and bankers. The least corrupt, according to Honduran perception, were university professors, teachers and least of all, the clergy. These findings have important implications for anti-corruption media campaigns.
- ▶ Corruption victimization, both direct and indirect experiences, is a significant predictor of reduced system support in Honduras and creates political *alienation and indifference*. This suggests that corruption can erode support for stable democracy, a major reason for trying to combat it.
- ▶ Corruption victimization reduces interpersonal trust and support for the Rule of Law as well and reduces confidence in the degree to which politicians respect the laws or represent the interests of their constituents. It also lowers levels of expectation of efficiency from the judiciary branch and raises the expectation of poor treatment by the police. Victims of corruption were more likely to agree that authorities could act outside the bounds of the law in order to capture criminals, a view that would further weaken democracy (by attacking rights of due process).
- ▶ Nearly one half of respondents had knowledge of a *cabildo abierto*, but fewer than one in five had actually participated. One in four had heard of *fiscalización ciudadana* programs. Only one in ten respondents felt that municipal finances are being well managed.


In the pages that follow a more detailed examination of these findings is presented.

## Chapter I. Hurricane Mitch

Hurricane Mitch attacked Central America in the fall of 1998 and had its most severe impact on Honduras, causing some \$3 billion in damage in an economy which that year had a total production of about \$14 billion. Few countries have experienced such massive loss as did Honduras. Shortly after the hurricane ended, national and international relief efforts began. Many feared that unless carefully programmed and controlled, the relief and rebuilding programs could be minimized. The survey being analyzed here examines citizen experiences and perspectives on the hurricane and the relief efforts.

### Impact of Mitch

Not all of Honduras was affected by the Hurricane, but large areas were. We asked our respondents, “How much did Mitch affect your community? Was it affected a lot, somewhat, very little or not at all.” The overall results appear in Figure I.1. As can be seen, just over half of the respondents said that their communities were affected a lot or somewhat.




**Figure I.1** How much did Mitch affect your community?

It is difficult to associate this data on the basis of community-level information with national statistics on the hurricane damage. The data that do exist are at the departmental or municipal level, and there is much missing data.<sup>4</sup> In many cases, individual communities were not damaged by the hurricane, but the municipal or departmental totals suggest heavy damage. Nonetheless, we entered into our data base the official data from the “Comisión Nacional de Emergencia,” at both the departmental and municipal level for the variables of deaths, wounded, disappeared, damaged and evacuated. We then assigned those values to each respondent. When we correlated the response to the above-analyzed question on perceived damage to community with the various official measures of damage, we found a statistically significant association between the perceived measure and the official report of damage to property ( $r = .25$ ; sig.  $< .001$ ). There was an even stronger association between the perception and the number of evacuees per municipality ( $r = .35$ ; sig.  $< .001$ ), a relationship that was also significant at the per capita level.

There is considerable variation in the perceived degree of severity of the hurricane (see questionnaire, Appendix A, question MITCH1). But, to grasp this variation, the reader needs to become aware that in statistics, there always exists an upper and lower range of responses for any result since we interview only a sample of the population and not the entire population. For example, if we interview a random sample of 300 adults in Tegucigalpa and ask them how many smoke, and the average comes out to 40%, we cannot say for certain that if we had interviewed all adults in Tegucigalpa that the average would be exactly 40%.


<sup>4</sup>For example, Comayagua is missing most data.

In fact, we would say, based on our sample, that the average would be no lower than about 34% nor any higher than 46%, and we would be correct in this estimate 95% of the time. The precision of our estimate depends upon the sample size; the larger the sample, the more precise our estimate. As noted in the introduction of this report, the sample size varied by department in the weighted sample. In order to eliminate the impact of this difference in sample sizes, which has a strong impact on what is known as the “confidence interval,” we unweight the sample here. Figure I.2 shows the results, reflecting the confidence intervals of the *unweighted* sample (in order to use the true number of cases per department). What stands out is a cluster of departments in which the severity of the hurricane was, on average, perceived as being worse than in other areas: Colón, Choluteca, El Paraíso, Gracias a Dios, Olancho, Santa Bárbara, Valle and Yoro.




**Figure I.2** Perceived impact of Mitch: Confidence intervals by Department

We also asked a series of specific questions as to the nature of the damage caused. Figure I.3 summarizes that information. As can be seen, crops, roads, and houses were the most likely to be damaged, but even among the least damaged properties, schools, over one-quarter of respondents reported damage in this area.




**Figure I.3** Respondent reports of community damage from Mitch

We also asked our respondents if reconstruction public works or projects had been undertaken in their communities. Figure I.4 shows the results for each of the measures. As can be seen, road reconstruction was by far the most common project, followed by bridges, water systems and houses.



**Figure I.4** Respondent reports of reconstruction projects




**Figure I.5** Response to Hurricane Mitch by degree of perceived damage to community: roads

### Responsiveness of the System to Hurricane Damage

We now know the basic parameters of the damage caused by Mitch and the nature of the efforts to respond to that damage. The research question to be answered here is the linkage between the two. That is, we would hope that reconstruction efforts were greatest where the damage was greatest. If not, this would suggest a diversion of reconstruction funds to those who needed them the least. There is clear evidence in the survey data that this did not happen and that the greatest efforts were expended in the areas of greatest damage.

Consider the results shown in Figure I.5. These results show the relationship between damage to roads (the area of most widely reported damage) and efforts at reconstruction. We see that among those respondents who state that they live in communities heavily damaged by Mitch, 73% reported that roads were reconstructed there.

The same pattern is found with bridge damage and bridge reconstruction, as shown in Figure I.6. We again see that those respondents who reported the greatest damage were the same ones most likely to report reconstruction efforts to rebuild bridges.



**Figure I.6** Response to Hurricane Mitch by degree of perceived damage to community: bridges

There is no need to repeat these graphs for the other areas of damage and reconstruction; there is a significant and positive association for all of them, showing that severity of damage and reconstruction were closely linked.

### Satisfaction with Reconstruction

The damage caused by Mitch was so great and so widespread that it is recognized that much needs to be done. We asked our respondents how satisfied they were with the reconstruction efforts (MITCH6). Figure I.7 shows the overall results. As can be seen, over two-thirds (67.8%) of respondents stated that the reconstruction effort was completely or somewhat satisfactory.




Figure I.7 Satisfaction with reconstruction efforts

It is important to hasten to add that this generally positive view of the reconstruction efforts refers to the entire range of efforts, those run by the government (national and local) and those run by NGOs and international groups. We asked our respondents who they felt had contributed more to the effort, and the results appear in Figure I.8 (MITCH7).





Figure I.8 Who has contributed the most to the reconstruction efforts?

In sum, most Hondurans appear to be satisfied with the reconstruction effort. The survey data verifies, in addition, that most reconstruction projects were implemented in those regions of the country with the greatest need.

## Chapter II. The Prevalence of Corruption in Honduras

### Perception of the Magnitude of the Corruption Problem

There is a perception of widespread public corruption in Honduras. We asked our respondents (EXC7), “Taking into account your experience, or what you have heard, the payment of bribes to public officials is: very common, common, uncommon or not at all common?” The results are shown in figure II.1. Of the total sample, 62.7% said it was very common or common.



**Figure II.1** How common is payment of bribes to public officials?

We can eliminate the “don’t know” responses from the total, and reexamine the distribution of responses. This is shown in Figure II.2. There we see that 73.7% of the respondents who were willing to give us their opinion on this matter said that bribery was very common or common.


### Magnitude of Individual Corrupt Acts

While the results of this question appear to indicate a perception of widespread corruption, it is best to put them in comparative perspective. When this is done (Figure II.3), Honduras ranks fourth in a comparative series that includes results from similar surveys in other countries (i.e., Paraguay, 1998, Bolivia, 1998, Nicaragua, 1998, El Salvador, 1999, and Honduras, 2001). This analysis is performed by excluding the don’t know responses from each country.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Missing data (i.e., non-response) varies somewhat among the countries, but only Bolivia has significantly lower missing data than the others: Bolivia, 6%; Paraguay, 9%; El Salvador 11%; Honduras 15%; Nicaragua 17%.

### How common is payment of bribes to public officials?



**Figure II.3** How common is payment of bribes to public officials? Honduras in comparative perspective

In Honduras the *perceived level* of corruption is lower than in any of the other countries in the series except Bolivia (even though Bolivia has a high actual level of corruption). A more detailed examination of the differences among the five countries appears in Table II.1. To enable the statistical package to calculate a meaningful average score, the responses were recoded, so that they range from a low of zero (“not at all common”) to 100 (“very common”). These results show that Bolivia stands by itself as the country with the lowest perception of corruption. Honduras and Nicaragua come together as a group, significantly higher than Bolivia, but insignificantly different from each other. Nicaragua overlaps with El Salvador, and Paraguay stands alone on the high end.

or vicarious experience with corruption. Some of these same items have also been measured in other countries, and the comparative results are presented following the results for Honduras alone.

We first asked each of our respondents if s/he had been stopped by a police official for a violation that s/he had not committed (EXC1). The overall results appear in Figure II.4. Fewer than one in ten respondents has had this experience.

Table II.1. Post-hoc (Duncan) comparisons of perception of corruption in five countries

Country	Sample N	Mean Score of Perception of Corruption by Similar Groupings			
		1	2	3	4
Bolivia 1998	2428	63.9			
Honduras 2001	2414		68.8		
Nicaragua 1998	2107		69.4	69.4	
El Salvador 1999	2505			71.1	
Paraguay 1998	1327				77.1
Sig.		1.0	.55	.06	1.0

Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.

Perception of corruption and personal experience with corruption are two different things, and while most Hondurans (and for that matter most Latin Americans in our comparative data base) perceive that bribery of public officials is very common, personal experience with corruption is far less common in each of these countries. The survey contains a series of 13 items that measure personal






Figure II.4: In the last 12 months, have you been stopped by a policeman for a violation you did not commit?

The next question followed up on the first one in the corruption series by asking the respondents who had been improperly stopped by a police officer if the police officer had asked for a bribe (EXC2). Figure II.5 shows the results. Most respondents had not been improperly stopped by a police officer, but of those who had, more than twice as many were asked for a bribe as were not.




**Figure II.5:** Police officer asked for a bribe

We then followed up this question with another, which asked if the respondent had actually paid the bribe that was asked for (EXC3). Figure II.6 shows the results. Once again, while most respondents were not requested to pay a bribe, more than twice as many who faced this request submitted to it.




**Figure II.6:** Did you pay the bribe requested by the police officer?

The survey also concerned itself with vicarious experience with corruption, which, admittedly, is a less reliable measure of corruption than direct, personal experience. For that reason, when an overall index of corruption is constructed in this study, only direct personal experiences are utilized. Nonetheless, it is of use to report on these vicarious experiences. Figure II.7 shows the results of a question (EXC4) where respondents were asked if they saw someone paying a bribe to the police in the last two years. Nearly one-fifth of respondents said that they had seen at least one case of such bribery.




**Figure II.7:** Did you see anyone paying a bribe to the police in the last two years?

The next item (EXC5) is similar, in that it also does not focus on direct personal experience with corruption, but is a broader item, dealing with corruption not of the police but of public officials (in general). The item read: "Do you know of someone who has paid a bribe to a public official?" The results are shown in Figure II.8. It is interesting to see that the percentage is *lower* than it was in the previous item, the one that dealt with the police, suggesting that the problem of bribery among police officers is more serious in Honduras than it is among other public officials.




**Figure II.8:** Do you know of someone who has paid a bribe to a public official?

The next item in the series (EXC12) examines bribery in the banking system. Here the focus is on direct personal experience rather than vicarious knowledge. We asked: “In order to process a loan or other transaction in a bank in the last 12 months, have you been asked to pay some money above the proper amount?” The results are shown in Figure II.9. Few Hondurans carry out bank transactions, and among the poor majority, contact with banks is very limited. For that reason, it is not surprising that the results shown in this figure are so low.




**Figure 11.9:** To process a loan or other transaction in a bank have you had to pay money above the proper amount?

The next item (EXC13) asks about bribery at work: “In your work, have you been asked to make an improper payment in the last 12 months?” Figure II.10 shows the results. These results indicate very little corruption in the workplace. One needs to temper these findings by noting that 39% of the respondents were home makers or students, and thus did not have direct contact with the workplace, and an additional 2% were retired. Nonetheless, even when these non-working respondents are excluded from the sample, only 3.7% of the working respondents have had to deal with corruption in the workplace.




**Figure II.10:** At work, have you been asked to make an improper payment in the last 12 months?

The survey asked about corruption in the court system. The item (EXC14A) read “Have you been asked to pay a bribe in the courts in the last 12 months?” The results are shown in Figure II.11. Direct contact with the court system is not common, as prior University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project surveys in Central America have found. As shown in the figure, only a very small percentage of Hondurans has had direct personal experiences with bribery in the court system.



**Figure II.11:** Have you been asked to pay a bribe in the courts in the last 12 months?

We followed up this question with one on vicarious knowledge of bribery in the court system. We asked (EXC14), “Do you know someone who has paid a bribe in the courts?” This item was not limited by time (i.e., no mention was made of the last 12 months). The results are shown in Figure II.12. Here the response is much higher, three times the personal experience with corruption in the courts, but still involving far less than 10 percent of the population.




**Figure II.12** Do you know somebody who has paid a bribe in the courts?

Corruption at the local level is also a concern of this study. As can be seen in Figure II.13, bribe demands in local government are relatively uncommon. We asked (EXC15) “Has a municipal employee asked you for a bribe in the last 12 months?”



**Figure II.13** Has municipal employee asked you for a bribe in the last 12 months?


The final item in this series asks about the Honduran system of community banks. We asked (EXC16), “Have you been asked for a bribe in a communal bank?” Figure II.14 shows the results. Only a very small proportion of respondents have had this experience.



**Figure II.14:** Have you been asked for a bribe in a community bank?

### Comparative Level of Corruption Victimization

The following graph (Figure II.15) compares individual experience with corruption in Honduras with identical questions asked in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia. Not all of the questions were asked in each of the countries, and because there were too few questions asked in Paraguay to make the chart meaningful, the results for that country are not included here. The overall pattern is clear. El Salvador consistently has the lowest level of corruption, while the level in Honduras is consistently somewhat above that of El Salvador, but below those of the other countries in the series. Only on the measure of paying a bribe at work is El Salvador higher than Honduras.



**Figure II.15** Corruption experience in comparative perspective


## Overall Scales of Corruption Experience

The above analysis has examined individual acts of corruption. From this point on in the analysis, we want to examine overall patterns, predictors and consequences of corruption. To do that, it would be unwieldy to work with the overall set of items, especially if they are found to form a reliable index of the overall pattern of corruption. In doing so, however, it would be important to isolate direct, personal experience with corruption from the vicarious experiences examined above because we can clearly link only the direct personal experiences to the individual attributes of our respondents. On the other hand, when people have observed corrupt acts, it can influence their thinking and behavior, even if they have not been personal victims of corruption. So, we need two measures of corruption, one measuring direct, personal experience and another measuring knowledge and/or observation of corrupt practices. The series of items that relates to direct, personal experience (which we call EXCTOT) are EXC1 (stopped by police), EXC2 (police solicited bribe),<sup>6</sup> EXC6 (public employee solicits a bribe), EXC12 (bank payoff), EXC13 (work payoff), EXC14a (court bribe), EXC14 (municipal employee bribe), EXC16 (communal bank bribe).<sup>7</sup> In examining the scale results, which contained 15 distinct levels, it was found that most of the responses cluster around five levels in the scale, and thus the overall scale was recoded into these five levels, from a low of 0 (no personal experience with corruption) to a high of 4 (frequent experience with corruption).

<sup>6</sup>Note that question EXC3 is not included since it deals with the payment of the bribe demanded in EXC2) and therefore would involve some double counting if included.


<sup>7</sup>The overall standardized Alpha reliability coefficient of these eight items is .63, indicating a modestly reliable scale.

The distribution of respondents on this overall scale of corruption experience is shown in Figure II.16. This shows that one in five respondents had a direct personal experience with corruption in the last year. Most respondents who were victims (about 16% of all respondents) were victims of only one corrupt act, but 4% were victims more than once.




**Figure II.16** Total direct personal experience with corruption in last year

The measure of observed or vicarious corruption experience (labeled VEXCTOT) includes items EXC4 (seeing a bribe being paid), EXC5 (knowing of someone who has paid a bribe to a public employee), EXC14 (knowing someone who has paid a bribe in the courts). The results are shown in Figure II.17. As can be seen, over 25% of the sample had at least one indirect experience in the year prior to the survey.



**Figure II.17** Indirect experiences with corruption in last year




**Figure II.18** Total of direct and indirect experiences with corruption in last year

We can summarize the overall corruption experience, both direct and indirect, for Hondurans by combining the two indexes just displayed. Figure II.18 shows that fully one-third of all Hondurans have been brushed by corruption in the last year. Our survey does not attempt to measure these experiences over a longer time period, but we can safely assume that over a longer period, those affected by corruption would increase in number.

### Reporting of Corrupt Acts

It is difficult to make progress on reducing corruption if citizens do not report such acts to the authorities. Of course, if citizens do not trust the authorities, they are not likely to report corruption, creating a vicious circle. We asked respondents if they had ever reported a corrupt act (WB43). The results are shown in Figure II.19. Fewer than 7% of the sample has reported corrupt acts.



**Figure II.19:** Have you reported a corrupt act?

The above results need to be qualified by looking at those who have experienced corruption (personally or vicariously), since those who have not experienced it, could not be expected to report it. Table II.2 shows the results. As can be seen, among those who had not been victimized, only 4.4% reported corrupt acts, whereas among those who had been victimized with greatest frequency (scoring 100 on the corruption scale, as indicated below), 23.5% reported it.

**Table II.2. Reporting Corruption as a Function of Corruption Victimization**  
Frequency of Corruption Victimization Scale


		Corruption Scale (0-100 range)					
		Not victimized	25	50	75	100	Total
Reported	Count	103	67	22	9	4	205
	%	<b>4.4%</b>	14.5%	30.6%	37.5%	<b>23.5%</b>	7.0%
Did not report	Count	2,261	394	50	15	13	2,733
	%	95.6%	85.5%	69.4%	62.5%	76.5%	93.0%
	Count	2,364	461	72	24	17	2,938
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table II.3, focusing on vicarious corruption experiences, shows a similar pattern. Among those with the highest frequency of hearing about or observing corrupt acts (see the column labeled “100”), nearly one-third reported it, whereas among those with the lowest frequency (see the column labeled “not at all”), only 3.6% reported it.

**Table II.3 Reporting Corruption as a Function of Vicarious Experience with It**  
Frequency of Hearing/Observing Corruption


		Frequency of Corruption Scale (0-100)					
		Not at all	33	50	67	100	Total
Reported	Count	78	47	1	45	28	199
	%	<b>3.6%</b>	11.1%	2.8%	21.0%	<b>32.6%</b>	6.8%
Did not report	Count	2,097	376	35	169	58	2,735
	%	96.4%	88.9%	97.2%	79.0%	67.4%	93.2%
	Count	2,175	423	36	214	86	2,934
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The survey also asked those who reported corrupt acts, to which institution they had done so. Figure II.20 shows the results. Overwhelmingly, among those who reported corruption, they did so to the police. A distant second was the press and then the courts. It is interesting to note that according to our survey, the police are also the ones responsible for considerable corruption. This may explain why more citizens do not report corrupt acts.



**Figure II.20:** Where was the report of corruption made?

We also asked a question directly linked to the issue of corruption during the reconstruction process. We asked (MITCH8): “Do you think that in general the funds for the reconstruction after Mitch were used to help the affected people, or was some of it diverted, or was the majority of it diverted?” The results are shown in Figure II.21. As can be seen, only slightly more than one-in-ten respondents believe that most of the money has been diverted for other purposes.




**Figure II.21** How were Mitch funds spent?

There was a follow-up to this question. We asked (MITCH9): “If the funds were diverted, by whom?” This was an open-ended question; no list was read to respondents. The results are shown in Table II.4. It is important to observe that 58.9% of the respondents said that the funds had not been diverted, and an additional 12.9% said that they did not know. Of those who did respond to this item (penultimate column), 41.8 said that it was “the government,” while 31.7% said it was “the mayors.” There also was an assortment of other responses, which are shown in the table.

Table II.4. Were the reconstruction funds diverted?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
The government	353	11.8	41.8	41.8
Mayors	268	8.9	31.7	73.5
Ministers	72	2.4	8.6	82.1
Private sector	42	1.4	5.0	87
The President	40	1.3	4.7	91.8
The military	21	.7	2.4	94.2
NGOs	13	.4	1.5	95.8
Politicians	12	.4	1.5	97.2
President of the patronato	11	.4	1.3	98.5
Other	12	.4	1.5	99.4
Total	844	28.1	100	
Inap (funds not diverted)	1768	58.9		
Don't know	388	12.9		
Total	2156	71.9		
	3000	100.0		

The last question in the “Mitch” series asked for an overall evaluation of the honesty of the government in spending both national and international funds on reconstruction (MITCH10). The results are shown in Figure II.22. As can be seen, opinions are divided, but only 24% responded with the two most negative options on this question.



**Figure II.22** How honestly did government act in spending reconstruction funds?



## Chapter III. Who Are the Victims of Corruption?

### Impact of Partisanship

What factors explain why some Hondurans are victims of corruption while others are not? In this chapter key demographic, socio-economic and contextual factors will be examined to see which ones, if any, help determine patterns of corruption victimization.

It is first necessary to address one key issue that could have potentially distorted the results of the levels of corruption victimization found in the prior chapter. Honduras, like many countries in Latin America, is intensely politicized, but in addition, party loyalties in Honduras are very deep and firm, dating back over a century. It may be that those who voted for or supported the candidate who lost the last election would be more likely to report acts of corruption, whereas those who support the incumbent party would be more likely to under report those same acts. In order to test this hypothesis, Table III.1 below presents the average corruption experience (personal, vicarious and an index of the two combined) for respondents who identified themselves with the party that won the last presidential election (Partido Liberal) and those who voted for the party that lost (Partido Nacional). As can be seen, there are no significant differences among these two groups for any of the three corruption victimization measures. This means that the reporting of corruption in the survey was not significantly influenced by partisan considerations.

Table III.1. Impact of Party Identification and Reports of Corruption

Vote in last presidential election		Saw/heard corrupt acts	Total corruption index
Partido Liberal (winner)	Mean	13.38	9.72
	N	1,050	1,041
Partido Nacional (loser)	Mean	13.14	10.07
	N	746	740
Total	Mean	13.28	9.86
	N	1,795	1,781

Differences not significant. Note: In this table those who refused to state the party for whom they voted (40.2% of the sample) or those who voted for minor parties (1% of the sample) were excluded from the analysis.

### Overall Predictors of Corruption Victimization

Many factors may be responsible for why it is that some Hondurans experience corruption while others do not. This analysis examines three sets of factors: 1) demographic; 2) socio-economic; and 3) ecological. In order to determine which, if any, of these factors helps to explain differences in victimization, it is necessary to carry out a multivariate analysis. This may sound complex, but in reality, all the method is doing is to examine the entire list of factors and determine which ones, after controlling for all of the others, have a statistically significant impact on corruption victimization.<sup>8</sup> The

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<sup>8</sup>The data set was examined for significant relationships by using a linear, continuous multivariate model (OLS Regression) since the index of corruption (the dependent variable) that ranges from 0-100 has an appropriate distribution.

results are shown in Table III.2, and the reader should focus on the last column, the one labeled “Sig.” This column tells us if the variable is a significant predictor of corruption victimization or not. Whenever this number is .05 or smaller, the result is significant. These results show that sex, age, education, income, wealth (defined as a composite index based on ownership of household artifacts, R1 to 12), and degree of urbanization are all significant predictors of corruption victimization (when holding constant for each of the other factors). More specifically, in the overall index of corruption victimization, which includes both personal and heard/observed corruption, the national average is 9.8 on the 0-100 scale constructed for this index. In the paragraphs below, each of these relationships is shown graphically.

Table III.2. Predictors of Corruption Victimization (Personal and Vicarious) in Honduras

	Unstandardized Coefficients	BStd. Error	Standardized Coefficients	Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	7.028	1.748			4.021	.000
Sex	-4.280	.646	-.122		-6.626	.000
Age	-.075	.023	-.063		-3.256	.001
Education	.655	.106	.139		6.149	.000
Income	.560	.175	.071		3.211	.001
Wealth	3.290	1.209	.053		2.722	.007
% of municipal population in urban areas	12.218	2.093	.140		5.839	.000

Adj. R<sup>2</sup>= .12, Sig. < .001 (indicating that the entire equation is statistically significant)

Females are significantly less likely to be victims of corruption than males in Honduras, a pattern that is found elsewhere as well. This finding likely emerges because it is males, especially in Latin America, who are involved in official transactions more than females. The results are shown in Figure III.1.






Figure III.1: Corruption victimization and gender

Age is also significantly related to corruption victimization. The regression equation given above shows a negative relationship between age and corruption victimization. In fact, as Figure III.2 shows, the pattern is more complex, following an inverted-U shape. That is, corruption is relatively low among the youngest respondents in the survey, increases through the middle years, and then declines. This identical pattern is found in all three indexes of corruption used in this study. It suggests that younger and older Hondurans have less contact with public officials, and as a result, end up being victimized less often.




**Figure III.2:** Corruption victimization and age




**Figure III.3:** Corruption victimization and education

Education has a very clear linear relationship to corruption; more education translates into higher probability of being a corruption victim. Of course, more highly educated people are normally higher income earners, but since income is controlled for in the regression results, this finding is significant even when income is controlled for. Figure III.3 shows the results for all three measures of corruption. For example, fewer than 10% of those with three or fewer years of education have heard or seen corrupt practices, whereas nearly 30% of those with college education have done so. This suggests that the more educated might be more sensitive to acts of corruption and report in our survey experiences that the less educated might overlook.

Income also has a clear, linear relationship to corruption victimization, as is shown in Figure III.4. Those whose total family income is at or below 1000 Lempiras per month have an index score of 10% or lower, while those at the top of the income ladder experience corruption levels three times as high. The pattern found for income is the same as the one found for wealth, so there is no need to present the graphical display of the wealth relationship here.




**Figure III.4:** Corruption victimization and monthly household income



**Figure III.5** Corruption victimization and urbanization


Urbanization has an impact on corruption victimization; the more urban the municipality in which the respondent lives, the greater the level of victimization. This finding is not surprising, since government agencies are concentrated in more urban settings. In the regression analysis the predictor variable used was percent of the population in urban areas, but it is easier to illustrate this relationship with a nominal variable, distinguishing among the major residential areas of Honduras. The results show that the greatest level of corruption victimization occurs in Tegucigalpa, and declines as the region becomes more rural. Tegucigalpa, of course, is the national capital and the place with the greatest concentration of government institutions, so it is not surprising that corruption is greatest there.

Since the sample design allows for comparisons at the level of the department, it is possible to examine inter-departmental variation in corruption. Figure III.6 shows these results for the *unweighted* sample since it is important to show the confidence intervals for each department. That is, we want to examine if the differences found by department are significant, and since significant depends upon sample size, for this analysis we want to allow each sample to be of approximately equal size. Since the number of respondents varied according to non-response rates, and since more respondents were interviewed in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, even the unweighted sample has differences in sample size by department, but the actual sample size is shown above each department name in the figure. Three departments stand out: Francisco Morazán--home to Tegucigalpa--and the Islas de la Bahía, which have unusually high levels of corruption, and Colón, with an unusually low level.



**Figure III.6** Index of total corruption victimization: Confidence intervals by Department

Since it has already been shown that a number of factors such as urbanization explain variation in corruption victimization, we want to know if these differences found in departmental variation in corruption levels remain after controlling for them. Figure III.7 shows the results, controlling for each of the variables found to be significantly related to corruption victimization in Honduras. Few differences emerge, and Colón is still quite low, with Francisco Morazán and the Islas de la Bahía still being high.



**Figure III.7** Total index of corruption by Department: Controlled for gender, age, income, wealth and urbanization

### Conclusions


In Honduras, corruption victims are more likely to be male than female, younger (especially in their mid-twenties to mid-thirties), highly educated, richer and more urbanized than those who are not victims of corruption. Programs that seek to stem the tide of corruption need to be aware of these clear demographic and socio-economic patterns.



## Chapter IV. Tolerance for Corruption


One of the most frequently heard arguments regarding corruption in Latin America is that people are getting what they deserve. That is, according to this view, corruption is high in Latin America because people are both tolerant of it and also see it as functional, even beneficial. How much truth is there to this statement in the case of Honduras? Do Hondurans regard corruption as beneficial and, therefore, are not merely victims of it but willing participants in it? We can answer this question in two ways. First, we analyze a question in the survey that deals directly with the potentially positive effects of corruption and, second, we examine a large series of items in which Hondurans were able to define the degree to which various practices are considered by them to be corrupt or corrupt but justifiable actions, or not corrupt.

The first question to be analyzed is one in which we asked our respondents if they believed that bribes facilitate getting around red tape (EXC8). Figure IV.1 shows the result, comparing the national sample of Honduras carried out in 2001 with a national sample of Nicaragua asking the same question, carried out in 1998. Two findings emerge. First, three out of five respondents in both countries believe that bribery does facilitate cutting through red tape. This is certainly a disturbing finding, if one that was not unexpected. It suggests that most respondents see a functional side to corruption. We will have more to say about this finding below. Second, there are no significant differences between the two countries.



**Figure IV.1** Do bribes facilitate cutting red tape?

While most Hondurans see bribery as performing a positive function, by facilitating transactions, what of those who have been victimized by corruption? What is their view of the functionality of corruption? The answer is given in Figure IV.2. Among those who believe that corruption does facilitate cutting through red tape, they are twice (or more) as likely to have been victims of corruption than those who have not. This is certainly a very disturbing finding. It suggests that not only is corruption viewed as functional by a majority of Hondurans, it also suggests that those who are its victims are the very ones significantly more likely to see corruption as functional. It does not mean, however, that they approve of corruption or that, even though they recognize its functionality, that they are happy participants in the system. The evidence for this assertion is presented below and in subsequent chapters.



**Figure IV.2**  
Corruption victimization and belief that bribes cut red tape

### Tolerance for Specific Acts of Corruption

The questionnaire contained a series of eleven questions attempting to measure the extent to which the respondents were tolerant or intolerant of various corrupt acts. This series gives us the opportunity to determine what Hondurans define as corruption and what they are willing to accept. It

also gives us the opportunity to see if Hondurans are more or less tolerant of such acts than are Nicaraguans.

The series presents each respondent with a set of corrupt practices that range in nature from high level corruption of elected representatives down to petty corruption involving school children giving gifts to their teachers in hopes of getting a better grade (see questionnaire series DC1-DC13). For each form of corruption, the respondents were asked to state if he/she considered the act to be corrupt and worthy of punishment, corrupt but justifiable, or not corrupt. Figure IV.3 shows the overall results for Honduras alone. It is clear from this set of results that tolerance for most forms of corruption is quite low. For example, 98% of Hondurans believe that a deputy accepting a bribe is corrupt and should be punished and 91% believe that private use of a public car is corrupt and should be punished. More leniency is shown to students and teachers exchanging gifts that might influence grades, but even here, about three out of four Hondurans believe these are corrupt, punishable acts. Where Hondurans are most tolerant of bribery is in the situation of a mother with many children who pays a bribe to speed up a transaction in the municipality, or when a mayor loans a public tractor for a communal project, but does so without the permission of his/her council.





Figure IV.3 Tolerance for various forms of corruption

How tolerant of corruption are Hondurans versus Nicaraguans? Figure IV.4 shows the comparisons. In this figure, the three possible responses to the questions were coded as 1,2,3, with a 1 being assigned to those who were the toughest on corruption (i.e., stating that the act is corrupt and ought to be punished), to those who recognized the act as corrupt but thought it justifiable, to those who found the act not to be corrupt. Using this coding scheme, the *higher* the score, the more tolerant of corruption.

effort to influence the teacher and that may explain why the Nicaraguan results differ on this item and the one that followed (the teacher accepting the gift). For all other corrupt practices described, however, Hondurans are systematically and significantly less willing to tolerate corrupt acts. In the case of high-level corruption, relating to a legislator accepting a bribe, overwhelmingly Hondurans and Nicaraguans are intolerant of this type of act, and therefore the differences are smaller between the two countries. But in other forms of corruption, where the respondents of both countries exhibited greater levels of tolerance for corruption, the gap between the two countries widened considerably.

These differences between the two countries are quite striking. Consider the question on a legislative deputy taking a \$10,000 bribe. In Honduras, 95% of respondents (including all respondents, as well as those who gave an opinion)<sup>9</sup> said that this was a corrupt act that should be punished, whereas in Nicaragua, 84% of the respondents reacted in this way. When it came to other acts, the gap was considerably wider. For example, 90% of Hondurans believe that the use of a state car for private purposes is corrupt and deserving of punishment, whereas only 66% of Nicaraguans felt this way. Even a relatively well tolerated act, such as a mother with several children paying a small bribe to get a birth certificate, was viewed as corrupt and punishable by 41% of Hondurans versus 26% of Nicaraguans.



**Figure IV.4:** Tolerance for various corrupt acts: Honduras vs. Nicaragua

The results shown in the figure make it clear that Hondurans are significantly *less* tolerant of most forms of corruption than are Nicaraguans. Only with respect to tolerating petty bribery of a school teacher to obtain better grades do Hondurans seem to be more tolerant of corruption than are Nicaraguans. There was, however, a seemingly minor change in the wording of the questionnaire on this item that might explain the difference. In Nicaragua the gift given by the student to his/her teacher was a marking pen or a blouse, whereas in Honduras, the marking pen was not included. It may be that a marking pen indicates a more serious

<sup>9</sup>In the figure above, non-response was excluded, and that is why the percentages given here differ.

## Factors that Explain Tolerance for Corruption

As shown above, many Hondurans are intolerant of corruption. Yet, there was wide variation in the sample, with some respondents being tolerant and others not being tolerant. What differentiates Hondurans on this dimension? We look first at the impact of corruption on tolerance for it. To do this, we create an overall scale of tolerance for corruption by summing up and taking the average of the 11 items analyzed above.<sup>10</sup> When we examine this overall scale with direct personal experience with corruption or with vicarious corruption experience, there is no significant impact. This means that corruption victimization does not make Hondurans more or less tolerant of corrupt practices.

Looking at the personal characteristics of Hondurans, we find that gender (females more tolerant), age (young more tolerant), income (higher income respondents more tolerant) and urbanization (more urban are less tolerant) have an impact on tolerance of corruption, whereas other factors such as party identification and education do not. These results are shown in the regression analysis in Table IV.1. The reader is reminded that the significant factors are those with values of .05 or lower in the column labeled “Sig.”

Table IV.1. Predictors of Tolerance for Corruption in Honduras

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta	Std. Error		
(Constant)	1.305	.045			29.21	.000
Sex	.038	.015	.056		2.61	.009
Age	-.001	.001	-.060		-2.70	.007
Income	.011	.004	.067		2.87	.004
% urban	-.076	.027	-.062		-2.86	.004
Education	0.001	.002	.011		0.44	.660
Party ID	.025	.015	.037		1.74	.082

Adj. R<sup>2</sup> = .01; Sig. < .001

## Perception of Honesty/Corruption of Various Groups

Most Hondurans are not tolerant of corrupt practices, as has been demonstrated. How corrupt or honest do they believe are various key groups in Honduran society? We asked a series of questions (PC1 to PC16), mentioning various categories of individuals and asking the respondents to rate them on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being the most corrupt and 10 being the most honest. The overall results are shown in Figure IV.5. This figure shows confidence intervals for each question. These confidence intervals show the spread of the average within which no significant difference from one question to the other occurs. These can be thought of as a “band of confidence.” The variation is clear. At the bottom of the scale, those perceived as most corrupt are customs employees, who average 3.4 on the 1-10 scale. Significantly, but only slightly above those individuals are party leaders, who scored 3.69, followed by a cluster of groups who are insignificantly different from one another: municipal council persons, deputies, the police,


<sup>10</sup>When there were valid responses on at least six of the eleven items, the average of the valid data was used. More than six missing responses made the entire case missing. The entire scale ranges from a low of 1 (corrupt and should be punished) to a high of 3 (not corrupt).

cabinet ministers and mayors. The next group up consists of judges and the military, followed by business people, business association leaders and store owners. The next cluster consists of NGO leaders and banks, both scoring above 5 on the 1-10 scale. Finally, those most trusted are university professors, teachers and, at the very top, the clergy, with an average score of 7.13.

average score of 5.15, they are far below teachers (6.39) and the clergy (7.13). This means that while NGOs might carry out an anti-corruption campaign, their messages would be most effective if delivered by professors, teachers or the clergy.


We can compare these results to those obtained in Nicaragua. Figure IV.6 shows the results. It is interesting to note how close the perceptions are in the two countries. Only minor differences emerge, with Hondurans expressing a sense of greater honesty in five of the categories, while Nicaraguans expressed a higher level in seven, with the remaining being approximate ties.

The importance of these findings is that they suggest that there is a common pattern that may be generalizable beyond these two countries and that could help in the formulation of anti-corruption campaigns elsewhere in Central America and Latin America as a whole.



**Figure IV.5** Perception of honesty/corruption: Confidence intervals by sample

These results are important for a variety of reasons. First, they suggest that most groups in Honduran society are viewed as more corrupt than honest; of the 17 groups listed, all but five scored in the dishonest end of the 1-10 continuum. Second, it is clear that if one wants to communicate an effective anti-corruption message, one should think about having the message delivered by those perceived to be the most honest: university professors, teachers and the clergy. While NGO leaders are at the upper end of the scale, with an



**Figure IV.6** Perception of honesty/corruption: Honduras vs. Nicaragua

## Chapter V. The Impact of Corruption on System Support

In many ways, the most important long-term reason to study corruption is the possible impact that it may have on democratic stability. There has been much speculation as to the effect of corruption on democratic countries. The thesis is that countries with high levels of corruption cannot expect to hold on to the loyalty of their citizens over the long run. Such countries are likely to be faced with political instability that could ultimately lead to their overthrow. Until recently, however, that speculation was not supported by empirical findings. As part of the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project, studies have been carried out in a number of Latin American countries in which it has been shown empirically that citizens who have been victims of corruption are less supportive of their political systems than those who have not. That research began with a study of Nicaragua, the results of which have been published in two reports and a recent article in an academic journal that focuses on issues of public integrity and transparency.<sup>11</sup> Since then, these findings have been replicated with data from Bolivia, Paraguay and El Salvador, suggesting that the Nicaragua findings are not idiosyncratic but form part of a larger pattern. In Appendix B the detailed review of the literature on this subject is presented. In this chapter we look directly at the Honduras results.

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<sup>11</sup>Seligson, Mitchell A. 1997. *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Study of Public Opinion*. A Report to USAID, Nicaragua. Washington, D. C.: Casals and Associates; Mitchell A. Seligson, *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Follow-Up Study* (Washington, D. C.: Casals and Associates, 1999); Mitchell A. Seligson, "Corruption and Democratization: What is to Be Done?" *Public Integrity* 3, no. 3 (2001).

### Correcting for Limitations of Prior Work

Does corruption matter in politics? As shown in Appendix B, views on this subject differ widely. It is not surprising that until recently corruption research has been largely descriptive rather than empirical. The problem researchers have confronted when studying corruption is that given its *sub rosa* nature, it is an extremely difficult phenomenon to measure. Over the years, different approaches have been taken to solve this problem, each with its own limitations.

The early efforts were based on the criminology approach of using official police and court records. One could simply count the number of arrests and convictions for corruption in a given country. The main difficulty with such an approach, of course, is the problem of the spuriousness of the measure; the more vigilant the authorities, the more arrests and convictions, completely independent of the corruption rate itself. Thus, in highly corrupt countries there may be virtually no enforcement, while in "squeaky clean" countries there may be frequent arrests and convictions for even minor infractions. For the most part, this approach has been abandoned.

In order to overcome the measurement problem inherent in using official records, two newer approaches have been taken, each with its own serious limitations, however. The first (already cited) is that carried out by Transparency International (TI) with its annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI). TI is an international coalition that promotes integrity in government world-wide. The TI effort has expanded over the years, including more countries and a wider range of data sources, including perceptions of nationals and expatriates. But the primary difficulty of this

index is that it is grounded, as its title states, in *perception* of corruption rather than the fact of it. This is a problem of which TI is well aware, and has resulted in their extensive efforts to improve the quality of the measure. In recent years, multiple measures and multi-year averages have been used, thus hopefully increasing the reliability of the measure.<sup>12</sup> In spite of all of its limitations, the CPI remains the most widely used measure of corruption in use today, akin to the Freedom House measure of democracy. Most economists rely upon it when they examine the impact of corruption on growth and investment.

The second recent approach, designed to go beyond perception and to get more directly at experience with corrupt practices, is the World Bank's "Private Sector Survey."<sup>13</sup> This survey was carried out in 1996 and 1997 in sixty-nine countries by sending questionnaires to 3,685 firms. The study, while helpful in many ways, still confronts a number of serious problems. First, the response rate was about 30 percent, leaving open the possibility that selection bias may have resulted in a tendency for more honest firms to have responded in the more corrupt countries whereas in less corrupt countries a wider cross section may have responded. A further problem with the World Bank approach was that, among the firms that did respond, the more corrupt ones certainly had more to hide than the less corrupt, resulting in potentially serious under reporting of corruption among the more

corrupt firms.<sup>14</sup>

Another even more recent approach to the measurement of corruption moves in an entirely different direction and runs into a new set of problems. The study of Japan by Pharr discussed in Appendix B uses newspaper reports of corruption as the independent variable. She recognizes that changes in corruption levels revealed by this measure may reflect changes in the actual level of corruption, or may be entirely a reflection of variation in the reporting of corruption. She argues, however, that this important distinction is not relevant for her analysis, but indeed it is, so much so that the conclusions of the research are largely undermined. Her argument is flawed for two reasons. First, she states "A given report of misconduct is a fact, a data point, in that it records a specific occurrence in which a public official is accused of wrongdoing" (Pharr<sup>15</sup>). In reality, however, the accusation may be entirely the invention of the newspaper itself, whose motivations for making the accusation may vary from a desire to increase circulation to an effort to weaken one party or candidate and strengthen another. By no means can we take the report as a "fact" in Japan, and we should have even less confidence in newspaper reports in much of the developing world where newspapers often range from irresponsible to largely government controlled. Journalists are often poorly trained, standards of ethics are largely non-existent and fact

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<sup>12</sup>These efforts are explained in detail in the TI web cite. The specific document that presents the methodological issues is: [www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/cpi\\_framework.html](http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/cpi_framework.html).

<sup>13</sup>For details see World Bank, *World Development Report*. World Bank, 1997. *World Development Report, 1997*. Washington, D.C. : Oxford University Press, pp. 174-175.

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<sup>14</sup>See the analysis of the impact of corruption on growth and investment, *World Development Report*. World Bank, 1997, Washington, D. C.: Oxford University Press, pp. 102-103.

<sup>15</sup>Susan J. Pharr, 2000. "Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies." In *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* ed. Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.194.

verification uncommon. Second, whatever the quality of the reporting of corruption in the press, all we can say if we find that trust in government declines when reports of corruption increase is that the media influences public opinion. We cannot say that corruption itself causes any changes whatsoever in public attitudes toward the state. Thus, in countries in which the press makes a habit of inventing stories of government scandals, and in which we find low confidence in the political system, our concern as social scientists should be with the quality of journalism and the corruption of journalistic standards rather than with public corruption.

An entirely different approach has been taken in the survey research field. This effort has been inspired by crime victimization surveys that have become the mainstay of sociological investigation into crime. Criminologists have long recognized that official reports of crime are highly unreliable because of the heavy degree of political manipulation of the data. Police chiefs who want new police cruisers from their local governments have major incentives to justify the request by the claim that a new crime wave has hit the town. It may be that the police chief has told his/her officers to become especially aggressive when enforcing the law, or it may be that the figures themselves have been "cooked." Alternatively, politicians who are seeking credit for success in crime fighting have incentives to see reports of fewer crimes, and salary raises for the police force might be contingent upon less aggressive policing. In order to overcome these intractable problems, criminologists have increasingly come to rely upon victimization surveys, which are widely regarded as providing a more accurate tally of crime rates.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup>Homicide rates, however, are used as reliable indicators of one form of extreme crime.

Internationally, this approach has been spearheaded by the United Nations Center for International Crime Prevention (Newman<sup>17</sup>). Implemented in 1987, the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) now includes 55 countries, with samples of between 1,000 and 2,000 respondents per country. In 1996, for the first time, a single question was included in the surveys on bribe victimization. While a broader series of questions is most certainly to be preferred, at least this source of data does not suffer from the biases and limitations inherent in the TI and World Bank private sector approaches. The United Nations effort does not ask about perception of corruption, but actual citizen experience with public corruption. While it cannot tap into high-level corruption (bribes of ministers and legislators), it does very effectively measure citizen exposure to (rather than perception of) day-to-day corruption. Recently, the World Bank has been following this approach and has begun conducting studies of corruption at the level of the citizen. A review of the approach used by the Bank has been presented as a conference paper (Kaufmann<sup>18</sup>). One such study, for example, has been carried out in Nicaragua.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>Graeme Newman, ed., 1999. *United Nations, Global Report on Crime and Justice*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp.27-28.

<sup>18</sup>Daniel Kaufmann, 1998. "Corruption Diagnostics: A New Technocratic Framework for the Analysis of Corruption and Its Implications for the Design of Action Programs." Miami Anti-Corruption Summit. Miami, Florida, April 2-4.

<sup>19</sup>See Comité Nacional de Integridad and World Bank-CIET International. 1998. *Encuesta nacional sobre integridad y corrupción en la administración pública: Encuesta de hogares*. Managua.

## The Missing Evidence for the Corruption/Legitimacy Linkage

Typical of those who decry the negative effects of corruption is the World Bank,<sup>20</sup> which recently stated the thesis that “Corruption violates the public trust and corrodes social capital... Unchecked, the creeping accumulation of seemingly minor infractions can slowly erode political legitimacy....” Unfortunately, although the Bank presented substantial evidence that corruption negatively affects the economy, it provided no support whatsoever for the claims that minor corruption (or even major corruption) erodes political legitimacy, for while the Bank presented evidence on the level of the independent variable (i.e., corruption), it presented no corresponding evidence on the dependent variable (i.e., political legitimacy). A more recent World Bank study uses a multi-index measure of governance, including perceptions of corruption world-wide and finds that per capita incomes and illiteracy are lower and infant mortality is higher when governance is poor (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton<sup>21</sup>). Yet, once again, there is no linkage between corruption on the one hand and political legitimacy on the other.

Much of the empirical research decrying the negative impact of corruption on political legitimacy has used measures of corruption that are seriously flawed (such as the ones enumerated above). Virtually none of the prior work, moreover, has been able to make a direct link between corruption and its impact on legitimacy. The studies that use nation-wide aggregates for corruption and

political attitudes run into the immediate problem of the ecological fallacy. In the absence of individual-level information researchers have no way of knowing if high levels of national corruption (even assuming for the moment that the measurement is not seriously flawed) are responsible for national levels of citizen attitudes toward their political systems. For this reason, the studies reviewed above that use the TI measure of corruption as a predictor and national aggregates of satisfaction with the performance of democracy as the dependent variable, are subject to questions of spuriousness. Indeed, a study by Lipset (see Appendix B) found that once controls were introduced for GNP, the purported relationship disappeared.

In order to test the hypothesis that corruption undermines political legitimacy, we need data at the level of the individual. Corruption surveys, though embryonic, appear to be the most promising of the efforts undertaken to date. Such surveys give us evidence at the level of the individual of his/her experience with day-to-day corruption. Unfortunately, most of those surveys thus far, while providing information on experience with corruption at the level of the individual, give us no information on the dependent variable (i.e., belief in legitimacy of the political system).

A way to overcome these limitations is to obtain corruption experience data at the level of the individual via survey research, as was done in the Honduras survey of 2001, while simultaneously obtaining information from those same individuals on their belief in the legitimacy of their government. The analytical task, then, becomes searching for the connections between corruption experience on the one hand and legitimacy beliefs on the other. Appropriate control variables and direction of causality questions need to be addressed, but can be with this approach. In this chapter, this is the approach taken.

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<sup>20</sup>World Bank, 1997. *World Development Report, 1997*. Washington, D. C.: Oxford University Press, pp. 102-104.

<sup>21</sup>Daniel Kaufmann, Arat Kraay and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton. 1999. *Governance Matters*. Policy Research Working Paper, no. 2196. Washington, D. C.: World Bank.

## Testing the Impact of Corruption on Legitimacy

Latin America in general, and Honduras in particular, where currently there is extensive attention focused on corruption (Tulchin and Espach<sup>22</sup>), is a good place to test the hypothesized linkage between corruption and legitimacy for two reasons. First, this is a region of the world long and widely believed to suffer from high levels of corruption. It is suggestive that only one Latin American country, Chile, scores in the top twenty of the least corrupt countries, ranking 19 out of 99 in the 1999 data set.<sup>23</sup> Costa Rica ties with Malaysia at 32. The remaining countries in the region score at 40 or worse.<sup>24</sup> Honduras ranked 94 out of 99 countries in the 1999 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. No country in Latin America scored lower. Second, Latin America has long had problems of political stability, suffering an endless succession of coups through much of its history. If, as Easton<sup>25</sup> and Lipset<sup>26</sup> have argued, legitimacy is a fundamental requisite for democratic

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<sup>22</sup>Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach., eds., 2000. *Combating Corruption in Latin America*. Washington, D. C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

<sup>23</sup>The TI index for 1999 included 139 countries, but since there are several ties in the ranking, the ranks range only from 1 to 99.

<sup>24</sup>This information is taken from the TI web cite at: [www.transparency.org/documents/cpi/index.html](http://www.transparency.org/documents/cpi/index.html).

<sup>25</sup>David Easton, 1975. "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support." *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (October), pp.435-57.

<sup>26</sup>Seymour Martin Lipset, 1994. "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited." *American Sociological Review* 59 (February), pp.1-22.

stability, then it is plausible that legitimacy is questionable in many Latin American countries. From an empirical point of view, considerable evidence exists to show that legitimacy levels remain low in many countries in the region, despite ten or more years of democratic rule (Seligson<sup>27</sup>).

## Measuring the Variables

Corruption is measured as in prior chapters, using an overall index of corruption experience, both personal and vicarious. Since that measure was described in prior chapters, that discussion will not be repeated here.

Legitimacy, or system support, is measured by a scale of diffuse support attempting to tap into confidence in the key institutions of government (Klingmann<sup>28</sup>; Norris<sup>29</sup>). The scale is based on five items (B1, B2, B3, B4, B6), each scored on a metric of 1 (a great deal) to 7 (not at all). The items, initially developed in studies of Germany and the United States, and refined in several studies of Latin America, sought to tap into generalized support for the basic institutions of government rather than support for the incumbent regime (Finkel, Muller


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<sup>27</sup>Mitchell A. Seligson, 2000. "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America." *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11(2), pp. 5-29.

<sup>28</sup>Hans-Dieter Klingmann, 1999. "Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis." In *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*, ed. Pippa Norris. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<sup>29</sup>Pippa Norris, 1999. "Institutional Explanations for Political Support." In *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*, ed. Pippa Norris. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.221-222.

and Seligson<sup>30</sup>; Seligson and Muller<sup>31</sup>). Respondents were asked the following questions.<sup>32</sup>



The numbering system used in the questionnaire as well as in the data base is reproduced here to enable the interested reader to further explore the data. The questions were as follows:<sup>33</sup>

- B1. To what extent do you believe that the courts in Honduras guarantee a fair trial?
- B2. To what extent do you have respect for the political institutions of Honduras?
- B3. To what extent do you think that the basic rights of citizens are well protected by the Honduran political system?
- B4. To what extent do you feel proud to live under the political system of Honduras?
- B6. To what extent do you feel that one ought to support the political system of Honduras?

In order make the range of responses for these items consistent with the range of the corruption experience measure, they were summed into an overall scale and transformed into a 0-100 basis. The overall scale was found to be statistically reliable (Standardized item Alpha = .80).

<sup>30</sup>Steven Finkel, Edward Muller, and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1989. "Economic Crisis, Incumbent Performance and Regime Support: A Comparison of Longitudinal Data from West Germany and Costa Rica." *British Journal of Political Science* 19 (July), pp.329-351.

<sup>31</sup>Mitchell A. Seligson and Edward N. Muller, 1987. "Democratic Stability and Economic Crisis: Costa Rica 1978-1983." *International Studies Quarterly* 31 (September), pp.301-326.

<sup>32</sup>The item in the original support scale, B3, did not associate well with the corruption items in some of the countries. In Bolivia, however, this item worked as expected. In order to maintain uniformity across all four countries, the police item, which is directly relevant to the corruption issue, was substituted.

<sup>33</sup>There is no question B5 in this study. Earlier versions of the PSA series included additional items, including B5, but that item (and others) were dropped as they were shown to be less essential to measuring

the basic concept. To retain consistency of comparisons with prior work, the original numbering system was retained in this study for this series and all others presented in these pages.

## Results

In order to determine if corruption victimization has an impact on system support, it is necessary to control for other factors that have sometimes been found to impact system support. These include sex, age, education, income, wealth and urbanization. In addition, it is important to control for the impact of party identification since, as noted in a prior chapter of this study, it may be that those who voted for the opposition party would report more corruption than those who voted for the incumbent party. Table V.1 shows the results. Statistical significance is shown in the last column, and the row in bold indicates a significant relationship. As can be seen, the only variable that made a significant contribution to the explanation of system support is the index of corruption victimization.

Table V.1. Predictors of System Support

	Unstandardized Coefficients	B Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	53.270	3.069		17.356	.000
SEXO Sex	-.424	1.010	-.009	-.419	.675
ED Education	.203	.169	.032	1.202	.230
EDAD Age	-.044	.037	-.027	-1.189	.235
Q10 Monthly household income	-.201	.275	-.019	-.733	.464
WEALTH	4.828	3.208	.042	1.505	.132
URBCNT Percent of municipal population in urban areas	-1.197	1.872	-.015	-.639	.523
VB4R Party identification	-1.834	.997	-.040	-1.840	.066
<b>TOTVIC Total index of corruption victimization</b>	<b>-.180</b>	<b>.030</b>	<b>-.137</b>	<b>-5.970</b>	<b>.000</b>

R<sup>2</sup> = .04

Since the total index of corruption victimization contains both direct personal experience with corruption as well as vicarious experiences, it is important to determine if these vicarious experiences were somehow influenced themselves by system support, such that those with low system support were more likely to report knowing of or observing corruption than those with high support. This hypothesis can be tested by focusing on the direct personal experience of corruption alone, as is done in Table V.2. As can be seen, corruption remains the only significant predictor of system support, thereby demonstrating that even when indirect experiences are eliminated corruption remains a significant predictor of reduced system support.

Table V.2. Predictors of System Support, Using Direct Personal Experience with Corruption

	Unstandardized Coefficients	B Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	52.842	3.068		17.223	.000
SEXO Sex	.037	1.007	.001	.037	.970
ED Education	.143	.167	.023	.856	.392
EDAD Age	-.039	.037	-.024	-1.058	.290
Q10 Monthly household income	-.285	.274	-.027	-1.043	.297
WEALTH	3.886	3.198	.034	1.215	.224
URBCNT Percent of municipal population in urban areas	-1.305	1.872	-.016	-.697	.486
VB4R Party identification	-1.890	.996	-.041	-1.897	.058
<b>EXCTOTR Personal victim of corruption</b>	<b>-.145</b>	<b>.034</b>	<b>-.095</b>	<b>-4.276</b>	<b>.000</b>

R<sup>2</sup> = .012, sig. < .001

Since we have examined direct personal experiences with corruption, it is useful to also examine the indirect experiences, including observing and hearing about corrupt practices. These results are presented in Table V.3. The same findings emerge; corruption, even indirectly experienced, reduces system support.

Table V.3 Predictors of Corruption, Including Vicarious Experiences with It

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	52.697	3.064		17.198.000	
SEXO Sex	-.311	1.006	-.007	-.309.757	
ED Education	.224	.169	.035	1.322.186	
EDAD Age	-.037	.037	-.023	-1.010.313	
Q10 Monthly household income	-.207	.274	-.020	-.755.450	
WEALTH	4.393	3.200	.038	1.373.170	
URBCNT Percent of municipal population in urban areas	-1.468	1.870	-.018	-.785.433	
VB4R Party identification	-1.826	.995	-.040	-1.835.067	
<b>VEXCTOTR Heard/saw corrupt act</b>	<b>-.114</b>	<b>.021</b>	<b>-.125</b>	<b>-5.489.000</b>	

R<sup>2</sup> = .02; sig. < .001

These results can be summarized and shown graphically (Figure V.1). Those who have suffered greater corruption victimization exhibit far lower system support than those who have not.




Figure V.1: Impact of corruption on system support

## Chapter VI. Democracy and Corruption

### Belief in Democracy

It has been shown that corruption victimization reduces support for the political system. Does it also have an impact on support for democracy? Political scientists have been making extensive efforts to measure support for democracy among the citizens of countries throughout the developing world. Democracy, as is well known, is a complex phenomenon, involving not just a single attribute but a complex series of characteristics including, among others, a robust civil society; active citizen participation; competitive, free, and fair elections; the rule of law; and respect for human and civil rights. The list could go on, and serious researchers attempt to include most of them in their efforts at measurement.


In light of the complexity of the phenomenon of democracy, is it possible to use a single survey question to capture citizen support or opposition? Probably not, yet one survey question, used repeatedly in many studies, has at least attempted to do so. That item (D22 in the Honduras survey) reads as follows:

With which of the following sentences are you most in agreement?

1. Democracy is preferable to any other form of government.
2. Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government is preferable to a democratic one.
3. A democratic regime or a non-democratic regime makes no difference to me.

The clearest evidence that corruption affects support for democracy is shown in Figure VI.1. As we can see, Hondurans who selected the “democracy” option or the “authoritarianism”

option were nearly equally likely to have been victimized by corruption, whichever of our three main indexes we examine. The key evidence, however, is that those who selected the option “don’t care which,” that is, they were indifferent to regime type, were far more likely to have been corruption victims. This finding suggests that corruption victimization impacts individuals by making them become disenchanted with politics, not caring how their system is run. In other words, being a victim of corruption in Honduras sharply increases the probability of political alienation.



**Figure VI.1:** Regime type preference and corruption

## Social Capital

Since the publication of Putnam's book on Italy,<sup>34</sup> social scientists have revitalized the study of social capital that was first made popular by DeToqueville. A central element in that research program has been the study of interpersonal trust. Trust is seen as forming an integral part of a cultural syndrome that stimulates individual political activation and mobilization, thereby increasing the overall accountability of the political system as well as its inclusiveness. The argument is that the more trustful citizens are, the more inclined they will be to become involved in voluntary collective associations. This increase in political participation in turn is seen as leading to stronger support for democratic regimes. In short, no trust, no participation, and no participation, no democracy.

Social capital theory, and the more specific notion of political culture, are very similar in their definitions of the direction of the relationship between values and the nature of the political system. Both agree that practices of everyday life and social norms are fundamental to encouraging participation and involvement with public issues. Social norms predominant in society orient the patterns of interaction that will affect individuals' perceptions about their role in the larger political system. If the values mentioned by these two approaches were to be listed, trust, tolerance, life satisfaction, and public attentiveness, would necessarily be part of the roster. Of these values, interpersonal trust has been one of the most relied upon to ascertain the accuracy of this entire theoretical framework.

Generalized trust produces a level of

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
<sup>34</sup>Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NNJ.: Princeton University Press, 1993).

behavior predictability and a sense of reciprocity that is presumed to create individual incentives to engage in public issues. The absence of trust among citizens is in the core of a "subordinate political culture" and hinders the formation of social capital (Almond and Verba, 1981; Putnam, 1993). This leads to situations such as that of amoral familism described by Banfield (1956), typical of southern Italy. Trust, in such case, is restricted to the immediate personal level, that of the extended family, and does not extrapolate to individuals further afield. The aggregate consequence of this motivational pattern is a weak civil society, unable to either confront the state or to produce benefits for the community. The vicious cycle of low trust is completed with the deep entrenchment of views that individuals are incapable of affecting the political system, that the state must be seen as the only provider of social welfare, and that the established order cannot and should not be challenged. In other words, lack of interpersonal trust is the cradle of an authoritarian political culture.<sup>35</sup>

Can corruption erode trust? There is strong evidence from the Honduras survey that it does. Figure VI.2 shows the results. We see that all three measures of corruption are clearly associated with trust; the higher the level of corruption victimization, the lower the trust. Moreover, since it is impossible to believe that victims of corrupt practices are selected on the basis of their level of trust, we have to assume that the causal arrows run from corruption victimization to trust and not the other way around.

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<sup>35</sup>For recent efforts to improve the measurement of interpersonal trust see Mitchell A. Seligson and Lucio Renno, "Mensurando Confiança Interperssoal: Notas Acerca de Um Conceito Multidimensional," *Dados? Revista de Ciências Sociais* 43, no. 4 (2000): 783-803.



**Figure VI.2:** Impact of corruption on interpersonal trust


### Support for the Rule of Law

There is also strong evidence in the survey that corruption victimization erodes support for the rule of law. Increasingly, researchers on democracy have viewed support for the rule of law as an essential ingredient in its long-term stability. Consider the case of Guatemala, in which vigilante justice has become a way of life in that country. Since 1996 the United Nations has documented over 600 public “lynchings.” Does corruption victimization erode support for the rule of law? Some questions in the survey suggest that it does.<sup>36</sup>

We asked our respondents (D43) “Which kind of a president would you prefer more? One who tries to solve problems via laws approved by

<sup>36</sup>For a discussion of lynchings in Guatemala see Mitchell A. Seligson, "Democracy on Ice: The Multiple Paradoxes of Guatemala's Peace Process," *Advances and Setbacks in the Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America* (University of Notre Dame Kellogg Institute, April, 2001).

the Congress, even though this takes a long time or, one who tried to solve problems rapidly, going around Congress if this were necessary?” Figure VI.3 shows the results. As can be seen, higher corruption victimization respondents are significantly more likely to prefer presidential problem-solving that bypasses the legislature and solves problems rapidly. In Honduras, this typically means through presidential decrees, which only serve to strengthen presidential dominance and weaken representative government. This suggests that corruption victims are less likely to support democratic due process than those who have not been victimized.




**Figure VI.3** Preference for type of president and corruption victimization

There is considerable further evidence that the rule of law is weakened by high levels of corruption. The survey contained a series of questions directly focused on the rule of law (items ROL4, 6, 7 and 10). We examine these items here.


The first item (ROL4) asked, “How much do you believe that politicians respect the laws?” A lot, a little or not at all? Figure VI.4 shows the results. As can be seen, the higher the level of corruption victimization, the less likely it is that respondents

believe that politicians respect laws. Comparing the two extremes, “respect a lot” with “not at all,” the corruption victimization index increases by 100%. These results suggest that corruption victimization makes Hondurans less trusting in the honesty of their public officials.




**Figure VI.4** Belief that politicians respect laws and the impact of corruption

We next asked about representation, and associated that with corruption victimization. Question ROL6 asked: “In your opinion, the deputy from your department represents your interests in Congress very well, a little, or not at all?” Figure VI.5 shows the results. While the differences are not significant between those who say “a lot” versus those who say “a little,” the big difference emerges in those who are most negative and say that the deputy does not represent them “at all.” Those respondents are far more likely to have been victims of corruption than those who responded less negatively.




**Figure VI.5:** How does department deputy represent your interests, and the impact of corruption

The next question has a different format. It asks the respondent what they believe is the main interest of politicians in power: the development of Honduras; helping the poor; helping the rich, or helping themselves? Before presenting the results as linked to corruption, it is of interest to see how the population divides up on this question. Figure VI.6 shows the results for the sample as a whole. As can be seen, most Hondurans are very cynical on this issue, with over 80% of them saying that politicians are out to help themselves or the rich.



**Figure VI.6** What is the main interest of politicians in power?


With this concentration of answers on the negative end of the continuum, we would not expect corruption victimization to have a significant impact, but it does, as is shown in Figure VI.7. Respondents who picked the two responses of “helping themselves” and “helping the rich” are significantly more likely to have been corruption victims than were those who were not victims.



**Figure VI.7:** What is the main interest of the politicians in power and the impact of corruption


The next question in this series asks about the efficiency of the judicial system. We asked (ROL10): “How efficient would you say is the judiciary? That is, that the courts are well equipped (with facilities, staff and financing) and provide rapid and competent service? Would you say that the courts are very efficient, somewhat efficient, very inefficient or not at all efficient?”

Let us first look at the overall distribution of responses. Figure VI.8 shows the results. Here we see a much more even spread of responses than in the last question. Only 12.1% of respondents say that the judiciary is not at all efficient, while most respondents select the middle category.




**Figure VI.8:** How efficient is the judiciary?

Now, we examine the links between corruption victimization and belief in the efficiency of the judiciary. Figure VI.9 shows the results. The relationship is significant but not completely monotonic. Nonetheless, the pattern is clear: those with low levels of victimization are more likely to believe that the judiciary is efficient than those who have experienced more victimization.



**Figure VI.9:** Belief in the efficiency of the judiciary and corruption victimization


A second series on the rule of law and democracy items was a bit different. Question AOJ1 asked, “How would you say you would be treated when you have to deal with the police? Very well, well, or badly.” An allowed response to this item was “never had dealings with the police.” This option accounted for 46% of all responses and therefore the results on this question are based on the remaining non-missing data. The results are shown in Figure VI.10. As can be seen, there is a direct, significant relationship. Respondents who have the highest levels of corruption victimization are those who expect the worst treatment by the police.



**Figure VI.10:** Expected treatment by police and victimization by corruption


A related item deals with expected treatment in the judiciary. As in the prior question on the police, respondents were able to state that they had no prior contact with the judicial system, and 56% of them answered this way. For the remainder, the relationship between expected treatment by the judiciary and corruption victimization is also statistically significant (sig. = .006), but the pattern is not monotonic and is not shown here.

We also asked (AOJ3) if, in order to capture criminals, the authorities could act outside the bounds of law or should they obey the law. On this question non-response is low, and Hondurans almost evenly divided in their views, as is shown in Figure VI.11.



**Figure VI.11:** To capture criminals, should authorities obey the law or can they act outside of it?


Figure VI.12 shows that those who selected the “outside of the bounds of law” response were more likely to have experienced a high level of corruption than those who responded that the authorities need to obey the law.




**Figure VI.12:** Impact of corruption victimization on belief that authorities should obey the law

### Local Government Participation

We included some items in the survey to measure knowledge and participation in local government. Figure VI.13 shows the results of a question (TR3) in which we asked about knowledge of the open town meetings, or *cabildos abiertos*. As can be seen, nearly one-half of the respondents said that they had knowledge of these meetings.




**Figure VI.13** Do you know what a “cabildo abierto” is?



**Figure VI.14** Have you attended a “cabildo abierto” in last year?

Knowledge of these town meetings and attendance are two different things. Figure VI.14 shows the results of a question (TRCb) in which we asked about participation in them. As can be seen, fewer than one in five Hondurans has done so.

We also asked about the perception of the management of municipal finances. Figure VI.15 shows the results. As can be seen, only about one in ten believes that they are being well managed.




**Figure VI.15** How well are municipal finances managed?

## Chapter VII. Benchmarks for a Media Campaign

Public awareness is a powerful tool in combating corruption. As the public becomes more aware of corrupt practices and can be persuaded not to tolerate them, the more the effective any effort to reduce corruption will be. In this chapter we examine the ways in which Hondurans obtain their information about public affairs, and determine how this information is spread differentially throughout the population.

### Attention to Radio as a Source of News

Radio has long been a major source of news in Latin America, and before the days of widespread availability of TV it was the major source. As shown in Figure VII.1, radio continues to be an important source of news for nearly three-quarters of the population.



**Figure VII.1:** Are you accustomed to listening to a radio news program?


Radio news listening is nearly ubiquitous; there are few demographic or socio-economic differences that separate Hondurans. This finding suggests that radio might be a good medium to transmit an anti-corruption campaign. Table VII.1 shows the multiple regression results. Only two variables (in bold) separate Hondurans in terms of radio news listening: older Hondurans listen more than younger and urban Hondurans listen less than rural.

Table VII.1. Predictors of Radio News Listening

	Unstandardized Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta	
(Constant)	.688	.051	13.540	.000
SEXO Sex	-.032	.017	-.036	1.828
<b>EDAD Age</b>	<b>.002</b>	<b>.001</b>	<b>.064</b>	<b>3.128</b>
ED Education	.003	.003	.029	1.201
Q10 Monthly household income	.001	.005	.006	.255
WEALTH	-.001	.056	.000	-.015
DPTO Department	.002	.002	.022	1.083
<b>URBCNT Percent of municipal population in urban areas</b>	<b>-.071</b>	<b>.033</b>	<b>-.046</b>	<b>2.161</b>


Adj.R<sup>2</sup> = .008, sig. = .004

The pattern of radio news listening by age is shown in Figure VII.2. It is notable that the pattern is not linear, as the regression above might suggest. Rather, it takes on the form of an inverted “U,” with listening to radio news lower among the young and the old, peaking at the middle ages. Nonetheless, it is important not to exaggerate the impact of age on radio news listening since even among the youngest age cohort, those 18-25 years of age, three-fifths of Hondurans regularly listen to radio news.



**Figure VII.2:** Radio news listening by age


As noted above, urbanization also affects listenership to news on the radio. Figure VII.3 shows the pattern, not by urban/rural ratio, but by the generally recognized political divisions of Honduras. We observe two things. First, radio news listening declines somewhat in the metropolitan area of San Pedro Sula. Second, it is higher in rural areas.



**Figure VII.3:** Radio news listening by location of interview


## Attention to TV as a Source of News

We live in a world dominated by TV, and even in Honduras, a poor country by any standard, TV is widespread. Yet, TVs are far from ubiquitous in Honduras according to our national sample data. Figure VII.4 shows the sample results.



**Figure VII.4:** Do you have a color TV in your house?

Watching TV news (Figure VII.5) is less common than is radio news listening.



**Figure VII.5:** Do you usually watch a TV news program?

## Predictors of TV News Viewing

TV viewing is less ubiquitous than radio listening. Table VII.2 shows the predictors of TV viewing.

Table VII.2. Predictors of TV News Viewing

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
(Constant)	.096	.048			1.996	.046
SEXO Sex	.024	.016	.025		1.480	.139
EDAD Age	-.001	.001	-.021		-1.177	.239
ED Education	.004	.003	.028		1.379	.168
<b>Q10 Monthly household income</b>	<b>.014</b>	<b>.004</b>	<b>.064</b>		<b>3.188</b>	<b>.001</b>
<b>WEALTH</b>	<b>1.063</b>	<b>.053</b>	<b>.435</b>		<b>20.051</b>	<b>.000</b>
<b>DPTO</b>	<b>-.003</b>	<b>.002</b>	<b>-.037</b>		<b>-2.163</b>	<b>.031</b>
<b>URBCNT</b>	<b>.189</b>	<b>.031</b>	<b>.109</b>		<b>6.061</b>	<b>.000</b>
<b>Percent of municipal population in urban areas</b>						

Adj. R<sup>2</sup>= .29; Sig. < .001

This model explains a considerable portion of the variance in TV news viewing. We see that gender, age and education are irrelevant to determining who watches TV news and who does not. But household income, wealth, department of residence and urbanization are all significant predictors.

By far the strongest factor influencing TV news watching is wealth (note the high t value). But even with wealth controlled for, monthly income also explains viewing. Thus, those who are wealthier and who have higher incomes are more likely to watch TV news than those who are poorer with lower incomes. In addition, more urban Hondurans (who also have greater access to electricity and, no doubt cable and better TV reception) view more TV news. In addition, there

are significant differences by department of residence, as described below.

The impact of income on TV news viewing is clearly shown in Figure VII.6. While only 30-40% of those in the poorest income brackets view TV news, about 90% in the highest income brackets do. Since, as shown earlier in this study, the wealthier are more likely to be corruption victims, this finding clearly suggests that media campaigns conducted by TV will have their largest audience among those who are the most frequent victims.






Figure VII.6: TV news viewing and income

Departmental variation is also significant. Figure VII.7 shows the results. Most departments hover around the national average, but Francisco Morazán and Cortés stand out far above the others on the high end, and Gracias a Dios and Intibucá on the low end. These results are not surprising, given that the two high-end departments contain the national capital, Tegucigalpa, and the second largest city, San Pedro Sula. These departmental variations need to be taken into account in any awareness campaign.



**Figure VII.7:** Watch TV news: Confidence intervals by sample




**Figure VII.8:** TV news programs regularly watched

### Variations in TV News Programs Viewed

The survey also asked respondents who do watch TV news which programs they watched. Figure VII.8 shows the results, excluding all of those who do not regularly watch TV news. The dominant station, with over one-third of the viewing share is Channel 5, “Telenoticias,” followed closely by Channel 7, “Abriendo Brecha,” and “CNN” and Canal 3, “Hoy Mismo” distant third and fourth. The remaining channels are each watched by fewer than 5% of Hondurans.

### Attention to Newspapers as a Source of News

Newspapers are widespread in Honduras, and many Hondurans read them, though readership falls below TV news. Figure VII.9 shows the results.



**Figure VII.9:** Newspaper readership

The factors that differentiate Hondurans on newspaper readership are shown in Table VII.3. By far the single most important factor in newspaper readership is education, with more highly educated Hondurans far more likely to read newspapers than the less-well educated (Figure VII.10). For example, for each one year increase in education, newspaper readership increases by 3.5%. Household wealth and income also play a role, with greater wealth and income both predicting to higher newspaper readership. Finally, greater urbanization translates into greater newspaper readership. Once these differences are controlled for, there is no significant difference in readership by department.

Table VII.3. Predictors of Newspaper Readership

	Unstandardized Coefficients	BStd. Error	Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
(Constant)	.169	.052		3.230	.001
SEXO Sex	-.024	.018	-.024	-1.346	.178
EDAD Age	-.001	.001	-.039	-2.061	.039
<b>ED Education</b>	<b>.035</b>	<b>.003</b>	<b>.248</b>	<b>11.572</b>	<b>.000</b>
<b>Q10 Monthly household income</b>	<b>.010</b>	<b>.005</b>	<b>.044</b>	<b>2.049</b>	<b>.041</b>
<b>WEALTH</b>	<b>.430</b>	<b>.056</b>	<b>.175</b>	<b>7.679</b>	<b>.000</b>
DPTO Departamento	.000	.002	-.001	-.064	.949
<b>URBCNT Percent of municipal population in urban areas</b>	<b>.134</b>	<b>.037</b>	<b>.070</b>	<b>3.603</b>	<b>.000</b>

Ad. R<sup>2</sup>= .18; Sig. < .001




Figure VII.10: The impact of education on newspaper readership

We also asked our respondents to name the newspaper they read most frequently. Figure VII.11 shows the results. It is clear that *La Prensa* is by far the most widely read newspaper, followed by *El Heraldo* and *La Tribuna* as distant second and third place newspapers. Any campaign directed at sensitizing Hondurans to the issues of transparency and anti-corruption would need to take these findings into consideration.




Figure VII.11: Newspapers read in Honduras

### Media and Victimization

Is it possible that the media make people more aware of corruption and therefore are more likely to report it in surveys? We see some evidence of this in the Honduras data set. In Table VII.3 the regression results are presented using personal victimization as the dependent variable and the three key media exposure questions (radio, TV and newspapers) as predictors. We include the standard control variables (gender, age, education, income, wealth and urbanization) to eliminate the impact that those variables have on victimization. What we see is that radio and TV exposure have no impact, but reading newspapers does; those who read newspapers are more likely to report being victims of corruption than those who do not. This may mean that newspaper readers are especially vulnerable to corruption, but it is difficult to imagine why that would be the case. Far more likely is that reading newspapers sensitizes individuals to corruption and makes them more willing to report it on surveys.

Table VII.4. Impact of the Media on Personal Victimization Reporting

	Unstandardized Coefficients	Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
(Constant)	6.080	1.686		3.606	.000
A1R Listen to radio news	-0.006	.007	-.018	-.886	.376
A2R Watch TV news	0.012	.007	.038	1.599	.110
<b>A3R Read newspaper</b>	<b>0.022</b>	<b>.007</b>	<b>.073</b>	<b>3.304</b>	<b>.001</b>
<b>SEXO Sex</b>	<b>-3.073</b>	<b>.594</b>	<b>-.101</b>	<b>-5.178</b>	<b>.000</b>
ED Education	.156	.100	.038	1.557	.120
EDAD Age	-0.049	.022	-.047	-2.247	.025
Q10 Monthly household income	.306	.160	.045	1.908	.057
<b>WEALTH</b>	<b>7.555</b>	<b>2.080</b>	<b>.100</b>	<b>3.632</b>	<b>.000</b>
URBCNT Percent of municipal population in urban areas	1.289	1.126	.024	1.144	.253

### Awareness of the Corruption Problem

Hondurans, like the citizens of most societies, are confronted by numerous problems. In a country as poor as Honduras, one would expect that economic problems would be of foremost concern. We asked Hondurans to name the most important problem that confronts their country in an open-ended question in which no list was read to them (A4). The results appear in Table VII.5. As can be seen, poverty dominates the list of concerns, and when added to the “cost of living” and “unemployment,” these economic concerns total 63.4% of the responses of all Hondurans in the sample who answered this question. Yet, corruption is listed in third place (if the economic concerns are summed) behind crime.

Table VII.5 What is the most important problem that the country faces?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Poverty	1072	35.7	37.8	37.8
Crime	680	22.7	24.0	61.7
Cost of living	367	12.2	12.9	74.7
Unemployment	361	12.0	12.7	87.4
Corruption	156	5.2	5.5	92.9
Drugs	62	2.1	2.2	95.1
Impact of Mitch	47	1.6	1.7	96.7
Potable water	37	1.2	1.3	98
Environment	21	.7	.7	98.8
Roads	12	.4	.4	99.2
Education	9	.3	.3	99.5
Migration	4	.1	.1	99.7
Health	4	.1	.1	99.8
No problems	3	.1	.1	99.9
Housing	3	.1	.1	100
Total	2839	94.6	100.0	
Don't know	161	5.4		
	3000	100.0		




Figure VII.12 Have you heard of social audit programs?

### Factors Explaining Awareness of Anti-Corruption Programs

Honduras is just beginning its efforts at anti-corruption. In this survey we wanted to determine how aware Hondurans are of these efforts, and related key government anti-corruption institutions. We also wanted to know the impact of media exposure to these programs and institutions.

One widely discussed anti-corruption tool has been the so-called “social audit” programs, or “fiscalización ciudadana.” We asked our respondents if they had heard of these programs (TR7a). Figure VII.12 shows the results. As can be seen, about one-quarter of the sample had heard of them.

What factors distinguish between those who had heard of the social audits and those who had not? Are these entirely socio-economic, or do they relate to media exposure, and if they do, to which media? Table VII.6 shows the multiple regression results to answer this question. The results are very interesting. We see that gender and age make no difference in awareness of the social audit programs, nor does income or wealth. The only personal characteristic that makes a difference is education, with those who are more highly educated having a somewhat higher awareness of the programs. The more urban the respondent, the lower the awareness of the social audit programs, but again, the association is not strong (but it is significant). Department of residence makes no difference, after all other factors are controlled for. Media news attention, however, is a much stronger predictor, with both radio news listening and newspaper reading significantly associated. By far, radio news listening is the most important predictor of knowledge of social audit programs. TV news watching has no significant impact. This finding can help guide awareness campaigns. But, what is perhaps the most important finding is that victims of corruption are significantly more aware of social audit programs than non-victims, suggesting that

being a victim sensitizes respondents to these efforts to control corruption. This means that corruption victims might be an especially attentive group for any anti-corruption campaign.

Table VII.6. Predictors of Knowledge of Social Audit Programs

	Unstandardized Coefficients	BStd. Error	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	2.035	.052		38.808	.000
SEXO Sex	-0.006	.017	-0.006	-0.318	.750
EDAD Age	0.001	.001	0.024	1.165	.244
<b>ED Education</b>	<b>0.009</b>	<b>.003</b>	<b>0.073</b>	<b>2.946</b>	<b>.003</b>
Q10 Monthly household income	0.007	.005	0.036	1.541	.123
WEALTH	0.089	0.06	0.041	1.483	.138
<b>URBCNT Percent of municipal population in urban areas</b>	<b>-0.073</b>	<b>.033</b>	<b>-0.048</b>	<b>-2.222</b>	<b>.026</b>
DPTO Departamento	0.003	.002	0.032	1.58	.114
<b>A1 Do you usually listen to any news on the radio?</b>	<b>0.091</b>	<b>.020</b>	<b>0.093</b>	<b>4.576</b>	<b>.000</b>
A2 ¿Do you usually watch the news on TV?	0.025	0.021	0.028	1.156	.248
<b>A3 ¿Do you usually read any Newspaper?</b>	<b>0.054</b>	<b>.020</b>	<b>0.061</b>	<b>2.747</b>	<b>.006</b>
<b>VEXCTOTR Heard/saw</b>	<b>0.002</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>0.129</b>	<b>5.592</b>	<b>.000</b>
<b>EXCTOTR Personal victim</b>	<b>0.002</b>	<b>.001</b>	<b>0.086</b>	<b>3.815</b>	<b>.000</b>

Adj. R<sup>2</sup>= .09; Sig. < .001

This question on social audits was followed up by one on participation in such programs, but only 4.8% of the population had done so, so further analysis of that question will not be carried out.

We also asked (TR5) if the respondent knew of the functions of the Comptroller General? Figure VII.13 shows the results. As can be seen, fewer than one in five respondents said that they did.




Figure VII.13: Do you know what are the functions of the Comptroller General?

We explored the factors that explain awareness or lack thereof of the functions of the Comptroller General's office. Table VII.7 shows the results, which are rather different from the prior ones. Here we see that those respondents who are older or who have higher levels of education are the most likely to be aware of these functions. Indeed, education is a very powerful predictor; for each increase in one year of education, knowledge of the functions of the Comptroller increases by 3%. Attention to the news media, however, when controlled for these other factors, makes no impact on knowledge. But, what does count is being a victim of corruption. Once again we see that corruption victims are significantly more likely to have knowledge of the functions of Comptroller General than those who were not victims.

Table VII.7. Predictors of Knowing Functions of Comp

	Unstandardized Coefficients	BStd. Error	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	-26.132	4.598		-5.683	.000
SEXO Sex	-2.599	1.513	-.033	-1.718	.086
<b>EDAD Age</b>	<b>.370</b>	<b>.055</b>	<b>.136</b>	<b>6.753</b>	<b>.000</b>
<b>ED Education</b>	<b>3.303</b>	<b>.252</b>	<b>.315</b>	<b>13.131</b>	<b>.000</b>
Q10 Monthly household income	.764	.406	.043	1.882	.060
WEALTH	8.699	5.221	.045	1.666	.096
URBCNT Percent of municipal population in urban areas	-1.754	2.838	-.013	-.618	.537
DPTO Departamento	.124	.148	.016	.835	.404
<b>A1 Do you usually listen to any news on the radio?</b>	<b>2.989</b>	<b>1.739</b>	<b>.034</b>	<b>1.719</b>	<b>.086</b>
A2 Do you usually watch the News on TV?	2.101	1.857	.026	1.131	.258
<b>A3 Do you usually read any Newspaper?</b>	<b>.941</b>	<b>1.699</b>	<b>.012</b>	<b>.554</b>	<b>.580</b>
VEXCTOTR Heard/saw	.189	.034	.124	5.567	.000
<b>EXCTOTR Personal victim</b>	<b>.160</b>	<b>.056</b>	<b>.062</b>	<b>2.870</b>	<b>.004</b>

Adj. R<sup>2</sup> = .19; Sig. < .001

We followed up this question with one asking about the specific functions of the Comptroller. A total of 83% of the respondents did not respond, either because they had answered “no” or did not respond to the previous question. Of those who did respond, Figure VII.14 shows the results. As can be seen, most respondents believed that the main purposes is to inform people about what happens in public administration.




Figure VII.14: What is the main function of the Comptroller?

The next question (TR6), asked about the functions of the Secretariat, or Ministry of Finance. Figure VII.15 shows the results. As can be seen, only one in five report that they know.





Figure VII.15: Do you know what are the functions of the Ministry of Finance?

Of those who say that know what these functions are, they were read a list of functions. Figure VII.16 shows which ones of these respondents thought were the main ones. Most respondents believe that it has mainly a budget preparation or accounting function.



**Figure VII.16** What is the main function of the Ministry of Finance?

## Conclusions

This chapter has presented information on the media attentiveness of the Honduran mass public. It has shown that the radio is the most common source of news, and listening to radio news increases knowledge of social audit programs (when controlled for other relevant factors). It has also shown that those who have been victims of corruption are more aware of social audits, and the functions of the Comptroller General and the Ministry of Finance. Finally, the chapter has shown which specific TV and newspapers the Honduran public watches/reads the most. All of this data could help in the design of a public awareness campaign.

## Appendix A: Questionnaire in English

### “Good Government: 2001” Survey Political Culture Project of the University of Pittsburgh

Identification Number [assigned in the office] _____	ID	_ _ _ _ _ _ _
Department _____	DPTO	_ _ _
Municipality _____	MUNI	_ _ _
Precinct: _____	JRV	_ _ _ _ _ _ _
Area: 1. Tegucigalpa 2. Distrito metro de Tegucigalpa 3. San Pedro Sula 4. Distrito metro de SPS 5. Otra ciudad grande 6. Cabecera departamental 6. Cabecera de municipio 7. Área rural	AREA	

Hour and Minute of Start: \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_  
(Hour) (Minute)

Mr(s): The University of Pittsburgh is conducting a survey in Central America to learn the opinions of citizens regarding different aspects of the national situation and the process of reconstruction. You have been selected at random to be interviewed and we would like to ask for your cooperation. Your responses will be confidential and we do not ask for your name. We are interested in your perception as part of the general public opinion.

<b>NOTE:</b> Gender: 1. Male 2. Female	SEXO	
To start, do you usually listen to news on the radio? 0. No. 1. Yes 8. DK/NR	A1	
Do you usually listen to news on the Television? 0. No [Skip to A3] 1. Yes 8. DK/NR	A2	
Which news program do you watch the most? 1. Channel 3, “Hoy Mismo” 2. Channel 5, “Telenoticias”; “TVC-5” 3. Channel 7, “ Abriendo Brecha” 5. Channel 9, “VICA Noticias”; “Contacto Directo” 6. Channel 11, “TV11” “Ajedrez Informativo” 7. Channel 13, “Noticias 13” 9. Channel 45, “Así se Informa” 10. Channel 54, “Noticiero 54” 11. Channel 63, “Noticias 63”; “Desayuno 63” 12. Cable, “CNN” 88= DK 99= INAP (does not watch news)	A2A	_ _ _
Do you usually read a newspaper? 0. No [Skip to A4] 1. Yes 8. DK/NR	A3	
Which Newspaper?	A3A	

El Heraldo 2. La Tribuna 3. La Prensa 4. El Tiempo 5. Tiempos de Mundo 6. Honduras This Week 8=DK; 9=INAP (doesn't read newspaper)		
--	--	--

In your opinion, what is the most pressing problem facing the nation? <b>(Do not read list)</b> 1. Unemployment 2. Inflation, high prices 3. Poverty 4. Crime 6. Drugs 7. The impact of Mitch 11. Corruption 12. The environment 50. No problems 88. Don't know Others: _____		<input type="text"/>
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How much did Mitch affect your community? Did it affect it a lot, some, very little, or nothing? 1. a lot 2. some 3. very little 4. nothing <b>[Skip to MITCH4A]</b> 8. DK	TCH1	
What damages did Mitch cause in your community? [read each one] Destroyed roads? 1. Yes 2. No 8. DK	TCH2A	
Destroyed bridges? 1. Yes 2. No 8. DK	TCH2B	
Destroyed houses 1. Yes 2. No 8. DK	TCH2C	
Destroyed fields 1. Yes 2. No 8. DK	TCH2D	
Destroyed schools 1. Yes 2. No 8. DK	TCH2E	
Destroyed river basin 1. Yes 2. No 8. DK	TCH2F	
Destroyed drainages 1. Yes 2. No 8. DK	TCH2G	
How many deaths approximately did Mitch cause in your community _____ deaths 888. DK	TCH3	<input type="text"/>
What projects have been done in your community/village for the reconstruction after Mitch? Read list:  Roads? 1. Yes, it has been done 2. No it has not been done 8. DK	TCH4A	
Bridges? 1. Yes, it has been done 2. No it has not been done 8. DK	TCH4B	
Health Centers? 1. Yes, it has been done 2. No it has not been done 8. DK	TCH4C	
Schools? 1. Yes, it has been done 2. No it has not been done 8. DK	TCH4D	
Houses? 1. Yes, it has been done 2. No it has not been done 8. DK	TCH4	
Potable water systems? 1. Yes, it has been done 2. No it has not been done 8. DK	TCH4F	
Small business loans 1. Yes, it has been done 2. No it has not been done 8. DK	TCH4H	
Vocational education 1. Yes, it has been done 2. No it has not been done 8. DK	TCH4I	

Reforestation DK	1. Yes, it has been done 2. No it has not been done 8.	TCH4J	
Do you think the reconstruction work has been:	1. completely satisfactory 2. somewhat satisfactory 3. somewhat unsatisfactory 4. completely unsatisfactory 8. DK	TCH6	
Who has contributed the most to the reconstruction after Mitch? The central government, municipal government, NGOs, or foreign donors?	1. central government 2. municipal government 3. NGOs 4. foreigners 8. DK	TCH7	
Do you think that in general the funds for the reconstruction after Mitch have been used to help the people affected, or some has been stolen or the majority has been stolen?	1. help affected people[Skip to MITCH11] 2. some stolen 3. majority stolen 8. DK	TCH8	

Who stole it? DO NOT READ LIST Make note _____	1. The President 2. The government 3. Ministers 4. Mayors 5. Private sector 6. NGOs 7. María Foundation 10. The military 11. The Congress 88. DK	TCH9	
Thinking about the national and international funds that were assigned for the reconstruction after Mitch. Do you think that the government acted with a lot of honesty, some honesty, little honesty or no honesty?	1. a lot of honesty 2. some honesty 3. little honesty 4. no honesty 8. DK	TCH10	

**Hand Card "A" to Interviewee**

Now we are going to use this card

This card contains a scale with 7 levels; each level represents a point that goes from 1-NOTHING to 7- that means A LOT. For example, if I were to ask you how much you enjoy watching TV, if you do not like to watch TV at all, you would choose the number 1, on the other hand if you like watching TV a lot, you would choose the number 7. If your opinion was between nothing and a lot, you would choose a number in the middle. So, to what extent do you like to watch TV, read the number. (MAKE SURE THAT THE PERSON UNDERSTANDS)

**NOTHING 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT**

Now, using card A please answer the following questions

To what extent do you think that the courts guarantee a just trial? DK=8	B1	
To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Honduras? DK=8	B2	
To what extent do you think citizen's basic rights are well protected by the political system of Honduras? DK=8	B3	
To what extent are you proud of living under the Honduran political system? DK=8	B4	
To what extent do you think the Honduran political system should be supported? DK=8	B6	
To what extent do you have confidence in the National Election Tribunal? DK=8	B11	
To what extent do you have confidence in the army? DK=8	B12	
To what extent do you have confidence in the National Congress? DK=8	B13	
To what extent do you have confidence in the government? DK=8	B14	
To what extent do you have confidence in the Comptroller General? DK=8	B15	
To what extent do you have confidence in the Minister of Finance? 8 = DK	B15A	
To what extent do you have confidence in the Human Rights Commission? 8 = DK	B15B	
To what extent do you have confidence in the Attorney General 8 = DK	B15C	

To what extent do you have confidence in the police? DK=8	B18	
To what extent do you have confidence in the churches? DK=8	B20	
To what extent do you have confidence in newspapers? DK=8	B21A	
To what extent do you have confidence in the news on TV? DK=8	B21B	
To what extent do you have confidence in the news on radio? DK = 8	B21C	
To what extent do you have confidence in your municipal government? DK=8	B22	
To what extent do you have confidence in nongovernmental organizations, NGOs (that is civic associations)? 8 = DK	B25	
To what extent do you have confidence in trade unions? DK=8	B23	

To what extent do you have confidence in politicians? DK=8 <b>PICKUP CARD "A"</b>	B24	
---	-----	--

**Hand Card "B" to interviewee**

Now we are going to change cards. This new card contains a scale of 10 levels, which goes from 1 to 10, with 1 meaning you firmly disapprove and 10 meaning you firmly approve. The next questions are intended to find out the various ideas that the Honduran people have. Please, use the card with 10 levels to answer.

**FIRMLY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 FIRMLY**  
**DISAPPROVE APPROVE**

There are persons who only criticize the Honduran form of government. How firmly do you approve or disapprove of the right to vote of those persons? DK = 8	D1	_   _
Always thinking of those persons that criticize the Honduran form of government, how firmly do you approve or disapprove that these persons can carry out a peaceful demonstration with the purpose of expressing their point of view? DK = 8	D2	_   _
How firmly do you approve or disapprove, that those persons who only criticize the Honduran form of government be permitted to run for office?	D3	_   _
Always thinking of those persons that criticize the Honduran form of government, How firmly do you approve or disapprove that they make a speech on television? <b>Pickup Card B</b>	D4	_   _

In the press they talk a lot about corruption. Do you think that what they say is almost always true, sometimes true, or almost never true? 1. almost always 2. sometimes 3. almost never 8. DK	D5	
--	----	--

Have you participated in a public meeting organized by your municipal government in the last 12 months? 1. Yes 2. No 8. DK	TR3B	
What is your opinion of the way that municipal funds are handled? 1. Well 2. Regular 3. Bad 8. DK/NR	TR3A	
Do you know the functions of the Comptroller General? 1. Yes [Skip con TR5A] 2. No. [Skip to TR6] 8. DK/NR [Skip to TR6]	TR5	
In your judgment, what are the principal functions of the Comptroller? <b>[read list]</b> 1. Put people in jail 2. Do a technical job 3. Do a political job 4. Provide information as to what happens in the public administration	TR5A	

DK = 8 Inap=9		
Do you know what are the functions of the Ministry of Finance? 1. Yes 2. No [Skip to DC1] 8. DK/NR	TR6	
In your judgment, what are the principal functions of the ministry? <b>[read list]</b> 1. Elaborate the national budget 2. Administer agricultural credit 3. Administer government accounts 4. Negotiate the budget with Congress 5. Collect taxes 8.DK 9. Inap	TR6A	

Many things happen in life. I am going to mention some of them. I would like you to indicate how you would judge the following acts as 1) corrupt and should be punished; 2) corrupt but justified under the circumstances; 3) not corrupt.		
For example, a congressman accepts a bribe of ten thousand dollars paid by a business. Do you think the congressman is: 1) corrupt and should be punished 2) corrupt but justified 3) not corrupt DK=8	DC1	
And what do you think of the business that paid the bribe? In your opinion this act is? 1) corrupt and should be punished 2) corrupt but justified 3) not corrupt DK=8	DC2	
And to which of the following entities (or organizations) would you feel most comfortable denouncing the bribe? 1) police 2) Judge 3) Press 4) Church 5) Human Rights Commission 6) Government 7) Mayor 8) NGOs Other: _____ 88. DK	DC2A	
A primary school student gives his teacher a shirt with the hope of getting a better grade. In your opinion the student is: 1) corrupt and should be punished 2) corrupt but justified. 3) not corrupt DK=8	DC5	
And the teacher who accepted the gift, in your opinion she is: 1) corrupt and should be punished 2) corrupt but justified. 3) not corrupt DK=8	DC6	
A public employee uses a government car that is only for official business to take his family to the beach to celebrate Easter. In your opinion, the employee is: 1) corrupt and should be punished 2) corrupt but justified 3) not corrupt DK=8	DC7	
Someone sees the government car on the beach. This person does not report this to the police. In your opinion, this person is also 1) corrupt and should be punished	DC8	

2) corrupt but justified 3) not corrupt DK=8		
The mayor of a municipality, without permission of the city council members, lends the city tractor to a group of neighbors for the purpose of building a baseball field. Do you think the mayor is: 1) corrupt and should be punished 2) corrupt but justified 3) not corrupt DK=8	DC9	
A mother with a number of children needs to get a birth certificate for one of them. In order not to wait, she pays the city employee 20 Lempiras more than needed. Do you think she is: 1) corrupt and should be punished 2) corrupt but justified 3) not corrupt DK=8	DC10	

And the city employee that accepted the tip is: 1) corrupt and should be punished 2) corrupt but justified 3) not corrupt DK=8	DC11	
During Christmas, a small store raises the price of candy. Do you think the owner is: 1) corrupt and should be punished 2) corrupt and justified 3) not corrupt DK=8	DC12	
A unemployed person is the bother-in-law of an important politician, the latter uses his influence to get him a job. Do you think the politician is: 1) corrupt and should be punished 2) corrupt and justified 3) not corrupt DK=8	DC13	

What does transparency mean to you? DK = 88 NOTE ANSWER _____ _____ _____	PUB3	
By transparency, we mean allowing the public and the media access to information that allows for scrutiny of public institutions. Do you think that the following institutions are highly transparent, somewhat transparent, or little transparent? The Presidency? 1. Highly transparent 2. Somewhat transparent 3. Little transparent 8. DK	PUB6	
The municipal government? 1. Highly transparent 2. Somewhat transparent 3. Little transparent 8. DK	PUB7	
The National Congress? 1. Highly transparent 2. Somewhat transparent 3. Little transparent 8. DK	PUB8	

The Comptroller General? 1. Highly transparent 2. Somewhat transparent 3. Little transparent 8. DK	PUB9	
The ministries? 1. Highly transparent 2. Somewhat transparent 3. Little transparent 8. DK	PUB10	
The state-owned enterprises? (ENEE, INA, HONDUTEL etc.) 1. Highly transparent 2. Somewhat transparent 3. Little transparent 8. DK	PUB11	
The police? 1. Highly transparent 2. Somewhat transparent 3. Little transparent 8. DK	PUB12	
The armed forces? 1. Highly transparent 2. Somewhat transparent 3. Little transparent 8. DK	PUB13	
The Attorney General? 1. Highly transparent 2. Somewhat transparent 3. Little transparent 8. DK	PUB14	
The Human Rights Commission? 1. Highly transparent 2. Somewhat transparent 3. Little transparent 8. DK	PUB15	
In the last 12 months, the attention paid by the press to the management of public funds has: 1. Improved 2. Stayed the same 3. Worsen 8. DK	PUB16	

Now we want to talk about your personal experience with some things that happen in daily life..

Have you been stopped by a police in the last 12 months for an infraction you did not commit? 0. No. [Skip to EXC4] 1. Yes [skip to EXC2] 8. DK/NR [skip to EXC4]	EXC1	
Did the police ask for a bribe? 0. No [Skip to EXC4]. 1. Yes 8. DK/NR 9. Doesn't apply	EXC2	
Did you pay the bribe 0. No. 1. Yes 8. DK/NR 9. Doesn't apply	EXC3	
Have you seen anyone in the last 12 months pay a bribe to a policeman? 0. No. 1. Yes 8. DK/NR	EXC4	
Do you know of someone who has paid a bribe to a public employee in exchange for some favor? 0. No. 1. Yes 8. DK/NR	EXC5	
Has a public employee asked you for a bribe in the last 12 months? 0. No. 1. Yes 8. DK/NR	EXC6	
Thinking about your own experience or what you have heard, do you think the payment of bribes to public employees is 1. Very common 2. Common 3. Little common 4. Not common 8. DK/NR	EXC7	
Do you think that paying bribes facilitates doing business in the public administration? 0. No 1. Yes 8. DK/NR	EXC8	
In order to obtain a loan or any other services at a bank in the last 12 months, have you had to pay money beyond what is correct? 0. No 1. Yes 8. DK/NR	EXC12	

In your job, have you been asked to make an improper payment in the last 12 months? 0. No 1. Yes 8. DK/NR	EXC13	
Have they asked you for a bribe in a court of law in the last 12 months? 0. No 1. Yes 8. DK/NR	EXC14A	
Do you know of anyone who has paid a bribe in a court of law? 0. No 1. Yes 8. DK/NR	EXC14	
Has some municipal employee solicited a bribe from you in the last 12 months? 0. No. 1. Yes 8. DK/NR	EXC15	
Have you been asked to pay a bribe at a communal bank? 0. No. 1. Yes 8. DK/NR	EXC16	
And now, have you ever denounced any act of corruption? 1. Yes [continue with WB44] 2. No. [Skip to PC1] 8. DK [Skip to PC1]	WB43	
Where did you make the complaint? <b>Don't read</b> 1. in the courts 2. police 3. media 4. Human Rights Commission 5. Comptroller General 6. municipality 88. DK 99. Inap  Other _____	WB44	_ _ _

**HAND CARD C TO THE INTERVIEWEE**

Now I am going to mention various public and private institutions. I would like to know to what extent you think the representative of these institutions are honest or corrupt. Using card C please indicate the number of the scale that best represents your point of view.

**Very Corrupt 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Very Honest DK=88**

To what extent would you say <b>congressmen</b> are honest or corrupt? DK=88	PC1	_ _ _
To what extent would you say <b>ministers</b> are honest or corrupt? DK=88	PC2	_ _ _
To what extent would you say <b>mayors</b> are honest or corrupt? DK=88	PC3	_ _ _
To what extent would you say <b>alderman</b> are honest or corrupt? DK=88	PC4	_ _ _
To what extent would you say <b>policemen</b> are honest or corrupt?	PC5	_ _ _
To what extent would you say <b>owners of retail stores</b> are honest or corrupt? DK=88	PC6	_ _ _
To what extent would you say <b>teachers</b> are honest or corrupt?	PC7	_ _ _
To what extent would you say <b>university professors</b> are honest or corrupt? DK=88	PC8	_ _ _
To what extent would you say <b>priests or pastors</b> are honest or corrupt? DK=88	PC9	_ _ _
To what extent would you say <b>leaders of business associations</b> are honest or corrupt? DK=88	PC11	_ _ _

To what extent would you say <b>businessmen</b> are honest or corrupt? DK=88	PC11A	_   _
To what extent would you say <b>judges</b> are honest or corrupt? DK=88	PC12	_   _
To what extent would you say <b>the military</b> are honest or corrupt? DK=88	PC13	_   _
To what extent would you say <b>political party leaders</b> are honest or corrupt? DK=88	PC14	_   _
To what extent would you say <b>leaders of NGOs</b> are honest or corrupt? DK=88	PC14A	_ _
To what extent would you say <b>banks</b> are honest or corrupt? DK=88	PC14B	_ _
To what extent would you say <b>customs employees</b> are honest or corrupt? DK=88 <b>PICKUP CARD C</b>	PC16	_   _
What is your opinion of people who illegally connect electricity from the ENEE? They should be: [Read list] 1. left alone 2. be denounced 3. be fined 4. be in prison            8. DK	PC23	_   _

Does corruption affect you or not? 0. No [Skip to IT1] 1. Yes [skip to CTRL1a] 8. DK/NR [Skip to IT1]	CTRL1	
(IF AFFIRMATIVE) In what way? <b>[Don't read]</b> 1. Bad public services Increase vice, hunger, and violence Increase insecurity Affects the creation of new jobs Higher taxes Affects the economy Public funds do not reach the public Other _____ 88. DK 99. Inap	CTRL1A	_ _  _

Speaking of people from here, would you say they are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, little trustworthy or not trustworthy? 1. Very 2. Somewhat 3. Little 4. Not 8. DK/NR	IT1	
Do you think that the majority of people worry only for themselves or do you think the majority of the time they try to help others? 1. Worries only for themselves 2. Try to help others 8. DK/NR	IT2	
Do you think that people would try to take advantage of you if the opportunity arises, or do you think that they would not take advantage? 1. Yes they would take advantage 2. No they would not take advantage 8. DK/NR	IT3	

Speaking of the last elections. Did you vote in the elections of 1997? 0. No[Skip to VB3] 1. Yes 8. DK/NR 9. Too young to vote	VB2	
For whom did you vote for president? [Do not read] 1. Carlos Flores (PL) 2. Nora de Melgar (PN) 3. The vote is secret Other: _____ 8. DK/NR 9. Inap [did not vote]	VB2A	
And in the next elections in November of this year, which party do you intend to vote for? 1. Partido Liberal Partido Nacional PINU Democracia Cristiana Unificación Democrática UD 8. DK o will not vote, vote is secret	VB3	
And, with which party do you identify the most 1. Partido Liberal 2. Partido Nacional 3. PINU 4. Democracia Cristiana 5. Unificación Democrática UD 6. None 8. DK, does not want to say	VB4	

Which factor do you think will be most important in deciding for whom to vote for president [read list] 1. The party 2. The government program 3. His honesty 8. DK	VB5	
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Which of the following phrases do you support the most? 1. Democracy is preferable to all other forms of government 2. In some circumstances an authoritarian government could be preferable to a democratic one. 3. It makes no difference whether we have a democratic or authoritarian government 8. DK	D2 2	
Of the governments I am going to describe, which is more democratic A system that guarantees a basic living standard? A system where decisions are made by the majority? 8. DK	D2 6	

<p>With which of the following statements are you most in agreement?</p> <p>1. What Honduras needs is a strong and determined man that can impose order with a strong hand, or</p> <p>2. What the country needs is a man who knows how to dialogue and compromise with all sectors of society.</p> <p>8. DK</p>	D3 9	
<p>With which of the following statements are you most in agreement?</p> <p>1. The only way of pushing the country ahead is by eliminating with a strong hand those that cause problems, or</p> <p>2. So the country can get ahead it is necessary to take into consideration everyone, including those who cause problems</p> <p>8. DK</p>	D4 0	
<p>With which of the following statements are you most in agreement?</p> <p>1. Human rights are more important than order and security, or</p> <p>2. Instead of human rights what the country needs is order and security</p> <p>8. DK</p>	D4 1	
<p>What type of government does this country need...?</p> <p>1. One that knows how to make the necessary decisions, with efficiency and speed even if it does not take into account all sectors, or</p> <p>2. One that takes into account all sectors even if it takes much longer to make decisions</p> <p>8. DK</p>	D4 2	
<p>What type of president of the Republic do you prefer?</p> <p>1. One that tries to solve problems through laws approved by Congress, even if this takes a long time, or</p> <p>2. One that tries to solve problems fast, avoiding Congress if necessary</p> <p>8. DK</p>	D4 3	
<p>Sometimes there are protests that cause difficulties because they close off the streets. In those instances, what should the government do?</p> <p>1. Negotiate with the protestors even if this takes several days or weeks, affecting the nation's economy, or</p> <p>2. Send the police to open the streets</p> <p>8. DK</p>	D4 4	
<p>When the situation in the country becomes difficult, which is the most important responsibility of government?</p> <p>1. Maintain order in society</p> <p>2. Respect individual liberty</p> <p>8. DK</p>	D4 6	
<p>In the next presidential elections, for which of the following governments would you vote for:</p> <p>1. A government that guarantees economic security and the possibility of a good income,</p> <p>2. A government that guarantees free elections, freedom of expression and the</p>	D4 7	



Robbery with physical threat or aggression Physical aggression without robbery Rape or sexual assault kidnapping (8) DK/NAOtro (especificque) _____ <b>VIC2</b>		
Crime # 2 _____ (use code from VIC2) <b>VIC3B</b>	VIC2A	
Crime # 3 _____ (use code from VIC2) <b>VIC3C</b>	VIC2B	
<b>[If they have been a victim]</b> Did you report the crime to any institution? Yes No 8. DK/NAOJ1	VIC5	
Speaking of the place or neighborhood where you live, and thinking about the possibility of becoming a victim of an assault or robbery, Do you feel very secure, somewhat secure, somewhat insecure, or very insecure? 1. very secure 2. somewhat secure 3. somewhat insecure 4. very insecure 8. DKAOJ11	AOJ6	

<b>How would you say they treat you in the police when you have to deal with them?</b> <b>1. Very well 2. well 3. bad 4. very bad 9. never did it 8. DKAOJ2</b>	AOJ1	
When you have to deal with the courts, how do they treat you? 1. very well 2. well 3. bad 4. very bad 9. never did it 8. DKAOJ3	AOJ2	
Do you think that in order to capture criminals: the authorities should always respect the laws or sometimes they can act outside the laws. 1. Respect 2. Act outside 8. DKAOJ8	AOJ3	
When there is serious suspicion about the criminal activities of an individual, Do you think that: we should wait for a judge to issue the appropriate order, or the police can enter the house without the need of a judicial order? (1) They should wait (2) The police can entert (8) DKAOJ9	AOJ4	
What do you think is best? To live in a society of order even if some rights are limited, or respect all the rights and freedoms, even if this causes some disorder? 1. Ordered society 2. Respect rights 8. DKAOJ10	AOJ5	

<b>How would you rate the job of the Flores government?</b> <b>1. excellent 2. good 3. regular 4. bad 5. very bad 8. DK</b>	<b>M1</b>	
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<b>Do you remember the name of the president of the United States</b> <b>[Clinton o Bush]</b> <b>0. Incorrect 1. Correct 8. DK/NR</b>	<b>G1a</b>	
<b>Do you remember the name of the president of El Salvador?</b> <b>[Francisco Flores]</b> <b>0. Incorrect 1. Correct 8. DK/NR</b>	<b>G1</b>	
<b>Do you remember the name of the president of Costa Rica?</b> <b>[Miguel Ángel Rodríguez]</b> <b>0. Incorrect 1. Correct 8. DK/NR</b>	<b>G12</b>	
<b>Do you know how many deputies are in the National Congress? [126]</b> 0. Incorrect (don't know) 1. Correct	G13	

What is your religion? 1. Catholic (practicing) 2. Catholic (not practicing) 3. Evangelical 4. Other (NOTE _____) 5. None	Q3	
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What was the last year of education you approved  - None : 0 - Basic: 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 => Primary - Intermediate: 7 - 8 - 9 => Middle School - High School: 10 - 11 y 12 => High School - Higher : 12 - 13 - 14 - 15 - 16 - 17 - 18 y más => Technical/University DK=88	ED	
What is your age? _____ años	EDAD	

Could you tell me if in your house (or farm) you have the following: [Read All]		
Color TV? 0. No. 1. One 2. Two 3. Three or more 8. DK/NR	R1	
Refrigerator? 0. No. 1. Yes 8. DK/NR	R3	
Telephone o celular? 0. No. 1. Yes 8. DK/NR	R4	
Car or truck? 0. No. 1. Yes 8. DK/NR	R5	
Washing machine? 0. No. 1. Yes 8. DK/NR	R6	
Microwave? 0. No. 1. Yes 8. DK/NR	R7	
Motorcycle? 0. No. 1. Yes 8. DK/NR	R8	
Tractor? 0. No. 1. Yes 8. DK/NR	R9	
Electricity 0. No. 1. Yes 8. DK/NR	R10	
Running water [pipes] 0. No. 1. Yes 8. DK/NR	R11	
Living room floor: 1. Dirt 2. Wood 3. Cemen, tile	R12	

Usually what is your occupation? [Use codes]	OCUP1	Código: _____
<b>Self employed</b>	<b>Full-time employee</b>	<b>Part-time workers or those not paid</b>
1. Owners of large or medium sized business	6. Top management of a business	12. Housewife
2. Owners of small businesses	7. Middle management of a business	13. Student
3. Land owners or tenants	8. Regular employee in the business	14. Retired
4. Ranchers who own their herds	9. Factory Worker	15. Short-term employment
5. independent professional (contractor)	10. Peasant	88. DK
	11. Merchant or artisan	99. Does not work

Only for land owners or tenants => how many manzanas (hectares) of land do you own or work? _____ (Use decimals if necessary).	OCUP2	_ _ _ _   _
--	-------	----------------

Have you been unemployed in the last year? 0. No [Skip to Q10] 1. Yes [skip to DESOC2] 8. DK	DESOC1	
(FOR THOSE THAT SAY YES) For how many weeks during the last year were you unemployed? _____ Weeks (01 = 1; 00= was not unemployed)	DESOC2	_ _   _ _

In which of the following ranks would you place the total monthly income of all the persons living in your home? (Use Card D)  1. Less than 300 lempiras 2. from 300-500 3. from 501-700 4. from 700-1.000 5. from 1.001-1.500 6. from 1.501-2.000 7. from 2.001-4.000 8. from 4.001-6.000 from 6.001-8,000 more than 8,000 88. DK/NR	Q10	
Are you? 1. Single 2. Married 3. Free Union 4. Divorced 5. Separated 6. Widowed 8. DK/NR	Q11	

Do you have children? How many? _____ [does not have = 0)	HIJOS	_ _ _
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Total time of the interview (see initial time)	TIEMP O	_ _ _ _   _ _ _ _
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I swear that I did this interview with person selected for that purpose:

\_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Reviewed by field supervisor \_\_\_\_\_

Signature of the person that entered the data \_\_\_\_\_

Signature of the person who verified the data \_\_\_\_\_

## Card A

<b>7 A LOT</b>
<b>6</b>
<b>5</b>
<b>4</b>
<b>3</b>
<b>2</b>
<b>1</b>
<b>NOTHING</b>

## Card B

<b>10 FIRMLY APPROVE</b>
<b>9</b>
<b>8</b>
<b>7</b>
<b>6</b>
<b>5</b>
<b>4</b>
<b>3</b>
<b>2</b>
<b>1 FIRMLY DISAPPROVE</b>

**Card C**

<b>10 VERY HONEST</b>
<b>9</b>
<b>8</b>
<b>7</b>
<b>6</b>
<b>5</b>
<b>4</b>
<b>3</b>
<b>2</b>
<b>1 VERY CORRUPT</b>

**Card D**

1. Less than 300lenpiras
2. from 300-500
3. from 501-700
4. from 700-1.000
5 . from 1.001-1.500
6. from 1.501-2.000
7. from 2.001-4.000
8. from 4.001-6.000
9. from 6.001-8,000
10. more than 8,000



## Appendix B: Literature Review on Corruption and Support for the Political System

### Corruption and Its Impacts<sup>37</sup>

Economists have long warned us about the pernicious impacts of corruption, arguing that it increases transaction costs, reduces investment incentives and, ultimately, results in reduced economic growth. Political scientists, ever the realists, have had a much more ambivalent view of the problem. The early tradition in political science was dominated by the functionalist school. As Huntington<sup>38</sup> argued in his famous writings on the subject: "...corruption provides immediate, specific, and concrete benefits to groups which might otherwise be thoroughly alienated from society. Corruption may thus be functional to the maintenance of a political system in the same way that reform is." This view represents a considerable body of writing by political scientists and sociologists, which views corruption in functionalist terms, especially in the developing world. More recently, however, now that democracies have emerged widely in the Third World, corruption has begun to be viewed quite differently, and is seen as a threat to consolidation of those regimes.

The evidence economists have gathered on the negative impact of corruption on investment and growth in developing nations is very strong. Political scientists, however, thus far have been far more anecdotal in their claims for the costs or

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<sup>37</sup>This material was first presented in Mitchell A. Seligson, *La Cultura Política de la Democracia en Bolivia: 2000* (La Paz, Bolivia: Universidad Católica Boliviana, 2001).

<sup>38</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

benefits of corruption in those nations. The apparently Janus-faced nature of corruption, it is shown in this chapter, at least in Honduras, is illusory. Corruption is not only bad for the economy, it is also bad for the polity as well. This chapter first briefly reviews the literature, and then tests the competing claims of the political effects of corruption using the survey data from Honduras, along with data from three other Latin American countries that rank high on international indices of corruption.

### Corruption as Economic Evil

Most economists who have studied corruption argue that it reduces investment and slows growth.<sup>39</sup> It does so for a variety of reasons. First, bribes are normally not reported by either party to the transaction, thus denying the treasury needed tax revenues. This tax loss is compounded because the bribe often serves to circumvent the reporting of a normal business transactions that otherwise would have produced tax consequences (e.g., construction permits, ad valorem taxes, sales taxes, import and export taxes, etc.). Second, public services become focused toward assisting those who pay bribes, denying those services to those who do not, thereby resulting in uneven and often inferior services to many. Third, bribes enable service providers (e.g., contractors for public infrastructure projects) to ignore established standards, offering substandard goods or services, from which the economy suffers (e.g., roads that deteriorate rapidly, hospitals that provide inferior treatment). Fourth, corruption weakens the rule of law and as a result makes transactions irrational from an economic point of view (e.g., contracts are

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<sup>39</sup>One exception is Nathaniel Leff. Nathaniel Leff, 1964. "Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption." *American Behavioral Scientist* 8 (November), pp.8-14.

not awarded to the highest quality, lowest cost bidder, but to the firm that pays the highest bribe).

In a large-scale cross-national study of the period 1982-1995 for over 100 countries carried out by the International Monetary Fund, Mauro<sup>40</sup> found that when corruption increases by two points on a ten-point scale, GDP decreases by half a percent and investment decreases by 4 percent. Furthermore, public investment suffers; expenditures on education decline by .5% for each two-point increase in corruption.<sup>41</sup> The World Bank<sup>42</sup>, also found, using a cross-national design, that among countries in which bribery was both high and unpredictable, the rate of investment was nearly half of what it was in low corruption countries. Corruption was also found to increase income inequality. According to Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme<sup>43</sup>, for example, corruption severely decreases income growth for the poor. Other studies come to virtually identical

conclusions (Ades and DiTella<sup>44</sup>; Mauro<sup>45</sup>). Yet another cross-national study, based on 69 countries, found that high levels of corruption encourage businesses to go underground, which denies the government of tax revenue, producing smaller, less effective government (Friedman, et al.<sup>46</sup>). In short, while not all agree that corruption is bad for the economy, there is a consensus that it is.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>40</sup>Paolo Mauro, 1997. *Why Worry About Corruption?* Economic Issues, vol. 6. Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund.

<sup>41</sup>The IMF argument is further elaborated by Tanzi and Davoodi. Vito Tanzi and Hamid Davoodi, 1998. *Roads to Nowhere: How Corruption in Public Investment Hurts Growth*. Economic Issues, vol. 12. Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund.

<sup>42</sup>World Bank, 1997. *World Development Report, 1997*. Washington, D. C.: Oxford University Press, pp. 102-104.

<sup>43</sup>Sanjeev Gupta, Hamid Davoodi, and Rosa Alonso-Terme, 1998. "Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?" IMF Working Papers 98/76. Washington, D. C.: International Monetary Fund.

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<sup>44</sup>Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella. 1996. "The Causes and Consequences of Corruption." *IDS Bulletin* 2 (1997), pp.6-10.

<sup>45</sup>Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 110(3); Paolo Mauro, 1997. "The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment and Government Expenditure: A Cross-Country Analysis." In *Corruption and the Global Economy*, ed. Kimberly Ann Elliot. Washington, D. C.: Institute for International Economics.

<sup>46</sup>Eric Friedman, et al. 2000. "Dodging the Grabbing Hand: The Determinants of Unofficial Activity in 69 Countries." *Journal of Public Economics* 77(3, June), pp.459-493.

<sup>47</sup>For a different view see Beck and Maher and Lien. J.P. Beck and M.W. Mahr, 1986. "A Comparison of Bribery and Bidding in Thin Markets." *Economic Letters* 20: 1-20 and D.D. Lien, 1986. "A Note on Competitive Bribery Games." *Economic Letters* 22: 337-431.

## Corruption as Political Good

If economists largely view corruption as “sand” in the gears of the economy, political scientists, drawing on the classic work of Robert Merton,<sup>48</sup> for many years largely viewed it as the “grease” that gets the bureaucracy moving in many developing countries. V.O. Key, one of the leaders in the early systematic study of politics, viewed corruption as necessary for politics itself. As he argued in his classic work on the politics of the southern states in the United States,

Quite apart from the levity with which corrupt-practices acts are regarded, literal adherence to some of the state laws would make a state-wide campaign almost impossible....The chances are about 99 to 1 that not a single serious race for state-wide office in any southern state (or any other state) during the past 20 years has been unaccompanied by perjury, morally if not legally, by the candidate or his managers in reports of campaign receipts or expenditures (Key<sup>49</sup>).

This work was followed by early studies in the developing world that saw positive political benefits to corruption (Abueva<sup>50</sup>; Bayley<sup>51</sup>; and

Nye<sup>52</sup>). But the classic statement is that of Huntington, who stood the economists’ perspective on its head; if the goal is to stimulate growth, corruption is a necessary evil. As he (Huntington<sup>53</sup>) argued: “In terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, over centralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over centralized honest bureaucracy.” Huntington was not alone in his view about the positive benefits of corruption. Other major studies followed (Waterbury<sup>54</sup>). In a classic collection of essays, Heidenheimer and his colleagues included many pieces that sung the praises of corruption (Heidenheimer, Johnston and LeVine<sup>55</sup>). For example, in a study that looks at Africa, one author asks, “What is the problem about corruption?” and answers by saying, “It is natural but wrong to assume that the results of corruption are always both bad and important (Leys<sup>56</sup>.” From this point

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<sup>52</sup>Joseph Nye, 1967. "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 61 (June), pp. 417-27.

<sup>53</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press, p.69.

<sup>54</sup>John Waterbury, 1973. "Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime." *World Politics* 25 (July), pp.533-55. John Waterbury, 1976. "Corruption, Political Stability, and Development: Comparative Evidence from Egypt and Morocco." *Government and Opposition* 11 (Autumn), pp. 426-45.

<sup>55</sup>Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston, and Victor T. LeVine, Eds. 1989. *Political Corruption: A Handbook*. New Brunswick: Transaction.

<sup>56</sup>Colin Leys, 1989. "What is the Problem About Corruption?" In *Political Corruption: A Handbook*, eds. Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnson and Victor T. LeVine. New Brunswick, NJ:

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<sup>48</sup>Robert K. Merton, 1957. *Social Theory and Social Structures*. New York: Free Press.

<sup>49</sup>V.O. Key Jr., 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. New York: Vintage Books, p. 481.

<sup>50</sup>José Abueva, 1966. "The Contribution of Nepotism, Spoils, and Graft to Political Development." *East-West Center Review* 1966, pp.45-54.

<sup>51</sup>David Bayley, 1967. "The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation." *Western Political Quarterly* 19 (December), pp.719-32.

of view, corruption serves the function of binding society together, something that is sorely needed in most developing nations. As Leys puts it: "the greater the corruption, the greater the harmony between corruptor and corupee (Leys<sup>57</sup>)."

This argument was made even more forcefully by a study on corruption in France. Bequart-Leclercq<sup>58</sup> states it clearly:

Corruption functions like grease in the gears; it has an important redistributive effect, it is a functional substitute for direct participation in power, it constitutes the cement between elites and parties, and it affects the effectiveness with which power is exercised.

Moreover, corruption is especially beneficial in nations with authoritarian traditions since "Corruption guarantees certain zones of freedom and of free movement in the face of the totalitarian tendencies inherent in states and political parties.... Political corruption has another important function, to redistribute public resources by parallel means accessible to groups that would otherwise be excluded" (Bequart-Leclercq<sup>59</sup>).

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Transaction, p.57.

<sup>57</sup>Colin Leys, 1989. "What is the Problem About Corruption?" In *Political Corruption: A Handbook*, eds. Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnson and Victor T. LeVine. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, p.54.

<sup>58</sup>Becquart-Leclercq. 1989. "Paradoxes of Political Corruption: A French View." In *Political Corruption: A Handbook*, eds. Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Victor T. LeVine Michael Johnston. New Brunswick, NJ, p. 192.

<sup>59</sup>Becquart-Leclercq. 1989. "Paradoxes of Political Corruption: A French View." In *Political*

In a similar vein, a study of corruption in Israel argues that corruption has positive economic as well as political effects. It encourages foreign investment by "bypassing cumbersome, genuinely hampering, governmental economic regulations" (Werner<sup>60</sup>). In the Israeli case, Werner argues that corruption has helped integrate immigrant groups into the larger culture, and also improves the quality of the bureaucracy by providing "supplemental income" that helps counteract the attractiveness of higher-paid private sector employment (Werner<sup>61</sup>).

Corruption is also central to the phenomenon of clientelism, which is also seen as a mechanism to bind citizens to elites. The classical work is that of Banfield in southern Italy (Banfield<sup>62</sup>). From this perspective, clientelism involves a clear-cut exchange relationship, in which personal favors are exchanged for political support, in the form of votes or contributions. Not all clientelism involves corrupt practices, but much

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*Corruption: A Handbook*, eds. Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Victor T. LeVine Michael Johnston. New Brunswick, NJ, p.193.

<sup>60</sup>Simcha B. Werner, 1989. "The Development of Political Corruption in Israel." In *Political Corruption: A Handbook*, eds. Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Victor T. LeVine Michael Johnston. New Brunswick, NJ, p.251.

<sup>61</sup>Simcha B. Werner 1989. "The Development of Political Corruption in Israel." In *Political Corruption: A Handbook*, eds. Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Victor T. LeVine Michael Johnston. New Brunswick, NJ, p.251.

<sup>62</sup>Edward Banfield, 1958. *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*. Chicago: The Free Press.

of it does (Etzioni-Halevy<sup>63</sup>; Johnston<sup>64</sup>). Clientelism, it has been noted however, can be a two-edged sword, increasing trust between patron and client, while decreasing trust for all others.

## Corruption as Political Evil

Recently, several prominent works have appeared that take strong issue with the benign view of corruption articulated by many political scientists in the past (Rose-Ackerman<sup>65</sup>). The rapid spread of democracy throughout the developing world is perhaps most directly responsible for this shift in perspective. While corruption may have had its positive functions under dictatorships, it is seen as being dysfunctional under democracy, especially as regards confidence in the political system.

Summarizing the findings of papers gathered in a recent edited volume, the editors argue that, "Countries in which petty corruption is pervasive must ... endure disablingly low levels of trust in public institutions, with all the extremely negative consequences for commitment to collective projects, civic behavior, levels of crime and public order" (Doig and Theobald<sup>66</sup>). Readers of the Doig and Theobald volume who are seeking empirical confirmation of their findings will be disappointed, however. The collection of studies, which covers Uganda, Hong Kong, Botswana and

Australia, is almost entirely descriptive, with little data and no statistical tests offered. The editors are not to be faulted, however, since an extensive review of the literature world-wide uncovers virtually no empirical support for the claims (Doig and McIvor<sup>67</sup>). One very recent, partial exception is a new study by Lipset and one of his students (Lipset and Salman Lenz<sup>68</sup>). The study is not focused directly on Huntington's emphasis on legitimacy, however, but rather on a related one, namely the impact of corruption on democracy, utilizing a large cross-national data set that incorporates a measure of democracy and a measure of corruption. Their data on corruption come from the Corruption Perception Index for 1998 compiled by Transparency International and their measure of democracy is the Freedom House index, averaged over the period 1972-1998. The findings are that although a strong bivariate relationship emerges, when controls for GNP per capita and other (unspecified) variables are introduced, the relationship becomes insignificant. These findings, while not speaking to the corruption/legitimacy nexus, do weaken support for the impact of corruption on the political system, since at least since the time of Huntington's observations on the functionality of corruption, it has been repeatedly found that developing countries have higher levels of corruption than advanced industrial countries. Therefore the failure of the relationship between trust and democracy to survive the introduction of a control for GNP greatly weakens our confidence in their conclusion that democracy is inversely associated with corruption. That study, therefore, not only does not

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<sup>63</sup>Eva Etzioni-Halevy, 1985. *Bureaucracy and Democracy*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

<sup>64</sup>Michael Johnston, 1979. "Patrons and Clients, Jobs and Machines." *American Political Science Review* 73 (June), pp.385-98.

<sup>65</sup>Susan Rose-Ackerman, 1999. *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>66</sup>Alan Doig and Robin Theobald, eds., 2000. *Corruption and Democratisation*. London: Frank Cass, p.6.

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<sup>67</sup>Alan Doig and Stephanie McIvor, 1999. "Corruption and Its Control in The Developmental Context: An Analysis and Selective Review of the Literature." *Third World Quarterly* 20(3, June).

<sup>68</sup>Seymour Martin Lipset, and Gabriel Salman Lenz, 2000. "Corruption, Culture and Markets." In *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*, ed. Lawrence J Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington. New York: Basic Books.

test the relationship between corruption and legitimacy, its own assertions that the study “broadly confirms” the linkage is refuted by their multivariate analysis (Lipset and Salman Lenz<sup>69</sup>).

The most recent evidence supporting the view that corruption leads to lowered legitimacy emerges in the collection edited by Pharr and Putnam<sup>70</sup>. In a chapter by Donnatella della Porta<sup>71</sup> looking at data from Europe, the author hypothesizes that corruption is both a cause and an effect of poor government performance, “thus reducing trust in the government’s capacity to address citizens’ demands....Lack of confidence in government actually favors corruption insofar as it transforms citizens into clients and bribers who look for private protection to gain access to decision-makers.” The evidence once again uses the Transparency International Perception Corruption Index and the Eurobarometer to obtain evidence on confidence in government. The results, focused on France, Germany and Italy for the period 1976-1995, support the hypothesis. Indeed, looking at all of the Eurobarometer cases as a group, the author finds an association between high levels of corruption and low satisfaction with democracy. In a related paper in that same volume

focused on Japan, Pharr<sup>72</sup> states: “This chapter demonstrates that in Japan, at least, officials’ misconduct has been by far the single best predictor at any given point in time of citizen confidence in government over the past two decades.” Pharr notes that this finding corresponds to that of Paige and Shapiro<sup>73</sup>, who found that in the United States public corruption (especially Watergate) brought about an abrupt and lasting change in public opinion. Several sources of data are used, but the main conclusions are based on a time-series regression that demonstrates that the number of articles on corruption in the main newspaper in Tokyo is the best predictor, over time, of dissatisfaction with politics.

In the Latin American region, Morris<sup>74</sup> carried out an extensive study of the causes and consequences of corruption in Mexico, a country which ranked 58<sup>th</sup> on the TI survey for 1999. Morris concludes that the positive role of corruption is limited to elites, who both pay and receive bribes as a regular way of conducting their affairs. When it comes to the mass public, however, he uses survey data to test the corruption/legitimacy linkage. The survey (a non-random sample of about 700 respondents) in three Mexican cities, did not ask about experience with

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<sup>69</sup>Seymour Martin Lipset and Gabriel Salman Lenz, 2000. "Corruption, Culture and Markets." In *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*, ed. Lawrence J Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington. New York: Basic Books, p.122.

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Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam, Eds, 2000. *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* Princeton: Princeton University

<sup>71</sup>Donatella della Porta, 2000. "Social Capital, Beliefs in Government, and Political Corruption." In *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* eds. Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.205.

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Susan J. Pharr, 2000. "Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies." In *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* ed. Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.173.

<sup>73</sup>Benjamin I Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, 1992. *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans; Policy Preferences*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp.337-38.

<sup>74</sup>Stephen D. Morris, 1991. *Corruption and Politics in Contemporary Mexico*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.

corruption, but only about the perception of the extent to which corruption is necessary to deal with the bureaucracy. The findings show a strong relationship between this perception and low trust in government, which is another (limited) way of defining legitimacy, but since the perception that bribes are needed may in fact be a function of the low evaluation of government in the first place, we really cannot be sure if corruption itself is responsible for the decline in trust in government.

A more recent study on corruption and system support, conducted in Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico, also examines perception of corruption rather than experience with it (Camp, Coleman and Davis<sup>75</sup>). In Asia Shin<sup>76</sup> has also studied corruption

for the South Korean case, but has focused on citizen perception of the corruption/honesty of public officials, rather than personal experience with corrupt practices.

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<sup>75</sup>Roderic Ai Camp, Kenneth M. Coleman, and Charles L. Davis, 2000. "Public Opinion About Corruption: An Exploratory Study in Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico." Annual Meeting of the World Association of Public Opinion Research. Portland, Oregon, May 17-18.

<sup>76</sup>Doh C. Shin, 1999. *Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.208-214.